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 NOUS, NOESIS AND NOETA 
The Transcendent Apriorist 
Tradition in Epistemology 
By Mark Robert Burgess 
Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
Glasgow University 
Department of Philosophy 
April 2002 With this comes what is known as the casting of wings, the enchaining in body: 
the Soul has lost that innocency of conducting the higher which it knew when it 
stood with the All-soul,  that earlier state to which all  its  interests would bid it 
hasten back. 
It has fallen:  it  is  at the chain:  debarred from expressing itself now through its 
intellectual phase, it  operates through sense; it is a captive; this is the burial, the 
encavernment, of  the Soul. 
But  in  spite  of all  it  has,  for  ever,  something  transcendent:  by  a  conversion 
towards the intellective act, it is loosed from the shackles and soars - when only it 
makes its memories the starting point of  a new vision of  essential being. 
[Plotinus 
1 
] ., 
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ABSTRACT 
There  is  perhaps  no  epistemological  theory  more  universally  rejected,  by  modem 
philosophers and commentators, than transcendent apriorism. In fact,  the notion that the 
pure human intellect, purged of  sensory contamination, can somehow transcend the limits 
of  all possible experience is now disdainfully regarded as an obsolete Platonic fantasy.  In 
the latter half of  the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant had vilified those who defended 
such extreme versions of  rationalism as, "dogmatic champions of supersensible reason". I 
Regrettably,  during  more  than two  centuries of philosophical inquiry,  this  derogatory 
attitude has hardened into an obstructive prejudice.
2 It is certain that the process has done 
much  to  impede,  truly  objective,  modem research into  transcendent  apriorism's  basic 
epistemology.  In  fact,  even  foundational  issues  relating  to  the  definition  and 
categorization of the theory have been neglected, or only superficially considered. As a 
result, numerous misleading "straw man" versions of  the doctrine have been promulgated, 
by  the  Logical  Positivists  and  others,  and  then very  enthusiastically  denigrated.  The 
consequent  defective  analysis  and  the  prejudice  that  engendered  it  have  seriously 
distorted  modem  appraisals  of the  theory's  epistemological  legitimacy_  Similarly, 
contemporary studies of  transcendent apriorism's philosophical history have been infected 
with damaging errors. This contamination is particularly transparent in the flawed theory 
of K.  Ajdukiewicz that "radical apriorism" had adherents "almost entirely among ancient 
thinkers" . 
3 
The  am of this  thesis  is  to  provide  a  new  and  comprehensive  analysis  of 
transcendent  apriorism  that  remedies  such  prevalent  misconceptions.  The  principle 
objective will  be  to  remove the encrusting layers of prejudice, error and confusion that 
blight  conventional epistemological and  historical treatments of the  subject.  Ultimately, 
this procedure will function to disclose the doctrine' s essential nature, its origins and the 
true course of  its historical development. In the light of  this analysis, we will be in a better 
position  to  determine  whether  extant  arguments  claiming  to  refute  or  undemline 
transcendent apriorism are legitimate or erroneous. The  methodology  used,  to  achieve  the  specified  ann,  will  attain  to  a  ne\\ 
objectivity  by  excluding  the  damaging  preconceptions  normally  associated  with 
transcendent  apriorism.  The  preliminary  stage  involves  an  unbiased  analysis  of Plato's 
familiar  and  largely  uncontroversial  version  of the  doctrine.  Categories  will  then  be 
established that differentiate the general theory from those epistemologies with which it is 
so  often confused.  In addition,  an original and much needed essential definition of the 
doctrine will be posited. The eradication of  definitional imprecision permits the question, 
whether transcendent apriorism originated with Parmenides, to be raised. The doctrine's 
epistemological elements  are  then deeply  analysed  in  relation to  variants  defended  by 
historical philosophers.  A  corrective  methodology operates throughout  the  thesis  that 
discloses  prejudice,  rectifies  error  and  eliminates  confusion.  The  progress  made  will 
prompt  (i)  an  attempt  to  solve  previously  intractable  problems  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  and  (ii)  a  re-appraisal  of the  extant  arguments  concerning  the  doctrine's 
legitimacy. 
The findings of  the analysis confirm the lamentable state of  modern research into 
transcendent  apriorism.  In  fact,  the  new  approach  has  completely  undermined  many 
putative certainties and rendered obsolete superficial contemporary debate. For instance, 
Christian Wolff is  often regarded as a paradigmatic transcendent apriorist, yet he  never 
ascribed to the epistemology. Plato is regularly considered to be the doctrine's originator, 
but this part is definitely played by Parmenides. In addition, there are newly discovered 
variants of  the doctrine that have previously gone totally unrecognised. In fact, A.  1. Ayer 
and  many  others  completely  overlooked  the  illuminative  tradition  of transcendent 
apriorism.  There are numerous discoveries of  this nature.  The most fruitful and original 
results, that stem from the doctrine's re-examination, occur in the new resolution given to 
several age-old historical  and epistemological problems. The  most interesting  outcome 
was the discovery that many arguments, relied upon to undermine or refute the doctrine, 
are unsound or have fundamentally missed their mark. 
The  significance of the  findings  is  undeniable.  Transcendent apriorism' s history 
and  epistemology  have  been  fundamentally  remoulded.  As  a  result.  during  an  age  in 
which empiricism enjoys an  almost  unrivalled predominance,  the  most  extreme form  of 
rationalism is resurrected with a demand for are-appraisal. Preface 
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PREFACE 
For many years, I have been interested in the traditional project of  building a transcendent 
metaphysical  system upon a  pure,  a  priori,  epistemological  foundation.  According  to 
Kant 
1
,  this extreme rationalist programme, to extend speculative knowledge beyond the 
limits of experience, was a natural but dangerously misleading disposition of the human 
mind. In contrast to this view, I have always regarded the cultivation of  this proclivity to 
be  a  legitimate  and  important aim of the  philosophical reason.  I therefore  agree  with 
Fichte  that  engaging  the  mind  in  pure  thought  represents  an  elevation  of human 
consciousness.
2  I would supplement this notion by endorsing the Platonist claim that the 
herementioned  elevation  affords  the  only  viable  route  to  transcendent  metaphysical 
knowledge.  Although  this  currently  unfashionable  perspective  influenced  the  general 
research concern of my thesis, the intention was never merely to  present an apologetic 
defence of this  view.  Instead,  the  analysis  was  undertaken as  an antidote to  all  extant 
prejudicative  treatments of the  subject.  In fact,  it  was  intended  as  a  continuation and 
furtherance of  a long forgotten wholly objective method of  enquiry developed by Hegel. 
3 
The more specific research undertaking originated from an investigation, prompted by 
a curious statement made by a philosophical commentator. Some years ago I was reading 
a brief section on transcendent metaphysics, in Reason and Experience by W.  H.  Walsh, 
when I  came  across the  following  cursory value judgement, "There seems  to  be  little 
difficulty  in  showing  that  metaphysics  in  this  sense  is  an  impossible  undertaking".4 It 
struck me  that, in the Critique of  Pure Reason, Kant had found it  necessary to develop 
lengthy  and  complex  arguments,  to  putatively  demonstrate  the  epistemological 
illegitimacy  of this  form  of metaphysics.  It also  occurred  to  me  that  Hegel,  in  The 
Phenomenology of Spirit and  The  Science of Logic,  had  subsequently  found  powerful 
reasons  to  reject  Kant's  main  conclusions.  Naturally,  I  was  aware  that  the  Logical 
Positivist's  had  used  their  verification  principle  in  an  attempt  to  establish  the 
epistemological  impossibility of transcendent  metaphysics.  However,  this argument had 9 
never convinced me and had fallen out of favour more generally.  Hence I read  o~ wi.th 
eager anticipation, to ascertain the previously undiscovered straightforward refutation. 
At  this  point,  it  was  certainly  difficult  to  envisage  the  impressive  metaphysical 
monuments of  the rationalist tradition collapsing before an argument that presented .... little 
difficulty".  My  doubts  were  soon  confinned  when  Walsh's  purported  refutation  was 
disclosed as an uninspiring  repetition of an old Kantian line  of reasoning.  Puzzled  and 
dissatisfied with Walsh's superficial analysis, I searched the literature for more profound 
reflections on the subject.  As a result, it was discovered that, subsequent to  the brilliant 
Hegelian  study,  there  was  a  general  sharp  decline  in  the  standard  of philosophical 
commentary.  The perfunctory opinion had emerged that transcendent  metaphysics  was 
impossible because its epistemological foundation was unsound. In fact,  this supposedly 
erroneous  epistemology,  that  I  designate  transcendent  apriorism,  rarely  seemed  to  be 
given serious consideration. Instead, it  was found that the negative evaluations of Ayer 
and Kant were generally just accepted on trust.  In exceptional cases, arguments against 
the epistemological doctrine were actually promulgated, but they were brief and poorly 
constructed.  More normally transcendent apriorism is  either ignored or rejected with a 
cursory remark. The only real exception to this trend was the philosophy of  Bergson. 
Recognising  that ingrained prejudice, rather than reasoned debate,  was determining 
contemporary research, gave me the impetus to provide a totally new account. In order to 
do  this  effectively  the  whole  edifice  of current  understandings  would  have  to  be 
overturned.  There  would  need  to  be  a  return  to  the  absolute  basics  from  which  the 
foundations of  a more enduring structure could be constructed. The historical origins and 
development of  transcendent apriorism, its essential epistemological nature, and many of 
the  extant  arguments  that  purport  to  undermine  it,  must  undergo  a  thorough  re-
examination.  The  raison  d'etre  of this  thesis  is  the  fulfilment  of this  reformative 
programme. 10 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis is dedicated to my parents Anne and Arthur Burgess.  I would also like it to be 
a tribute to  the  memory of the  Hegelian philosopher Hywel Thomas  who  inspired  my 
interest in traditional metaphysics.  Thanks must  also  go  to  my  long-suffering tutor Pat 
Shaw and to Kenneth Haycock who persistently solved my computer problems. INTRODUCTION 
There  was  a  time  when transcendent  apriorism  was  regarded  as  the  epistemological 
master doctrine underpinning the most profound metaphysical systems.  Indubitably,  the 
vast and enduring philosophical heritage of  Platonism was built upon its firm foundations. 
In that tradition,  the doctrine was considered to provide a  methodology by  which the 
highest  philosophical  knowledge  could  be  attained.  In  both  Christian  and  Pagan 
Platonism, it had functioned to disclose the existence and nature of  God, the immortality 
of  the sou~ the eternal archetypes, the true nature of  the universe and the moral destiny of 
man.  The  discovery  of the  seminal  route  to  such  ultimate  wisdom  had  been  the 
epistemological golden legacy of  the Eleatics. It is unsurprising therefore that Parmenides 
allegorised his  discovery of the method as a journey, "far from the  steps of men", I  to 
receive the enlightenment of  a divine being. It is testimony to the doctrine's power, that it 
was only the growing influence of  mediaeval Aristotelianism that eventually displaced the 
method from its deserved position of  prominence. However, when the Cartesian tradition 
of  continental  rationalism  emerged,  a  reinvigorated  transcendent  apriorism  was 
engendered from the ashes of the mediaeval world.  It flourished  again as the dominant 
epistemological method in the works of  Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz and Spinoza. 
Yet,  a  moment of crises was looming.  Immanuel Kant  had  brilliantly attempted to 
bolster and purifY the method in his Inaugural Dissertation.  However, before this work 
was complete, an historic volte-face occurred in his thinking.  In fact,  his next work, The 
Critique  of Pure  Reason,  was  a  sustained  attack  on  the  doctrine's  pretensions  to 
transcend experience. According to conventional wisdom, this attack was so devastating 
that it dealt transcendent apriorism its deathblow.  In succeeding centuries, the mesmeric 
rise  to  prominence of the  empirical  method  coincided  with  an  explosion  in  scientific 
progress.  Despite the  restraining  voices of Hegel and Bergson,  the  old and  venerable 
rationalist methods were ridiculed and swept aside on a tide of  enthusiasm. Reflecting this 
fervour,  a  young A.  1.  Ayer confidently enunciated a  simple  principle
2  that  putatively 
rendered  the  old  master doctrine  obsolete.  Since  then  it  has  become  the  hackground assumption of  our empiricist age, that the doctrine is false and that this has been proved 
the  case.  In  a  typical  recent  article,  Norman  Swartz3  has  argued  that  rationalist 
methodologies  "ought to  be defunct"  and  assures  us  with conviction that  their  '~otal 
extinction  is  assured".  Transcendent  apriorism  cannot  even  look  for  support  from 
Lawrence Bonjour's espousal of  rational intuition in his recent book In Defence of  Pure 
Reason. It is  symptomatic of our times that even when synthetic  a priori knowledge  is 
granted legitimacy the possibility of  it having transcendent claims is just never considered. 
The grounds for the disregard of  this possibility, by Bonjour and others, are rarely stated. 
In fact,  it is normally considered that the rationale behind the disregard need not be made 
explicit because it is wholly self-evident.  Hence, Rudolf Steiner has observed that.  '~he 
thing-in-itself and a transcendent ultimate foundation of  things are nothing but illusions. It 
is easy to see that this is the case".4 
Historically  speaking,  it  is  undeniable that the reputation of transcendent  apriorism 
has  undergone  a  radical  reversal.  The  Parmenidean  journey  of enlightenment,  once 
viewed with reverential awe, is now derided as an embarrassment to philosophy. It is the 
contention  of this  thesis  that,  contrary  to  popular  opinion,  the  dramatic  status 
transformation  is  not  justified  by  any  of the  existing  argumentation.  In  fact,  the 
judgemental revision results from an unquestioning faith in the ubiquitous use of  scientific 
method,  a  misguided  adherence  to  socially  constructed  common  sense  and  a  gross 
overestimation of various putative refutations.  In other words,  the  modern derogatory 
attitude  is  founded  on  prejudice  rather  than  argumentation.  Unfortunately,  this 
unsympathetic treatment has also  engendered a complacency that has  grossly distorted 
post-Hegelian epistemological analysis of  transcendent apriorism Another negative result 
has been the false history that has emerged from the disingenuous attempt to prove that 
various  famous  transcendent  apriorists  were  actually  empiricists  at  heart.  As  a 
consequence, this thesis has ridiculously had to demonstrate that transcendent apriorists 
like  Plotinus  do  not  have  secret  empiricist  agenda.  If complacency  is  the  root  of the 
general corruption of analysis,  then  simple  definitional  inaccuracy  is  a primary  branch. 
The issue of  the essential definition of  transcendent apriorism is technical and is dealt with 
comprehensively in chapter 2 of  this thesis. However, the reader requircs a simple general 
wlderstanding of  the doctrine by way of  introduction. 
Historically  speaking  transcendent  apriorism  seems  to  emerge  as  a  solution  to  an 
intractable  epistemological  problem  set  by  the  ancient  doctrine  of  univcrsal  flux. 13 
Fragments of Heraclitus confirm his  central conviction that  everything  flows  (lTOVTO 
pEl
5
), so  that like  a  moving  river reality is  never at rest but  is  undergoing continuous 
transformation.  Cratylus
6
,  a  disciple of Heraclitus,  argued cogently that  because things 
are perpetually in a  state of flux  it  was impossible  to  know them.  In fact,  true  things 
cannot  even be  said  of that  which changes,  because  as  soon as  the  putative  truth  is 
uttered the object of that truth has changed. Hence, the attempt to  capture reality  in  a 
truth seeking net of words is to introduce a false stability into a world that is  essentially 
impermanent. Cratylus, conscious that he had reached an epistemological dead end, quite 
consistently refused to say anything  further,  merely  wagging  his  finger  at  a  reality  he 
could not know. 
The  radically  sceptical consequences  that  are  embedded  in  the  Heraclitean  theory 
present a profound epistemological problem. Knowledge seems to require an immutable 
object.  Undoubtedly, the fundamental characteristic of the few  things that we  consider 
ourselves to know, with apodeictic certainty, is fixity or permanence. We do not usually 
consider that the principle of  non-contradiction or simple mathematical equations can be 
rendered false  by the passage of  time.  In contrast, the objects of our experience do not 
seem to possess the necessary stability to be known. Hegef states that even the simplest 
sense  statement like  "this is  night" when applied to a changing world  "soon becomes 
stale". This incompatibility problem facilitated the inception of  transcendent apriorism, for 
it  drove a wedge between epistemological aspiration and the world of experience. The 
argument  developed that the  impermanent  world,  which cannot become  an object  for 
knowledge,  is  revealed to us by the senses.  However, our reasoning and truth seeking 
functions  demand  a  different  epistemological  object  that  is  stable  and  unchanging. 
Therefore, truth cannot reside in the reports of  the senses. In fact, an early argument used 
by Melissus of Samoss denies the senses can attain truth,  because the objects that are 
revealed by the senses are impermanent and therefore unknowable. It is necessary then to 
reject the senses if  we are to attain knowledge. 
However, for the Eleatics, this is not to revert to Cratylus type scepticism. For them. 
the  arguments  do  not  legitimate  a  universal  scepticism  but  rather  a  local  scepticism 
concerning only the senses and the world of  experience. The revelation of  the goddess to 
Parmenides had been that. if the senses are rejected and the pure reason engaged. then an 
intelligible  realm of permanence could be attained.  The world,  as  it  is  presented to  the 14 
senses,  is  rejected and the  question is  raised  concerning  how the  world  necessarily  is 
according to the dictates of  pure reason. This is not the application of  pure reason to the 
sensory world,  but the transcending of the false  sensory world by the pure reason.  The 
transcendent  intelligible  reality  that  is  attained,  unlike  its  sensory  counterpart,  is  a 
congenial knowledge object because it  is  immutable.  Parmenides brings home this  point 
when he  observes of it,  "changeless within the  limits  of great bonds  it  exists  without 
beginning or ceasing, since coming to be and perishing have wandered very far away, and 
true conviction has thrust them Off,.9 Hence, the early transcendent apriorist method in 
the  Eleatic  tradition,  as  it  did  later  in  the  Platonic  10,  represented  a  solution  to  the 
scepticism induced by the Heraclitean doctrine of  flux. 
As can be seen from this historical account of the doctrine's inception, the essential 
feature of transcendent apriorism is the downgrading of sensory information. Apriorism. 
as  an extreme rationalist  doctrine,  is  a  call to  eliminate  all  sensory elements  from  the 
knowledge quest, for they corrupt true knowledge and can act as  an ignis fatuus to  the 
mind. In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kane I blames the failure of  metaphysics to attain the 
progress of  science on the recurring contamination of  pure a priori knowledge by sensory 
data.  The  infecting  sensory elements that are  to  be  excluded  by  apriorism take many 
forms.  For instance, they include not only immediate sensory data but also the developed 
and often abstract reasoning on the senses typical of  the scientific understanding.  For the 
apriorist,  it  is  the  epistemological  ancestry  that  counts.  If reasoning,  no  matter  how 
abstract, has its ultimate origins in sensation then it  cannot become a legitimate vehicle 
for  transcendent  knowledge.  This  variety  of unsuitable  knowledge  will  be  designated 
logico-sensitive  cognition  because  it  involves  a  mixture  of sensation  and  abstract 
reasonrng. 
There is a modem trend, post-Frege
l
:?,  to call a proposition a priori if, although it has 
its origins in  sensation,  it  can be justified independently of the senses.  The transcendent 
apriorist,  however,  is  a purist in these matters and repudiates any knowledge originally 
acquired  from  an illegitimate  union with the  senses.  Collectively  all  knowledge  that  is 
intrinsically  contaminated  with  sensation  will  be  designated  as  emerging  from  the 
aesthetic functions of the mind.  The term aesthetic is  used  in  direct connection with  its 
etymological  root  in  sensory  perception  and  must  not  be  confused  \\ith  artistic 
endeavour.  It is  certain that the aesthetic  functions  cannot  have  any  intrinsic  role.  Yet. 
many  transcendent  apriorists do  think  that  they  can have  an  extrinsic  role.  In  Lcibni,' I~ 
theory of innate ideas sensory experience does have a role in uncovering noetic ideas that 
are dormant in the soul. 
However, these sensory elements are not intrinsic  to the ideas  fonned  but  function 
only  in  the  method  of their  discovery  and  are  therefore  tolerated.  Hence.  not  all 
transcendent  apriorists  believe  that  everything  the  aesthetic  functions  can  achieve  is 
wholly negative. Admittedly, there are many who believe that the sensory acts as a veil of 
Maya obscuring the true reality with illusion.  However, there are others who,  although 
they deny that ultimate knowledge can be attained by experience, admit that there is  an 
inferior  realm to  which the  senses  are  passably  adequate.  The  fonner  embrace  a  full 
sensory scepticism. For the latter it is a matter of  adequation; the senses are adequate to 
their proscribed inferior realm so  long  as  they do  not  stray into  the  intelligible  realm. 
These different transcendent apriorist theories of perception are important because they 
dramatically  affect  the  reSUlting  ontology.  If there  is  a  realm  to  which  the  senses  are 
adequate  as  well  as  an  intelligible  realm  then there  is  a  pull  towards  an  ontological 
dualism. If  sense-objects are merely obstructing illusions then their status as full existents 
is undermined, so that they could not constitute a realm, and an ontological monism most 
naturally results. 
The  repudiation  of an intrinsic  role  for  the  senses  in  the  attainment  of ultimate 
knowledge is the negative aspect of  apriorism. The question remains, which functions of 
the mind are uncontaminated by sensation and so  can lead the apriorist to his goal? It is 
important to note that historically all answers to this question, within the tradition, have 
posited some  form of intellectual intuition.  This is  a very broad category and  includes, 
within its range, both the humble intuition, involved in finding the conclusion of  a simple 
syllogism, and the grand intuition that claims a direct acquaintance with the divine being. 
These  intuitions  can  occur  in  addition  to,  during  or separate  from  a  pure  deductive 
process. Generally, they fall  into two categories and are either discursive or illuminative. 
The discursive ones are propositional in nature and form an integral part in the building of 
deductive systems of metaphysics. Many such systems, inspired by the Euclidean model. 
proceed  more  geometrico  and  require  both  intuitions  that  grasp  the  basic  axioms 
(axiomatic  intuition)  and  those  that  grasp  the  conclusions  of deductive  sequences 
(deductive  intuition).  In  contrast,  the  illuminative  intuition  does  not  mediate  knowing 
through propositions and instead grasps reality directly.  It  functions to  know things. not 16 
to know about things. All such pure intuitions and processes, that constitute the positi\'e 
aspect of  apriorism, will be designated collectively the noetic functions. 
It must  always  be  remembered  that  transcendent  apriorism  is  an  epistemological 
method of attaining philosophical knowledge.  Hence,  various trans-rational or mystical 
intuitions, used to obtain transcendent knowledge, are disqualified from the methodology. 
This does not however mean that certain transcendent apriorists have not engaged with 
such intuitions.  Plotinus  13 ,  for  example,  talks  of an intuition  by  which  the  intellect  is 
''transported''  and  "drunk  with  nectar".  However,  here  he  is  going  beyond  the 
transcendent apriorist method in a mystical flight.  Such trans-rationalist intuitions will  be 
designated hyper-noetic visions and are always carefully distinguished. 
So  far,  we  have  merely  considered  the  transcendent  apriorist's  pure  apriorist 
methodology  and  it  is  now  time  to  examine  the  transcendent  goal.  The  sensory 
purification of the  apriorist  method  is  designed  to  lead  the  mind  from  that  which  is 
immanent,  within  our  experience,  to  the  realm  that  transcends  such  experience. 
According to the early Kant the pure intelligence, "is the faculty of the  subject through 
which it  is  able  to represent things which cannot by their own nature come  before the 
senses of that subject".14 It is  usually considered as a journey from the impermanent or 
illusory phenomena to the ultimate  goal of stability and truth,  viz.  the realm of the  in-
itself.  Hence,  to  purify  yourself  from  sensory  contamination  and  then  take  the 
phenomenal world as your ultimate object of  knowledge would have seemed strange and 
wrong to the early transcendent apriorists. 
However, as we shall discover, this immanent rather than transcendent apriorism itself 
has a long history. It was this type of  apriorism that Engels
l
)  had criticised in Hegel and 
Dilling.  It formed the basis of Cartesian science and Husserlian phenomenology.  It  also 
has  a  less  distinguished role  in Austrian Economics.  Unfortunately,  because of a deep 
misunderstanding, this doctrine has often been erroneously associated with transcendent 
apriorism.  However, in distinct contrast, the transcendent apriorist does not  set  himself 
up as a rival to the physical or social scientist. He does not see it as his goal to pontificate 
on the phenomenal world using the apriorist method.  In fact,  he  would regard science. 
like  Plato,  as  dealing  with an  inferior realm in  which only belief rather than kno\\ ledge 
can apply.  Alternatively,  he  would  agree  with  Parmenides  that  the  scientist  deals  only 
with  an  illusory  object  unworthy of serious  study.  If the  transcendent  apriorist  can  he 
described as anything. he is an noumenalist not a phenomenalist or phenomenologist. The 17 
Hegelian method is  profound but it has more to do  with Aristotelian immanent ism than 
Platonic  transcendence.  Hegel  wrote  the  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  whereas  a 
transcendent apriorist would have to write a noumenology of  spirit. 
Most  philosophers  have  had  their  primary  and  most  sustained  contact  with 
transcendent  apriorism in  its  Platonic  guise.  In fact,  it  is  widely accepted,  though  not 
universally held, that Plato's epistemology is both transcendent and apriorist. It is for this 
reason that,  although the  earlier Parmenidean version marked the  doctrine' s historical 
beginnings, this thesis commences with an analysis of  Plato.  The initial chapter therefore 
contains  a  deep  analysis  of Plato's epistemology,  which  is  designed  to  expound  and 
clarify at least  one version of the transcendent apriorist method.  The  insights of many 
years study into extreme rationalist systems have been condensed into this chapter. This 
has  resulted,  among  other  things,  in  a  modem  defence  of the  traditional  but  very 
unfashionable Platonic two-world's theory; a new contribution to the debate on whether 
Plato's notion of  ElTlOTllI-lTJ meant true belief plus a logos or direct acquaintance with the 
forms, and the discovery that Plato held a secret doctrine, revealed only to initiates. 
This  initial  analysis  introduces  the  phrase  "transcendent  apriorism"  to  Platonic 
scholarship as if  it were an accepted and familiar terminology. The analysis also proceeds 
from the assumption that the definition of  transcendent apriorism is fully  understood and 
therefore  serves  to  distinguish  the  doctrine  from  other  epistemologies.  However,  the 
reality is that the terminology has never been used and, post-Hegel, the understanding of 
the  doctrine's definition,  and hence  its  distinction from other epistemologies,  is  a  lost 
legacy.  In the first  part of chapter 2,  the confusion that results both from this loss of 
understanding, from complacent definitions and from the inconsistent use of  terminology 
is considered. As a remedy to this situation a new system for categorising epistemologies 
is  developed  and  those  with  which  transcendent  apriorism  is  most  often  confused 
explained  and  distinguished.  Many  commentators  have  thought  that  philosophers  like 
Hegel,  Wolff,  Bradley and Heidegger were transcendent apriorists.  In fact,  they use  the 
same arguments against them as they would against Plato or Spinoza. The new categories 
will  allow us  to  determine  to  what extent this  is  legitimate.  In  the  second  part of the 
chapter, a new and requisite precise definition of  the doctrine is given to  entirely end the 
confusions. At this stage, the amazing fact emerges that no one since Kant and  Hegel has 
ti.llly understood the doctrine. 18 
Having arrived at a better understanding of  exactly what transcendent apriorism is.  it 
is time to look more closely at its component parts.  We  have already seen that  it  is the 
noetic functions,  or those aspects of cognition uncontaminated by sensatioI\ which are 
considered the gateway to the transcendent.  In the third chapter,  the  various forms  of 
noetic  functions  used  will  be  enumerated and  analysed.  This  will be  important  in  the 
process of distinguishing  the various types of transcendent  aprio rism.  There  are  many 
paths that lead to the transcendent and different methods place  their trust  in  different 
noetic functions. 
The entire preceding analysis had been an excellent preparation for answering a hotly 
disputed question in the history of philosophy.  It has been assumed until this point that 
Parmenides,  rather than Plato,  was  the  founder  of the  transcendent  apriorist  method. 
However,  this  is  normally  seen  as  a  very  contentious  issue.  Tn  fact,  there  are 
commentators who deny that Parmenides was an apriorist at all.  In order to  prove the 
case  it  is  necessary to  fully  analyse  the  Parmenidean epistemology.  This  analysis  will 
determine both whether Parmenides did hold to the doctrine and, if he did, what version. 
It is  discovered that, whereas Plato's admits a two-world system,  Parmenides will  only 
countenance the existence of  one.  This difference highlights an important distinction for 
the whole history of  the doctrine. In its progress, the analysis goes some way to resolving 
the  perennial  and  unanswered  question  of the  status  of the  Parmenidean  "way  of 
opinion". 
Parmenides developed his  apriorist method with great confidence and  would  never 
have  foreseen the interminable modem debates concerning what  is  to  count as  a priori 
knowledge.  However,  no  modem account  of transcendent  apriorism  can  ignore  this 
essential debate and it is therefore dealt with in the fifth chapter. It was discovered that 
transcendent  apriorists  have  a  very  strict  notion of the  a  priori,  which  is  designed  to 
ensure complete purification from sensory knowledge. Kant's whole project of rescuing 
metaphysics,  in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation,  had  been  founded  upon  a  concentrated 
focusing  upon this stringent criterion for excluding experience.  Yet, this notion of the a 
priori, in sensu stricto, has caused a lot of  confusion to modem philosophers, post -Frege. 
This  is  largely  because  they  are  accustomed  to  working  with  a  much  less  restricti\ e 
criterion.  Influenced,  no  doubt,  by  the  apparent epistemological triumph of empiricism 
they see no  need to decontaminate the a priori of all  experiential input.  In  hroad temlS. 
for  them.  a  priori  knowledge  is  fundamentally  knowledge  that  C,ill  be  justified 19 
independently of  experience. This understanding does not prevent the senses playing their 
part in the process of  the acquisition of  such knowledge. In contrast, for the transcendent 
apriorist,  even  the  process  of acquisition  must  exclude  sensory  experience.  The 
confusions  that  result  and  those  also  arising  from  determining  what  counts  as 
"experience" whether excluded or not, are then identified and resolved. 
The real question, raised by the debate on the a priori, is how is it possible to acquire 
knowledge  without  the  intrinsic  contributions  of sensory experience? Traditionally,  of 
course, the main theory that accounts for this possibility is the doctrine of  innate ideas. In 
the  sixth chapter,  which deals  with this  theory,  it  will  be  argued  that  innate  ideas  are 
definitely the most promising foundation for a certain variety of transcendent apriorism. 
This may lead the modem philosopher to think that this would constitute a refutation of 
this  version,  because  the  antiquated theory of innate  ideas  is  now defunct.  However, 
again,  the  theory of innate  ideas  has  generated  much  prejudice,  confusion  and  failed 
refutations.  In  fact,  the  ignorance  concerning  a  priori  knowledge  has  also  affected 
theories of  innatism and the distinction between the a priori and the innate is confused as 
a result. It is certain that Herbert of Cherbury and Leibniz developed very sophisticated 
dispositional  versions  of the  theory,  the  fundamentals  of which,  even  today,  Noam 
Chomsky still endorses. 
The theory of innate  ideas,  however,  is  not required in  the  illuminative  tradition of 
transcendent apriorism considered in the seventh chapter. That there is such a tradition, is 
totally  ignored  by  Ayer  in  his  attack  on transcendent  metaphysics.  The  illuminative 
tradition states that the ultimate transcendent knowledge can be gained directly through a 
special  type  of illuminative  intuition.  In  the  Seventh  Epistle,  Plato
l6 
had  stated  that, 
although  inexpressible  in  propositional  form,  certain knowledge  could  be  attained  by 
acquaintance when the mind is, '''flooded with light".  This type of intuition is sui generis 
and  forms the basis of an entire epistemological tradition, of which Augustine, Plotinus, 
Malebranche  and  Bergson form  an integral part.  The  nature of the  intuition  is  closely 
examined and the history of illuminative transcendent apriorism traced.  The  viability  of 
the theory can be challenged by certain arguments in Kant and Ayer and these are dealt 
with.  As  a  result  of the  new  understanding,  important  questions  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  can  be  answered.  For  example,  whether  Henri  Bergson  was  in  fact  an 
irrationalist and  whether Malebranche' s claim to "see all  things  in  God"'7  forms  part  0 f 
the illuminative tradition. ~o 
So  far,  there  has  been a  concentration on various  apriorist  methods  to  transcend 
experience. Chapter 8 deals exclusively with the telos of  this method, the goal to which it 
is striving viz. the transcendent itself  Contrary to a widely held belief,  it  is disclosed that 
the  transcendent  apriorist  does  not  claim to  directly  know  the  in-itself  The  massive 
obstacle that Kant and Schopenhauer placed in the path of transcendent apriorism.  viz. 
that the in-itself just cannot be known, in this way,  is  consequently removed. It is  also 
seen that  the  perennial problem that has  been thrown at transcendent  apriorists  since 
Plato, viz.  the status of  the relationship between the phenomenal and the noumenal. just 
does not apply to certain varieties of the doctrine.  For certain transcendent apriorists, 
who are also monists like Parmenides and Spinoza, there is  simply no  relation,  because 
the  phenomenal world just doesn't exist.  Hegel's devastating  main criticism of Kant's 
critical  philosophy  is  also  considered  at  this  point.  In the  light  of all  that  has  been 
discovered the famous problem of  the Cartesian circle is given a new solution. 
In the final chapter, consideration is  given to the important relationship between the 
scientist  and  the  transcendent  apriorist.  There  is  an initial  discussion of the  nature  of 
scientific  epistemology.  Some commentators have  suggested that  the  scientist  is  going 
beyond  experience  and  positing  noumenal  entities  of his  own.  This  claim  will  be 
considered.  Much has been written recently about traditional accounts of  the continental 
rationalists being mere caricature. In fact, it is extremely fashionable to promote the idea 
that Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza had scientific interests and empiricist strands to their 
philosophies. It is discovered that this entire viewpoint stems from a prejudice. Cartesian 
science which all these philosophers saw as paradigmatic was deductive  not  inductive, 
and hence apriorist in nature. It is admitted that the continental rationalists had a function 
for experience in their epistemologies. However, this type of  justification was considered 
necessary due to the  limits  of the human mind.  It had an inferior status and  was  only 
appealed to as a last resort. In terms of  the history of  philosophy, there is also a serious 
contribution to the unresolved debate on the status ofSpinoza's scientia intuit iva. 
The  conclusion examines  important  contemporary arguments  in  this  research  area. 
The journey through the  thesis,  in  its entirety,  will involve  a  fundamental  loosening of 
assumptions. In fact,  it  is organised to effect a paradigm shift  in our understanding of an 
epistemological  theory of ancient  lineage  and  immense  importance.  The  dominance  of 
empiricism,  in  contemporary epistemology. must  not  be  allowed  to  close and  prejudice 21 
minds to divergent philosophical approaches. After all,  the empire of empiricism.  like all 
empires, is subject to decline and transformation. CHAPTER 1 
PLATO'S lRANSCENDENT APRIORISM 
[Q 1]  Don'~ you think that the person who is likely to succeed in this attempt most 
perfectly  IS  the  one  who  approaches  each  object,  as  far  as  possible  with  the 
unaided intellect, without taking account of any sense of sight in his thinking, or 
dragging any other sense into his reckoning - the man who pursues the truth by 
applying his pure and unadulterated thought to the pure and unadulterated object, 
cutting himself off as much as possible from his eyes and ears and virtually all the 
rest of his body, as an impediment which by its presence prevents the soul from 
attaining to truth and clear thinking? Is not this the person,  Simmias,  who  will 
reach the goal of  reality if  anyone can? 
1.1. Paradigmatic Transcendent Apriorism 
Plato  is  normally  adjudged,  by  commentators,  to  be  the  paradigmatic  exemplar  of 
transcendent apriorist epistemology.2 It is nonnally considered, firstly, that the positing of 
entities,  i.e.  Forms (EtOOS),  which are regarded as (i)  the ultimate object of knowledge 
and (ii) ontologically3 separate (EXwptOav) from the sensory world, demonstrates a clear 
commitment to epistemological transcendence. With regard to point (i), Plato puts special 
emphasis on the epistemological importance of  the Forms, which are not disclosed to the 
aesthetic  functions,  when  he  observes,  "For  the  existents  which  have  no  visible 
embodiment,  the  existents  which  are  of the  highest  value  and  chief importance,  are 
demonstrable  only  by  reason  and  are  not  to  be  apprehended  by  any  other  means".  '* 
Dominic J. 0' Meara, in his essay 'The Hierarchical Ordering of  Reality in Plotinus', states 
what is  accepted by  most commentators viz.  that,  "What  is  fundamental  in  Plato  is,  of 
course the forms". 5  The same point actually provides a foundation for  an important but 
controversial  interpretation  of the  Theaetetus.  F.  M.  Cornford.  in  Plato's  Theory  of 
Knowledge. had observed that the aporia that results from the ultimate inadequacy of the 
presented definitions of knowledge,  in  the  Theaeletus.  is  induced  to  emphasize a very 
specific epistemological issue.  The point is that without the forms considered as the true ,  ... 
--' 
objects  of knowledge  no  such  definitions  can actually  be  given.  This,  according  to 
Cornford,  was  the  ultimate  purpose  of the  dialogue  and  explains  why  Plato  is  not 
transparent about his true epistemology, "Plato could not press the argument further in 
this direction without openly discussing the Forms as the true objects ofknowledge".6 
The  evidence  for  point  (ii)  underpins  most  interpretations,  both  traditional  and 
modern.  It was Aristotle who  had used the notion that the Forms  are  Exc.uploav  to 
distinguish  the  Socratic  from  the  Platonist  ontologies,  "Socrates  did  not  take  the 
universals  to  be  separate,  nor  the  definitions,  but  they  [the  Platonists]  made  them 
separate,  and  called  such  entities  Forms".7  There  is  much  debate  in  contemporary 
scholarship,  as we shall  soon discover  with regard to establishing  the  sense  in  which 
Aristotle  uses  the  term  "separation".  However,  the  orthodox  interpretation  posits 
ontological separation and connects it  with the notion of transcendence.  Hence,  G.  F. 
Else in his  article "The Terminology of Ideas" understands Aristotle  in  this way,  "The 
exaltation of  the true seat of  the ideas to a 'place beyond heaven' is the transcendence of 
which  Aristotle  speaks". 
8  Such  and  other  evidence,  for  this  standard  picture,  leads 
Hamlyn quite naturally to conclude that Plato is predominantly a metaphysician, "of the 
transcendent type". 
9 
Secondly,  since  the  rejection of the  aesthetic  functions  in favour  of the  noetic  is 
conspicuously  evident,  in  dialogues  from  all  periods,  Platonism  and  apriorism  are 
normally closely associated.  Aristotle assures us that,  "From his  early years Plato  was 
familiar with the Heraclitean doctrine of  Cratylus, that all sensible things are in a constant 
state of flux  and that we can have no  knowledge of them.  To the end of his  life  Plato 
10  G  lin  d  .  remained  loyal  to  those tenets".  More  recently 1.  C.  B.  os  graws attentlon  to 
Plato's "polemic against sense-perception",  II  while  A.  Ajdukiewicz regards Plato  as an 
.  .  "I  '}  "extreme apnonst . -
Notwithstanding, the standard picture is regarded by some commentators as just too 
simplistic and there are certainly some who  have taken issue  with it.  Few,  if any,  have 
denied Plato's apriorism but some have questioned whether his epistemology. particularly 
in the later dialogues,  is  truly transcendent.  The criticism of the standard interpretation 
has usually taken the form of  a denial of  the ontological separation of  the Platonic Forms 
from the world of  experience. Naturally, then, the traditional "two worlds" hypothesis is 
firmly rejected. (This, not just for the standard reason that the forms an: truly eternal - not sempiternal  - i.e.  outside  space  and  time  and  therefore  cannot  have  any  location  in  a 
"world" or anywhere else). A single example of  such a separation denia4 out of  the many 
that will be discussed subsequently, is evident in what T. Irwin calls the "non-reducibility 
h  ."  13  This  h  .  ha  h  t  esIS  .  t  esIS  states t  t t  e Forms are not independent existents but are merely 
elements  within  experience  that  are  not  entirely  definable  in  sensible  terms  alone, 
"fortnS ... are not definable through sensible properties alone".14  Certainly, this theory, as 
Gale  Fine  observes,  involves,  "rejecting  a  version  of empiricism  according  to  which 
everything can ultimately be explained in terms of, or reduced to, sensible features of  the 
world".15  However the apriorist theory, that results, is  obviously going to  be  immanent 
rather than transcendent.  The interpretation of Plato that underlies the non-reducibility 
thesis,  and other such unorthodoxies is  incorrect and  the debate  surrounding  it  will  be 
considered. However, the main emphasis in this chapter will be on correctly categorizing 
Plato's  transcendent  apriorist  epistemology,  not  on  defending  the  legitimacy  of the 
ascription to Plato of  this type of  epistemology. This categorization issue certainly throws 
up more controversy and a proper understanding of it  will allow us  to  correctly locate 
Plato's contribution, in relation to the tradition. 
1.2. Plato and Apriorism 
1.2.1. Intrinsic Scepticism: Alo8nolS in Relation to AAn8Ela and  ~o£a. 
Fundamental to the broad consensus on Plato's epistemological apriorism is the analysis 
of the  aesthetic  functions.  It is  certain that  Plato  conforms  to  the  strict  transcendent 
apriorist  criteria  for  the  treatment  of these  functions.  However,  the  nature  of this 
treatment is  open to misreading.  Pannenides rejects the  aesthetic  functions  because of 
certain  implicit  sceptical  considerations.  For Plato,  in  contrast,  it  is  explicit  issues  of 
adequation that are fundamental.  Indeed the sceptical thesis that  the  aesthetic  functions 
are deceptive "in themselves" is not the ultimate reason for their rejection in the Platonic 
epistemology.  Instead,  it  is  the  fact  that these functions just cannot  intrinsically deliver 
knowledge with regard to that which is  Truly Real.  However. this  is not to  endorse an: 
view. which might suggest that Plato did not recognize that the aesthetic functions could 
be distorting, false,  deceptive or misleading "in themselves". It is just that this scepticism 
is  subsidiary.  It certainly exists.  as  subsequent  examples  will  provc.  Howc\cr.  it  is  the 25 
inadequacy  theory  that  makes  scepticism  inevitable,  not  scepticism  that  makes  the 
aesthetic functions inadequate. 
References  to  truly  sceptical issues  do  occur  but  are  relatively  infrequent.  In  the 
Phaedo, the aesthetic functions in general are described as "not clear and accurate"  16, and 
are consequently regarded as a hindrance when used in partnership with the soul in any 
inquiry.17  In this dialogue the same functions are regarded as  "entirely deceptive,,18  and 
we  are  again  urged  to  refrain from  using  them. 19  In the  Republic  all  the  senses  are 
'd  d  t  b  "d  c.  .  ,,20  b'  21  COnsl  ere  0  e  electIve  or su  ~ect to  error  .  In fact  with  regard  to  the  last 
mentioned passage and a later passage in the Theaetetus there is  some prefigurement of 
the  examples  used  in  Cartesian  scepticism.  The  first,  [Q2],  contains  the  so-called 
"argument from illusion"  and is  the  locus classicus for  the  famous  example  where  the 
stick  appears  bent  in  water.  The  second  [Q3]  conclusively  demonstrates,  using  the 
perceptual mistakes that occur in dreams and madness, that the aesthetic functions can be 
unreliable in themselves: 
[Q2]  The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far  does not 
appear equaL Why no. And the same things appear bent and straight to those who 
view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of 
vision about colours.
22 
[Q3] There remains the question of  dreams and disorders, especially madness and 
all  the  mistakes  madness  is  said  to  make  in  seeing  or  hearing  or  otherwise 
.  23  ffilspercelvmg. 
All  such examples,  taken together,  may  seem  like  a  Platonic  renewal  of Eleatic-type 
scepticism.  However,  the  Platonic  attitude  to  the  aesthetic  functions  is  substantially 
different.  The first  point to make is  that, despite the evidence to the contrary presented 
above, Plato's attitude to the aesthetic functions is more positive than that of  the Eleatics. 
For him, sensory information undoubtedly has both an extrinsic role to play in attaining to 
the Truly Real and an intrinsic role to play in forming opinions or probable beliefs. 
Let  us  first  consider its contribution to the attainment of knowledge (E1tHJTlll·!Tl)  of 
the Truly Real. It must be emphasized that the role of the aesthetic functions in  Plato. as 
in  the  Leibnizian  apriorism,  is  entirely  extrinsic  to  the  reasoning-function  itself  This 
extrinsic  use.  as  we saw in  the introduction, can be  the  only  legitimate  fUnction  for  the 
senses within any apriorist system. It is worth remembering that if the aesthetic functions 26 
are used to grasp the Truly Real intrinsically,  i.e.  in terms of knowledge-acquisition or 
knowledge-justification, then we are not dealing with an apriorist epistemological system. 
How  then  do  the  aesthetic  functions  operate  extrinsically  in  Plato?  To  speak 
metaphorically  they  act  upon the  pure  reasoning  function  as  triggers  or catalysts  for 
knowledge-acquisition. For example, in the Republic Socrates speaks of  a specific group 
of sensations  that  "invite  the  intellect  to  reflection,,?4  He  is  referring  to  a  range  of 
perceptions that initially provoke a degree of  confusion in the soul viz.  "those that issue in 
a contradictory perception".25 The soul is then motivated to solve the anomaly presented 
by its sensory experience and is  hence stimulated to  use  its judgement in the  "opposite 
way from  sensation".  26  Ironically the  positive  contribution  sensation  makes  here  is  to 
encourage the mind to reject the aesthetic functions. In the Symposium,  there is a related 
function  for  sensation.  Certain primary  sensory  experiences  can  initiate  in  the  soul  a 
graduated process of  knowledge acquisition. Admittedly, such sensations only function to 
initiate a long and involved process. However, the process itself is  an  important one.  In 
this case the visual experience of beautiful young men, can initiate a process in the soul 
culminating  in  a  vision  of the  Form  of Absolute  beauty  itself,  "And  so,  when  his 
prescribed devotion to boyish beauties has carried our candidate so far that the universal 
beauty dawns upon his inward sight, he is almost within reach of  the final revelation".  27 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Platonic  theory  of anamnesis,  viz.  that  knowledge  IS 
recollection, lies at the back of  this sort of  theory of  sensation. Sensation acts as a trigger 
that facilitates the remembrance of the pre-natal experience of the Forms.  For instance, 
the experience of  the beauty in this world triggers a distant memory of  the soul's pre-natal 
confrontation with absolute beauty. This is certainly the role appointed to sensation in the 
Phaedrus where Plato observes, "Such a one,  as soon as  he  beholds the beauty of this 
world, is reminded of  true beauty and his wings begin to grow".  28 Again, in this case, the 
initial  sensation  is  an  extrinsic  trigger  to  the  development  of a  more  profound 
understanding that requires the rejection of  sensation. This rejection is necessary because 
the true wisdom sought is of  something that lies beyond the aesthetic functions,  for "sight 
is  the keenest mode of perception vouchsafed us through the  body~ wisdom,  indeed,  we 
b " 19  cannot see there  y  .-
According to Plato, in all these cases, sensation should not be trusted on its  O\\TI. nor 
should it  be  used  in  partnership with the soul (logico-sensitive cognition)  in  any  inquiry 
whose object is the Truly Real. A demonstration of  why this is so will be given in the nc'\t 27 
section. Certainly, such uses would constitute an illegitimate intrinsic use for the aesthetic 
functions  with respect to an apriorist epistemology.  Yet,  there  is  no  doubt that  Plato 
considered the aesthetic functions as sometimes acting positively as a  springboard to a 
higher understanding. They could do this however only in so far as they were extrinsic to 
the enquiry. 
1.2.2. Platonic Adequation: That-Which-Is-Not "Is", Contra Parmenides. 
For  the  Eleatics  any  intrinsic  role  for  the  aesthetic  functions  leads  immediately  to 
falsehood. In their case, the object-correlate towards which these functions are directed is 
nothingness  or  "what  is  not".  This  is  why  the  Eleatics  solely  considered  issues  of 
scepticism. The issue of  adequation could not even be raised because it would require the 
existence  of some  other realm independent  of the  Truly  Real  to  which  the  aesthetic 
functions could be seen as adequate. The existence of  such a realm would fundamentally 
contradict the Eleatic theory of ontological-monism.  In this respect,  in  contrast to  the 
Eleatic, the Platonic epistemology posits just such a second realm. The realm referred to 
is  designated in various ways throughout the dialogues.  For example  it  is  called,  "the 
realm of the variable  ,,30,  "the realm of opinion,,3},  "the  realm of becoming and passing 
away,,;32 "this world of  generation"  33 , or "a sort of  moving process ofbecoming".34 
These  descriptions  may  initially  function  to  suggest  the  characteristics  of the 
Parmenidean "way of opinion".  Despite a  superficial  similarity,  there  is  an absolutely 
fundamental distinction between the two. It could be said that both Parmenides and Plato 
regard the so-called "realm" of  8o~a  as the object-correlate of  the sensory functions. It is 
certainly clear that  Plato  thought  in  terms of particular "faculties"  functioning  only  to 
reveal a  particular class of object,  "different  faculties  are  naturally  related  to  different 
objects".35  In this respect the aesthetic functions are specifically related to the "realm of 
becoming".  This  "realm"  is  definitely  the  relevant  object-correlate  as  the  following 
passage  make  clear,  "Did  we  not  say  some  time  ago  that  when  the  soul  uses  th~ 
instrumentality of  the body for any inquiry, whether through sight or hearing or any other 
sense - because using the body implies using the senses - it  is  dra\\TI  away hy  the body 
into  the  realm  of the  variable".  36  Similarly.  as  we  discover  later.  in  chapter  4,  the 28 
Parmenidean way of  8o~a is,  in a  corresponding way,  directly related to  the aesthetic 
functions. 
However, the similarity ends here with the connection between the faculty  and  the 
"' 
object-correlate. The actual nature of the object-correlate itself is  clearly distinct  in  the 
theories  of Plato  and  Parmenides.  This  is  not,  however  an  uncontested  claim  For 
instance, both J.  H. H Loenen and D.  W.  Hamlyn would deny any such distinction in this 
regard.  Their theories merge the Platonic  and Parmenidean "realms of opinion".  Both 
think that the Parmenidean Way of  ~o~a,  like its Platonic counter-part. has some form of 
real existence, i.e.  is an actually existing or subsisting realm.  This theory concerning the 
Parmenidean epistemology is  false  and will  be  challenged.  Although,  both are  correct 
with regard to their analysis of  the Platonic "way of  opinion". However, the appreciation 
of the differentiating factors, between it and its Parmenidean counterpart, are missed by 
both commentators. Plato himself certainly saw the difference clearly. In fact both a large 
part  of the  Sophist  and  an  important  section  in  the  Republic  are  concerned  with 
delineating it.  The Eleatic stranger, in the Sophist finds  it  necessary, in doing so, to "lay 
unfilial hands,,37  on one of "father Parmenides",38  most  important pronouncements.  To 
establish  that  his  "realm of becoming"  has  some  form  of being  - in  contrast  to  the 
Parmenidean realm of opinion,  which  has  none  - Plato  finds  it  necessary  to  contest 
Parmenides' famous prohibition against thinking that-which-is-not.  In the  Sophist Plato 
observes,  "We  shall  find  it  necessary  in  self-defence  to  put  to  the  question  that 
pronouncement of father  Parmenides,  and establish by main force  that  what  is  not,  in 
some respect has being,  and conversely that what  is,  in a  way  is  not".  39  Hence,  Plato 
wants to make an existence-claim for the object-correlates of  the aesthetic functions but, 
in  order to  do  so,  he  must  naturally  overcome the  reasons that  Parmenides  gave  for 
rejecting any such claim. 
Parmenides' position,  in  denying  such existence-claims,  is  metaphorically treated by 
Plato with respect to the extreme idealist doctrine held by "the gods,,40 or the "friends of 
the forms".41  Now this theory is set out in contrast to that posited by "the giants",42 or the 
"lovers of sights and sounds",43  who hold to  an extreme materialist  theory which states 
that. "real existence belongs only to that which can be handled and offers resistance to the 
touch".44 The gods reject any fom1 of  materialism, "defending their position some\\here in 
the  heights  of the  unseen  maintaining  with  all  their  force  that  true  reality  consi~ts in certain intelligible and bodiless fonns".45  For the gods, anything else necessarily inhabits 
the world of  becoming and, as a consequence, does not possess real being in any respect. 
"what those others [the giants] allege to be true reality they [the gods] calL not real being 
but a sort of  moving process ofbecoming".46 
For a proper understanding of what is going on in the gods and giants analogy.  it  is 
essential to grasp the real significance of an important section of the Sophist viz.  242a-
246c.  Denis 0' Brian makes an important point when,  in an essay entitled "Matter and 
Evil",47  he  draws attention to the frequent  misunderstandings of the  Eleatic  Stranger's 
project  in this  passage.  He  observes,  "For  the  burden of the  Stranger's  proof of the 
existence of non-being in the Sophist is commonly misrepresented in modern studies of 
that  dialogue".48  Plato  is  not,  as  0'  Brian  correctly  observes,  "seeking  to  refute 
Parmenides' denial of the very possibility of any conception of 'what  is  not"'.49  Plato, in 
fact, agrees with Parmenides that we cannot speak or think "of  what is not  in any way at 
all,,·50  The key to what Plato  is  doing  here is  a correct understanding of what  is  really 
being  objected  to  in  the  Parmenidean  epistemology.  If this  has  nothing  to  do  with 
Parmenides' denial of "what is  absolutely not" then what has  it  to  do  with? The answer 
must lie with the reason Plato gives for associating Parmenides' theories, but not his own. 
with the position of  the "gods" or "friends of  the forms". 
It is  clear to me  that Parmenides' system is  included in this category.  i.e.  with the 
gods,  because  of his  rigid  adherence  to  an  epistemological  postulate  that  asserts  an 
inseparable  connection  between  knowing  and  being  "something",  i.e.  having  an 
instantiation. If  x is knowable, then x can exist. If  on the other hand x is unknowable then 
x cannot exist.  (It may be  that Plato projects back onto Parmenides his  own notion of 
B1rUrr1]f.J1]  and  his  own argument  against  the  knowability  of the  realm  of becoming). 
Although C.  H.  Kahn argues51  that  Parmenides'  meant,  "to  know",  the  better and  less 
confusing  translation  is  "to think".  This is  not  only because of linguistic  considerations 
like those given by Kirk et. al. 52  When Parmenides talks about that which is thinkable he 
means that which is logically consistent or involves no contradiction. This would certainly 
be a characteristic of that which could be described as  BJr1aT'lf.J'l in  Plato. but  the  latter 
term fimctions  in  a different way.  Pannenides does not  really object  to  the  variability of 
the way of becoming  but  rather that it  involved  the  contradiction of saying  or thinking 
that-which-is-not. The mind ",vanders"  in  Pannenides because it negkcts pure reasoning. 30 
As a consequence, the mortal intelligence mixes up the distinct categories of being  and 
not being and misapplies them. However, inevitably the result is the same with regard to 
each of  these terms viz. knowing or thinking. 
Parmenides  strongly  connects  epistemological  status  with  ontological  status.  If 
something is epistemologically unknowable (that which is unthinkable is unknowable for 
Parmenides) then it cannot have any ontological instantiation. It is not just, as Cornford 
has suggested, that the friends of the Forms are just "extremists who,  like  the  Eleatics, 
want  to  make  the  whole  of reality  changeless".53  Although  this  is  certainly  a  true 
statement about both parties, it is to miss Plato's point. The Eleatics and the "Gods" or 
"friends of the forms"  want to suggest that there could not be,  in any possible world, a 
form of reality that  is  not,  in every respect,  changeless  (Plato)  or logically  consistent 
(Parmenides). As a consequence - for it is a consequence as we shall discover - knowable 
(Plato) or thinkable  (Parmenides).  Their point is  not that  it  is  a fact  about the  existing 
reality that it is changeless, but rather that any possible reality must be changeless. 
Again, at a superficial level, it looks as if, in the passage from the Sophist, the position 
of  the "gods" is similar to that of Plato himself. Is not Plato, for instance, a friend of the 
forms?  Yet,  this  is  true only to the extent that  he  posits forms.  However,  he  certainly 
does not  agree with what is  fundamental  about  the  God's position,  viz.  the  previously 
mentioned rigid connection between epistemological and any form of ontological status. 
For Plato, just because something cannot be known does not mean to say that it does not 
have  any  form  of existence.  Hence,  the  Strangers'  need  to  lay  "unfilial"  hands  on 
Parmenides' pronouncement denying that-which-is-not. After all,  that-which-is-not is the 
status to which Parmenides relegated anything unknowable (in sensu stricto). This is not 
just a challenge to the logic ofParmenides' argument concerning that-which-is-not, as the 
commentators mentioned by 0' Brian suggest.  Rather the  pronouncement  needs  to  be 
challenged because it is the foundation upon which Parmenides' monism is built. Plato. as 
we will now demonstrate attempts to prove that another realm exists between being and 
not being which, although it cannot be known, still exists in some way. 
In fact,  for Plato, such a realm exists and is identical with the object-correlate of the 
aesthetic functions.  The first  thing to say  is that this object-correlate is considered to  be 
unknowable in the strict sense. For Plato, there is a strict criterion of what  is to  count as 
knowledge  (E1tt<JtllJ.lll).  True  knowledge.  hy  definition.  is  not  defeasihle.  Hence.  the 
object-correlate that corresponds to  the faculty of kno\vledge must  be  something stahle. 31 
eterna~ abiding and unchanging or, in Plato's own metaphor in the Meno, something that 
is tethered, "That is why knowledge is something more valuable than right opinion. \\t  bat 
distinguishes  one  from  the  other  is  the  tether"  .54  If we  think  we  know  an  object  of 
knowledge x and this x were to change in some way (especially, in Plato. into its opposite 
y)  then we could not have had real knowledge of x in the first  place.  As Schopenhauer 
correctly says of  the Platonic epistemology, "they [the things of this world] are likewise 
not objects of a real knowledge (E1ttcr'tllllll), for there can be such a knowledge only of 
what exists  in and  for  itsel£  and  always  in  the same  way".55  Evidence that this  is  the 
correct interpretation comes from the following passages in the dialogues: 
[Q4]  Nor can we  reasonably  say,  Cratylus,  that  there  is  knowledge  at  alL  if 
everything is  in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding.  For knowledge 
too  cannot  continue  to  be  knowledge  unless  continuing  always  to  abide  and 
•  56 
eXISt. 
[Q5] And can we say that any precise and exact truth attaches to things, none of 
which are at this present, or ever were, or ever will be  free  from change? .. And 
how can we ever get a permanent grasp  on anything  that  is  entirely devoid of 
permanence.  57 
[Q6]  That we find  fixity,  purity, truth,  and  what we have  called perfect clarity, 
either  in  those  things  that  are  always,  unchanged,  unaltered  and  free  from  all 
admixture, or in what is most akin to them; everything else must be called inferior 
and of  secondary importance.  58 
The realm of  becoming revealed by the aesthetic functions, as its name suggests, does not 
meet this strict criteria for knowledge. For Plato, it has all the features of  Cratylus' world 
of permanent  flux  and  variability.  In  fact,  absolutely  nothing  in  this  realm  remains 
constant, everything being subject to the processes of  becoming, generation, destruction, 
movement, mixture and finally change with regard to their location in time.  In terms of 
the  entities  which  are  present  in  this  realm,  concrete  examples  from  Plato  include: 
beautiful young  men  who  become  old  and  ugly,  that which  is  cold  becomes  hot,  that 
which is hard becomes soft, that which is living, dies and is again reborn. the mixture and 
transformations of the  four  elements earth, air,  water,  and  fire  and  the  motions of the 
heavenly spheres.  According to Aristotle
59
,  this  was a doctrine Plato  maintained  to  the 
end of  his career. There is certainly clear evidence for  it  in the dialogues and a couple of 
substantiating passages are quoted below: [Q7]  And there is  another nature of the same name with it,  perceived by sense, 
created always in  motion, becoming in place and again vanishing out of place.
60 
[Q8] Ever to be the same, steadfast and abiding, is the prerogative of  the divinest 
of things only.  The nature of the bodily does not entitle it to this rank. Now the 
heaven,  or the universe as we have chosen to call it,  has received many blessed 
gifts from him who brought it into being, but it  has also been made to partake of 
bodily  form.  Hence,  it  is  impossible  that  it  should  abide  forever  free  from 
change.
61 
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In  conclusion,  the  way  of becoming  is  not  a  suitable  object  for  the  faculty  of 
knowledge (in sensu stricto) only for the faculty of opinion. Opinion is "knowledge" for 
Plato in only a very loose sense as we shall soon discover.  The object-correlate cannot 
then be known, only opined. Yet, for Plato, contra Parmenides the object-correlate of  the 
way  of opinion  still  exists  in  some  way.  Notice  how  this  breaks  Parmenides'  rigid 
connection between knowability  and  any  ontological  status,  as  previously  mentioned. 
Certainly, in Plato, the object-correlate of  the way of  opinion does not fully exist (it is not 
the Truly Real)  like the realm of the forms.  However, the ever-changing objects of the 
aesthetic functions are not condemned, by Plato, to the oblivion of  non-existent seemings 
(as in Parmenides), "Neither that which is nor that which is not is the object of  opinion,,;62 
"We must admit that what changes and change itself are real things,,63  and "Does not he 
who opines bring his  opinion to bear upon something or shall we  reverse ourselves and 
say that it  is possible to opine, yet opine nothing? That is impossible,,64.  To  use a useful 
term from modem philosophy,  the  Platonic  way of opinion might  be  said  to  "subsist" 
rather than "exist". In the system of  Meinong, subsisting entities are "ideal objects" such 
as  mathematical  objects  or  abstractions  like  similarity  and  difference.  In  'Zur 
Gegenstandstheorie' Meinong observes that these do not have the same ontological status 
as  "real"  (wirklich)  objects investigated by the a posteriori sciences.  The  kind of being 
that belongs to the latter entities is  termed existence (Existenz) rather than subsistence 
(Bestand). Consider the following quotation: 
[Q9] Furthermore, objects are such that their nature either allows them, as it were 
to exist and to  be  perceived or prohibits it so  that, if they have being at  alL  this 
being cannot be existence, but only subsistence [Bestand] in a sense which has to 
be  explained  further.  For  example,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  difference 
between  red  and  green  has  being,  but  this  difference  does  not  exist  it  merely 
subsists.  Similarly,  the number of books in  a library does not exist  in  addition to 
the  books~ the  number of diagonals of a polygon exists,  if that  is  possible,  even less.  However,  we  must  acknowledge,  surely,  that  each  of these  numbers 
subsists.65 
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In contrast,  the  Platonic  epistemology reverses this ontological assessment.  The  world 
revealed to the  aesthetic functions  and investigated by the a posteriori sciences merely 
subsists while the "ideal objects" truly exist. To sum up, the subsistent realm in Plato lies 
"between that which purely and absolutely is and that which wholly is not".66 
Plato, then wants to place his theory between the two extremes - between the "gods" 
denial of  ontological status to anything that varies and the giants attribution of  being only 
to that, which does vary and change.  He wants to assert that there is a reality, of some 
form, in both the realm of  the unchanging and that of  the changeable. Only this reality has 
a different ontological status in each case.  Plato then is positing an ontological dualism 
that  contrasts  with  both the  gods  and  the  giants  who  are  ontological  monists  in  the 
idealist  and  materialist  mode  respectively.  This  connects up  with the  earlier notion of 
epistemological adequation. Plato's main criticism of the senses then is not that they are 
inherently deceptive,  as  in  scepticism.  Rather the  aesthetic  functions  are  directed to  a 
realm of being that cannot be truly known only opined.  Such an object-correlate is  not 
identical with the Truly real but is nonetheless onto  logically subsistent. It  is not identical 
with "not being" and hence is something that can be the object of  belief and opinions. It is 
the realm for which the senses prove adequate. 
The subsidiary Platonic scepticism analysed earlier, results from factors relating to this 
adequacy  nexus.  The  aesthetic  functions  reveal  an  inferior  object-correlate  that  is 
constantly changing. In Plato, like is known by like. This is a theory Augustine, in On the 
Greatness of  the Soul, was later to designate the "affinity of  realities".  67  Hence when the 
soul  uses  the  aesthetic  functions  it  is  dragged  towards  an  inferior  and  inconstant 
knowledge-object.  This  has  a  detrimental  effect  and  its judgements  are  consequently 
defeasible  and  unreliable.  The  aesthetic  functions  used  by  the  soul  to  grasp  such  an 
object-correlate could not grasp the Truly Real but instead would inhabit a twilight world 
between  ignorance  and  knowledge,  "the  faculty  correlated  with  it  would  be  neither 
•  ."  68  SCIence nor neSCIence  . 
The  sensory  functions  are  only  unreliable  in  themselves  because  of this  whole 
inadequacy nexus.  They drag  the  soul - whose  true object correlate  is  the  unchanging. 
intelligible world - into a realm in which is not its natural element. We shall soon disco\ cr that the variable senses are adequate to their variable object. However. the soul itself is 
not akin to this variable world. Rather it is consonant with the eternal unchanging reality 
of  the fonns, "when it  [the soul] investigates by itself, it passes into the realm of  the pure 
and  everlasting  and  immortal  and  changeless,  and  being  of a  kindred  nature ... ".69 
Therefore it is most grievously led astray when this route is not followed: 
[QI0] When it  [the soul]  inclines to that region which is mingled with darkness. 
the world of becoming and passing away, it  opines only and its edge is blunted, 
and it shifts it opinions hither and thither, and again seems as if  it lacked reason.
70 
[Q 11] Did we not say some time ago that when the soul uses the instrumentality 
of  the body for any inquiry, whether through sight or hearing or any other sense -
because using the body implies using the  senses - it  is drawn away by the body 
into the realm of  the variable, and loses its way and becomes confused and dizzy. 
as though it were fuddled, through contact with things of  a similar nature?71 
It is not the fact that the aesthetic functions may, or may not, be inherently unreliable 
that  really  counts against  them.  In fact,  this  issue  of scepticism is  not  primary  in  the 
Platonic epistemology as it is in Descartes. The important point is that they lead the pure 
soul to consider the wrong object-correlate.  The aesthetic functions cannot, because of 
their inadequacy,  lead the soul to knowledge of the Truly Real.  So  instead they lead  it 
into  their  own realm for  which it  is  totally  unsuited.  Instead  of pure  reason  working 
independently to  attain to the  Truly Real,  it  then makes its judgement on the  basis of 
perception, which corresponds to the realm of  appearance rather than reality. This should 
remind us that Plato is rejecting logico-sensory cognition and not just sensationis~ "And 
suppose judgement occurs, not independently, but by means of  perception; the only right 
name  for  such a  state of mind  is  'appearing'  ... what we  mean by  'it  appears' a blend of 
perception  and judgement".  72  Now remember  that  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  world 
revealed  to  the  aesthetic  functions  is  ontologically  speaking  "mere"  appearance  as  in 
Pannenides. Although it  seems that Schopenhauer makes this mistake when he observes, 
"This world [the Platonic world of  ()o~a] that appears to the senses has no true being. but 
only a ceaseless becoming~ it is, and it also is not; and its comprehension is not so much a 
knowledge as an illusion.73 I  n fact, as we shall discover, the Platonic world of  8o~a  is not 
an Eleatic type illusion. 
Although Hamlyn is mistaken, in the assessment of  Parmenides, his analysis of  Plato is 
correct when he observes. "Plato does not quite say that the so-called sensible  \\orld is 
mere appearance. He does imply that the sensible world is in some sense less real than the 35 
Fonns" 74  Plato  is  doing  what  1.  Moravcsik  calls  "fundamental"  ontologv75.  In  other 
'-~ 
words,  he  is  not just  categorising  reality  as  in  "inventory"  ontology  but  is  trying  to 
discover what is  ontologically primary, i.e.  being in the truest sense.  This  ovr~  ov he 
associates with the forms  only.  Pannenides, once he  had discovered the primary being, 
viz. the One, denied existence to any other entity. However, there are entities independent 
of  the Truly Real that Plato wants to subject to ontological gradation. Some are closer to 
the Truly Real than others and, in this respect, there is certainly an intermediary class of 
object between the forms and sensory experiences. As Aristotle correctly states, "Further, 
besides  sensible things and Fonns he  says there are  the  objects of mathematics,  which 
occupy  an  intermediate  position,  differing  from  sensible  things  in  being  eternal  and 
unchangeable,  from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form itself is  in each 
case  unique".76  The  existence  of intermediate  entities,  however,  causes  a  problem  in 
interpretation that is discussed in the next section. 
1.2.3. Plato and Logico-Sensitive Cognition 
[Q12]  Now does  it  occur to you,  in  saying  what  you have just said,  that  the 
majority of arts,  as  also  those  who  are  busied therewith,  are  in  the  first  place 
concerned  with  opinions  and  pursue  their  energetic  studies  in  the  realm  of 
opinion?  And  are  you  aware  that  those  of them  who  do  consider  themselves 
students of  reality spend a whole lifetime in studying the universe around us, how 
it  came to be,  how it  does things,  and  how things happen to  it? .. Then the task 
which such students among us have taken upon themselves has nothing to do with 
that which always is, but only with what is coming into being, or will come, or has 
come.
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It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in  the  true  transcendent  apriorist  tradition,  Plato 
distinguished himself,  the project of his philosophy, from the  science of his day.  Those 
students mentioned  in  [Q12]  are presumably following  the Ionian tradition of studying 
nature  nEpt <DUo-EWC;.  Notice that the main criticism brought against  them  is  that  the 
object  and  foundation  of their  knowledge  is  the  world  of becoming,  i.e.  the  sensory 
world: the world of  entities that are not wholly real. To reason about. and from.  the flux 
of the sensory world is  to concern yourself only with things that one can have opinions 
about.  Knowledge  requires  the  absolute  stability  of the  knowledge-object.  Those  then 
that  attempt  to  know  things  with  logico-sensitive  cognition  are  pejoratively  termed 
"doxophilists""S rather than philosophers. 36 
However, it may seem that there is a problem with the above account. Does not Plato 
himself give a long and complex account of "the Universe around us,  how it  came into 
being, how it does things" i.e. the world as revealed to the senses (the phenomenal world) 
in  the  Timaeus?  Is not this  a  serious  Platonic  attempt  at  scientific  understanding.  an 
attempt to pursue an enquiry by reasoning about the deliverances of the senses (logico-
sensory cognition)? Could it be that Plato had changed his opinion of the senses in the 
move to the later dialogues? In the Republic it had been certain that "if anyone tries to 
learn about the things of sense, whether gaping up or blinking down. I would never say 
that he really learns - for nothing of  the kind admits of  true knowledge".  79  Yet we must 
not repeat the same mistake of  some commentators when they attribute a truly significant 
content to Parmenides' way of  Do~a . The scientific project in the Timaeus can, at best, 
be  described as a  series of probable beliefs only.  As such.  it  has  more status than its 
Parmenidean  counterpart  but  is  still,  most  definitely,  of subsidiary  importance.  The 
following quotations make this clear: 
[Q13]  The remaining phenomena of the same kind there will be  no  difficulty in 
reasoning  out by the method of probabilities.  A  man  may  sometimes  set aside 
meditations about eternal things, and for recreation turn to consider the truths of 
generation,  which  are  probable  only;  he  will  thus  gain  a  pleasure  not  to  be 
repented of, and secure for himself, while he lives, a wise and moderate pastime. 
Let us grant ourselves this indulgence and go through the probabilities relating to 
the same subjects which follow next in order.80 
[Q14]  Remembering what I  said at first  about probability,  I  will do my  best to 
give as probable an explanation as any other - or rather, more probable - and I will 
first go back to the beginning  .. .1  call upon God and beg him to be our saviour out 
ofa strange and unwanted inquiry, and to bring us to the haven ofprobability.81 
[Q15] And in speaking of  the copy and the original we may assume that words are 
akin  to  the  matter  which  they  describe;  when  they  relate  to  the  lasting  and 
permanent and intelligible, they ought to be lasting and unalterable, and as far  as 
their nature allows, irrefutable and invincible - nothing less. But when they express 
only the copy or likeness and not the eternal things themselves, they need only be 
likely and analogous to the former words. As being is to becoming, so is truth to 
belief  If then,  Socrates,  amidst  the  many  opinions  about  the  gods  and  the 
generation of the universe, we are not able to give notions which are altogether 
and in  every respect exact and consistent with one another, do not be  surprised. 
Enough if  we adduce probabilities as likely as any others  ... 
82 
For Plato. scientific research is a rest from the intellectual pursuits that are of  primary 
importance. It is  a  kind of hobby.  something one does to  relax.  The immanent  subject 
matter. which the scientist investigates. is  the object-correlate of the aesthetic functions. 37 
These aesthetic functions are only adequate to their own realm.  However, this adequacy 
is,  for  Plato,  still  distant from  the truth.  Even the most  exact material things  obseryed 
through the senses, although created by the demiurge in the image of the forms,  all fall 
short of truth.  In the immanentist  philosophy of Aristotle the trans-lunary world is  the 
most perfect thing in creation. In On the Heavens he observes, "We must show not only 
that the heaven is  one, but also  that more than one heaven is  impossible,  and,  further, 
that, as exempt from decay and generation, the heaven is eternal".  83 Yet for Plato even the 
most eternal of  visible things are not commensurate with the Truly Real which ultimately 
transcends them, "These sparks that paint the sky, since they are decorations on a visible 
surface, we must regard, to be sure, as the fairest and most exact of  material things, but 
we must recognize that they fall far short of  the truth".  84 In conclusion, certain knowledge 
about the Truly Real cannot be attained by the aesthetic functions of the intellect.  The 
sensory functions are unreliable faculties that, when used in conjunction with reason, give 
us at best probable opinions about the phenomenal world only.  Wisdom must be sought 
independently  of their  use,  "sight  is  the  keenest  mode  of perception  vouchsafed  us 
through the body; wisdom indeed we cannot see thereby".  85 
1.2.4. Pure Notions and Principles 
So  far,  in  the  discussion  of Plato's  apnonsm,  there  has  been  a  concentration  on 
establishing exactly what type of critical attitude exists in the dialogues, with respect to 
the  aesthetic  functions.  For  Plato,  of course,  this  critique  does  not  entail  a  general 
epistemological scepticism, although certain Platonic schools viz. the Middle Academy of 
Arcesilaus and the New Academy of  Cameades were to do  so  at a later period. In order 
to discover why Plato rejects such scepticism"  it is necessary to examine the constructive 
side  of his  epistemology.  What  category of noetic  functions  does  he  rely  on to  attain 
insight  into  truth?  How  is  knowledge  (in  sensu  stricto)  acquired  and  justified 
independently of  the discredited aesthetic functions? It must be remembered that. for the 
transcendent  apriorist  epistemologist,  with  his  rigid  exclusion of experience  (in  sensu 
stricto) from intrinsic and  adequate knowledge acquisition or justification, some special 
non-empirical theories must be devised. 
Let  us  start  with  the  Platonic  analysis  of the  building  blocks  of propositional 
knowledge  (knowledge  by  description).  For  there  are  many  commentators.  like 38 
J.S.Gosling86,  who  assert  that  such  an  analysis  constitutes  a  complete  picture  of the 
Platonic  noetic  functions.  For  them  knowledge  (in  sensu  stricto),  in  Plato's  view.  is 
exhaustively  characterised  by  the  formulaic  definition  "true  belief plus  a  logos"  (here 
logos,  in  its  most  important  sense,  is  interpreted  as  an  account  justifYing  what  one 
believes87).  As  a  consequence,  they  would  reject  any  higher  "acquaintive"  mode  of 
knowing in Plato. There are reasons to contest this rejection. What these reasons are and 
the  consequent  positing  of a  higher  acquaintive  mode  of knowing  in  Plato,  will  be 
covered later.  Meanwhile this section confines itself to propositional knowledge,  which 
has an important, though not ultimate role, in the Platonic epistemology. 
A  good  place  to  begin  this  analysis  is  with  the  thorny  subject  of knowledge 
acquisition. For here it is that Plato sets out the important noetic theory that knowledge is 
recollection or anamnesis,  "learning  is  recollection".88  This  theory  applies  to  both  the 
concepts  and  principles  involved  in  the  reasoning  process.  Although  many  later 
transcendent apriorists reject the details  of the theory,  none of them deny the need  to 
establish a suitable replacement. 
One of the most basic elements of  propositional knowledge is the concept. So  let  us 
first  examine  its  noetic  derivation.  Plato  certainly believes,  against  the  empiricist,  that 
there are pure concepts derived from the noetic functions of  the intellect. Those concepts, 
derived  from the aesthetic  functions,  are  of course considered  impure  and  inadequate. 
However,  there  are  some  interpretations  of Plato,  that  suggest  that  even  the  noetic 
concepts are ultimately inadequate to the Truly Real,  viz.  those who think that knowing 
(strict sense) in Plato is non-propositional. 
Whether they are the ultimate building blocks of  knowledge (strict sense) or not, the 
existence of noetic  concepts is  confirmed by the discussion of absolute  equality  in  the 
Phaedo. It will be clear from the following that the analysis is not specific to equality but 
can be extended to cover all other Forms/absolutes. Socrates makes this point when he 
observes,  "Our present argument applies  no  more to  equality than  it  does  to  absolute 
beauty, goodness, uprightness, holiness, and, as I maintain, all those characteristics which 
we designate in our discussion by the term 'absolute"'.  89  Now, according to  Plato. we all 
possess the concept of absolute equality of which the particular instances of equality \\e 
perceive with the senses - i.e.  the equality of one stick to  another, or the equality in the 
appearances  of twins  - fall  short,  "we  admit  I  suppose  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 39 
equality - not the equality of stick to stick and stone to stone, but something beyond all 
that and distinct from it - absolute equality".90 
However, on an empiricist account of  the derivation of  concepts we derive our ideas 
from  the  aesthetic  functions  (see,  for  instance,  1.  Locke91).  In contrast,  the  aesthetic 
functions,  for  Plato, reveal only a phenomenal world that is  an  imperfect copy of True 
Reality.  There  are  in  this  realm  no  instances  of perfect  equality,  only  the  close 
resemblances  discussed  above.  How could  we  then,  given  an  empiricist  account  of 
concept derivation, formulate the concept of perfect equality from a sensory world that 
contains nothing that corresponds to this concept.  The fact  is  that,  for  Plato. any  such 
derivation is impossible. This impossibility sets up the problematic discussed above, i.e. if 
not  from  the  aesthetic  functions,  from  where  are  our  pure  concepts  derived?  Plato's 
solution is the doctrine that before we were born the soul was separate from the body and 
was able therefore to apprehend the pure essences with the pure intellect. The concepts 
derived from this blessed vision are innate in the soul at the moment of birth,  "We had 
knowledge,  both before  and  at  the moment  of birth,  not  only of equality and  relative 
magnitudes,  but of all  absolute  standards".92  This knowledge  is  subsequently forgotten 
because of the briefuess of the vision,  our trust in the misleading aesthetic functions  or 
our allurement to the demands of  the body: 
[Q16]  Now,  as  we have  said,  every human  soul has,  by  reason of nature,  had 
contemplation  of being;  else  would  she  never  have  entered  into  this  human 
creature; but to be put in mind thereof by things here is not easy for every soul. 
Some, when they had the vision,  had it  but for  a moment; some when they had 
fallen  to  earth  consorted  unhappily  with  such  as  led  them  to  deeds  of 
unrighteousness,  wherefore  they  forgot  the  holy  objects  of their  vision.  Few 
indeed are left that can still remember much  ...  93 
However,  the  knowledge  and  the  concepts  with  which  it  is  associated  can  be 
recovered. The innate concepts derived from the vision can be "remembered" by various 
methods; the primary one being the process of  catharsis practiced by the true philosopher. 
The innate concepts take the form of  universals and are used in the proper differentiation 
into  classes.  of the  individual  data  of perception.  However,  the  concepts  cannot  be 
derived intrinsically from the world that  the aesthetic functions  reveaL  although contact 
with the phenomenal world can prompt a remembrance.  This however, as  we  have seen. 
is  only an extrinsic derivation.  Knowledge of the Forms acquired before hirth  when the -to 
soul was in a  disembodied state is  the only possible source of the pure concepts. This 
indirectly  confirms  that  concepts  cannot  be  derived  in  any  way  from  the  aesthetic 
functions because in a disembodied state there are no aesthetic functions from which to 
derive them,  "So before we began to  see and hear and use our other senses we  must 
somewhere have acquired the knowledge that there is such a thing as absolute equality,,94. 
That  Plato  ascribed  to  this  strange  doctrine  is  evident  from  many  passages  in  the 
dialogues, one of  which is quoted here and more evidence will follow in the next section: 
[QI7] For only the soul that has beheld truth may enter into this our human form 
seeing that man must needs understand the language of Forms, passing from a 
plurality  of perceptions  to  a  unity  gathered  together  by  reasoning  and  such 
understanding is a recollection of  those things which our souls beheld aforetime as 
they journeyed with their  god,  looking  down upon the  things  which now we 
suppose to be, and gazing up to that which truly is.
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It is  not just noetic  concepts that  are  explained  by the  theory of anamnesis.  The 
existence  of the  pure  principles  of propositional  reasoning,  i.e.  those  intuitions  that 
constitute axiomatic intuition and deductive intuition, are also accounted for.  That there 
are such pure principles, in the Platonic philosophy, is clear from a particular passage in 
the Republic that contains the "line" metaphor. In this passage, there is a discussion of  the 
intelligible objects of cognition and their corresponding cognitive states. The intelligible 
region is  divided into  two  sections representing the different  types of knowledge  and 
knowledge-object, the first  being btavOta the second VOllOl<;.  The attainment of pure 
principles is associated with the latter section: 
[Q  18] By the distinction that there is one section of  it which the soul is compelled 
to investigate by treating as images the things imitated in the former division, and 
by means of assumptions from which it proceeds not up to a first  principle but 
down to a conclusion, while there is another section in which it advances from its 
assumption to a beginning or principle that transcends assumption, and in which it 
makes no use of  the images employed by the other section, relying on ideas only 
and progressing systematically through ideas.
96 
The images referred to in the above passage are the images of  geometric figures used 
by the geometers to  aid their calculations. The implication is  that if even these abstract 
images are to be excluded from the dialectic search for first  principles. then other more 
concrete emanations from  the aesthetic  functions  are also  a  fortiori  e:xc luded  from  the oft 
process - a process that relies  only on pure essences or Forms.  Now if  the  process of 
attainment  is  pure,  i.e.  if nothing  is  used  but  the  pure  intellectual  processes  in  the 
attainment  of the  first  principles,  then  the  principles  themselves  must  be  pure  by 
definition.  The  first  principles are  derived exclusively from the  noetic  functions of the 
intellect  and  this  is  what  it  means  to  describe  them as  "pure".  This  interpretation  is 
confirmed by the following passage that explicitly rejects any inclusion of  the "objects of 
sense" from the dialectic process that attains to the first principles: 
[Q19] Understand then, said I, that by the other section of  the intelligible I mean 
that which the  reason itself lays  hold of by the power of dialectic,  treating  its 
assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, 
footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires 
no  assumption and is  the  starting point of all,  and after attaining  to  that again 
taking  hold of the  first  dependencies from  it,  so  to  proceed downward  to  the 
conclusion, making no use whatever of  any object of  sense but only of  pure ideas 
moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.97 
In both passages  [Q17,  p.  40]  and  [Q18,  p.  40]  the  exclusion  of the  senses  IS 
understood in terms of using  only the pure essences or Forms in the dialectic  process. 
However, as [Q19] suggests, it is not only the dialectic process but also the conclusions 
of that  process,  which  are  connected  with  the  pure  essences  or  Forms,  "moving  on 
through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas". Just as the pure concepts are derived from 
our recollection of the pure essences or Forms,  so  the pure principles are  also  derived 
from an identical source. The recollection of  the form provides us with the pure concepts 
and pure principles of reasoning. This would imply,  as the previous section made clear, 
that the pure principles of reasoning are ultimately derived from the disembodied life of 
the soul before birth. 
However,  the  connection  between  principles  and  Forms  may  be  difficult  to 
comprehend. This connection however can be explained when we consider Plato's notion 
of  the Form of  the Good. In the famous cave metaphor in the Republic the ultimate stage 
in the ascent toward true knowledge is the apprehension of  the form of  the Good, "I n the 
region of  the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is  the idea of the good".98 
Now such an apprehension,  which is  achieved by  the process of recollecting the  Fonn. 
gives rise to the principle of  sufficient reason and the principle of  perfection viz.  that there 
is a specific reason why everything is as it  is, rather than haying some other being and that this reason is that it is the best that it possibly can be.  The recollection of  the fonn. then. 
gives us insight into the principles that govern the Truly real. 
In conclusion,  the  pure  principles  like  the  pure  concepts have  their  origins  in the 
noetic  functions  of the intellect.  A fact  that  is  accounted for,  in  Plato,  by  the  strange 
theory  of recollection,  which  explains  how  these  principles  and  concepts  can  be 
indwelling,  that is  innate in the  soul.  As  Socrates observes,  "It  is  clear that they have 
never learned anything from me.  The many admirable truths they bring to birth have been 
discovered by themselves from within. But the delivery is heaven's work and mine". 99 The 
Socratic method is designed to bring that which is innate in the soul but "forgotten" to the 
forefront of consciousness, i.e.  remembrance. It strives to encourage recollection of the 
Forms. The famous slave boy example in the Meno specifically attempts to  demonstrate 
the recovery of  geometric principles from someone without any knowledge of  geometry: 
[Q20] Socrates:  Either then he has at some time acquired the knowledge, which 
he  now has,  or he  has always  possessed it.  If he  always  possessed it,  he  must 
always have known; if  on the other hand he acquired it at some previous time.  it 
cannot have been in this life,  unless somebody has taught him geometry. He  will 
behave in the same way with all geometric knowledge, and every other subject. 
Has anyone taught him all these? You ought to know, especially as he  has been 
brought up in your household. 
h  h  him 
100  Meno. Yes, I know t  at no one ever taug  t  . 
Having  analysed  the  building  blocks  of propositional  knowledge  in  Plato  we  have 
uncovered several theories concerning the noetic functions. These theories are the ancient 
precursors of  the much later doctrine of  innate ideas. A theory of  innate ideas, as we shall 
discover later. underlies most non-illuminative forms of  rationalism. However, there was 
more to Plato's epistemology than an anticipation of  a discursive rationalism. 
1.2.5. Plato's Secret Doctrine 
[Q21] It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in e\ery 
soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that  is  purified and kindled afresh by 
such studies when it  has  been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits. a 
faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes.  for  by  it  only reality  is 
beheld. 101 ·tJ 
The claims made in this section are somewhat controversial and certainly cannot be said 
to be fashionable.  There is  a  huge debate in modem scholarship as to whether or not 
Plato thought that the pure propositional knowledge is the ultimate form of  knowing. In 
the terminology of  this thesis the question would be, did Plato, like Parmenides, believe 
that deductive intuition was the last word in the theory of  knowledge. Alternatively. did 
he, like his successors the neo-Platonists, posit some higher noetic function.  Those who 
seek to limit  Plato's epistemology to propositional knowledge ascribe to what shall be 
termed the "dialectic" theory whereas those who think there is a higher mode of  knowing 
shall be said to ascribe to the "illuminative" theory. The debate on this question is by no 
means  settled.  In fact,  J.C.  Gosling,  a  commentator who  would  certainly  oppose  my 
version of the illuminative theory given in this section, admits that, "the issue is  one of 
those  on  which  we  do  not  have  enough  clear  evidence  for  decisive  proof to  be 
possible".  102 
The main things to note about the illuminative position is  that (i)  it  is the traditional 
doctrine; (ii)  while all those who ascribe to the theory are agreed that there is  a higher 
mode of  knowing, the characterization and nature of  this mode is disputed amongst them 
and finally (iii) that the theory has many modem defenders. 
With regard to point (i) it  was Plotinus who first attributed an illuminative theory to 
Plato. He connects a quote from Plato's Seventh Epistle with his own theory of  a hyper-
noetic  vision  that  transcends  reasoning.  From the  fact  that  Plato  states,  in  Seventh 
Epistle,  that  knowledge  of "serious  realities"  cannot  be  spoken or written,  Plotinus 
concludes  quite  logically that the Platonic  "insight"  cannot be  discursive  but  must  be 
illuminative in nature. For if  knowledge claim x cannot be  spoken or written how can it 
be  propositional.  For what proposition cannot  be  spoken or written? This  reasonable 
conclusion allows Plotinus to assimilate the Platonic theory to his own doctrine: 
[Q22] It cannot be spoken or written, but we speak and write impelling towards it 
and  wakening  from  reasonings  to  the  vision  of it,  as  if showing  the  way  to 
someone who wants to have a view of  something. For teaching goes as far as the 
road and travelling, but the vision is the task of  someone who has already resolved 
103  to see. 
With respect to point (ii) above. Plotinus' notion of  a "vision" that transcends reasoning is 
fundamentally  non-noetic. This is  different from many other illuminative  interpretations. Bertrand Russell,  while  agreeing  with Plotinus' notion that truth in  Plato  is  "a kind  of 
vision", states that it is a vision akin to aesthetic vision, a "union of  thought and feeling" 
that "Every one who has done any kind of creative work has  experienced".104 It is  also 
compared by Russell to Spinoza's "intellectual love of god", and the extent to which this 
is true will be examined later.  Another alternative theory is presented by Tamas in  The 
Passion of the  Western  Mind.  Here Plato's vision is  seen in  noetic rather than hyper-
noetic or aesthetic terms. The "vision" is seen as a function of  intellect and is acquaintive 
in nature. Tamas talks of  the "penetrating eye of  the soul, the illuminated intellect". 105 He 
is  certainly correct to posit an illumined intellect in Plato. He is  only wrong to suggest 
that this  is  a .universal theory of knowing  in  the dialogues.  In the thesis terminology, 
Plato's vision would be  categorized as illuminative intuition.  Alternatively,  in  Gosling's 
terminology, it is described correctly as a "quasi-seeing of  supra-sensible objects"  .106 
With  regard  to  point  (iii)  Bertrand  Russell  has  already  been  mentioned,  but  an 
important illuminative interpretation has been posited by Cornford who clearly affirms his 
commitment  to  an  acquaintive  rather  than  descriptive  interpretation  of  Plato's 
epistemology.  In Plato's  Theory  of Knowledge  he  states  "all  knowledge  of truths,  as 
distinct  from  immediate  acquaintance  with  sense-data,  involves  acquaintance  with 
Forms".107 A view reiterated by Richard Tamas, "True knowledge [in Plato], by contrast, 
is possible only from a direct apprehension of the transcendent Forms"  .108  This view is 
echoed by  R.  S.  Bluck,  in  an article  entitled  "Knowledge  by  Acquaintance  in  Plato's 
Theaetetus", when he states "It looks, then, as though Cff[aT'lP'l may be knowledge by 
acquaintance with Forms".109 It is also enthusiastically endorsed by Cherniss.
llo 
While D. 
W. Hamlyn argueslll that the illuminative theory is true but only until dialogues up to and 
including the Republic. After this Plato presumably, seeing the error of his ways, adopts 
the propositional theory. 
The opposing dialectic theory is defended by many modern commentators. In addition 
to Ryle's version that will be dealt with in a later chapter, Cooper states that "Cornford's 
reaffirmation  of the  doctrine  that  only  the  intuition  of Forms  deserves  the  name 
"knowledge" produces a confused and inadequate line of  thought" 
1 
12. Gosling also states 
"I  hope to have shown that there is  as yet  no  reason to suppose that  Plato thought that 
knowledge consisted of  some sort of  intellectual perception"  .113 
With  respect  to  any  attempt  to  resolve  this  debate,  it  must  be  said  that  Gosling  is 
correct when he  observes that no  single piece of evidence is  likely  to  prove decisive for 45 
one  side  or another.  In fact  there  appears,  at  first,  to  be  a  strange  ambiguity  in  the 
dialogues themselves. It is possible that this ambivalence may not be accidental. There is 
one possible solution to the problem that explains Plato's failure to be specific with regard 
to this point. This solution rejects the extreme views on both sides of  the debate. It rejects 
the  view,  of the  dialectic  theory,  that  there  is  nothing  in  Plato  that  transcends 
propositional  knowing.  However,  it  also  rejects  the  illuminationist  view  that  all  true 
knowledge is of  the acquaintance type. 
In broad terms, the main epistemological theory espoused by Plato. in the dialogues, 
is dialectical or propositional in nature. This is the theory Plato wants to present to those 
in his audience who are not already initiated into the secrets of  philosophy. Thus far. there 
is  agreement with those who  ascribe to the dialectic theory.  However, the illuminative 
theory is correct in so far as this dialectical or propositional epistemology is not ultimate. 
We are familiar from the metaphor of  the line, 114 that Plato envisages different epistemic 
levels  or modes of knowing.  The  highest  level,  the  ultimate  knowing  faculty  is  of an 
illuminative nature and this constitutes the secret doctrine. Absolute Truth can be attained 
through acquaintance knowing only by those who  are the truly initiated. Being initiated 
actually means not only being of the correct philosophical temperament but also  being 
thoroughly practised in dialectic. Hence, dialectic or propositional knowledge has a role 
to play in the attainment of  this  ultimate knowing. It helps open and direct the "eye of  the 
soul"  (the  noetic  acquaintive  faculty,  or  illuminative  intuition)  to  its  proper  object 
correlate. 
[Q23] And it is literally true that when the eye of  the soul is sunk in the barbaric 
slough of  the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it Up.llS 
[Q24]  The true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument 
whereby each of  us apprehends is that of  an eye that could not be converted to the 
light from the darkness except by turning the whole body. Even so, this organ of 
knowledge must be turned around from the world of becoming together with the 
entire soul, like the scene-shifting periactus in the theatre, until the soul is able to 
endure the contemplation of  essence and the brightest region of  being. I 16 
Plato's metaphorical notion of "the eye of the soul"  is  akin to illuminative intuition and. 
although it  is a faculty that  is  latently possessed by every SOUI
I17
•  nevertheless it  must  be 
developed and properly directed by dialectical reasoning. If  the initiate is suitable and has 
a  high  degree  of proficiency  in  dialectics.  ultimately  acquaintive  knowing  supervenes 
upon  propositional  knowing.  At  the  culmination  of the  \vhole  process  the  ultimate -l6 
revelation occurs spontaneously in the  SOU4  "at last in  a flash of understanding of each 
blazes up,  and  the  mind,  as  it  exerts all  its  powers to  the  limit  of human  capacity,  is 
flooded with light" I 18.  The illuminative epistemology is the ultimate form of  knowing and 
constitutes  Plato's  "secret  doctrine".  The  secret  doctrine  is  spoken of metaphorically, 
disguised  or merely  hinted  at  in the  dialogues.  That  Plato  had  such hidden doctrines. 
which  he  thought  best  only  to  reveal  to  the  initiated,  is  certainly  confirmed  by  the 
following passages: 
[Q25]  For this  reason no  serious  man  will  ever think of writing  about serious 
realities for the general public so as to make them a prey to envy and perplexity.119 
[Q26] If  I thought it possible to deal adequately with the subject in a treatise or a 
lecture for the general public,  what finer  achievement would there have  been in 
my life than to write a work of  great benefit to mankind and to bring the nature of 
things to light for all men? I do not, however, think the attempt to tell mankind of 
these matters a good thing except in the case of some  few  who  are capable of 
discovering the truth for themselves. 120 
The  uninitiated  are  not  given  the  secret  doctrine  for  many  reasons  apart  from  any 
possible "envy or perplexity"  [Q25]. The first  is simple. For Plato, like Plotinus, there is 
no  possibility of attaining the ultimate intuitional insight without the process of dialectic 
or propositional reasoning. The long process of  training for the guardians in the Republic 
is  no  accident.  They must become competent in mathematics (especially geometry), the 
sciences  (especially  astronomy)  and  dialectics  (in  particular  the  method  of "severe 
training,,121  Parmenides recommends). Then only the best, at quite a mature age, go on to 
discover  the  ultimate  acquaintive  knowledge,  "At  the  age  of fifty  those  who  have 
survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of 
knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upward the 
vision of their souls and  fix their gaze on that which sheds light  on all". 122  Now if  the 
uninitiated thought that the terminus of  the knowledge project was just a direct intuition, 
they  may  think,  like  the  tyrant  Dionysius,  that  the  hard  work  of preparation  is 
unnecessary. They may even treat philosophy with contempt or think that the possibility 
of  absolute knowledge is within easy reach, "In the case of  the rest to do so would excite 
in some an unjustified contempt in a thoroughly offensive fashion, in others certainly lofty 
and vain hopes, as if  they had acquired some awesome lore".123 -p 
The initiates are certainly given hints to the existence of  a secret doctrine. Cornford is 
right  to  say  that  Socrates'  failure  to  define  knowledge  in  propositional  terms.  in  the 
Theaetetus, definitely points the way towards the inadequacy of  propositional knowledge 
to  attain the fmal  revelation.  The revelation is  the direct  acquaintance  knowing of the 
Forms, but of course this is  left  unstated.  In passages,  from  the Republic.  there  is  an 
indication that the  truths revealed by dialectic  are not ultimate.  Socrates tells  G laucon 
that it appears that dialectic brings us to the end of  philosophical enquiry.  However. he 
then hints that there is  a further path to ultimate knowledge that dispenses with images 
and symbols and attains truth directly. Glaucon is then told that, despite having the will to 
do so, Socrates is unable to show him this path: 
[Q27]  Tell me, then,  what is  the nature of this  faculty  of dialectic?  Into  what 
divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it  is these, it  seems, that would 
bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come 
to the end of our journeying. You will  not be  able,  dear Glaucon,  to  follow  me 
further, though on my part there will be  no  lack of good will.  And,  if I could,  I 
would show you,  no longer an image  and  symbol of my  meaning,  but the  very 
h  .  124  trut  as It appears to me. 
This evidently hints  at the type of intuition Kant  denies  in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation 
when he observes,  "No  intuition of things  intellectual but  only  a symbolic  [discursive] 
knowledge of  them is given to man". 125 
The same hint is given at the metaphorical level by the image of "the eye of  the soul". 
a faculty that is often clearly separated from the dialectic process, see [Q21, p.  42]. The 
images of vision are certainly intimately connected with acquaintive knowing in the later 
illuminative tradition. For example, Scott MacDonald is correct to say that Augustine, at 
least, "develops his notion of direct acquaintance in terms of the metaphors of light  and 
vision".126  Yet Gosling and Cross think that too much can be read into these metaphors, 
"I  agree  with  Cross  ... that  too  much  can  be  made  of Plato's  use  of visual  and  actual 
metaphors".I27  Rather  than  suggesting  any  illuminative  theory  they  think  that  such 
imagery is just an indispensable tool for describing the power and clarity of  philosophical 
understanding, "if one wishes to grow lyrical about the illuminating powers of philosophy 
there is little else to do about it  but expand these metaphors" 128.  There is a sense in which 
they  are  correct.  Both Parmenides  and  Descartes  used  the  images  of illumination  but 
ncither  believcd  in  any  intuition  epistemologically  higher  than  deductive  intuition. -t8 
Grasping the conclusion of  a deductive sequence (with deductive intuition) or a primary 
axiom (axiomatic  intuition)  are processes that might  summon up  such metaphors.  The 
separation of the eye of  the soul from the dialectic process could just be the distinction 
between  the  actual  process  of noetic  deductive  reasoning  and  deductive  intuition. 
However,  it  is  puzzling why,  in Plato, a long  process of training  to  the  age of fifty  is 
required merely to draw conclusions from deductive chains.  It is  also  puzzling why  the 
metaphor  seems  so  overblown.  It is  true that  Augustine  uses  the  imagery  of light  or 
"enlightenment" to delineate elementary noetic functions.  However, one does not often 
encounter drawing a conclusion from a deductive process being  described  as  the mind 
being "flooded with light" 129 or compared with a spark that is kindled in the soul. 130 
There is also the question of  the unpredictable nature of  the Platonic intuition. It does 
not arrive, methodically in stages, like the drawing of  conclusions in the noetic deductive 
process.  Rather it  arrives after a "long period of instruction"  it  arrives "suddenly, like a 
blaze kindled by a leaping spark".131  The acquaintive nature of  the intuition is also hinted 
at in (i) the eye-witness metaphor. 132  Here those with true belief only are compared with 
the jury in a trial, while those who have knowledge are compared with the eye-witness -
someone immediately acquainted with the facts; and (ii) the road to Larissa argument. 133 
Here those with knowledge are compared to a guide who  has acquaintive knowledge of 
the  road  to  a  town  called  Larissa.  Both  the  eye-witness  and  the  guide  attain  their 
respective  knowledge  by  acquaintance  because  the  type  of knowledge  gained  is  not 
comparable  with  drawing  conclusions  from  a  deductive  process  or grasping  a  simple 
axiom.  Perhaps this  is  one of Plato's  many  hints  to  the  initiated  that  true  knowledge 
transcends the processes of  deduction. 
Plato's ultimate intuition is  certainly not mystical as  Plotinus suggests.  The pseudo-
Areopagite  recommends  the  abandonment  of all  knowledge  in  order  to  become  an 
"unstained mirror, ready to receive the primordially luminous beam of  the Thearchy" .1341n 
Plato there is no conscious abandoning of  the intellect in an act of  love or for purposes of 
a  union  with the one.  Plato  sometimes refers  to  this  mystical  "heaven  sent,,13S  type  of 
intuition and clearly distinguishes it  from his own methods.  It  is often described as a type 
of respectable  or  valuable  "madness"  that  informs  the  wisdom  of the  prophetess  at 
d  h  S b'I  1,{1  H  '"  h  Delphi,  the  priestesses  at  Dodona  an  t  e  y  1 S -.  ence  somettmes,  t  e  greatest 
blessings  come  by  way  of madness.  indeed  of madness  that  is  heaven  sent" 137  This  is 
clearly not  to  be compared with the highest  intellecti\e intuition of the philosopher.  It  is not this type of intuition to which the guardians in the Republic are supposed to attain 
after  years  of intellectual  effort.  The  Platonic  intuition,  in  contrast  to  the  mystic'S, 
supervenes upon a purely intellectual process, a process that is  intrinsic to the  intuition 
itself.  Certainly,  no  abandoning of the intellect is  required and it  is  never compared to 
madness divine  or otherwise.  It is  rather a moment of sane  enlightenment.  For similar 
reasons the Platonic intuition cannot be, as Russell suggests, a type of  aesthetic intuition 
or feeling.  Plato again clearly distinguishes this type of intuition form his  own method. 
Aesthetic  intuition  is  described  in  the  Phaedrus  as  the  "third  form  of possession  or 
madness,  of which  the  Muses  are  the  source".  138  It is  therefore  associated  with  an 
abandonment of rationality rather than a culmination of intellectual work.  In aesthetics 
skill and sanity fail  before divinely inspired madness,  "if any man come to the gates of 
poetry without the madness of the  Muses,  persuaded that skill  alone  will  make  him a 
good poet, then shall he and his works of sanity with him be brought to nought by  the 
poetry of  madness"  .139 
If the dialectic  theory is  correct, all  knowledge  is  true belief plus a logos and  this 
logos  is  propositional.  Yet  how  does  one  explain  what  Plato  is  talking  about  in  the 
following passage, where he denies that his own dialogues constitute an insight  into the 
studies to which he devotes himself: 
[Q28] I certainly have composed no work in regard to it, nor shall I ever do so  in 
the  future,  for  there  is  no  way  of putting  it  into  words  like  other  studies. 
Acquaintance  with  it  must  come  rather  after  a  long  period  of attendance  on 
instruction in the subject itself and of  close companionship, when, suddenly, like a 
blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it  is  generated in the soul and at once becomes 
If  ..  140  se  sustammg. 
The dialogue cannot express the ultimate truth because such a truth cannot be  put into 
words.  How  can  true  knowledge  be  propositional  if language  is  inadequate  to  its 
expression? Plato observes, "Hence no  intelligent man will ever be so  bold as to put into 
language those things which his reason has contemplated, especially not into a form that 
is  unalterable  - which  must  be  the case with  what  is  expressed  in  written symbo Is" .  141 
Notice  also  how,  in  the  Seventh  Epistle,  the  four  descriptive  modes  of knowing  are 
considered inadequate to the "fifth entity" i.e. that which is known. These modes viz.  (i) a 
name, c.g.  the name  circle~ (ii)  a description. e.g.  the definition of  circle~ (iii)  an image. 
~.g.  an  instantiation  or  representation  in  the  world  of a  circle.  and  (iv)  dialectical :;0 
understanding, e.g. justified beliefs in the mind concerning the circle, are the elements of 
propositional knowing and yet: 
[Q29] Each of  the four makes the reality that is expressed in words or illustrated 
in objects liable to easy refutation by the evidence of  the senses. The result of  this 
is to make practically every man a prey to complete perplexity and uncertainty. 142 
Surely, ifwhat has been called the dialectic theory were correct it would certainly imply a 
scepticism concerning that ultimate object of  knowledge, viz.  "the fifth entity", that is not 
born out by  the  rest  of the  Epistle.  How indeed  can Ryle,  Gosling  et  al.  restrict  the 
Platonic  insight  into  such  an entity,  to  propositional  knowledge  (the  contents  of the 
dialogues and the theory of knowledge contained therein)? After all,  those who  attempt 
to put their ideas about the highest objects in  writing,  like  Dionysius,  are described as 
having their wits "utterly blasted". 143 
In fact,  the  whole  debate between the  dialectic  and  illuminative  theories  has  been 
misconceived.  Ryle  and  Gosling have pointed out that, for the Plato of the Theaetetus, 
the acquaintive knowing of the elementary simples is  impossiblel
44  and have concluded 
that  this  implies  that  Plato  rejected  all  knowledge  that  was  acquaintive.  The  point  is 
however  that  Plato  is  here  deliberately  inducing  aporia.  He  is  giving  an  account  of 
knowledge  in  purely propositional terms.  He  is  taking  the  propositional theory  to  its 
ultimate limits and is showing that any attempt to account for knowledge in terms of  the 
propositional theory alone leads to an unresolved paradox.  Of course, then the simples 
cannot be  apprehended, but this does not prove that, on any theory, simples cannot be 
apprehended - this is the point. 
The dialogue is meant to point beyond itself The aporia is designed to induce in us a 
desire for a more adequate theory of  knowledge. It is a hint for the initiated that the sense 
of knowledge, in purely propositional terms, as true belief plus a logos is  inadequate. If 
knowledge was true belief plus a logos why is the Theaetetus an aporetic dialogue? Why 
are we still left in confusion when we have supposedly found the answer to the problem? 
Could it be that Plato is saying, "you have not found the answer, there is another stage in 
knowing, think  harder"? However, the full-blooded illumination theory is  also  incorrect. 
Theories  that  rigidly  associate  true  knowing  with  direct  acquaintance  with  Forms 
underestimate  the  fundamental  role  of  propositional  knowledge  in  the  Platonic 51 
epistemology. Therefore, the secret doctrine theory is the only argument to make sense of 
the debate. 
However,  despite these examples there  would have  been too few  clues to  posit a 
secret doctrine had not Plato been provoked to make some aspects of  its nature explicit. 
He  did  this  in  order  to  distance  himself from  certain  spurious  accounts  that  were 
circulating,  claiming  to  represent  the  ultimate  meaning  of the  Platonic  philosophy. 
Ironically we may have the tyrant Dionysius and other unknown pseudo-philosophers to 
thank for the provocation.
145  The actions of  these men certainly made Plato reveal more 
than  he  was  previously  willing  to  disclose.  Plato's  rejection of the  spurious  texts  or 
accounts does not result from the fact  that they contain spurious illogical propositions. 
The  rejection  occurs  for  the  simple  reason  that  such  mediums  of information  use 
propositions; whereas, in Plato's view, ultimate knowledge cannot be put into words/texts 
because it is acquaintive in nature. 
1.3. Plato and the Issue of Transcendence 
[Q30]  Then those  who  have  no  experience of wisdom and  virtue  but are  ever 
devoted to  feastings  and that sort of thing  are  swept downward,  it  seems,  and 
back again to the centre, and so sway and roam to and fro throughout their lives, 
but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the upper region 
nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted 
stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth and heads bowed 
down over their tables they feast  like cattle, grazing and copulating ever greedy 
for more of  these delights, and in their greed kicking and butting one another with 
horns and hoofs of  iron they slay one another in sate less avidity, because they are 
vainly  striving  to  satisfY  with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent 
f  h ·  ul  146  part 0  t  err so  s. 
Let  us  now  move  to  consider  whether  Plato  was  a  transcendent  apriorist  or  an 
immanentist as some have claimed.  Since true E1ttO"'tllf.lll,  for  Plato  is of the Forms (by 
acquaintance or description) the whole issue revolves around the status of these Forms. 
Are  they immanent to  the  world of experience, or do  they transcend it? The answer to 
this question of status has come to depend, in contemporary philosophy, on the issue of 
whether  Plato  ontologically  "separated"  the  Forms.  Gale  Fine,  in  her  essay  entitled 
"Separation",  distinguishes  this  notion of ontological separation which entails  that  the 
Forms  exist  "independently  of any  given  F  sensible  particular"  147  from  both  local 52 
separation  "Here  A  and  B  are  separate  from  one  another  when  they  are  in  different 
places,,}48  and definitional separation "A is definitionally separate from B just in case A 
can  be  defined  without  mention  of (the  definition)  B".149  So  far,  particularly  in  my 
account of adequation, it has been have indicated that the Forms are both ontologically 
and  locally  separate.  However,  it  would  be  foolish  to  ignore  that  certain  modern 
commentators oppose this position. 
We  have  already mentioned those  commentators who  hold  to  the  non-reducibility 
thesis. Others, like John Moline, warn us of  the putative "danger of suggesting that there 
are two textures and two 'realms'. ISO  He goes on to suggest that the Forms are "powers" 
ingredients in the mixtures which make up sensible bodies, and hence are immanent to the 
world of  experience. This view entails classification of  Plato as an immanentist and similar 
theories are  espoused by P.Natorplsl  and  lA. StewartlS2. Gale  Fine  gives perhaps the 
most powerful statement against the arguments used to defend separation. Although she 
doesn't argue for a full  immanentist position, she does see a qualified immanentism as a 
possibility.  For she  does not think the defenders of separation have  proved their case. 
Terrance  Irwin  in  an article  on Plato's Heracleiteanism, IS3  interprets  separation of the 
Forms in Plato as being on the definitional rather than the ontological level.  A similarly 
unorthodox position is  maintained  by  Donald Ray  Morrison who  maintains  that  what 
Aristotle means by separation (choristos) is 'numerical distinctness,.IS4 
It must also be said however that the denial of  transcendence is a minority viewpoint. 
Jean Roberts in a review of  John Molines' book calls the immanentist theory a "heterodox 
understanding ofa Platonic fonn"lss and accuses Moline of  "an attempt to read Platonism 
out of Plato"  .IS6  We  have  already mentioned  Aristotle's  theory  that  the  separation of 
Forms  is  the  essential  distinguishing  feature  of Platonism;  a  feature  that  allows  us  to 
distinguish Platonism from the Socratic theory of  ontologically unseparated universals. J. 
D.  Mabbott  goes  as  far  as  to  say  that  "Chorismos  is  the  only  doctrine  we  can  with 
certainty  attribute  to  Plato". IS7  The  transcendent  theory  is  also  defended  strongly  by 
Cherniss  who  states  that  certain  passages  in  the  Timaeus  involve  "statements  of the 
transcendence of  the ideas that no impartial judge could overlook or sophisticate away. It 
would be impossible for  the definition to  be put more concisely and  unambiguously". IS8 
We  have  already  mentioned  Walsh  and  Else's  similar  defence  of the  theory.  Other 
statements of it  occur in the following  small sample:  Brian Carr states that "The  form is 
an entity which exists in a special non-spatiotemporal rea1n1 of Forms, and  is  the  Ideal or 53 
Standard of  circularity". 159  Similarly R. Tamas observes of  any form that "It is immaterial 
beyond spatiotemporal  1imitatio~ and transcendent to its many instances". 160  In addition 
see Ross, Burneyeat' and Cornford.161 
The first thing to say about this debate is that even Gale Fine, who fights so heroically 
to  maintain the possibility of an immanentist  interpretatio~ ultimately admits  that there 
are Forms that are transcendent. Despite attempting to  counter all the major arguments 
that close off  the possibility, there are some she cannot contend with. For instance, in the 
Timaeus, the demiurge creates the world of  experience on the model of  the Forms. This 
would imply that there is a time t when the Forms existed without any instantiation in the 
world of experience.  For the  Forms existed before  the  world of experience  was  even 
created.  Hence,  the Forms must  be  onto  logically distinct  from the  sensibles.  They can 
exist when sensibles do not. They are not immanent to the world at time t.  Fine does not 
draw the obvious conclusion that they are not immanent to the world after time tat t1. 
Yet this is obvious to me because Plato constantly reminds us that one characteristic 
of  the Forms is that they are unchanging and eternally the same, "one kind of  being is the 
form  which  is  always  the  same,  uncreated and indestructible,  never receiving  anything 
into  itself from without nor itself going out to any other".162  But if  there were a time t 
when they were ontologically distinct from creation and then a time  t1  when they were 
immanent  to  creation,  then between t  and  t1  they have  changed quite  drastically.  Yet, 
Forms do not change.  They do  not exist in a world that tolerates any becoming so  they 
cannot become something else.  They are not like sensible things that can be  beautiful at 
one time and ugly at another. Now it could be argued that relational change is not really 
an intrinsic change in the Forms themselves.  An all powerful creator god could change 
their relation to  the  world of creation without intrinsically altering them.  Yet,  Plato  is 
famous  for  regarding  relational  change  as  change  proper.  Consider only the  examples 
used by Socrates, in the Phaedo, when he talks about Simmias possessing the quality of 
smallness  in  comparison  to  Phaedo  but  having  the  quality  of tallness  in  relation  to 
himself 163  Anyway what  the  demiurge  actually does is  different,  he  creates an  inferior 
world  on the  model of the  Forms  he  does not  transform the  Forms  into  principles  of 
immanent nature. 
Now Fine  only  admits  that  the  Timaeus  argument  is  sufficient  to  prove  that  some 
Forms are immanent (at least at time t), "The argument just sketched is a valid argument 
tor  the  separation of some Forms".  In  particular she  means moral  Forms and  Forms of "most  natural  lcinds".I64  It  does  not  prove  that  the  Form  of fire  is  ontologically 
independent  for  fire  is  said  to  have  traces  in  the  primordial  chaos  165  and  is  therefore 
always instantiated. Moreover, it does not prove the transcendence of  goodness or justice 
because these are instantiate in the demiurge himself This latter point  is  an  interesting 
non  sequitur  because  Fine  should  be  concerned  with  whether  Forms  can  exist 
independently of  sensibles. To say that the fonn of  goodness is always instantiated in the 
demiurge who undoubtedly is  not a sense-object, does not prove that goodness cannot 
exist  without a sensible  instantiation.  Since the demiurge himself transcends the  world, 
any instantiation of a Form in him is irrelevant to make Fine's point.  We must therefore 
conclude that goodness and justice are Forms that exist independently. If we do this, we 
have an immense number of  Forms that have been proved to be ontologically separate. If 
we do still assume that some, like fire, are immanent, they must be unusual exceptions. In 
reality it is difficult to imagine there being any real exception to this. Surely, in a dialogue 
like the Sophist where a interweaving of  Forms is posited
166 there would be some mention 
of a  fundamental  division between those Forms that were  immanent  to  the  world and 
those that were transcendent. 
However, there is a slight doubt that can be raised even against the arguments raised 
in  the  Timaeus  that  Fine  finds  so  convincing.  The  Timaeus  is  a  Platonic  exercise  in 
scientific  enquiry.  Plato  makes  no  more  claims  for  his  cosmology  there  than  that  it 
contains  probable  beliefs.  Having  said  this  it  is  unlikely  that  Plato  would  make  an 
educated  guess  at  the  truth,  which  involved  doctrines  that  contradicted  his  theory of 
Forms.  However, evidence that is more significant will be used to back up the theory of 
the  transcendence  of Forms.  Fine  is  correct  that  much of the  evidence  presented  by 
scholars  up  to  this  point  has  not  decisively  proved  the  case.  However,  consider  the 
following  facts  viz.  (i)  there  are  such a large  number of arguments for  transcendence, 
which are logically coherent at least on specific interpretations, and (ii) Fine fails to refute 
them  and  only  indicates  the  existence  of a  possible  alternative  interpretation.  This 
suggests that the case against transcendence is decidedly tenuous. 
The main supporting arguments for transcendence occur in the Parmenides. and are 
not examined by Fine.  The first  clue to a transcendence doctrine occurs when Socrates is 
challenging Zeno's treatise.  In order to  do  so  he  asks Zeno if  he  accepts that there are 
Forms which exist just by themselves, "Do you recognize that there exists, just by itself: a 
Form of likeness  and  again another contrary  fo~  unlikeness itself'  .167  The  fact  that  a form could exist "just by itself' certainly seems to rule out any necessary instantiation of 
Forms  in  the  particulars  of this  world.  Is  to  exist,  "just  by  itself',  not  to  exist 
independently of  anything else, and is this not what is meant by the ontological separation 
of  Forms? However, as it stands the statement does not prove transcendence. However, it 
does indicate that Forms can exist separately from their instantiations. It therefore counts 
as  an argument against  some of Molines' points.  Unfortunately,  it  does not prove that 
Forms  are  transcendent  to  these  sensible  instantiations.  The  Forms  may  be  still  be 
immanent in this world but exist in the heavens or some other place, but separate from 
their sensible instantiations. 
Socrates  himself  actually  posits  such  an  immanentist  theory.  He  suggests  to 
Parmenides that the Forms may be thoughts in the mind, "But, Parmenides, said Socrates, 
may it not be that each of  these Forms is a thought, which cannot properly exist anywhere 
but in a mind". 168  This is an early version of  a conceptualist theory of  universals. Indeed, 
it  is  a theory,  which suggests that the Forms are immanent to the world in  the human 
mind. Socrates is not speaking here of  notions like Geist in Hegel, Nous in Anaxagoras or 
the  Mind  of God  in  Augustine,  and  even if he  were  not  all  of these  theories  are 
transcendent.  Consider the  case of Hegel who  believes  in just such a universal  Mind. 
However,  as  was  indicated  in  the  introduction,  the  Hegelian  epistemology  is  most 
definitely immanentist.  In the Parmenides Plato is portraying Socrates as a young nalve 
philosopher and you get the impression, from his remarks, that Socrates is unsure himself 
of the  ontological status of the  Forms.  Sometimes his  choice  of expression seems to 
indicate  an immanentist  theory that bears out Molines'  doctrine,  "But Parmenides,  the 
best I can make of  the matter is this - that these Forms are as it were patterns fixed in the 
nature 0 f things" .  169 
Parmenides  at  this  point,  presumably  because  Socrates  is  wavering  tries  to  bring 
clarity by fixing the ontological status of  the Forms. He does this by introducing a truly 
philosophical-technical sense to what Socrates means by being "just by itself'. We  have 
already explored the ordinary language sense of  this phrase. However, the new technical 
sense excludes the possibility of  immanence; "just by itself' is to mean "in its own world". 
If  it exists in its own world then this world cannot be the world that we experience: 
[Q31]  Parm. Because, Socrates, I imagine that you or anyone else who asserts that 
each of  them has a real being Just be itself. would admit, to begin with, that 56 
no such real being exists in our world. 
Socr. True, for how could it then be just by itse1f?17o 
This passage is the refutation of  Fine's point that "auto kath hauta" could mean "different 
from"  sensible particulars rather than ontologically separate from them. 171  It is obvious, 
against Morrison and Irwin, that in Plato there is a stronger notion of separation than is 
implied  by  numerical  or definitional  distinctness.  The  Forms  are  certainly  posited  as 
existing  in  their  own world.  Remember  also  that  the  things  in  our  world  are  mere 
subsistents and do  not really exist, in the true sense, like the Forms. Hence, if  something 
is  Truly Real like  the  Forms  it  cannot  exist  in  our world.  A fact  that  Parmenides re-
iterates, "But as you admit, we do not possess the Forms themselves, nor can they exist in 
our world". 172 This is another argument against the immanentists. Anyway, Parmenides at 
this point fixes  with certainty the status of  the Forms. They are transcendent and do  not 
exist  in  our  world.  This  rigid  ontological  separation  is  then  illustrated  by  many 
examples. 173 
According  to  Parmenides,  the  existence  of this  ontological  separation  throws  up 
several important epistemological and theological problems. Such problems would never 
arise if  the Forms were immanent. The first problem that Parmenides mentions is similar 
to  that  faced  by theologians and philosophers who  believe  in a transcendent God.  It is 
generally designated the problem of natural theology. This problem will inevitably affect 
any  ontological  dualist  like  Plato.  The  terms  and  significances  we  attribute  plus  the 
knowledge we humans possess in our immanent world have reference only to the things 
in that world. The things in this world are given, by us, the same names as the Forms in 
that other world. However, the names in our world have reference only to the things in 
our world not to that which transcends it, "these things in our world which bear the same 
names as the Forms are related among themselves, not to the Forms, and all the names of 
that  sort  that  they  bear  have  reference  to  one  another,  not  to  the  Forms" .174  The 
significance of  things in this world is similarly incapable of  transcending this world, "The 
significance of  things in our world is not with reference to things in that other world, nor 
have these their significance with reference to  us,  but,  as I say,  the things in that world 
are what they are with reference to one another and toward one another, and so  likewise 
are the things in our world". 175 It is the same with that which counts as human knowledge. 
This too will  have reference only to  the immanent  world and as  a consequence "beauty 
itself or goodness itself and all the things we take as Forms in themselves are unknowable 57 
t  " 176  The  1  gical  .  f  o  US  .  ontolo  separatIon 0  Forms then sets us substantial epistemological 
problems. For if  they are separate it seems we cannot know them. 
According to Plato's Pannenides, it also has an unacceptable theological consequence. 
The Gods are usually considered to be omniscient and omnipotent. However, ontological 
separation means that the God's "most perfect knowledge" has reference only to the most 
perfect realities  viz.  the Forms.  The gods then must be ignorant of the things  in  our 
imperfect world. They therefore cannot be omniscient. Not only this, but the god's power 
and mastership has reference only to the essential slave not to the de facto slave in our 
immanent  world.  They do not then have  any power over us.  They are  not therefore 
omnipotent. Parmenides states these unacceptable consequences in the following terms, 
"Just as we do not rule over them by virtue of  rule as it exists in our world and we know 
nothing that is divine by our knowledge, so they, on the same principle, being gods, are 
not our masters, nor do they know anything of  human concerns".177 Socrates at this point 
interjects  saying  that  a  doctrine  that  had  such  consequences  would  be  just  "too 
strange".178 Now these problems can be logically stated only on the assumption that the 
Forms are transcendent.  How can we have problems knowing them if  they are  in  our 
world? If  the gods know the form of  the just and this Form exists in our world, how is 
that a problem for the divine omniscience? 
The critic may point out at this stage that ontological separation has  still not been 
proved. Does the fact that Parmenides brings out intolerable consequences in the doctrine 
of separate Forms not mean that Plato  rejects it too? Is the Parmenides  an attempt 
perhaps to reject early immature theories that Plato later discarded? The fact that it  is a 
young Socrates that is presenting the argument may suggest this.  However, the fact  is 
that Parmenides does not reject the theory. Contrary to this viewpoint, his purpose is only 
to suggest that there is more to be considered in stating the theory than Socrates realized. 
There are more philosophical problems involved in the theory which Socrates would have 
realized  had  he  subjected  himself to  Parmenides  method  of "severer  training"  m 
dialectics.179  This is  a method which brings out consequences of asswning a theory and 
denying it. In fact it is my contention that Parmenides is using this method himself in his 
criticism of  the theory of Forms just as he  later uses it on his own theory that all things 
are one.180  For Plato's Parmenides never rejects the theory of onto  logically  separated 
Forms.  His  argument  that  they  would  be  unknowable  is  only  methodological  and  is 
qualified in the text. In fact. all Parmenides actually claims is that it would be difficult to 58 
convince someone who thought they were unknowable.  To  say something is  difficuh is 
not to say that it is impossible: 
[Q32]  Suppose someone should say that the Forms, if  they are such as we  are 
saying  they  must  be,  couldn't  even  be  known.  One  could  not  convince  him 
that  he  was  mistaken  in  that  objection,  unless  he  chanced  to  be  a  man  of 
wide experience and natural ability, and were willing to follow one through a long 
and remote chain of  argument.  181 
The theory of  ontologically separate Forms is admittedly difficult to prove in the light 
of Parmenides' many objections but there is  certainly a hint that such a proof could be 
given by an extraordinary talented philosopher, "Only a man of exceptional gifts will be 
able to see that a form, or essence just by itself, does exist in each case, and it will require 
someone still more remarkable to discover it and to instruct another who has thoroughly 
examined all these difficulties".182  However, Parmenides immediately, at this point. goes 
on to emphasise the importance of  this project. For without a theory of  Forms, which are 
distinct  objects of knowledge,  we are  left  with a world of flux  that cannot  be  known. 
Without the Forms existing distinct from the world of sensibles (remember if  they were 
wholly in  our world they too would be  in flux)  there would be  nothing permanent that 
could be named and this would, "completely destroy the significance of  all discourse". 183 
As a consequence the philosophical project itself would be  impossible.  Socrates then is 
not  to  be  faulted  for  (i)  his  theory,  which  Parmenides  endorses  again184  nor  (ii)  his 
philosophical project which is confirmed as important. It is the arguments surrounding the 
justification of  his theory that he has paid inadequate attention to. He wants to define the 
Forms before he is trained to understand the philosophical consequences of  his theory and 
how to defend it against the sceptic, "you are undertaking to define 'beautiful' Just' 'good' 
and other particular Forms, too soon, before you have had a preliminary training". 185  The 
preliminary  training  provides  practice  in  analysing  the  multifarious  and  often  hidden 
consequences of  maintaining any philosophical position. 186 
This  theory  is  supported by  the  fact  that Plato  actually does provide  a  solution to 
what  the  Mediaevals  called  the  problem of natural  theology.  In  doing  so,  he  answers 
Parmenides criticism on this point. The theory that  knowledge  is  reminiscence provides 
an  explanation  of how  n10rtals  can  attain  to  the  divine  wisdom  despite  the  radic~l 
separation of worlds.  The  theory  maintains  that  the  soul  has  a divine  nature  which  is 59 
trapped, in this world, only because it is a prisoner of  the body.  "the soul is  trapped like 
an oyster in a shell". 187  Before it was imprisoned it was resident in the divine world and 
there came face to face with the Forms themselves. If  we can attain to divine knowledge. 
in this world, it is only because of  a memory of  a primordial encounter of  the disembodied 
soul with the other divine world - where the Forms permanently reside.  This is  Why,  in 
order to attain knowledge,  it is  necessary ultimately to  turn the  soul around from  this 
world in order to hberate it from this earthly plane. 
To  conclude  this  section,  Aristotle's  analysis  of Plato's  theory of Forms  must  be 
supported. He regarded them as ontologically separate substances that are transcendent 
to  sensory particulars.188  He  makes  no  reference  to  any  evidence  that  suggests  Plato 
believed in the immanence of  the Forms at any time in his career. This would certainly be 
a strange omission, because the immanence of  the Forms was a major Aristotelian theory 
(the  Medieval's  characterized  the  Aristotelian  attitude  to  the  Forms  in  the  phrase 
universalia in rebus). Surely, he would recognise such an important precursor. There can 
be  no  sense  in  saying  that  Aristotle  wanted  to  be  considered  the  originator  of this 
particular  theory  and  therefore  deliberately  ignored  its  existence  in  Plato.  There  is 
evidence  for  this  point  in  the  fact  that  Aristotle  quite  without jealousy attributed  the 
theory to Socrates, "And Socrates gave the impulse to this theory [of Forms], as we said 
before, by means of  his definitions, but he did not separate them from the particulars; and 
in this he thought rightly, in not separating them".189 That the Forms existed, transcendent 
to  their sensible  instantiation is  clear from many passages in the dialogues.  To mention 
but a few:  in [Q30, p.  51] from the Phaedrus mortals, in love with the sensory world, are 
condemned  for  not  "transcending  all  this"  and  turning  their  mind's  eye  to  the  "upper 
region".  Similarly in the  Theaetetus there is talk of "that other region which is free  from 
evil".190  In the Phaedrus
l91  there is talk of  a "place beyond the heavens" and the "earthly 
likenesses"  of the  Forms.  Now  these  examples  indicate  locational  separation.  Yet. 
according to Fine, locational separation does not necessarily imply ontological separation. 
However, it  does imply this when combined with a doctrine, which states that the Forms 
continue to exist when the particulars fade away. A form like beauty, in the upper region 
continues to exist even when beautiful things disappear. When can this other region really 
be devoid of Forms? All this supports Plato's conclusion, "We are  in fact convinced that 
if we  are  ever to  have  pure  knowledge of anything  we  must  get  rid  of the  body  and 
contemplate things by themselves with the soul itself,.142 CHAPTER 2 
THE ELEMENTS OF TRANSCENDENT APRIORISM 
[Q33]  This  science  took the  determinations of thought  to  be  the  fundamental 
determinations of things. It assumed that to think what is  is to know in  itself~ to  ,  , 
that extent, it occupied higher ground than the critical philosophy that succeeded 
it. 
[Hegel!] 
2.1. The Theories Expounded by Our Predecessors2 
60 
The general analysis of  Plato gives the misleading impression that transcendent apriorism 
is  already  sufficiently  defined,  with  its  own  established  epistemological  terminology. 
However, it is important to understand that the phrase transcendent apriorism refers to an 
epistemological doctrine  with  a very determinate nucleus  of definitional conditions.  In 
fact, the currently available terminological and definitional formulations of  the doctrine do 
much to obscure this fact.  For some reason many such formulations, are intolerably loose 
when  exactitude  is  so  obviously requisite,  particularly  for  purposes  of differentiation. 
There  even  appears,  at  times,  to  be  an  element  of complacency  involved.  The 
complacency often results from the acceptance, in modem epistemology, of  either or both 
of the  following  general assumptions viz.  (i)  that everyone already understands exactly 
what the doctrine involves and how it is distinct from related epistemologies, or (ii) that 
the  doctrine  is  fundamentally  untenable  in  its present form or has,  in  actual fact,  been 
conclusively refuted. The unfortunate result has been that philosophers are often content 
to  use  their  own indeterminate  designatory  terminology.  There  is  also  a  tendency  to 
promote  particular  definitional  aspects  as  a  substitute  for  an  exhaustive  and  precising 
definition. In consequence, no  generally agreed terminology or definitional formation has 
emerged. far less been established, in the field of  modem epistemological studies. 
The confusing diversity of tenns and  meanings.  which are  listed  in appendix  1.  are 
culled from  modem epistemological texts.  There is  no  doubt that despite divergence in 61 
content, the authors mentioned are attempting, but unfortunately failing, to designate and 
define an identical epistemological doctrine. The Kantian-type terminology used suggests 
that  many of them may  have  in  mind,  in  varying  stages of vagueness,  the  theory of 
knowledge,  which  underpins  the,  so-called,  "pre-critical"  or "dogmatic"  metaphysics. 
More specifically, the epistemological doctrine, rejected in the Critique of  Pure reason, 
which presumes that, "it is possible to make progress with pure knowledge, according to 
principles, from concepts alone".3 The object of  such pure knowledge is, "a realm beyond 
the world of the senses where experience can yield  neither guidance nor correction".4 
Those definitions  that do not contain Kantian-type  terminology seem to be  confusing 
conventional textbook definitions of "rationalism" with the Kantian formulation.  While 
this confusion will be exposed later, the accuracy of  the Kantian contnbution itself is, of 
course, along with other traditional terms and definitions, also open to question. 
Looking  back  from  the  standpoint  of a  whole  thesis  devoted  to  the  subject  of 
transcendent apriorism the definitions, listed in appendix I, seem somewhat naive.  This 
perceived naivety led to the conclusion that only complacency could have contnbuted to 
the lack of determinacy in their present formulation.  During the course of  this chapter, 
there  will be  an attempt  to expose  the  inadequacies  in  each of these  definitions.  In 
addition,  it  will be  discovered  that  other  contemporary  attempts  at  differentiational 
accuracy  within  the  field  of research,  viz.  (i)  P.  F.  Strawson's  distinction  between 
"revisionary"  and  "descriptive"  metaphysics  and  (ii)  C.  S.  Peirce's  contrast  between 
"ontological"  and  "scientific"  metaphysics,  are  broad  net  divisions  incapable  of 
differentiating  effectively  between transcendent  apriorism  and  related  epistemological 
doctrines. 
The  same  complacency  that  underlies  many  contemporary  formulations  cannot, 
however,  be attributed to  some of the more traditional definitions.  The complacency, 
stemming from the belief that the doctrine is  untenable, certainly cannot be ascribed to 
them.  It is  necessary to remember that transcendent apriorism once existed as a living 
tradition, providing, as it did, a determinate epistemological method for the establishment 
of  some of  the greatest systems of  metaphysics. The method was considered to possess a 
unique  epistemological veracity and  was often explicitly  defended  against  the various 
attacks  of empiricists  and  sceptics.  However,  there  are  systems,  within  this  older 
tradition, in which the method was not explicitly stated or analysed. A possible reason for 
this, although not the only one, was that ontology and metaphysical system building were 62 
often given priority over issues in  epistemological method.  In some  instances.  this may 
demonstrate  the  existence  of another  type  of complacency.  Fortunately.  it  is  not 
complacency  evident  in  the  majority  of philosophers  in  the  once  flourishing  "living" 
tradition.  A  comparison  between  the  modem  and,  the  more  profound.  traditional 
definitions will occur later in this thesis. 
A  general  list  of the  philosophers  and  philosophical  movements  that  employ  the 
epistemological methods of transcendent apriorism within the living  tradition are given 
below.  The  list  is  presented only  as  part  of a  general  introduction to  the  reader  and 
contains  many  omissions:  Parmenides  of Elea,  Zeno  of Elea,  Me lis sus  of Samos,  the 
Megarics,  Plato,  Philo  of Alexandria,  Plotinus,  Porphyry,  Iamblichus,  St. August ine. 
Proclus, Saint Anselm, William of  Auxerre, Saint Bonaventure. Henry of  Ghent, Marsilio 
Ficino,  Nicolas  Malebranche,  Rene  Descartes,  Gottfried Wilhelm  Leibniz,  Benedict  De 
Spinoza,  and the  Cambridge  Platonists.  The  tradition then went  into  tenninal decline. 
Immanuel Kant  briefly revived the method in  the Inaugural Dissertation.  However,  it 
was  Hegel  who  gave  the  doctrine  both  its  most  profound  statement  and  its  most 
sophisticated defence,  especially  against  the  critical philosophy of Kant.  However.  for 
Hegel, the doctrine was,  in some ways,  limited.  Although it  was regarded as a positive 
contribution  to  the  history of philosophical  thinking,  it  was  not  conceived  to  be  the 
highest  stage  of that  history.  The  philosophy  of Bergson represents  a  late  and  final 
flowering of  the theory. 
It may appear strange that Christian Wolff, the philosopher described by Kane as "the 
greatest of  all the dogmatic philosophers" is not present in the above list. In fact, contrary 
to both Kant's assertion and popular interpretation, Wolffwas not a transcendent apriorist 
at all.  In addition, there are other interesting and significant omissions. A.  J.  Ayer
6 seems 
to regard F.  H.  Bradley and M.  Heidegger as archetypal transcendent apriorists. Neither 
of them, in fact,  corresponds to this categorization and Ayer would have done better to 
direct  his  attacks  against  those  philosophers  that  are  in  the  above-mentioned  list.  J. 
Macquarrie
7 and others would include Hegel but this again is a mistake; despite what has 
been said concerning his positive attitude towards the doctrine. 
It  must  be  understood  that  it  is  not  the  contention  of this  paper  that  all  the 
philosophers  and  philosophical  movements.  in  the  living  tradition.  worked  with  an 
identical  form of transcendent  apriorism.  Indeed.  we  shall discover later that  this  is  not 
the case. Parmenides' version of  transcendent apriorism is different. in some aspects, irom 63 
Augustine's.  However, those differentia that do  exist  are  non-essential for  purposes of 
definition. Hence, their existence does not warrant or require a separate epistemological 
designation.  There are  rather different  types of transcendent  apriorism,  the  nucleus of 
core definitional conditions remaining determinate within all versions. In  fact~ it  was the 
discovery  of these  essential  conditions  that  allowed  the  formation  of an  improved 
definition  from  a  mass  of data from  different  periods.  Despite  this,  it  is  important  to 
remember  that,  to  say  that  an aspect  is  non-essential,  in  definitional  terms,  is  not  to 
contend that it  is insignificant and can be ignored. It is these aspects that distinguish the 
different  versions  of transcendent  apriorism.  In  fact,  the  non-recognition  of these 
important distinctions has caused much confusion in the assessment of  the doctrine. 
In regard to the complacency argument previously mentioned, it is undeniable that the 
doctrine  seems  immediately  recognizable.  For  instance,  there  is  an  undeniably  close 
connection  between  transcendent  apriorism,  as  it  is  subsequently  defined,  and  the 
epistemology  of the  "dogmatic"  metaphysics  Kant  tried  so  hard  to  discredit  in  The 
Critique. The doctrine is also familiar to the modern philosopher as being connected with 
the epistemology of "transcendent metaphysics" which is the main target of A.  J.  Ayer's 
Language  Truth  and Logic.  However,  in  both cases,  even with regard to the  issue  of 
recognition, a close connection is all that is admitted at present. The actual relationship is 
more complicated than it  seems and caution is urged. At the level of understanding, the 
issue is even more involved, as has been already stressed. 
As a general consequence, it  is necessary to establish both the terminological aspect 
and the definitional content of  the doctrine with some exactitude. The referent doctrine, 
therefore, is  stipulated by a specific set of  conditions that are essential to it  and directly 
related to the selected terminology. It is possible that the reader may find the approach in 
this  section  over-cautious.  It may  seem  that  terminological  neologisms  with  complex 
meaning contents are redundantly functioning to explain an epistemological position that 
is already familiar. However, the problems encountered, in a long analysis of  transcendent 
apriorism, are convincing testimony that the determination of its exact meaning-content. 
on commencement.  is  fundamentally  requisite.  The errors and  misconceptions that  can 
and do result from a more relaxed attitude to such issues will be disclosed in this section 
as a wanung. 64 
2.2. A Detenninate Designation 
In order to understand the reasons for the accusation of  terminological imprecision, it 
is  first  necessary to establish the actual distinctions between transcendent apriorism and 
other  epistemological  doctrines.  For  it  is  upon  this  understanding  that  any  correct 
definition  should  be  based.  Unfortunately,  this  would  require  the  disclosure  of more 
information than is possible at the present moment. However, a simplified version can be 
presented,  instead,  that  will  help  the reader understand  now,  what  will be  revealed  in 
more  detail  later.  A  new categorization  system has  been  devised  that  is  designed  to 
clearly  and  exactly  delineate  certain  specific  epistemological  strands  that  exist  within 
philosophical and  scientific  systems.  The  subsequent tabulation,  designated table  1.,  is 
formulated to be  a general and  simplified  overview of this system,  containing concrete 
examples  from  the  history  of philosophy.  In the  table,  point  [A]  presents  a  general 
definition  of  the  category,  point  [B]  lists  a  few  philosophers  whose  work 
uncontroversially  falls  within  that  particular  categorization,  and  point  [C]  gives  an 
argument form that exemplifies a particular category: T 
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APRIORISM  APOSTERIORISM 
[A]  That the intellect can attain to the  [A] That the intellect can attain to the 
Truly Real identica4 in this case, to the  Truly  Real identical,  in  this  case,  to 
noumenal  world  by  using  a  priori  the  noumenal  world  by  a posteriori 
reasoning or intuition.  reasoning or intuition. 
[B] Parmenides, Melissus, Plato, 
Plotinus, St.Anselm, Spinoza. 
[B]  Aquinas,  Duns  Scotus,  Wolff 
Schopenhauer. 
[C]  The  ontological  proof of God's  [C] The cosmological proof of  God's 
existence.  existence. 
[A]  That the intellect can attain to the  [  A]  That the intellect can attain to the 
Truly Real identical, in this case, to the  Truly  Real  identical,  in  this  case,  to 
phenomenal  world  by  using  a  priori  the phenomenal world by a posteriori 
reasoning or intuition. 
[B] Hegel, Kant, Husserl, Fichte, 
Bradley, Menger, DUring, 
Descartes' (scientific programme). 
[C] Descriptive Phenomenology, 
Austrian Economics, Cartesian 
science, transcendental argument. 
reasoning or intuition. 
[B]  Epicurus,  Roger  Bacon,  Locke, 
Hume, J.S. Mill, Berkeley, positivism, 
modem science, existentialism. 
[C] Hume's "experimental method of 
reasoning", scientific induction. the 
hypothetico-deductive method, 
Popper's method of  falsifiability. 
Existential phenomenology. 
Table 1. The Four Epistemological Divisions. 66 
Transcendent  apnonsm,  transcendent  aposteriorism,  immanent  apnonsm  and 
immanent  aposteriorism  are  distinct  epistemological  doctrines  that  underpin  various 
metaphysical systems or arguments. It is the non-recognition of  the clear division between 
them,  when  it  extends  to  the  general  epistemological  foundations  of metaphysical 
systems,  which  accounts  for  some  of the  abovementioned  crudeness  in  the  existing 
terminology.  The following examination, of closely related epistemologies, will highlight 
that which is essential about transcendent apriorism. 
2.2.1. Transcendent Aposteriorism 
Transcendent  aposteriorism  affirms  that,  although  humans  can  attain  to  transcendent 
knowledge, they can do so only through reasoning that is ultimately rooted in experience 
of phenomena.  The  main  type  of "cosmological"  proof for  the  existence  of God  is, 
therefore,  an  archetypal argument  in  this  respect.  John Hick
8  defines  arguments in  this 
category as  "a posteriori theistic  proofs"  that  supposedly  "proceed from the  world to 
God".  Such  arguments  begin  with  postulates  ultimately  derived  from  experience  and 
attempt  to  prove  from  them the  existence  of something  that,  in  fact,  transcends  that 
experience.  As  an aside,  it  must  be emphasized  at  this  stage that not  all  cosmological 
arguments are a posteriori. As M.  W.  F.  Stone remarks,  "The cosmological argument is 
an argument for a cause or reason for the cosmos. It can take either an  a priori or an a 
posteriori form". 
9  This will explain why a rationalist like  Leibniz could make use of the 
argument. His a priori version is based on the principle of sufficient reason and does not 
contradict his transcendent apriorist epistemology. Having noted this let us return to the a 
posteriori  versions  of the  argument.  The  first  three  ways  of Thomas  Aquinas,  as 
presented in the Summa The%giae, are just such cosmological proofs. The existence of 
an object, viz. God, that infinitely transcends all sensory experience, is to be demonstrated 
from the following axioms, which are derivative of  experience: 
[Q34]  It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in 
motion. 
In the world of  sensible things we find there is an order of  efficient causes. 
We find  in nature things that are possible to be and not be, since they are found to 
d 
10  be generated, and to be corrupte  . 67 
Now transcendent aposteriorism, as  a more general epistemology, was in fact  most 
prevalent in this Medieval Christian Aristotelianism. Biblical reference to the doctrine was 
often traced to  St.  Paul's speech to the Romans.  The seminal part of  this speech is given 
here, in the translation of  John Duns Scotus, "For since the creation of  the world, God's 
invisible attributes are clearly seen being understood through the things that are made". II 
In the  Summa  Theoiogiae,  Aquinas  also  refers to  this  quotation and  reformulates the 
essence of  the epistemological doctrine in his own terms, "Our minds understand material 
things by abstracting ideas of them from their images, and then use such knowledge to 
acquire knowledge of  immaterial things". 12 
This  epistemology  is  also  fundamental  to  the  metaphysics  of John  Duns  Scotus, 
whose object-cognate (as for Aristotle and Aquinas)  was being  qua being.  However, it 
has to be said that unlike Aquinas, Scotus thought that, what is now termed transcendent 
apriorism, was the ideal type of  knowing for the natural intellect, "were it not hindered". 13 
However,  because  in  this  life  the  natural  intellect  was  "ex  infirmitate'\  due  either  to 
original  sin  or some  aspect  of the  divine  order,  it  can,  unfortunately,  only  found  its 
metaphysics  upon transcendent  aposteriorism.  This  was  also  the  position of Robertus 
Grosseteste in his commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Anaiytics, "I  say it  is possible to 
have  some  knowledge  without  the  help  of the  senses,  for  in  the  divine  mind  all 
knowledge,  not  only  of universals  but  also  of all  particulars,  exist  etemally  ... and  this 
would be the case with all human beings, if they were not weighed down under the load 
of  a corrupt body". 14 By the time, in a subsequent period, that the poet John Milton wrote 
the  following  clear  definition,  the  doctrine  was  a  well-established  epistemological 
commonplace: 
[Q35]  But  because  our understanding  cannot  in  this  body  found  itself but  on 
sensible things nor arrive so clearly to the knowledge of God and things invisible 
as  by orderly conning over the visible  and inferior creature, the same method is 
necessarily to be followed in all discreet teaching. 15 
Although subsequently falling  into decline, the doctrine is revived much later and informs 
a significant portion of the metaphysics of Christian Wolff and Arthur Schopenhauer. In 
his  Discursus  Praeliminaris.  Wolff signals  his  aposteriorist  epistemological  stance  by 
stating the requirement that his  philosophy must  begin with experiential principles.  "the 
principles  of philosophy  must  be  derived  from  experience".  16  It is  also  clear  that.  for 68 
Wolff:  expenence  has  a  role  in  the  corroboration  (corroboratio)  and  falsification  of 
philosophical  theories.  In  his  Psychologia  Rationalis,  the  argument  for  the  pre-
established harmony of  body and soul is seen as a "hypothesis" superior in nature to those 
of  Descartes and the Occasionalists. However the hypothesis is to be regarded as falsified 
as  soon  as  experience  is  contradictory  with  it,  whereas  experiential  corroboration 
increases its probability.17  In the Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica,  Wolff asserts that 
the goal of his  entire philosophy is the "marriage of reason and experience (connubium 
rationis  et  experientiae).  18  The  method used to  facilitate  this  marriage  is  unusual  and 
proceeds in two  stages starting and  founded  upon an "ars  inveniendi a posteriori",  an 
analysis that proceeds from observations and experiments. The insights of  this completed 
investigation are  then incorporated and  expanded in an "ars inveniendi a priori"  which 
uses  a  demonstrative  method.  In an  article  entitled  "Christian  Wolffs  Philosophy  of 
Contingent Reality", these facts and others have led C.A.  Van Peursenha to speak of  the 
"empiricist character of his metaphysics".19 It is  significant also  that the method is used, 
by  Wolff,  transcendentally  to  answer  all  the  problems  of metaphysics,  including  the 
existence  of God  in  natural  theology  and  the  immateriality  of the  soul  in  rational 
psychology. Christian Wolffs philosophy is therefore both a posteriori and transcendent. 
The following quotation [Q36] from,  The  World as  Will and Representation, shows 
that Schopenhauer also considered that there is a possibility of  attaining to knowledge of 
things-in-themselves with a posteriori methods. This knowledge depended on the fact that 
we  are not merely knowing subjects, but are ourselves identical with the thing-in-itself, 
"we  ourselves  are  the  thing-in-itself,.20  Being  conscious of oneself (a non-spatial  and 
hence non-perceptual intuition) therefore was considered to be a "subterranean passage" 
to  knowledge of the in-itself  All  other noumena we  have to approach "from without" 
whereas with consciousness of  self we can penetrate within the in-itself This knowledge 
is regarded as a posteriori rather than a priori: 
[Q36]  But as  perception can furnish  only phenomena,  not things-in-themselves, 
we  too  have  absolutely  no  knowledge  of things-in-themselves.  I  admit  this  of 
everything,  but  not  of the  knowledge  everyone has of his  own willing.  This  is 
neither a perception (for all perception is spatial), nor is it  empty~ on the contrary, 
it  is  more real than any  other knowledge.  Further it  is  not  a priori,  like  merely 
formal knowledge. but entirely a posteriori.  21 69 
To  sum up,  transcendent  aposteriorism is  the  epistemological doctrine  that  affirms 
that the intellect  can attain to the Truly ReaL  in this case identical with the  noumenal 
world, by reasoning from experience. In consequence, it is a doctrine that is substantially 
different from transcendent apriorism - as defined in our as yet non-technical way - that 
demands, as we shall soon discover, a strictly a priori form of  reasoning. 
So, bearing this in mind, let us now return with fresh eyes to the existing terminology 
from appendix 1, which seeks to categorize what is meant by transcendent apriorism. It is 
now  obvious  that  one  of the  important  functions  of the  terminology  must  be  to 
differentiate transcendent apriorism from transcendent aposteriorism. In this respect, it is 
immediately clear that the term "metaphysics",  used  by  many  commentators.  does not 
function in this way.  Both epistemological systems are in fact  usually embraced by this 
term. What philosopher would not argue that both Aquinas (a transcendent aposteriorist) 
and  Plato  (a  transcendent  apriorist)  were  doing  metaphysics?  Indeed,  if the  term 
"metaphysics" applies to both systems it cannot be used to differentiate between them. 
Qualificatory terms are therefore required, so  let us consider these.  Walsh and Ayer 
use  the  term  "transcendent"  to  qualifY  metaphysics.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen,  both 
epistemological systems are transcendent in nature.  Therefore, this qualifYing term does 
not allow us to differentiate between them.  We  can then reject the phrase transcendent 
metaphysics  as  inadequate.  That  Walsh  is  loose  in  his  terminology  is  more  surprising 
because  he  explicitly  identifies  the  epistemological  distinction  required  and  finds  it 
significant. Consider this passage from his book Metaphysics: 
[Q37]  But  it  is  only  fair  to  point  out  that  there  are  many  supporters  of 
transcendent metaphysics in particular all those who  draw their inspiration from 
Thomas Aquinas,  who  would regard that view  [a view resembling transcendent 
apriorism]  as  extravagant and indefensible.  That 'there is  nothing in the intellect 
which  was  not  previously  in  the  senses'  seems  to  them  axiomatic:  the 
metaphysician,  like  any other enquirer, has no choice but to start from empirical 
premises.  But though he  must begin from experience, it does not follow that his 
1') 
thinking has to remain within the bounds of  the experienceable.--
Hegel's alternative qualifYing term "Pre-Kantian" must now be analysed.  Immediately 
this  is  found  to  be  useless because there are examples of both types of epistemological 
system in existence before Kant.  Plato and Aquinas. for example, are both "pre-Kantian" 
but.  in  fact,  represent  the  opposing  epistemological  polarities.  The  Solomon  and 
Macquarrie qualifier "speculative" is equally unhelpful. The first  disadvantage of  the term 70 
for our purpose is that it  has had more than one meaning in the history of  philosophical 
usage.  Despite this we can, at least, be sure that  Solomon and Macquarrie use  it  in  its 
Kantian, rather than Hegelian or other, sense. In the Kantian usage, "speculative" refers 
to an object that transcends any possible experience, or a concept that refers to such an 
object, "theoretical knowledge is speculative if  it concerns an object, or those concepts of 
an object, which cannot be reached in any experience. It is so named to distinguish it from 
the knowledge of nature,  which concerns only those objects or predicates of objects, 
which can be given in a possible experience".23 Hence "speculative" is a term identical in 
meaning  to  transcendent  as  used  by  Walsh  and  Ayer.  It cannot  therefore  distinguish 
between transcendent apriorism and transcendent aposteriorism for reasons already given. 
Loenen's qualifier  "deductive"  also  fails  in  this regard.  Consider Charles  Sayward's 
definition of deduction,  "for any  sentence  S,  relative  to a  set  of sentences K,  a  finite 
sequence of  sentences whose last sentence is  S (the one said to be deduced) and which is 
such that each sentence in the sequence is an axiom or an element ofK, or follows from 
preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule ofinference".24 Now there is no reference 
to the necessity for any sentence, axiom or element to be derived either a posteriori or a 
priori.  For deduction  is  a  species  of argument  or inference  irrespective  of any  such 
consideration. It would be correct to apply the term deduction both to, (i) the method of 
more  geometrico  in  Spinoza's  Ethics,  which  proceeds  from  a  priori  axioms  and  is 
contentually a priori and,  (ii) the ideal demonstrative science of  Aristotle that proceeds 
from  a  posteriori  axioms  and  is  contentually  a  posteriori.  In  conclusion,  again  the 
important distinction is not made by the qualifying term. 
A  more difficult case is  that of the qualificatory term "dogmatic" used, by  Kant,  to 
qualifY metaphysics. It is more complex because initially, at least,  it  seems to meet our 
criteria of differentiation.  In fact,  the phrase "dogmatic metaphysics"  is  indeed  used to 
encompass  those  systems  that  absolutely  exclude  the  practice  of reasoning  from 
expenence.  The  "sweet  dogmatic  dreams  ,,25  of  reason  actually  arise  from  the 
"presumption that  it  is  possible  to  make  progress with pure  knowledge,  according  to 
principles, from concepts alone".  26 And the term pure, in Kant's philosophy, is formulated 
in a very determinate sense to exclude the empirical, "A priori modes of knowledge are 
entitled pure when there is no admixture of  anything empirical".  27 
However. this reference is not. implied by the term "dogmatic". In  t~lCt, the term. even 
in  Kant himself:  is  intended to emphasize two aspects of  metaphysics of  the transcendent 71 
type  that are  unconnected with this  important distinction.  In the  first,  strict  sense.  the 
term is used to describe philosophical systems that do not correspond to Kant's notion of 
a "critical" philosophy. In this connection the Critique of  Pure Reason, an embodiment of 
the critical philosophy, was intended to "clip the wings of  dogmatism".28 and in place of 
the dogmatists' enquiry "into things", it proposes a "critical enquiry concerning the limits 
of  my possible knowledge"  .29 Dogmatism then involves a direct system building approach 
to metaphysics, without the required epistemological investigation into the possibility of 
such a structure. 
The second, common language sense of the term dogmatism is also present in Kant. 
In the Critique he states that the government of reason "under the administration of  the 
dogmatists,  was  at first  despotic ... ". 30  In this  sense  dogmatism  is  the  negation of the 
autonomous intellect with its criticaL  freethinking and questioning attitude. Again, there 
is no sense in which a term with this meaning would significantly qualify "metaphysics" in 
the  sense  required  above.  The  previous  rejection  of both  the  terms  "dogmatic"  and 
"transcendent"  obviously  renders  Schopenhauer's  phrase  "dogmatic  transcendent 
philosophy" useless. The replacement of  the term "metaphysics" with "philosophy" in fact 
diminishes rather than enhances the specificity of  the terminology - metaphysics, after all, 
is actually a specific type of  philosophy. 
It cannot be denied that, in the definitions quoted earlier, there are qualificatory terms 
that  do  go  some  way  to  indicate  the  distinction  required.  In particular,  Copleston's 
qualifiers "rationalist" or "pure" seem to make the appropriate point because they tend to 
emphasize  the  non-a  posteriori  nature  of transcendent  apriorism.  In  this  respect, 
Copleston's  phrase  "rationalist  or pure  metaphysics"  has  much  in  common  with  our 
remaining definitions viz. Loenen's, "epistemological rationalism", Mourelatos' "dogmatic 
rationalism" and 1. Cottingham's, "Apriorism". That this a priori element is emphasized in 
the  above  terminology,  however,  is  simply  not sufficient.  This  is  because,  as  table  1. 
makes clear, in addition to the differentiation of  transcendent apriorism from transcendent 
aposteriorism it  is equally important to distinguish the doctrine from immanent apriorism. 
lnunanent apriorism,  as a  substratum of various metaphysical and  scientific  systems.  is 
most definitely a distinct epistemological doctrine.  It  is  however far  more complex and 
must be dealt with in detail. 2.2.2. Immanent Apriorism 
As  defined  in  table  1,  the  doctrine  of immanent  apnonsm  is  distinguished  from 
transcendent apriorism with respect to the selection of an object-correlate for the Truly 
Real.  In immanent  apriorism,  this  object-correlate  is  the  phenomenal  rather  than  the 
noumenal world.  This particular choice of object-correlate can be  influenced by  several 
factors.  In post-Kantian philosophy,  the main reason for  the identification of the  Truly 
Real and the phenomenal world was the actual rejection, as unnecessary or incoherent of 
the  notion of an  in-itself or noumenal  world.  To  avoid  confusion,  and  because  it  is 
sufficient  to  make  the  point  here  intended,  at  this  point,  the  phrases  "in-itself'  and 
"noumenal world"  are  regarded  as  synonymous.  In addition,  the  terms  "phenomena", 
"representations"  and  "appearances"  are  not  distinguished.  However  later  these  same 
terms and phrases will be given exact meanings that are non-identical.  Kant had insisted 
that  "behind  appearances  we  must  admit  and  assume  something  else  which  is  not 
appearance - namely things in themselves,,3]  because "otherwise we  should be landed in 
the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears".  32 
Yet, it  is the existence of  this "something else" behind or underlying appearance that 
is strongly denied by the main strand of  immanent apriorism. Incidentally, it is also denied 
by a type of  immanent aposteriorism. Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and Evil, announces the 
fundamental idea in aphoristic form,  "The apparent world is the only one, the 'real world' 
is  merely  added  by  a  lie.".33  In actively  promulgating  what,  for  Kant,  is  an  "absurd 
conclusion" philosophers must defend themselves against the Kantian argument. They do 
this by suggesting, contra Kant, that there is a sense in which there can be an appearance 
"without anything that appears". Consider the following statements: 
(i)  His appearance was immaculate. 
(ii)  Appearances can be deceptive. 
(iii)  I  t appears to me to be water. 
(iv)  His appearance was unexpected. 
In  uses  (i),  (ii)  and  (iii)  the  Kantian  argument  that  demands  something  behind 
appearance makes sense. For example in (i) it makes sense to reply "Yes but appearances 
are deceptive".  The consequence of this statement. designated (ii), is  that  there may be 
some  non-deceptive  reality  behind  the  appearances.  Considering  statement  (iii),  if it 73 
appears to me, P, that x is G and to someone (or something) else, Q, that x is H then this 
might indicate that there is  something which x is,  independently of how it  appears to  P 
and Q. However, in sense (iv), it would just not make sense to ask for something else that 
was behind the appearance.  Heidegger used the term phenomenon to indicate this latter 
special  meaning  of coming-on-the-scene.  It was  a  sense  that he  traced directly to  the 
Ancient  Greek  term  $atVo!J.EvOV  and  its  verbal  root  $atvEcr9at meaning,  "to  show 
itself'. This is why Heidegger can say that the word phenomenon "has nothing to do with 
what is called an 'appearance' or still less a 'mere appearance"'.  34  A phenomenon is rather 
"the  showing-itself-in-itself,35  and  signifies  "a  distinctive  way  in  which  something  is 
encountered".36  Heidegger's  definition  of  phenomenon  corresponds  to  its  use  in 
descriptive,  existential  and  Hegelian  phenomenology.  Although,  to  indicate  the  same 
notion Hegel and Sartre sometimes, but not always,  use the additional term "appearing" 
rather than the ambiguous term "appearance". 
The need for the abovementioned usage emerges from a philosophical position that 
repudiated the notion that the Truly Real was the noumenal world and instead embraced 
the  only  world,  i.e.  the  phenomenal,  as  the  Truly  Real.  This  phenomenal  world  is 
therefore no longer seen in contrast with the noumenaL for there is nothing at all "behind" 
the  appearances.  There is,  as  Sartre suggests, only the series of phenomena and hence 
only  one  existent  thing  viz.  the  phenomenal  world,  "Modem  thought  has  realized 
considerable  progress  by  reducing  the  existent  to  the  series  of appearances  which 
manifest  it.  Its  aim  was  to  overcome  a  certain  number  of dualisms  which  have 
embarrassed philosophy and to replace them by the monism of the phenomenon".37  As 
such  it  was  not  seen  as  a  loss  to  metaphysics,  rather  it  was  just  a  redirection  of 
consciousness  toward  the  true  object  of knowledge.  As  long  as  philosophers  had 
associated  the  Truly  Real  with the noumenal  world  their  attitude  to  appearances  was 
negative, "to the extent that men have believed in noumenal realities, they have presented 
appearance  as  a  pure  negative".38  Sartre's  formulation  is  slightly  inaccurate,  however, 
because it  is not the fact that men have believed in the existence of  noumenal realities that 
requires them to regard appearances as negative. For instance, Kant certainly believed in 
the existence of  the noumenal world both as the source of  the given and as a precondition 
for  the moral law.  Yet. as we shall soon discover, he  regarded phenomena in a  positin~ 
way.  Rather,  it  is  the  actual  association of the  Truly  Real  and  the  noumenal  world.  a 
connection  denied  by  Kant.  which  leads  to  the  negative  assessment  of appearances. 74 
Appearances  are  considered  illusory,  deceptive  or just  inadequate.  In  contrast.  the 
association of the Truly Real with the phenomenal world meant a new positive attitude 
toward appearances. 
The association of  the Truly Real and the phenomenal world was made in a variety of 
philosophies.  In Appearance  and Reality,  F.  H.  Bradley39  had  observed  that,  "the 
Absolute is experience" and explained what he meant in the following way: 
[Q38] All appearance must belong to reality. For what appears is, and whatever is 
cannot fall outside the real. And we may now say that everything, which appears 
is somehow real in such a way as to be self-consistent. The character of  the real is 
to possess everything phenomenal in harmonious form. 40 
This  is  a  thought  echoed  by  Sartre,  Husserl  and  Merleau-Ponty  when they  observe 
respectively:  "the appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it  is the essence,,41; 
"What  things  are  ... they  are  as  things  of experience,,42  and  "We  must  not,  therefore, 
wonder whether we really perceive a world, we must instead say:  the world is  what we 
perceive" .  43  Since this was the generally held belief in po st  -Kant ian immanent apriorism, 
there was seen to be no longer any point in attempting to transcend experience. Actually 
there  was  nothing  beyond  that-which-is,  to  be  transcended.  For that  which  is  to  be 
transcended  in  transcendent  apriorism  viz.  the  phenomenal  world  was,  for  immanent 
apriorism, the only True Reality. In fact, as Husserl informs us, "It is a fundamental error 
to suppose that perception (and every other type of  intuition of  things, each after its own 
manner) fails to come into contact with the thing itself,.44 The phenomenological phrase 
"thing  itself'  is  not  to  be  confused  with the  contrasting  notion of a  "thing-in-itself'. 
Therefore, the identification of  the Truly Real and the phenomenal world was considered 
an  escape  from  an  inhibiting  illusion.  It  again  opened  up  the  possibility  of absolute 
knowledge  of reality that  had  been denied  by  the Kantian positing of an  unknowable 
thing-in-itself 
Kant  himself did  not  think  that  the  positing  of a  thing-in-itself precluded  the 
possibility  of such  knowledge.  However,  Hegel  had  argued  that  if there  were  an 
unknowable thing-in-itselfthen that same thing-in-itselfwould inevitably remain the True 
Reality sought in philosophical enquiry. The fact that we cannot know it  would therefore 
entail  the  triumph  of  scepticism.  The  elimination  of  the  thing-in-itself  therefore 
represented,  for  the  post-Kantian  immanentists  the  defeat  of scepticism.  Their  entire 75 
immanentist programme is therefore summed up by Sartre when has states, in Being and 
Nothingness, that: 
[Q39]  If we once get away from what Nietzsche called  "the illusion of worlds-
behind-the-scene,"  and  if we  no  longer  believe  in  the  being-behind-the-
appearance,  then  the  appearance  becomes  full  positivity:  its  essence  is  an 
"appearing"  which  is  no  longer  opposed  to  being  but  on the  contrary  is  the 
measure of it.  For the being of an existent is  exactly what it  appears. Thus, we 
arrive  at the idea of the phenomenon such as we can find,  for  example,  in  the 
"phenomenology" of Husserl or of Heidegger - the phenomenon or the relative-
absolute. Relative the phenomenon remains, for  "to appear" supposes in essence 
somebody to whom to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of  Kant's 
Erscheinung (appearance). It does not point over its shoulder to a true being that 
would be, for it absolute. What it is, it is absolutely, for it reveals itself as it is. The 
phenomenon can be studied and described as such, for it is absolutely indicative of 
•  1£45  ltse  . 
I  t must be stated at this point that although all the philosophers mentioned in this section 
had immanentist programmes, not all of  them can accurately be described as "apriorists" . 
Sartre,  Heidegger  and  Merleau-Ponty  are  not  included  in  our final  list  because  they 
cannot  be  described  as  such.  However,  the  epistemology  of  the  "existential" 
phenomenologists (as opposed to the descriptive phenomenology of Husserl and others) 
is not a significant concern in this thesis. It is sufficient to note that the modes of  knowing 
employed by them, in grasping the phenomena, are not a priori in the sense required by 
apriorism.  As  Macquarrie has correctly observed,  "Existentialists and empiricists make 
common  cause  against  the  speculative  rationalism  of earlier  times.  They  distrust  all 
attempts to construct philosophy a priori".  46  This association with the aposteriorist is of 
course  complicated  by  the  strange  and  varied  modes  of knowing  extant  within 
existentialism.  Most  are  experiential  based  modes  of knowing,  but  some  do  more 
resemble a mystical/poetic intuition or insight, whose status is more difficult to assess. 
In  contrast  to  the  immanentist  programmes  so  far  analysed,  although  Kant  is  an 
immanent apriorist, his immanent ism is something of  a compromise. The existence of  the 
t hing-in-it self makes it, in a sense, negative in nature. The denial to human consciousness 
of (i)  an  intellectual  intuition,  "intellectual  intuition,  forms  no  part  whatsoever of our 
faculty of  knowledge"47 or (ii) a noumenal use for the categories, "the principles of  pure 
understanding can apply only to objects of  the senses under the universal conditions of  a 
possible experience, never to things in  general without regard to the mode in  which we 76 
intuit  them,,48,  means that,  unfortunately our cognition is  restricted to  the phenomenal 
world. 
In the event, Kant makes a virtue of  necessity and redefines the Truly Real so  that it 
applies  to  that  which falls  within  experience,  viz.  to  appearances.  This  subversion of 
traditional philosophical usage involves the rejection of  a possible transcendent apriorist 
claim that appearances and representations have a status as illusion. According to Kant, if 
this  were  the  case  then because  knowledge of the  in-itself is  impossible  it  would  be 
inevitable that all human cognition would have to be interpreted as grasping mere illusion. 
Kant  therefore  subverted  the  terms  "Reality"  "Truth"  and  "illusion"  so  that  he  could 
ascribe reality to appearances or representations. This was the epistemological move that 
Hegel subjected to devastating criticism. Kant's position is formulated as follows: 
[Q40]  It would  be  my  own fault,  if out of that  which  I  ought  to  reckon  as 
appearance, I made mere illusion.  That does not follow as a consequence of  our 
principle of  the ideality of  all our sensible intuitions - quite the contrary. It is only 
if we ascribe objective reality to these forms  of representation, that it  becomes 
impossible  for  us  to  prevent  everything  being  thereby  transformed  into  mere 
'11  .  49  1 uSlon. 
Again, a different type of  immanent apriorism occurs in Cartesian science. Here there 
is neither a denial of  the existence nor the possibility of  knowing the thing-in-itself. Rather 
the science of nature must use the method of  immanent apriorism because of its chosen 
special  object  viz.  the  phenomenal  world.  The  choice  of object-correlate  therefore 
depends on the particular nature of  the subject matter. There may be a noumenal world 
and possibly it  can even be known but, through the choice of  the investigator, there is a 
concentration on the phenomenal. 
In  conclusion,  we  can  now  see  immediately  the  inadequacy  of the  remammg 
terminological contributions.  Copleston's  "rationalist"  or  "pure  metaphysics"  Loenen's, 
"epistemological  rationalism",  Mourelatos'  "dogmatic  rationalism"  and  J.Cottingham's, 
"Apriorism"  are  patently deficient.  This  is  because the terms  "rationalism"  "pure"  and 
"apriorism". although emphasizing the a priori nature of  our subject-doctrine. fail to mark 
its  transcendent  as  opposed  to  immanent  nature.  Husserl,  for  instance.  refers  to  his 
phenomeno logy as ·"rationalism". The method is  certainly a priori, using as it  does what 
Husserl calls an "essential" or "fidetic" intuition to produce its descriptions.  Kockelmans 
has  even  described  Husserl's  phenomenological  psychology  as  "aprioristic".  50  Fidetic 77 
intuition is  really identical to Kant's notion of the intellectual intuition that is  denied to 
human consciousness but possessed by God, see [Q42, p.  79].  Yet Husserl uses such an 
intuition to analyse the things of experience viz.  phenomenon, not to transcend them in 
pursuit of the thing-in-itself or the noumenal world.  The following  quotation illustrates 
this point: 
[Q41]  The  pure  phenomenology of experience  in  general  ... has  to  do  with  the 
experiences  that  can  be  grasped  and  analysed  in  intuition  in  their  essential 
generality,  but  not  with  empirically  apperceived  experiences  as  real matters of 
fact. .. The essences grasped in essential intuition and the connections based solely 
upon the essences, are brought to expression descriptively in concepts of  essence 
and lawful statements of essence.  Every such statement is  an a priori one in the 
best sense of  the term.
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Hence, Husserl is  not a transcendent apriorist but an immanent apriorist and the above 
mentioned terminology does nothing to mark this fact.  It only seeks to establish that he is 
an apriorist. 
The  other  terms  involved  in  the  remammg  definitions,  VIZ.  "metaphysics" 
"epistemological"  and  "dogmatic",  also  do  not  function  to  illustrate  the  required 
distinction.  The meanings of dogmatic and metaphysics have already been analysed and 
indicate  something entirely different,  while  epistemology is just a non-specific term for 
the  theory  of knowledge  in  general.  It is  now  clear  why  the  phrase  "transcendent 
apriorism"  was  invented  to  specify  the  subject-doctrine.  It  rules  out  the  sources  of 
possible confusion. It may be noted at this point that the distinction between transcendent 
apriorism and immanent aposteriorism has not been considered. It will be considered later 
but it  is  best explicated subsequent to its contrary doctrine, viz.  transcendent apriorism. 
being properly defined. 
2.3. The Mis-Categorization of  Wolff, Hegel, Heidegger and Bradley 
Even at the level of  preliminary analysis, before a technical definition and explanation 
have  been  given  of the  subject  doctrine,  some  errors  in  existing  categorization  are 
recognizable. The mentioned inaccuracies could even be due just to a lack of  attention to 
terminology.  It appears  already.  at  this  stage,  that  Kant  and  others
52  are  mistaken  in 
categorizing  Christian  Wolff as  a transcendent  apriorist  because.  as  we  have  seen.  his 78 
philosophy is transcendent aposteriorist. Yet, even modem critics, like  V/.  H.  Wals~ can 
make the mistake of  attributing to Wolff, not only a transcendent apriorist epistemology. 
but the most extreme form of  this doctrine. In Reason and Experience Walsh observes. 
"the most extreme form of  rationalism would be that ofWolfP,.53 
A.lAyer and others also are misguided in considering F.H.Bradley and M.Heidegger 
to  be  transcendent  apriorists.  Firstly,  because  both,  as  we  have  seen,  follow  an 
immanentist rather than a transcendent epistemological programme. They have therefore 
no  interest in transcending the limits of  possible experience.  Secondly, although Bradley 
could be termed an apriorist, because his notion of "feeling above the level of  relations" 
can be interpreted as a species of  a priori intellectual intuition (one reminiscent of  Kant's 
notion), Heidegger cannot. In the early philosophy of  Being and Time,  the "disclosure" of 
phenomena  is  attained  though  a  type  of experiential  intuition  or  "ontological  mood" 
(Befindlichkeit),  not  through a  priori intellectual  intuition.  In  fact,  as  Calvin  Schragin 
suggests, "Heidegger rejects without qualification any rationalist metaphysical speculation 
and  a  priori  epistemological  construction  which  focuses  upon  mental  and  cognitive 
processes  to  the  neglect  of the  phenomena themselves.  On this  point  Heidegger  is  a 
radical and consistent empiricist".54 I would agree with this point but to analyse it, at the 
present moment in detail, would take us too far from our present purpose. Presently, it is 
sufficient to  say that if  the analysis is  correct then Ayer's assessment of Heidegger as a 
transcendent apriorist - when, in fact, he is an immanent aposteriorist - is incredibly wide 
of  the mark. 
Macquarrie  and  others  are  similarly  mistaken  in  considering  Hegel  to  be  a 
transcendent apriorist. Hegel is most definitely an immanent apriorist. His epistemological 
stance  stems  from  a  strand of immanent  ism that  originates  in  Fichte's rejection of the 
Kantian noumenal world.  For Hegel, the positing of an unknowable thing-in-itself only 
results  from  the  misleading  and  undefended  presuppositional  metaphor  i.e.  that 
knowledge is a "tool with which one masters the Absolute".55 Ifknowledge is a tool then 
it  is  natural to conclude that the particular nature of such an  instrument will  distort the 
truth, when functioning as a medium between subject and reality. The "fear of  falling into 
error,,56  in the Kantian philosophy therefore assumes "certain ideas about cognition as an 
instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and 
this  cognition".  57  The  Hegelian  rejection of the  unknowable  thing-in-itself.  as  an  error 
based  upon  such  a  misleading  metaphor.  means  that  like  the  phenomenological 79 
immanentists there is, for Hegel, only the phenomenal world and the phenomenal world is 
identical with the Truly Real. 
As  a  consequence  of this  account,  it  may  seem  strange  that  Hegel  defended 
transcendent apriorism.  Hegel certainly did not agree with this doctrine's association of 
the Truly Real and the noumenal world. To posit such a world was a mistake. However. 
he  recognized that the transcendent apriorist, unlike the Kantian.  regarded the thing-in-
itself as knowable - see [Q33, p.  60]. Hence, the transcendent apriorist did not make the 
mistake of  the critical philosophy viz. to presuppose "that the Absolute stands on one side 
and  cognition on the  other,  independent  and  separated  from  it  and  yet  is  something 
real".58  His belief that there was a bridge, a link between that which is thought and how 
things  are  in-themselves,  prevented  this  separation.  For  Hegel,  the  Truly  Real  was 
certainly  identical  with  the  phenomenal  world.  It was  the  essence  of things  to  be 
phenomenal.  There  could  not  be  things  that  were  not  for  Absolute  or  finite 
consciousness, "The things of  which we have direct consciousness are mere phenomena, 
not for us only, but in their own nature".  59  However this phenomenal world was known 
by  a  priori  means.  Experience  plays  only  an extrinsic  role  in  knowledge  acquisition. 
Hence  although awakened  by  experience  philosophy  does  not  intrinsically  begin  from 
experience. Hence, Hegel was not a transcendent apriorist as some have suggested, rather 
he just agreed with one aspect of their epistemology - against the critical philosophy of 
Kant. 
2.4. Further Modern Distinctions 
In the early part of  this chapter, two modem attempts at definitional accuracy that so 
far we have not considered were mentioned. Strawson's distinction between "descriptive" 
and "revisionary" metaphysics should be familiar to the reader. In Individuals Strawson, 
make his distinction: 
[Q42]  Descriptive metaphysics is  content to describe the actual structure of our 
thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better 
structure  ... Perhaps no  actual metaphysician has  ever been,  both in  intention and 
effect,  wholly the one thing or the other.  However, we can distinguish broadly: 
Descartes. Leibniz. Berkeley are revisionary, Aristotle and Kant descriptivc.
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Irrespective  of the  criticisms  levelled  at  this  distinction  and  its  applicability  to  the 
philosophers mentioned
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it  is clear it does not help us with the differentiational analysis 
of  transcendent apriorism.  There is a distinction to be made between how we ordinarily 
divide up the world into categories and the transcendent apriorist's attempts to transcend 
these  categories.  It seems  obvious  that  Reality,  as  it  normally  manifests  itself to  the 
human  understanding,  is  plural,  changing  and  temporal  - although  this  is  not 
uncontroversial.  Whereas  a  transcendent  apriorist  metaphysician,  for  instance 
Parmenides,  wants  us  to  believe  that  Reality  is  one,  unchanging  and  eternal.  The 
"descriptive" metaphysician would merely describe the conceptual scheme that makes the 
plural,  changing,  temporal world that we actually experience possible.  In contrast, the 
"revisionary"  metaphysician  would  question  whether  the  world  that  we  actually 
experience is in fact Real. If she decided - usually the criterion for such a decision would 
be  a  noetic analysis  - that it  was not she  would consequently revise  her notion of our 
normal conceptual schema, i.e.  would see it as producing falsehood rather than truth. In 
the  latter  case,  there  are  various  value-judgements that  entailed  the  final  revision.  In 
descriptive metaphysics theoretically no evaluation occurs, just a neutral description. 
It must be observed that most of  what counts as transcendent apriorism is revisionary 
in nature. It can also be admitted that this is an interesting and important point. However, 
it  cannot be said to be a unique characteristic and hence a determining differential factor 
in  the definition of transcendent apriorism.  There is  no  reason why immanent apriorist, 
transcendent aposteriorist or even immanent aposteriorist systems cannot be revisionary 
in  this sense. Few of  the philosophers in these traditions can be described as conforming 
to the descriptive model of  metaphysics. In fact, Strawson's distinction seems independent 
of particular epistemological commitment.  The modem scientist's world of sub-atomic 
particles,  or the  world revealed to us  in relativity theory is  as much a  revision of our 
ordinary categories as the noumenal world of the transcendent apriorist.  Consequently, 
Strawson's  distinction  is  of little  use  in  uniquely  defining  transcendent  apriorism.  Of 
course, to be fair to Strawson, this was not his specific project in making it. 
C.  S.  Peirce's distinction between ontological metaphysics and scientific metaphysics 
is more informative. Ontological metaphysics we are told uses an "a priori method" while 
scientific metaphysics uses the method of the sciences viz.  "observation and reasoning". 
There  is  also,  in  scientific  metaphysics,  a  connection  between  Truth  and  the  perfect 
understanding of the  phenomenal  world  and,  in  ontological metaphysics,  a  connection 81 
between Truth and the noumenal world.  The  recognitio~ in  Peirce's  distinctio~ of the 
importance of the a priori method and the noumenal world is correct. However exactly 
what  is  meant  by  such a  method  and  such  a  world  are  not  really  developed.  Peirce 
acknowledges  that  pragmatism is  a  kind  of 'prope-Positivism',  which  affirms.  "almost 
every proposition of  ontological metaphysics is gibberish".62 He does not therefore deem 
it worthy (a common failing) of  deep analysis. There is, therefore, almost nothing we can 
learn from his distinction. 
Having analysed now most modem approaches to transcendent apriorism, they are all 
found,  without  exceptio~ to  be  inadequate.  This  appears  to  be  a  strange  situation 
because it is clear, after considerable analysis of  the doctrine, that those philosophers who 
worked in the de facto tradition of  transcendent apriorism had a profound understanding 
of the important distinctions.  This understanding is  at  a high  level  in  Kant's Inaugural 
Dissertation. However, it  is the work of  G.  W.  F Hegel which, as we have already seen, 
manifests  the  most  profound  epistemological  insight.  The  opening  quotation  of this 
chapter was from Hegel's Encyclopaedia o/the Philosophical Sciences. Its placement at 
the  head of this  chapter was  no  accident.  For it  can only  be  the  result  of the  deepest 
insight  into  the  transcendent  apriorist  project.  An  insight,  incidentally,  that  has 
subsequently  been  altogether  lost.  Hegel,  as  we  have  seen,  had  a  high  opinion  of 
transcendent apriorism.  He often compared it  favourably,  in certain of its aspects, with 
the  contemporary philosophy of his  day,  "The  older metaphysic  had  in  this  respect  a 
loftier  conception  of thought  than  that  which  has  become  current  in  more  modem 
times".63  It is  this  constructive attitude to the  doctrine that seems positively correlated 
with  the  level  of insight  into  its  nature.  In  consequence,  the  weakness  of modem 
interpretations appears to stem from their unqualified negative assessment of  the doctrine. 
To  identify such latent prejudices is an important propaedeutic to a future  unprejudiced 
analysis of  transcendent apriorism. 
2.5. A Detenninate Definition-Fonnulation 
If the  purpose  so  far  has  been  to  provide  the  referent  doctrine  with  a  determinate 
designation,  the  next  stage  is  to  stipulate  a  determinate  definition-formulation.  The 
definition is designed to be more adequate than the simplified version given in table  I.  It 82 
is  however much more complex and the rest of the thesis is  really an exposition of its 
terms. The formal definition, designated Deft, is therefore formulated as follows: 
By transcendent  apriorism is  meant  the epistemological doctrine  which  affirms 
that, by the exclusive means of a priori (sensu stricto) ratiocination or immediate 
intellectual  intuition,  the pure (human)  intellect can attain to knowledge of the 
Truly Real. The Truly Real being understood, in this case, to be identical with the 
noumenal "world"; defined itself as the undistorted being-for-consciousness of  the 
in-itself 
To  conclude  this  chapter,  the  new  terminology  and  its  corresponding  categorization 
system appears to avoid the ambiguities inherent in the extant designations of  the referent 
doctrine.  The  determinate  referent  doctrine  required,  and  is  given,  a  determinate 
designation. 83 
CHAPTER 3 
THE NOETIC FUNCTIONS 
3.1. The Pure (Human) Intellect 
In  the  technical  definition  of transcendent  apnons~ Def\,  it  is  the  .... pure  (human) 
intellect"  that  grasps the  Truly Real.  The  qualificatory term  "pure"  indicates  the  strict 
exclusion of the  aesthetic  functions.  In  fact,  the  use  of the  term.  in  this  way,  follows 
philosophical tradition.  For example,  Meissner  in  his  Philosophisches Lexicon of 1737 
defines  pure  reason as  "a  completely  distinct  cognition  in  which  the  understanding  is 
separated from the senses and imagination".  1 Also,  for Kant, a representation is  termed 
pure  "when  there  is  no  mingling  of sensation". 
2  It was  Parmenides  who  confidently 
maintained  that the  purification,  of the  human  intellect,  provided the  seminal  route  by 
which transcendent enlightemnent is finally attained. Before the post-Hegelian decline, the 
method was held, by many philosophers, to be an ideal to which the human reason dreams 
of aspiring.  However, this does not indicate that they all considered it  to  be within the 
scope  of the  intellect's  power.  In  fact,  the  method  of complete  purification  is  often 
perceived to be  beyond the limited  scope of human cognition.  Often,  the possibility of 
fulfilling the method is granted only to intelligences that do not possess our limitations i.e. 
to angelic intelligence or to the mind of  God. It has been asserted that, for Duns Scotus, 
transcendent apriorism was just such an ideal form of knowing.  In fact Scotus thought 
that  the  method was not available  to a degenerate human consciousness.  He  therefore 
reluctantly contented himself with transcendent aposteriorism. Kant,  in the first  Critique. 
denies  intellectual  intuition  to  the  human  "dependent"  intellect  that  is  required  to 
incorporate sensibility.  However he also recognizes it as an ideal and therefore attrihutes 
it to the Godhead or "primordial" being: [Q42] But however universal this mode of  sensibility may be. it does not therefore 
ce~~ to .be  .sensib~tr  I.t  is  derivative  (intuitus  derivativus),  not  originaL  not 
ongmal (mtUltus  ongmanus), and therefore not an  intellectual intuition.  For the 
reason  stated  above,  such  intellectual  intuition  seems  to  belong  solely  to  the 
primordial being, and can never be ascribed to a dependent being. 3 
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Any  epistemologist  with  this  viewpoint  cannot  really  be  classed  as  a  transcendent 
apriorist.  In fact,  despite  its  respectful  idealisation  the  belief necessarily  excludes  the 
possibility  of transcendent  apriorism  for  any  human  consciousness.  Instead.  it  is  the 
contrasting belief that the human intellect can attain constructively to  such purity. which 
distinguishes the doctrine. 
3.2. The Pure Intellectual Functions 
The human intellective processes, that are traditionally considered to  confonn to such a 
restrictive criterion of purity, are examined in  the next  sections.  It  must  be  emphasized 
that  there  is  no  commitment  made  at  this  point  to  the  existence  or viability  of the 
intellective or noetic functions mentioned.  However.  a commitment to  at  least a few  of 
them  is  an  indispensable  condition  for  the  validity  of any  transcendent  apriorist 
epistemology.  Hence,  their importance requires  a lengthy  and  detailed  discussion.  The 
following categories represent only an introduction. 
3.2.1. Axiomatic Intuition 
Axiomatic  intuition  is  the  rationallintellectual
4  intuition  of primary  axIOms  or  simple 
propositions.  This  species of intuition would involve  the immediate,  non-inferential and 
unconditional apprehension of  self-evident propositions by the pure intellect. To elucidate 
this  definition.  let  us  start  by  examining  the  philosophical  notion  of intuition  itself. 
Unfortunately. this is  a not a simple matter and  several epistemological confusions have 
arisen  with  respect  to  it.  To  begin.  let  us  consider  some  standard  contemporary 
definitions of  intuition: 
[Q43]  Bruce Russell - a non-inferential knowledge or grasp. as of a propositi.on. 
.  .  ~ 
concept, or entity that is not based upon perception. memory. or IntrospectIon. [Q44]  Robert  Tragesser  - Most  generally  one  has  intuitive  1cnowledge'  that  p 
whe~ (l) One knows that p  (2)  one's knowledge that p  is  immediate,  and  (3) 
one's knowledge that p is not an instance of  the operation of  any of  the five senses 
(so that knowledge of  the nature of  one's own experience is not intuitive).6 
[Q45]  Alan  Lacey  - An  alleged  direct  relation,  analogous  to  vlsual  seeing, 
between the mind and something abstract and so not accessible to the senses.
7 
[Q46] J  C.  B.  Gosling - S knows that p intuitively if  (a) p is true (b) he is justified 
in believing that p, and (c) his knowledge that p is not based upon his inferring p 
from  other propositions.  The  criterion for  its  being  so  based  is  simply  that  S 
would deny, for any set of  propositions p*  from which p follows, that he believes 
that p because he believes that P*. 
8 
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Here  Tragesser's  definition  is  the  most  plausible  because  it  successfully  identifies  the 
shared  characteristic  of the  various  forms  of intuition  subsequently  mentioned  in  this 
thesis. Definitional point (2) in Tragesser's definition specifies this essential discriminative 
as "immediacy". By immediacy is meant a direct apprehension unmediated by any process 
(e.g. deduction, induction & etc.), which involves successive movement or memory9. 
The term immediate here must not be confused with the "subjective self-evidence" of 
scholastic philosophy. In other words, to be immediately apprehended propositions need 
not be evident at the subject's first encounter with them. In fact, the proposition may take 
some time to reveal its self-evidence. It would then be immediate in the scholastic sense 
of being  "objectively  self-evident".  To  know  p  by  intuition  then  is  to  see,  grasp  or 
apprehend the truth of  p through a form of  direct perception that can be either intellective 
or sensory  in  nature.  The  latter,  sensory or empirical,  type  of intuition  is  present  for 
instance  in  Kant  "That intuition which is  in  relation to the object through sensation,  is 
entitled  empirical".l0  I  do  not therefore  see  Tragesser's definitional  condition  (3)  as  a 
characteristic of intuition in  general  but  rather of noetic  intuition  in  particular.  For a 
similar reason it  is  necessary to reject Lacey's necessary connection between intuition in 
general and a cognitive object "not accessible to the senses". and Bruce Russell's similar 
limiting of  the scope of  intuition to anything "not based upon perception". It must be said 
that despite the rejection of one of Lacey's points, he  is  nearer the truth about intuition 
than Gosling and  Russell.  With his  "direct relation analogous to  visual  seeing".  he  has 
certainly understood the importance of  immediacy to intuition. 
Gosling  and  Russell  are  wrong to  make  non-inferentiality  a necessary  condition of 
intuition  in  general.  In  fact.  there  exists  an  intuition  that  is  deeply  in\olved  with 
interentiality  viz.  deductive  intuition.  In  other words.  it  is  possible  - despik a  hint  of 86 
paradox - for an intuition to be both immediate and inferential. At least this is true to the 
extent that an intuition can be the re-immediation of  an inferential process. This notion of 
re-immediation  will  be  explained  in  detail  when  discussing  the  Kantian  notion  of 
intellectual intuition later in this thesis. 
The general notion of  intuition given here is always qualified by the terms rational or 
intellectual.  This is to indicate that sensory intuition (a la Kant) or other non-intellectual 
intuitions  (e.g.  D.  H.  Lawrence's  "blood  knowing"!!  or the  various  types  of mystical 
intuition) are to be excluded from our list of noetic functions.  While  sensory intuition is 
excluded because it is just obviously non-noetic,  non-intellectual intuitions are  rejected 
because they do not have any role within transcendent apriorist epistemology. 
Having  considered  intuition  in  general  let  us  now  move  to  the  consideration  of 
axiomatic intuition in particular. We have said that this type of  intuition is non-inferential. 
Now non-inferential intuition was recognized by Aristotle and posited as a solution to the 
problem of  the foundation of  knowledge. In fact, the following sceptic directed argument, 
presented in the Posterior Analytics, is interesting in this respect: 
[Q47] They assume that we cannot know the posterior thing because of the prior 
things, since these lead to no primary things; and their assumption is correct, since 
it  is  impossible to go through an infinite series.  If on the other hand the regress 
stops, and there are principles, these are, in their view, unknowable, since they are 
indemonstrable,  and  demonstration  is  the  only  way  of knowing  that  they 
•  !2  recogruze. 
Here,  for  the  sceptic  (as  for  the  epistemological coherentist)  the  ability  to  infer  one's 
belief x from some other belief y is the only true mark of  genuine knowledge.  However, 
for Aristotle, first principles are knowable despite being non-inferable. They are grasped 
by  a special faculty of intuition or "nous,,13  without the need for  any  further  inference. 
This  non-inferentiality  characterizes  any  intuition,  which  can  be  categorized  as  an 
example of axiomatic intuition.  However, it  does not characterize intuition in  general as 
Gosling has suggested in [Q46, p. 85]. 
The  other  definitive  feature  of  axiomatic  intuition.  mentioned  above  was 
unconditionality. Again, this criterion was recognized by Aristotle. Consider the following 
passage from the Topics: [Q48]  The  true  and  primary  things  are  those  that  have  credence  (pistis)  not 
t~ough other things,  but through themselves.  For in  the case of principles of a 
SCIence,  a  further  reason  must  not  be  sought;  rather,  each  principle  must  be 
credible itself in its own right. 14 
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An intuition that is unconditional then is one that does not rely on any further proposition 
or set of  propositions for its epistemic justification. It is considered true or false  in itself. 
by the fact of the intuition alone,  independently of the truth or falsehood of any other 
propositions. If  the object of  the intuition is true then it is true independently of  the truth 
of any  further  set  of propositions.  The  epistemic  credibility  of x  rests  only  with  the 
intuition itself, no reference to other propositions is required to establish its truth status. 
Another  essential  aspect of axiomatic  intuition  is  that  its  object-correlate  is  always  a 
proposition. It has nothing, despite a superficial similarity, to do  with non-propositional 
knowing (or knowing by acquaintance). 
Traditionally, and from a rationalist point of  view, examples of  principles apprehended 
by axiomatic intuition are often to be found in the axioms of  foundationalist systems. The 
following  list  is  of course contentious and is  only presented to provide the reader with 
some concrete examples with which he is  familiar:  The first  principles of (i)  Geometry: 
examples of  which would be Euclid's first postulate viz. "Exactly one straight line can be 
drawn between any two points"  or his  fifth  common notion viz.  "The whole is  greater 
than the part"; (ii) Logic:  for example the principle of contradiction, or the principle of 
identity; (iii) Metaphysics: for example the seminal axiom of  Parmenides viz.  "Nothing is 
not,,15;  Descartes famous "cogito ergo sum,,16;  Leibniz's restatement of the foundational 
principle,  "There is  no effect without a cause,,17  or, the first  axiom of Spinoza's Ethics, 
"'Everything  which  exists,  exists  either  in  itself or in  something  else,,18.  Other simple 
examples of things grasped by axiomatic intuition are the simple  arithmetical equations 
1  + 1  =2,  7x7=49 etc.  Axiomatic intuition will  become clearer when it  is  contrasted with 
the  second and third  items  on the  intellective  function  list  that  we  will  now move  to 
discuss. 
3.2.2. Deductive Intuition 
Deductive intuition is the rational intuition of  the secondary propositions that result from 
the process of deduction.  This intuition  is  identical to  axiomatic intuition in  tenns of its 88 
immediacy. However, whereas axiomatic intuition is  in no way dependent on deduction, 
although a deductive system can be founded upon a number of  such intuitions, deductive 
intuition can occur only after deduction has taken place. It acts as the re-immediation of  a 
process of inference.  For any deductive process a proposition p is  derived from one or 
more premises p ... pn. Normally this process would not be considered intuitional. There is, 
after all, a process. There is definitely a movement from one truth to another and memory 
is requisite. However, the actual grasping of  the conclusion p itself is still undeniably an 
act of  intuition. This is explained, later but the reader may want to look now at [QI00, p. 
160] from G. R.  G. Mure. What has been called deductive intuition is there described as a 
"re-immediation of  the discursive, mediatory moment". The first thing to notice about this 
is that deductive intuition, unlike axiomatic intuition, is closely connected with inference. 
In fact,  inference  is  requisite for  deductive  intuition to  be  possible at  all.  In addition, 
deductive  intuition  unlike  axiomatic  intuition  is  conditional.  In  other  words,  it  is 
dependent on other intuitions being correct. It does not normally stand alone as the full 
justification of  truth. The truth condition of  p ...  Pn is relevant to p. 
An example of  deductive intuition would be Spinoza's "third kind of  knowledge" viz. 
scientia intuitiva (a full discussion of  which will be given at later). To give an example of 
such an intuition Spinoza takes the arithmetical problem of  finding the fourth proportional 
given three sequential numbers. This is done with the help of  a special kind of  inferential 
intuition viz.  deductive intuition,  "For instance, one, two, three,  being given,  everyone 
can see that the forth proportional is six;  and this is  much clearer, because we infer the 
fourth  number  from  an  intuitive  grasping  of the  ratio  which  the  first  bears  to  the 
second"  19. Parkinson, in Spinoza's Theory of  Knowledge, recognizes the existence of  such 
an intuition but does not give the correct explanation of  it when he observes, "in calling 
such knowledge 'intuitive' Spinoza does not mean that it is not inferential knowledge. For 
him,  intuitive  knowledge  is  not  to  be  compared to  seeing  something,  as  opposed to 
inferring something".20 What Parkinson fails to grasp is that, as Mure has pointed out, see 
again  [Q I 00,  p.  160],  even  such  inferential  procedures  have  their  intuitional  re-
immediations. Therefore, intuition can be inferential but still a type of  mental seeing. This 
whole example, however, is a complex case, when any such intuitional re-immediation of 
an inferential process counts as an example of  deductive intuition. 89 
3.2.3. Noetic-Deductive Reasoning. 
Noetic-deductive reasoning is  the process by which the pure intellect attempts to form 
valid propositions through the linking of data derived from both axiomatic intuition and 
deductive intuition. Deduction, unlike both axiomatic intuition and deductive  intuition~ is 
not an immediate grasp or insight but rather a process that necessarily involves duration. 
In terms of  the Cartesian philosophy what is intuited "must be grasped  ... at the same time 
and not successively,,21, on the other hand deduction is a process, "which appears not to 
occur all at the same time, but involves a sort of  movement on the part of  our mind when 
it infers one thing from another".  22  Because of  the presence of  duration and movement, a 
further characteristic distinguishing intuition from deduction is the presence of  memory. It 
is  noteworthy that rationalist philosophers like  Spinoza and  Descartes thought that the 
durational element and the consequent reliance on memory could be eliminated from the 
process  of deduction.  This  putative  process  was  entitled  enumeration:! 
3  and  could 
completely transform argumentation into  a form of intuition.  As a consequence of our 
previous analysis,  this form of enumerative intuition would be categorized as deductive 
intuition - not axiomatic intuition). It is clear then that noetic deductive reasoning is,  in 
terms already defined, mediate, inferential and conditional. 
3.2.4. The Apprehension of  Noetic Concepts. 
So  far,  we  have  limited  our analysis  to  the  apprehension of propositional knowledge 
without considering the concepts out of  which this propositional knowledge is composed. 
Noetic concepts are defined as those concepts possessed by the mind but which are not 
derived from the senses.  The locus classicus for the exemplification of such concepts is 
the  passage  in  Plato's  Pheado  where  notions  such  as  equality,  beauty,  goodness, 
uprightness and others are considered to be of this type. The following  passage (one of 
many)  gives an indication of Plato's belief in such concepts, "So before we began to see 
and hear and use our other senses we must somehow have acquired the knowledge that 
there is  such a thing as absolute equality".  24  Of course the Platonic theory of anamnesis 
soon  fell  out  of favour.  However.  it  was  later  replaced  by  other  theories  of noetic 
concepts. Just such a theory was the epistemological doctrine of  illuminatio~ which had 
adherents from  Augustine to Malebranche.  Here certain (or all)  ideas/concepts were not 90 
derived, in the nonnal way, from the senses nor, as in Plato, were they remembered from 
a previous disembodied state of  existence. Instead, it was the pure intellect illuminated by 
God  that  could  function  as  the  source  of concepts  and  ideas.  Hence  Malebranche's 
famous quotation "que nollS voyons toutes choses en Dieu,,?5 
It was Descrates modification of this theory to suggest that clear and distinct ideas, 
rather  than  being  "seen"  in  the  divine  Mind,  were  rather  "implanted  in our  souls  by 
nature" that gave rise to the doctrine of  innate ideas or concepts. Descartes famous wax 
example26  was actually intended to prove the existence of noetic concepts. The concept 
Descartes' considers is the general notion of "body" which, he attempts to demonstrate, 
comes from the pure intellect. In the example, all the sensory qualities of  the wax change 
when  it  is  heated,  yet  we  do  not  think  that  there  has  been  a  change  of substance. 
According to Descartes, this is  because the essence of the wax has nothing to do  with 
what the senses reveal. The clear and distinct notion of  extension, which is found instead 
to be the essence of  wax, is proved to come not from the senses or the imagination as is 
usually thought,  rather it  depends on "purely mental scrutiny".  27  He concludes that the 
notion of body itself is derived from the noetic rather than the aesthetic functions of  the 
mind,  "I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty 
of imagination but by the intellect alone".28  In all these examples the process or faculty 
that  grasps  these  noetic  concepts  cannot,  by  definition,  be  reliant  on experience  and 
therefore  has  itself a  noetic  nature.  If it  did  rely  on experience  in  any  way  then the 
concepts themselves could no longer be considered noetic. 
The  notion  of a  concept  that  is  a  priori  may  seem  unusual,  because  there  is  an 
emphasis (in my opinion an overemphasis) in modem philosophy on the notion of  a priori 
truth. Now a proposition can be true a priori but a concept does not seem like something 
that can be true or false. Yet the notion of  an a priori concept is, in fact, coherent because 
the older notion of a priori concerned itself both with issues of  justification and origin. 
This  is  why Kant  can legitimately state that "Such a priori origin is  manifest  in  certain 
concepts, no less than in judgements".29 The technical name for such a concept in Kant  is 
a notion, "The pure concept, is so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone (not in 
the pure image of  sensibility), is called a notion".30 91 
3.2.5. Noetic Introspection 
Noetic introspection is the capacity of  the pure intellect for rational reflection3
!. that is an 
awareness that transcends the merely internal sensations of empirical introspection and 
which can rationally intuit or comprehend the noumenal-sel£  To posit the existence of 
noetic introspection would be to deny the empiricist claim that all introspection is a kind 
of  inner sensation and that the results it produces are epistemologically on the same level 
as  those  of the  five  outer  senses.  As  an  example  of a  philosophical  doctrine  that 
instantiates the empiricist view consider, for instance, the doctrine of  the self in Hume's 
Treatise,  "For my part, when I enter most intimately into  what  I call  myself I always 
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade.  love or 
hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never  can  observe  anything  but  the  perception".32  For  Hume,  as  this  quotation 
demonstrates, the self was nothing except a bundle of  perceptions. Any notion of a self 
not  discoverable  by  such  inner-sense  is,  as  Kenny  observes,  to  be  "rejected  as  a 
metaphysical monster".  33  Traditionally the rationalist extension of introspection beyond 
this  inner-sense  model  had  existed  within  the  science  [Wissenschaft34]  of rational 
psychology. Consider Hegel's explanation of  the aims of  this science: 
[Q49] The name 'rational', given to this species of  psychology, served to contrast 
it with empirical modes of  observing the phenomena of  soul. Rational psychology 
viewed the soul in its metaphysical nature, and through the categories supplied by 
abstract thought. The rationalists endeavoured to ascertain the inner nature of  soul 
as it is in itself and as it is for thought".  35 
Despite the fact that this science is now considered to be discredited, largely because 
of the influence of Kant  and Hume,  there were rationalists who  wanted to  assert that 
although empirical introspection exists, it only gives us knowledge of  the phenomenal ego 
and that this knowledge does not exhaust what we could know about the self.  For such a 
rationalist there was an intellectual intuition,  incomparable with external sensation, that 
can  attain  to  knowledge  of the  noumenal  self.  The  cognitions  involved  in  self-
consciousness  (i.e.  awareness  of a  transcendental  ego  that  is  the  subject  to  which 
experiences occur) are often cited as examples of this fonn of awareness.  Plotinus asks 92 
"what  precludes  the  reasoning  Soul from  observing  its  own content  by  some  special 
faculty?" .  36 
The most famous introspective intuition of  this rationalist type is the "I think" part of 
the Cartesian Cogito. As Gary Hatfield observes, "the argument to the conclusion that the 
proposition  'I  am','  I  exist,'  is  necessarily  true  is  ultimately  founded  upon  the  direct 
introspection of the meditators own thinking".  37  The significance of such an intuition is 
demonstrated by the fact that, from it alone, Descartes attempted to prove the soul/mind's 
existence (ergo sum), its identity as intellectual substance (res cogitans), its immateriality, 
indivisibility, incorruptibility and finally its immortality. As Kant later observed "I think is, 
therefore, the sole text of  rational psychology, and from it the whole of  its teaching has to 
be  developed".38  Kant,  of course,  rejected  Descartes  conclusions,  regarding  them  as 
resulting from the "paralogisms of  pure psychology".39 
3.4.6. Illuminative  Intuition 
Illuminative intuition is an unmediated rational intuition of intelligible objects. It is often 
referred to as  knowledge  by  acquaintance (or knowing things)  and  is  often contrasted 
with  knowledge  by  description  (or  knowing  about  things).  It was  Grote  who  first 
introduced the  distinction by  noting  that  some  natural languages  distinguish  "between 
these  two  applications  of the  notion of knowledge,  the  one  being  yvc.vval,  noscere, 
kennen, conna1t:re, the other being El8Eval, scire, wissen, savoir".
4°For Grote, knowledge 
about  things  is  essentially  propositional knowledge,  where  the  mental  states  involved 
refer to  specific  things.  In addition,  this propositional knowledge  can be  more  or less 
complete, can be justified inferentially based on experience and can be communicated. For 
some philosophers this experiential knowledge provides an epistemic basis for knowledge 
about things and is,  in some sense, difficult or impossible to communicate. According to 
William  James,  in  The  Meaning  of Truth:  A  Sequel  to  Pragmatism,  knowledge  by 
acquaintance can be of  people and things, sensations of  colour, flavour, spatial extension., 
temporal duration, effort and perceptible difference. 
Of  course, the transcendent apriorist is concerned with intellective rather than sensory 
acquaintive  intuition.  The  direct  apprehension of a  Platonic  Form  like  absolute  beauty 
would be a more relevant example.  In fact,  as has been proved, the illuminatiyc intuition 93 
of the Forms, that constitutes Plato's secret doctrine, is of  the acquaintance type.  Much 
more detail will emerge in chapter 7 so  it is  sufficient to  note that illuminative intuition 
like axiomatic intuition is immediate, non-inferential, and unconditional. However, unlike 
axiomatic intuition it is non-propositional. CHAPTER 4 
ELEATIC INCEPTION 
[Q50] For never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are, but 
you must hold back your thought (vollua) from this way of  enquiry nor let habit 
born of  much experience, force you down this way, by making you use an aimless 
eye  or  a  sounding  ear  and  tongue:  judge  by  reason  the  strife-encompassed 
refutation spoken by me. 
[Parmenides ofElea
1
] 
4.1. Exegetic Problems with Pannenidean Atcr9acnc; 
94 
Two  distinguished  pre-Socratic  scholars,  viz.  A.  P.  D.  Moure1atos  and  1.  H.  M.  M. 
Loenen,  who  have  both written entire  books specifically devoted to  the  exposition of 
Parmenides  and  the  Eleatics  respectively,  are  at  least  agreed  on  one  substantial 
conclusion.  According  to  Mourelatos,  Parmenides  of Elea  is  the  "father  of Western 
rationallsm~2  Similarly,  according  to  Loenen.  Parmenides  is  the  "founder  of 
epistemological rationalism".3 It is, however, not an uncontentious issue. For example, in 
both John Cottingham's books on the rationalist tradition, viz.  Rationalism (1984),  The 
Rationalists (1988), there is  not one mention of Parmenides of Elea.  In contrast, Plato 
rather than Parmenides is confidently adjudged to be the "father ofrationalism".4 That the 
tradition begins from Plato  is  a not uncommon theory.  However, it  is  a theory against 
which substantial evidence can be developed. In fact, it is much more logical to contend 
that  the  transcendent  apriorist  methodology  was  the  epistemological  legacy,  inherited 
(and  modified)  by  Plato  from,  that  "reverend and awful  figure ,,5,  Parmenides  of Elea. 
In contrast to the above issue,  Mourelatos and Loenen disagree on the question of 
what type of "rationalism" is represented by the Parmenidean fragments.  On the surface. 
this  is  largely  a  technical  matter  of exegesis  but  it  may  betray  a  more  fundamental 
vagueness  in  the  understanding  of what  they  mean  by  the  terms  "rationalism"  and 
"epistemological  rationalism"  respectively.  The  consequent  misunderstanding.  and  the 95 
proper categorization of  the Eleatic epistemology that helps to eradicate it, will be objects 
of our investigation. Hence, at the most general level, the two questions to be answered 
in this section are, (i) was Parmenides the father of Western rationalism or transcendent 
apriorism? In addition, (ii) if so, what category of  rationalism or transcendent apriorism 
did Parmenides hold to? 
The first thing to note is that ifParmenides is to be considered the genuine founder of 
transcendent  apriorism then we  would expect,  in  the  light  of our previous definitional 
analysis,  firstly  a  challenge  to  or  downgrading  of the  epistemological  value  of the 
aesthetic functions.  Secondly, there would be reliance instead on the noetic functions for 
the  attainment  of Truth.  It  will  therefore  be  wise  at  this  point  to  consider  the 
epistemology of Parmenides in  relation to  these points.  However,  the  epistemological 
value  that  Parmenides'  attributes  to  the  noetic  and  aesthetic  functions  is,  again,  a 
contested  issue.  For example,  Verdenius  has  suggested  that  the  Parmenidean  voos, 
normally accepted as paradigmatic  ally noetic, may mean, "knowing in a wide sense,,6 i.e. 
may  include  sense  perception.  If this  were  so,  we  would  have  to  concede  that 
Parmenides'  epistemological instrument is  non-noetic.  Rather it  would  be  part of what 
Kant would call the logical use of  the intellect or, in the terminology of  this thesis, logico-
sensitive cognition. Parmenides would then have to be considered an aposteriorist rather 
than an apriorist.  If this  were  the  case it  would be  necessary to  re-assess Parmenides' 
evaluation of  the aesthetic functions. 
Such a re-evaluation is attempted by Hussey who holds that, for Parmenides, it is not 
the  case that sense  perception is  necessarily false  or inadequate.  Rather falsehood  only 
originates from sense-perception used, routinely and without due thought, as an exclusive 
guide to the Truly Real, "Parmenides does not condemn sense-perception as such  ... What 
he  attacks  is  the  habit  of unthinking reliance on sense perception as  the  only  guide  to 
reality.
7  Like Verdenius, Hussey seems to suggest that, for Parmenides, logico-sensitive 
cognition (cf. Verdenius' concept of  the Parmenidean VOOs) is a viable guide to reality. 
In addition, in more traditional scholarship, Theophrastus makes the surprising claim 
that  Parmenides considered thought and perception to be  the  same,  "For he  speaks of 
perceiving  and  thinking  to  be  the  same".8  It is  unclear how Theophrastus wants  us  to 
understand  this.  However,  if he  means to posit an  actual identity between thought and 
perception. then this will  be dealt with in our later response to Verdenius.  I f.  in contrast. 96 
Theophrastus wants to suggest that atcr9amc; and vooc; are the same in respect to being 
determined  by  the  same  physiological  mechanisms,  for  instance,  then  this  \\ill  be 
discussed  in  our treatment  of fragment  B 16.  Either  actual  identity,  or the  similarity 
Theophrastus  actually  posits  both entail  an  equivalence  of epistemological  status  for 
atcr9amc; and vooc;.  If such an equivalence were accepted it  would be obvious that the 
transcendent apriorist epistemology, viz. to question the aesthetic and trust the noetic, is 
a non-starter. 
Admittedly, this type of  analysis is rare. However many scholars have drawn attention 
to the fact that Parmenides, unlike the later Eleatic philosopher Melissus, does not in fact 
explicitly present an argument against the senses in the text of his  poem.  For example, 
Jonathan  Barnes  observes,  "I  do  not  deny  that  Parmenides  was  an  enemy  of the 
senses ... but that enmity is left implicit in Parmenides' poem: we have no formal argument 
for  scepticism  in  the  text  and  no  explicit  statement  of scepticism".9  Von  Fritz  has 
suggested that this omission was occasioned by the fact that Parmenides did not consider 
the  senses as  the  cause of error in mortal thinking,  "Parmenides does not  refer to  the 
senses  as  the  cause  of the  erroneous  beliefs  but  speaks  only  of the  vooC;  1tAaKtOV 
[wandering mind] of  mortals". 10 However Von Fritz' point is not as extreme as it sounds. 
He does admit that Parmenides viewed the senses as inadequate, i.e.  as "unable to grasp 
the true reality". II 
Historically, within transcendent apriorism, there are two main negative categories in 
terms of  which the aesthetic functions are judged, viz.  (i) Scepticism - i.e. they are false, 
deceptive, misleading & etc., or (ii) Inadequacy - i.e. they are inadequate to the thing that 
is  desired to be  known.  Now whether Parmenides believes (ii)  rather than (i)  is  not to 
suggest that he is  anything other than a transcendent apriorist. To use, for instance, the 
Medieval  claim that  adequatio  rei  et  intellectus
l2  and then to  say  that  the  senses  are 
inadequate  to  the thing  desired to  be  known,  is  just to give  an  alternative  reason for 
rejecting the aesthetic functions. The question as to whether the aesthetic functions, in all 
their uses, cause error is irrelevant. It may be that there is a level of  being to which they 
are  perfectly  adequate.  The  only  essential  requirement  for  a  system  of transcendent 
apriorism is  that the  aesthetic  functions  are,  in  fact,  rejected  in  the quest for  the  Truly 
Real, and this much Von Fritz concedes to the Parmenidean epistemology. 97 
Another similar interpretation, in terms of inadequacy,  is given by H.  H.  Loenen.  In 
fact,  Loenen posits a realm in  which the  senses are absolutely adequate to  their  "own 
domain" but, of  course, unable to grasp the Truly Real: 
[Q51] All this by no means implies an absolute rejection of  the senses. Parmenides 
only  wants to keep  the  senses  from  overstepping the  boundaries of their  own 
domain.  The warning of the goddess can thus only be  intended to prevent men 
from applying sense-perception and thought based on it to true reality, the domain 
of  pure thought.  13  . 
In conclusion, Verdenius, Hussey and Theophrastus present an important challenge to the 
view of Parmenides as  "the father of rationalism",  whereas Von Fritz and Loenen only 
raise an interesting question about the sub-categories of  transcendent apriorism. Both are 
important points and will be considered in the following sections. 
4.2. The Evidence ofDoxography and Testimonia 
Before moving to consider the more  substantial evidence  it  is  worth saying  at  this 
point  that  (i)  the  main  doxographical  tradition  (Theophrastus  excepted)  and  (ii) 
testimonia from Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus, clearly state that Parmenides had a negative 
attitude  towards the  aesthetic  functions.  The  reasons  for  this  attitude  may  be  slightly 
different  in  each  case,  of course.  The  following  examples  illustrate  this  traditional 
interpretation: 
[Q52] Aetius - "Parmenides says that the senses are false" .14 
[Q53] Pseudo-Plutarch - "Parmenides hurled the senses out of  truth". 15 
[Q54] Sextus Empiricus - "He [Parmenides] gave up trust in the senses".16 
[Q55] Diogenes Laertius- "Parmenides makes it  clear that one should not attend 
to the senses but to reason". 17 
[Q56] Aristotle - "The Eleatics pass over perception and disregard it, thinking that 
one should follow reason  .. .In the light of  their arguments this seems to follow;  in 
the light of  the facts it is near to madness to hold such opinions".18 
[Q57] Plato - Socrates: "My admiration would be much greater if  anyone could 
show  that  these  same  perplexities  are  everywhere  involved  in  the  forms 
themselves  - among  the  objects  we  apprehend  in  reflection.  just  as  you  and 
Parmenides have shown them to be involved in the things that we see" .19 
[Q58] Plotinus - "He [Parmenides] did not locate being in sensible objects?) 98 
In respect to these doxographical quotations, it must be said that there has been much 
recent  research  in  pre-Socratic  studies  devoted to  questioning  the  legitimacy  of such 
sources.  The  hidden  agendas  of the relevant  authors  have  been  uncovered  and  their 
intellectual integrity challenged. The most significant work in this area has even suggested 
that such authors could even alter the texts themselves in order to bring them more into 
line with their own philosophical agendas. Well this last point, at least, cannot be the case 
with regard to  Parmenides' attitude towards the  senses.  There  is  no  explicit  argument 
against the senses in Parmenides' poem, so it is obviously impossible for someone to have 
introduced  a  spurious  one.  However,  it  is  wise  to  accept  the  more  general  sceptical 
attitude  and  require  further  substantial  evidence  to  endorse  views  from  this  type  of 
source. 
It is certain that the testimonia of  Plato. Aristotle, and Plotinus have more authority. 
However, the extent of  this authority has also been questioned. For example, despite the 
fact  that  G.  S.  Kirk  et.  aI.,  in  The  PreSocratic  Philosophers,  accept  that  these 
philosophers are,  on many points,  more reliable than the doxographical commentators, 
there is still scepticism: 
[Q59]  On Plato:  his  references  to  Heraclitus,  Parmenides  and  Empedocles  are 
more often than not light-hearted obiter dicta, and one-sided or exaggerated ones 
at that, rather than sober and objective historical judgements.
21 
[Q60]  On Aristotle:  his  judgements  are  often  distorted  by  his  view  of earlier 
philosophy  as  a  stumbling  progress  towards  the  truth  that  Aristotle  himself 
revealed in his physical do ctrines.  22 
The  first  quotation is  certainly true,  with respect  to  Plato's treatment  of those of his 
predecessors  for  whom he  had  little  regard.  However,  it  is  not generally the  case  for 
those philosophers that he respected. Heraclitus and Parmenides fall into this category as 
do, for example, Socrates and Zeno. The type of  analysis required to prove this however 
is  beyond the scope of  this thesis, as is an accurate response to the criticism of  Aristotle 
in  [Q60]. It is sufficient to say here that the consensus of  views expressed in [Q52-60, p. 
97 -8 J is generally correct and then seek to prove it. 99 
4.3. The Instructive Error of  The  ophrastus 
As  mentioned  previously  Theophrastus  thought  that,  for  Parmenides,  percelvmg  (an 
aesthetic function) and thinking (a noetic function) were "the same". The consequence of 
either interpretation of this would be that both functions have the same epistemological 
status for Parmenides; a corollary that Theophrastus endorses. As we have seen.  if true. 
such  an interpretation would  preclude  any  transcendent  apriorist  downgrading  of the 
aesthetic functions in favour of  the noetic. It would signal the conclusion that Parmenides 
was not a transcendent apriorist. The specific arguments Theophrastus' uses to establish 
his  interpretation  of Parmenides  are  found  in  his  work  De  Sensu.  Because  of its 
importance, it will be quoted at length. 
[Q61]  The majority of general views about sensation are  two:  some  make  it of 
like  by  like,  others of opposite by  opposite.  Parmenides,  Empedocles and Plato 
say it is of  like by like, the followers of  Anaxagoras and of Heraclitus of  opposite 
by  opposite.  Parmenides gave  no  clear definition at  all  but  said  only that  there 
were two elements and that knowledge depends on the excess of  one or the other. 
Thought varies according to whether the hot or cold prevails,  but that which is 
due to the hot is better and purer; not but what even that needs a certain balance; 
for,  says he, "As is at any moment the mixture of  the wandering limbs, so mind is 
present to men; for that which thinks is the same thing, namely the substance of 
their  limbs,  in  each and  all  men;  for  what  preponderates  is  thought"  - for  he 
regards  perception and thought  as  the  same.  So  too  memory and  forgetfulness 
arise  from  these  causes,  on account  of the  mixture;  but  he  never  made  clear 
whether, if  they are equally mixed, there will be thought or not, or if  so, what its 
character will be.  But that he  regards perception as  also  due  to  the  opposite as 
such he  makes clear when he  says that a corpse does not perceive light, heat or 
sound owing to its deficiency of  fire, but that it does perceive their opposites, cold 
silence  and  so  on.  And  he  adds that in general everything that exists has  some 
'3  measure of knowledge.-
Supposedly  then,  Parmenides  believes  that  noetic  and  aesthetic  knowledge  is 
dependent on the changing constitution of the body.  The thought (VOOs)  of men (which 
here may include both aesthetic and noetic elements as used in Verdenius' "broad sense" 
mentioned  previously) depends  "at  any  moment"  on "the  mixture of wandering  limbs". 
That  is  to  say,  on  which  of the  two  elements  the  hot  or  the  cold  prevails  in  the 
constitution of the body.  If the hot dominates the mixture the  perceptual and  cognitive 
powers are enhanced - they are "better and purer". Presumably, if  the cold dominates they 100 
are diminished. There is a sense in which everything, thouglL is a possessor of  some fonn 
of  knowledge, detennined by the nature of  its constitution. Like is kno\\  TI by like. so eYen 
the corpse can perceive cold and silence because it possesses these attnbutes in its O\\TI 
constitution. 
For Theophrastus this is a historical summary ofParmenides' views on perception and 
cognition.  The  implications  for  Pannenides'  work  as  a  \vhole  are  not  considered. 
However,  later  commentators,  who  find  this  passage  important  for  illuminating 
Pannenides' epistemology. are forced to admit its problematic nature. How can such an 
ever-changing unreliable fonn of  human cognition, dependent solely on the "wandering" 
constitution of  the body. grasp with "true conviction" (1!tcrncr UA1l8T)<;) what Pannenides 
calls  elsewhere,  in  fragment  Bl,  "the  unshaken  heart  of well  rounded  truth?"  If the 
constitution  of the  body  is  constantly  changing  or  "wandering"  (the  mixture  of the 
elements frequently changes) then the \lOOS, that depends on it, must also  be constantly 
changing or wandering. 
If Pannenides believes  that  "like  is  known by  like"  [Q61.  p.  99]  how can such a 
changing  faculty  grasp  a  reality  that  is  described  in  the  following  terms.  "changeless 
within the limits of  great bonds it exists,,2-l, "Justice has never loosed her fetters to allow it 
to come to be or perish, but holds it fast,,25  and "Fixed it will remain. For strong necessity 
holds it  within the bonds of  a limit".26  Surely. in this case only a changeless ±aculty can 
know such a changeless object of  knowledge. Furthennore it  is not the wise man but the 
mortals who "wander knowing nothing,,27 for whom "helplessness guides the wandering 
thought (lTAaKO\l \100\1) in their breasts".28 Yet, if Theophrastus was correct, we would 
alL  according to Pannenides, be  in  this  epistemological predicament.  Our \lOOS  would 
wander inevitably depending on "the mixture of  the wandering limbs". 29 
Although the previous examples are my own, it  is certain that Verdenius, Loenen and 
Von Fritz all recognize similar difficulties here. In Parmenides. Jfelissus.  Gorgias Loenen 
states: 
[Q62] One feels compelled to do this the sooner because of the serious problem. 
never  solved  satis±actorily  in  the  traditional  interpretations.  how  the  absolute 
knowledge proclaimed by Parmenides himself is possible if the human \lOOS  varies 
either from one person to another or even in one and the same individual.  In  the 
words of Verdenius: "how it  was possible ±or his lTAay AO\lOO  to extricate itself from this phenomenal world of error and  intermmgling and to  have  part  in  the 
sphere of  real being.30 
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Loenen also  wonders  why Parmenides  "hurls  reproaches,,31  at  the  heedless  mortals  in 
fragment B8 when, according to B 16, their wandering voos is  part of their inescapable 
psychological endowment. Von Fritz finds the problem of reconciling the Theophrastus 
fragment with the rest ofParmenides' metaphysics and epistemology so difficult that he is, 
"doubtful whether these difficulties can ever be resolved, at least in the realm of human 
logic" .32 
In their one brief comment on [Q61, p. 99], which incidentally is not a response to the 
above  difficulties,  Kirk  et.  al.  inadvertently  suggest  an  attractive  solution  to  such 
problems.  They see  the  fragment  as a closing  comment  on the  psychology underlying 
mortal opinion, "DK, B 16  gains in point if  construed as a final  dismissive comment on 
mortal opinion".33 This would connect it directly with the psychology of  the mortals who 
"know nothing"  in fragment  B6.  This  connection is  also  made  by  G.  Vlastos when he 
observes,  "When  Parmenides  speaks  of the  thinking  frame  in  fragment  16  as  'much 
wandering' he links it unmistakably with the 'wandering' mind of the 'know nothings"'.  34 
Fragment B 16  can,  as a  consequence,  be  seen as  describing  the psychology of mortal 
opinion only. Presumably, in this theory, there is nothing written into the epistemological 
script of  human psychology. Hence, having a wandering voos is within the sphere of  will, 
a result of human ignorance rather than human constitution.  In this case then it  is  only 
ignorant mortals that allow their voos to be determined by the constitutions of  their body. 
Presumably, humans can direct their voos and attain to Truth by an alternative method. 
However,  there  are  obvious problems with this  view.  To  be  fair  to  Theophrastus, 
Verdenius, Loenen and Von Fritz it is certainly evident that Parmenides does not seem to 
exclude certain enlightened mortals from his analysis.  He specifically says that  "mind  is 
present to  men;  for  that  which thinks  is  the same thing,  namely the substance of their 
limbs  in  each  and  all  men".  35  This  would  indicate  a  deterministic  psychological 
epistemology  without  the  possibility  of exception.  Theophrastus  observes  that,  in 
addition,  memory,  forgetfulness  and  perception are  interpreted,  by  Parmenides,  in  the 
light of this theory. It seems then that if we take fragment  16 as a truthful representation 
of Pannenides' epistemology,  then the  mutable  and  heterOn)mOllS  noetic  and  aesthetic 
functions  have  an  identical  epistemological  status.  A  status  that  is  inadequate  to  that 102 
attainment of  the Truly Real by an autonomous mortal consciousness. Yet aga~ we are 
confronted with the problem that Parmenides' poem is all about this very attainment. The 
goddess tells the kouros36  that  "It is proper that you should learn all  things,,37  which 
includes the "unshaken heart of  well-rounded truth".38 
The solution to the problem requires the acceptance of  two important postulates: (i) 
Fragment 16 belongs to Parmenides' Way of  h.o~a rather than to his Way of  AA1l8Ela 
and (ii) The Way of  Opinion is wholly false and has no legitimacy for Parmenides. 
4.4. The Correct Location of  Fragment 16 
Parmenides' poem is divided into two distinct sections. Firstly, there is the Way of  Truth 
represented  by fragments  Bl  to  B8  line  49.  Secondly,  there  is  the  way  of opinion 
represented  by B8.62 to  B14.  There  is  an obvious  linking  passage  between the two 
sections  B8.50  to  B8.61.  Some  authors,  including  H.  Frankee
9
,  ILoenen4o  and  J. 
Bollack4t, have noted the similarity ofB16 to certain elements within the Way of  Truth. 
However only Loenen draws the conclusion from the correspondence that the fragment 
actually belongs in this section, "It follows that the fragment belongs to the first part of 
the poem. The only suitable place for it is undoubtedly the lacuna between frs. 3 and 6".42 
This  understanding  is  founded  on  specific  aspects  of Loenen's  unique  and  unusual 
interpretation  of Parmenides.  Mourelatos  is  puzzled  by  it  and  calls  it  an  "extreme 
hypothesis,,43 without giving any reasons for rejecting it. To fill in this lacuna, reasons for 
rejecting Loenen's suggestion will now be given. 
First, consider the notion of  "mixture" in B 16. Remember it is the voos itself that is 
detennined by the mixture of  elements in the body. If  this is a notion that is important to 
the account of  human epistemology in the Way of  Truth, then surely it is strange that in 
the  course of the  Way of Truth the very notion of mixture  is  proved impossible.  By 
definition, if  something is a mixture it must contain entities that are distinct in some way. 
Yet we are told later that the Truly Real is one, all together44; Nor is it divided since it all 
exists alike45; it  is  equal to itself on every side46; it is  all continuous.47  Now if  the Truly 
Real is one thing, undividable and alike in every aspect of  itself, i.e. undifferentiated, then 
mixture  is  impossible  and  any  psychology  based  on it  does  not  make  sense.  It is  no 
accident that all  other talk of mixture occurs exclusively in the way of opinion, e.g. (i) 104 
the theory surrounding B 16. Therefore, B 16 belongs to the way of  opinion by association 
and because of  their falsity. 
Another  reason  why  B16  cannot  be  part  of the  Way  of Truth  is  that  if the 
physiologically  detenninistic  epistemology  expressed  by  it  is  accepted,  then  the 
consequences  are  in  blatant  contradiction  to  the  chastisements  and  commands  of the 
goddess. In order to make sense at all of  these chastisements and commands we  would 
require a notion of the autonomy of the intellect denied by B 16.  Consider. for instance. 
how the  mortals  are  treated  at  the  beginning  of [Q63,  p.  103]  and  in  the  following 
quotations: 
[Q64]  For this is the first  way of enquiry from  which I hold you back,  but then 
from  that  on  which  mortals  wander  knowing  nothing,  two  headed;  for 
helplessness guides the  wandering thought in  their breasts,  and  they are carried 
along, deaf and blind at once, dazed, undiscriminating hordes, who believe that to 
be  and not to be  are the  same and not the  same~ and the path taken by  them is 
backward-turning.  60 
[Q65]  But you must hold back your thought (vOll\la) from this way of enquiry, 
nor let habit, born of  much experience, force you down this way.61 
[Q66]  Judge by  reasoning (AOyw) the  strife-encompassed refutation spoken by 
62  me. 
Now if the  pureness  and  clarity of all  men's  thoughts  are  purely  determined  by  what 
element  happens  to  be  dominant  in  their  bodies  then  it  seems  pointless  to  blame  the 
mortals for being "carried along" by or "forced down" a particular line of  thought. Their 
constitution would rigidly determine which path they follow.  Hence, if B  16 is correct all 
men  must  be  "carried"  and  "forced".  For in  this  case,  as  Homer observes,  "the  mind 
(voos) of men on this earth is like the day that the father of  the gods and men brings to 
them".63  Men's thoughts are heteronymously derived.  Again,  surely it  is  strange that the 
goddess  commands the kouros to  hold  himself back  from  certain  paths.  He  is  in  fact 
specifically  told  to  "hold  back  your thought  (volllla)" which  directly  contradicts  B16 
where  "As  is  at  any  moment  the  mixture  of the  wandering  limbs,  so  mind  (VOOS)  is 
present to men" [Q61, p. 99]. 
Notice the  assumption of intellectual autonomy that  underlies quotations 63-6.  The 
Kouros is also commanded to judge or discriminate by reasoning (Aoyw
M
)  yet according 
to  B 16  the decision to  do  this  is  something out \\ith the control of the  human  will.  The 105 
mortal's  initial  error, the reason for  them going astray,  is  not the  domination of their 
constitution by the cold. Rather it is to have made an incorrect decision, "they have made 
up their minds to name two forms"  for "that is  where they have gone astray"  [Q63, p. 
103]. It is a  "path taken by them"  [Q64, P.  104] not a path determined for them.  They 
take this path by following habitual modes of thought "habit born of much experience" 
[Q65,  p.  104]  i.e.  by  not  using  their judgement;  not  by  being  determined  in  their 
judgements. The mortals are described as "undiscriminating" because they do not assess 
the  consequence of following  certain paths and just choose to follow  the  one that  is 
habitually followed. It is a matter of  will, not compulsion. 
These last points also seem to rule out the previously mentioned KirkIVlastnos theory 
that B16 is a description of  mortal thought processes in the Way of  Truth. For B16 posits 
the theory that all men's thoughts are heteronymously determined i.e. outside the sphere 
of  will. In contrast, in The Way of  Truth, the mortals' thoughts are autonomous and their 
errors arise from the mistaken judgments of  the will, or at least from not actualizing the 
possibilities for judgement open to them. To conclude, Loenen must be wrong to place 
B 16 in the Way of Truth. It is correctly situated in the Way of  Opinion. This is the first 
postulate of  the interpretation. Let us now move to consider the second. 
4.5. The Status of  the Way of  h.o~a 
The status of the way of  Bo~a is  a contested issue.  A.  A. Long, in "The Principles of 
Parmenides' Cosmology,,65,  has listed many different  ancient and modem interpretative 
trends and classified the main categories66. To resolve the problems of  interpretation that 
surround  this  issue  is  important  to  many  issues  in  the  Parmenidean  epistemology. 
Although immediate concerns locate the analysis here, it must always be born in mind that 
there  are  later  arguments  in  mind.  For  example  if (i)  the  Way  of oo~a has  no 
epistemological credibility and (ii) it can be established that the way of  opinion represents 
the  world  revealed  by  or  interpreted  through  the  aesthetic  functions,  then  (iii)  the 
aesthetic  functions  necessarily  give  wholly  false  testimony.  This  shall  be  termed  the 
aesthetic credibility argument. 
If the placing of B 16  is  correct then Theophrastus' interpretation depends finally  on 
attributing  a  credible  epistemological  status to  the  way of oo~a. This  status must  be 106 
substantial enough that we would consider it relevant to the epistemology of  the Way of 
Truth. There are many philosophers who are willing to attribute this status. For example, 
if  they are to be  consistent,  such a substantial status must  be  attributed to  the way of 
8o~a by Theophrastus, Kirk, Verdenius and Vlastos. This is because they all treat B 16 as 
an  important part of the Parmenidean epistemology generally,  yet  unlike Loenen locate 
BI6 in the Way of  Opinion. Theophrastus gives the most extreme statement of  this view 
when he observes that Parmenides "followed both ways" and "tried to give an account of 
the origin ofthings".67 In addition, Loenen thinks that the way of opinion, although not 
suitable  as  a  vehicle  for  necessary  knowledge  about  immutable  things,  is  certainly 
important for contingent knowledge of  mutable things. "Way A does not refuse to accept 
the real existence of  concrete things, but it merely denies (I) that it is exclusively mutable 
things which exist (this is implied) and (2) that these can be the object of  knowledge (in 
the strict sense, i.e. of  immutable or necessary knowledge".  68 
Plutarch, Aristotle,  Theophrastus and many others69  have treated elements from the 
Way  of opinion  as  important,  viz.  as  a  serious  attempt  to  rival  the  cosmologies  and 
cosmogonies of Ionia. As Plutarch observes, "For he  has said much about the earth and 
about the heavens and sun and moon, and he recounts the coming into being of  men; and 
as befits an ancient natural philosopher, who put together his own book, not pulling apart 
someone  else's,  he  has  left  none  of the  important  topics  undiscussed".  70  In all  these 
authors there seems to be the feeling that Parmenides would not have devoted so  much 
space to the way of  opinion without attributing to it any real significance. 
In contrast to the above authors Mourelatos specifically warns us against "treating the 
epistemology and metaphysics of'Doxa' as the next best thing to  the epistemology and 
metaphysics of  'Truth' against Parmenides' express warning to the contrary".  71  This thesis 
strongly endorses the latter viewpoint. Parmenides explicitly and consistently refers to the 
status  he  attributes  to  the  way of mortal  opinion.  These  references  are  all  extremely 
negative: 
[Q67]  Here  I  end  my  trustworthy  discourse  and  thought  concerning  truth~ 
Henceforth learn the beliefs of mortal men,  listening to the deceitful ordering of 
7') 
my words. -
I  Q681  It is  proper that  you  should  learn all  things.  both the  unshaken heart of 
well-rounded truth. and the opinions of  mortals in which there is no true reliance. 
But nonetheless you shall learn these things too, how what is believed would have 
to be assuredly pervading all things throughout.  73 [Q69] For never shall this be forcibly maintained, that things that are not are. but 
you must hold back your thought from this way of enquiry, nor let habit, born of 
much experience, force you down this way, by making you use an aimless eye or 
an  ear  and  tongue  full  of meaningless  sound:  judge  by  reason  the  strife-
encompassed refutation spoken by me.
74 
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There is really no mystery attached to the fact that Parmenides devotes a substantial part 
of his poem to an account of supposedly false mortal opinions.  The explanation for it  is 
explicitly given in the text of  the poem. Although the goddess warns the kouros against 
actually  following  the  false  path  of mortal  opinion  [Q64,  p.  104],  [Q69],  he  is 
nevertheless instructed to learn about it  [Q67, p.  106].  The Goddess explains that it  is 
proper that he should "learn all things" both the True and the false  [Q68, p.  106].  The 
goddess even gives the reason why he  should learn something that is  false,  "The whole 
ordering  of these  [the  elements  within  oo~a] I  tell  you  as  it  seems  fitting,  for  so  no 
thought  of mortal  men  shall  ever  outstrip  you". 75  What  this  means  will be  explained 
presently. 
It may  seem  paradoxical when I  say  that  Plutarch and  others  were  (i)  correct to 
assume that the way of  oo~a  was an attempt to rival the work of  the nature philosophers 
of Ionia (in fact  it  was meant to be the most convincing account that it  was possible to 
give)  and  (ii)  wrong  to  attribute  to  such an  account  a  credible  status.  However,  the 
apparent paradox is resolved when we consider that Parmenides' ultimate intention is to 
prove that any path of  mortal opinion no matter how superficially appealing, cannot have 
the  least  credibility.  The  mortal  path  is  used  by  those  who,  by  carelessly  not 
discriminating  between being  and  not  being  [Q69],  end  up  saying  and  thinking  that-
which-is-not, i.e. not-being. For Parmenides, to do this is to think illogically and, as such, 
is not permissible, "I shall not allow you to say nor to think from not being: for it is not to 
be  said nor thought that it  is  not,,76.  Yet confronted with the task of refuting the sheer 
diversity of mortal opinions that make  that  illegitimate  step  Parmenides decides  on an 
ingenious  time-saving  strategy.  If the  most  convincing  and  universal  of all  possible 
accounts can be presented and shown to be false then all the rest (past, present or future) 
could a fortiori, be dismissed. This strategy will ensure, as Parmenides observes, that "no 
h  h  - 1  hll  .  ,,77  t  oug  t of morta  men s  a  ever outstnp you  . 
rhe way of  oo~a then is  not  an account of the  views of ordinary mortals [Zeller
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Hamlyn79]  nor is  it  a critique of Heraclitus' cosmology [Bernays8°1  or of P)1hagoreanism 108 
[Burnet 
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I]. Rather it is Pannenides' own unique product, "he put together his O\\TI book, 
not  pulling  apart  someone  else's". It is  intended  to  be  the most  universaL  (hence  its 
length), best and most persuasive account possible considering that the underlying logic is 
flawed.  The  account  therefore,  because  plurality  is  denied  in  aATl6Ela,  postulates  a 
minimum of  just two forms to explain everything.83  The extreme contrast here would be 
with Anaxagoras' cosmogony, which posits an infinity of  homoeomerous principles, see 
Aristotle84. The account also satisfies the pervasiveness criterion that is,  in B 1, extended 
even to a convincing account of  "what is believed", i.e. to oo~a. Light and night pervade 
"all things throughout" because "all is full of  light and obscure night at once, both equal, 
since neither has any share of  nothing".  85 
The account also,  as B9 suggests, possesses the  least possible share of non-being. 
Individually not being divisible - remember divisibility is  rejected in aATl6Ela,  "Nor is  it 
divided,  since  it  all  exists  alike,,86  - night  and light  have  no  share  in it.  It may be no 
accident that, in Plato's Parmenides, Socrates mentions this "non-divisible" characteristic 
of day - "if it were like one and the same day, which is in many places at the same time 
and nevertheless is  not separate from itself'.  87  Not-being is only admitted in the division 
between them, i.e. as a consequence of  the mistaken positing of  two forms. However, any 
such admission is  enough to invalidate the entire Way of  oo~a, "for they need not have 
named so much as one" [Q63, p.  103]. 
The Ionian cosmogonicallcosmological principles, viz.  water (Thales) Air (Anaximenes) 
or Fire (Heraclitus) seem, at first,  to satisfY the pervasiveness criterion.  Such accounts, 
after all,  posit only one principle as both the apXTl and OTOIOXEIOV of  all things. If this 
were true, Parmenides could not claim to have given the most convincing of  all accounts. 
However, the problem with the Ionian principles is that unlike night and day they can be 
divided  or  separated  from  themselves  infinitely;  compare  B4  for  Parmenides  worry 
concerning the notion of "separability".  Water, for instance, can be divided into  smaller 
portions infinitely.  Parmenides' way of opinion is  superior because only one division is 
possible and hence posited. Night for example is  "in every direction identical with itself: 
but not with the other, i.e. light. 88 
The next major argument against the legitimate epistemological status of the way of 
opinion involves a consideration of Parmenides' main method in  the Way of Truth. The 
tollowing  represents  a  brief SlU1IDlaI)'  of Parmenides'  arguments  in  this  section of his 109 
poem: (i) Either a possible object of  thought is and it is impossible for it not to be or it  is 
not and it  is  needful that it  not exist;  (ii) You cannot logically think about an object of 
thought that does not exist, therefore (iii) Any possible object of  thought must necessarily 
exist. The conclusion (iii) constitutes Pannenides' primary axiom and it may seem like an 
unpromising starting point. 
Many  modem philosophers  would  deny even that  "existence"  is  a predicate at  all. 
Instead, they would affirm that the term existence adds absolutely nothing contentual to 
the phrase "possible object of  thought". Yet, for Pannenides, this was not the case. The 
term "existence" was most definitely a synthetic predicate and was, in fact. pregnant with 
contentual implications.  The reason for this was that, for Pannenides. existence did  not 
just  register  the  bare  fact  of "being".  It was  not  a  portmanteau  term  i.e.  the  "most 
universal concept" or "highest genus" covering men, trees, ideas, pains, etc.; rather it was 
used, in a strict sense, to connote: that which does not, in any consideration applicable to 
it, involve or incorporate any aspect of  not-being. 
To give a simple example, we would normally consider a plurality of  things to exist in 
the world. However, for Pannenides, this notion would involve the illegitimate positing of 
not-being. Not-being would be necessary to  spatially separate two or more things from 
each other. (Remember this was the fundamental problem with the positing of light and 
night  in  8o~a and why "they have named two forms  when the needs must not name so 
much as one"). Hence, a plurality of  objects cannot exist (in sensu stricto). However, this 
is  not just to  be  an approach of via negativa to  what is  implied  by  the term existence. 
From information concerning the attributes which any object of knowledge that  "exists 
(strict sense)" cannot possess, it is also possible to derive knowledge about what qualities 
it  actually does and must possess. For example, from the fact that plurality involves not-
being and the object of  thought that exists (in sensu stricto) cannot involve any aspect of 
not-being,  we  can derive the fact that the object of thought must be  non-plural or one. 
The  oneness  of being.  according  to  Plato  at  least,  was  Parmenides'  most  significant 
doctrine
89
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The additional qualities that Parmenides manages to derive by this method are given 
1I1  column  A  of Table  2  below.  Now the  arguments  presented  here  in  The  Way  of 
AAE8Ela  demonstrate the actual nature of that which exists.  For the way of AA1l8Ela  is 
the only path that  is  not  false  "there still remains [after the others are rejected] just one ]10 
account of a  way,  that it  is".90  As such it  is  described in the following  terms (i)  "my 
trustworthy discourse and thought concerning truth,,91;  (ii)  "the unshaken heart of well-
rounded truth,,92; (iii) "a path of  persuasion for she attends upon truth,,93; (iv) the way "is 
genuine"  .94  Hence, that-which-is incontrovertibly possesses all the qualities mentioned in 
column A, (a) - (m) and this is  identical with the truth. In what remains of  the Way of 
oo~a  the qualities that are attributed to the object of  knowledge - see column B in table 
2.  - directly contradict those mentioned in AAT}8Ela.  Hence, they necessarily must be 
false and hence the explanatory account that includes them must be false. [A] The Way of Truth (AATl8Ela) 
(a) One [B8,5-9&29] 
(b) Fixed [B8,30] 
(c) Does not perish [B8,l-4;21&27] 
(d) Does not come into being [B8,21&26] 
(  e) It never will be [B8,5-9 
(f) Of  a single kind [B8, 1-4] 
(g) Uncreated [B8,l-4] 
(h) Perfect [B8,1-4&32] 
(i) Remaining the same [B8,30] 
All exists alike [B8,22-5] 
All together [B8,5-9] 
(j) Not more here or less there [B8,22-5] 
Equally balanced [B8,43] 
(k) Changeless [B8,26&37 & C.F.
95
] 
(1) Inviolate [B8,49] 
Imperishable [B8, 1-4] 
(m) Whole [B8,1-4&37] 
Not divided [B8,22-5] 
[B] The Way of Opinion (Ao~a) 
(a) Plurality [B8,53] 
(b) Wandering [B10,4; B14; B15] 
(c) Perishing [B19,2] 
(d) Coming into being [B 10,3; B 17] 
(e) Will be after [B19,2] 
(f) Opposite [B8,55] 
(g) Birth [B 12,4: B 17, 1] 
(h) Hateful [B 12,4] 
(i) Difference [B8,56] 
(j) What preponderates is [B 16] 
(k) Growth [B 1  0,6; B 19] 
(1) Destruction [B 10,2] 
(m) Mingling [B 12,4-5] 
Table 2. The Contradictions between Parmenides' Two Ways. 
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This  argument  in  combination  with  those  stated  previously  makes  a  strong  case 
against  those  who  attribute  legitimacy  to  the  way  of  oo~a.  Yet,  the  conclusion 
concerning  the  way of opinion in  general and  B 16  in  particular is  not  unique  to  this 
analysis.  Commenting on the deterministic  psychology of B 16  Michael Frede observes 
that "not only is this not Parmenides' own view of  reality, it is a picture that is extremely 
primitive  and  schematic  in  its  conception  of cognition".96  However,  Frede  gives  no 
justification for this view.  Instead, he refers the reader to arguments given in a paper by 
A.  A.  Long.  In  the  referred  to  paper  Long  himself  categorically  concludes,  "the 
cosmogony  gives  a  totally  false  picture of reality".97  However,  Long's  arguments  for 
establishing  this  conclusion  are  weak.  Hence,  it  was  found  necessary  to  develop 
arguments to properly back up this position. 
If  the account is  correct. then there can be no evidence concerning the legitimacy of 
the senses that can be derived from the way of  opinion. In summary, we have shown that 
(i)  Loenen and Verdenius were right to find problems of  consistency when incorporating 
elements  of the  epistemology  of  oo~a into  the  Way  of Truth.  (ii)  Loenen  was 
consequently  wrong  to  actually  place  such  elements  within  that  Way  of Truth.  (iii) 
Plutarch and  Aristotle are  mistaken when they attribute to the method,  in  the  Way  of 
opinion,  significant  philosophical  credibility.  In  fact,  the  whole  point  of oo~a is  to 
undermine  the  credibility  of just  such  a  method  and  (iv)  Theophrastus'  argument 
concerning  the positive  epistemological  status of the  senses  is  not legitimate,  for  it  is 
based on a misunderstanding.  We have now shown that the way of  opinion is false.  Is it 
now possible to establish the  "aesthetic credibility argument"  by connecting the way of 
oo~a  with the aesthetic functions themselves? 
4.6. What is the Way of  ~o~a  an Account of? 
Barnes is  correct to  say that Parmenides,  unlike Melissus,  probably never presented an 
explicit  argument against the  senses.  This  is  certainly directly stated in  the tradition by 
Theophrastus.
98  However.  there  is  plenty  of evidence  from  within  the  text  that  he 
considered  them  false.  As  we  have  discovered,  the  way  of opinion  is  a  plausible  but 
ultimately  logically  fallacious  account.  What  then  is  oo~a an  account  of? Traditional 
commentators are agreed that  it  is an account of the sensible world. This  is certainly the 113 
main function of 8o~a. In the fragments that remain there is  a cosmological account. 
"And you shall know the nature of  aither and all the signs in it and the destructive works 
of the pure torch of the shinning sun,  and whence they came into  being; and you shall 
hear of  the wandering works of  the round-eyed moon  ... ,,99; a psychological epistemology 
as in fragment B 16, which we have already considered; an embryology from which Galen 
quotes, "On the right [side of  the womb] boys on the left girls"I00  and an anthropology 
"the coming into being of  men" according to Plutarch.  101 
The indications are that this whole section is  similar  in  content to the tradition of 
writing Ionian and later cosmologies, the tradition ofTTepl <!>voews. Note its similarity in 
style  and  content  to  the  cosmology  presented  by Empedocles
,102
.  Plutarch  refers  to 
Parmenides directly as a writer in this tradition when he observes "As befits an ancient 
natural  philosopher".103  The  revolutionary  aspect  of Parmenides  account,  that  which 
radically distinguishes it from the tradition of  TTepl  <!>voews,  is that ultimately the whole 
account  is  considered  to  be  completely  false  by  the  author  himself  At  the  level  of 
sensation, for Parmenides, things appear to be plural, to change, to be born and to die, to 
wander, to exist and not exist, to move position, to be hateful. It is this world as revealed 
to the aesthetic functions that 8o~a  is attempting to give some rational explanation of 
Aristotle  observes  that  Parmenides  is  here  "constrained  to  fall  in  with  obvious 
appearances"  .104  Yet  for  Parmenides the categorization or,  in  his  terms, the naming of 
things that are a  transparent description of sensations results in  an empty nominalism. 
That  which  the  aesthetic  functions  naturally  make  one  believe,  is  completely  false. 
Mortals have trust that these things and qualities describe that-which-is but really they are 
just uttering empty names that have no correlation to reality.  The goddess utters divine 
wisdom in  AAf)8ela  whereas she utters mortal truth in  8o~a. In addition to  [Q63.  p. 
103], consider the following in this respect: 
[Q70] In this way, according to opinion, these things have grown and now are and 
afterwards after growing  up  will  come to  an end.  And upon the  humans  have 
established a name to distinguish each one. 105 
[Q71]  Therefore it  has been named all the names which mortals have laid  down 
believing  them  to  be  tnle - coming to  be  and  perishing.  being  and  not  being, 
changing place and altering bright colour.  106 1l-+ 
The  mortal~  through  his  aesthetic  functions,  expenences  change,  birt~  deat~ 
alteration of colour and all the qualities mentioned in colomn B in table 2.  That is our 
everyday  sensory  experience  even  today.  However,  according  to  Parmenides,  reality 
necessarily must be changeless and possess all the qualities in colomn A.  Therefore. that 
which is revealed by the aesthetic functions has no reference in reality. It is a mere name. 
Now  we  could  say  that  this  proves  Hussey's  point  that  the  problem  is  not  sense 
perception per se  but  sense-perception "used routinely and without thought" .  Yet,  for 
Parmenides, the problem with the aesthetic functions  does not exist at the simple  level 
only i.e. with what is routinely revealed by them. 
Even quite sophisticated analysis of  that which is revealed by the aesthetic functions is 
false.  The  way  of mortal  opinion  itself proves  this.  It  is  not,  after  all,  just  an 
unsophisticated reliance on the senses, but rather includes sophisticated logico-sensitive 
cognition. Only consider Parmenides astronomical knowledge when he refers, in oo~a, to 
the moon as a "night shining,  foreign light, wandering around the  eart~ always looking 
towards the rays of  the sun". 107 The insight that the moon shines with a borrowed light is 
also  present in the truth-claiming cosmology of  Anaxagoras, "the sun induces the moon 
with brightness".  108 It is difficult to know Parmenides' or Anaxagoras' reason for believing 
that the moon is  not self-Iuminating.  It  may have nothing at all to do  with our modern 
scientific reasoning on this matter. 
However, what it does indicate is that the way ofoo~a  does not merely catalogue the 
results of  an unthinking attitude towards the senses. The senses immediately suggest that 
the  moon  shines  in  its  own right.  This  immediate  assessment  is  false.  Only  a  more 
sophisticated interpretation of  sensory information can conclude that unlike the sun, it  in 
itself is non-luminous while it "borrows" its light from the sun. This sophisticated account 
is  not  merely  sensation  based  but  involves  what  has  been defined  as  logico-sensitive 
cognition. It is clear that the way of  oo~a is not just a summation of  routine views about 
the  existing  world  as  it  appears to the  senses.  Rather there is an attempted account of 
how  the  existing  universe  came  into  existence  "how earth and  sun and  moon and  the 
aither which is common to all and the Milky Way and furthest Olympus and the hot force 
of the  stars surged forth and came to  be". \09  Such a theory would  surely require  more 
than Hussey's use of sense perception "without thought". Yet, this theory too, according 
to  Parmenides. is false. 115 
It is safe to conclude here that Hussey makes an incorrect assessment of Parmenides 
attitude  to  the  senses.  For  Parmenides,  even  quite  sophisticated  accounts  of sense-
perception are  ultimately  false.  Pure reasoning,  if  exercised  would  soon discover  that 
there was no difference between, or plurality of  moon and sun, light and dark. In addition, 
to  assert even the existence of such entities involves the contradiction of thinking that 
non-being  exists.  Such notions are just empty names  without reference and to  give  an 
account of  them (like the way ofoo~a)  whether sophisticated or not is to "go astray" , to 
"give a deceitful ordering" or to follow a path in which there is "no true reliance". 
The  path of oo~a then is  a sophisticated account of the  world as  revealed to  the 
aesthetic  functions.  Remember,  in  this  respect,  that  it  is  meant  to  "outstrip"  all  other 
mortal  accounts.  As  such  when  we  fit  the  argument  into  the  aesthetic  credibility 
argument-format we discover that it now represents a challenge to all accounts based on 
the aesthetic functions, no matter how sophisticated these aesthetic functions are. 
4.7. Verdenius Notion that NooS Incorporates Alo8aolS 
Let us now turn to Verdenius' notion that the Parmenidean VOos  - normally regarded 
as the Parmenidean noetic function - may mean,  "knowing in a wide  sense,,110,  i.e.  may 
include  sense-perception.  Certainly,  the importance of the terms  voos,  VOElV and  their 
derivatives  to  the  Parmenidean  epistemology  is  indisputable.  Such  terms  are  used 
consistently throughout the poem
lll and always with epistemological resonances. Yet the 
connection  with  sense-perception,  that  Verdenius  posits,  is  difficult  to  detect  both  in 
Parmenides himself and within the whole tradition of the use of such terms before and 
after Parmenides. The most influential study made of  these important terms is the trilogy 
of  papers, published in Classical Philology, by Kurt von Fritz viz. (i) "Noos and Noein in 
the  Homeric  Poems"  1  12:  (ii)  "Noos,  Noein,  and  their  Derivatives  in  Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy (Excluding Anaxagoras) Part  1:  From the Beginnings to Parmenides" 113  and 
(iii)  "Part 2:  The Post-Parmenidean Period,,114.  This impressive analysis of  ancient Greek 
linguistic usage attempts to catalogue the many different senses of  voos and VOElV over a 
substantial historical period. viz. from Homer to Democritus. The closest Von Fritz gets 
to  the  interpretation Verdenius gives of the  Parmenidean  use  of voos and  VOElV  is  in 
respect  to  an  analysis of their Homeric  use.  He  observes  in  separate  passages that  "In 116 
Homer also  the  VOos is  closely related to sense-perception,,115  and "But in the  stage of 
semantic development represented by the Homeric poems, the concept of  VOElV is more 
closely related to the sense ofvision,,1l6. 
Yet,  significantly  what  he  does not say is  that,  in  Homer (or anyone  else  for  that 
matter),  VOos  itself  incorporates  sense-perception  as  an  intrinsic  function.  Or,  in 
Verdenius terms, that the meaning of voos is wide enough to include sense-perception. 
For Von Fritz, it  is  "related to" sense-perception only in the sense that the word and its 
derivatives  are  normally  used  simultaneously  with  sensory,  usually  visual,  stimuli. 
According to this account, in Homer, the terms VOos and VOElV are used in a very precise 
way to connote a type of immediate recognition.  In particular, it  is used when, through 
the  sight  of a  concrete  object,  someone  realises  the  full  meaning  of a  situation.  For 
instance, in the Illiad, Aphrodite appears to Helen disguised as an old woman. Now the 
verb  VOElV  is  only  used  when  Helen  suddenly  recognises  that  she  is  dealing  with  a 
goddess. I 17  When Paris sees Menelaus  I 18  VOElV is used when he recognizes that Menelaus 
has nothing else on his mind but to kill him.  Similarly VOElV is used when Odysseus sees 
the smoke from his own house
l19 recognising that he is finally home after his long travels 
and other examples of  an identical nature. 120 
No  process of discursive  (used in  the  Kantian sense i.e.  non-sensitive) reasoning is 
involved  in  these examples.  Neither is  it  the  case  that  it  is  a sensory datum that  is of 
particular importance to the knower.  It is  not the fact  of a change in the old women's 
appearance, in itself, that strikes Helen but rather the sudden realization that she is in the 
presence of the divine.  It is  not the sight of Menelaus that strikes Paris, rather it  is  the 
recognition of his  intent.  Again,  it  is  not the  smoke,  as  a sensory datum,  that  strikes 
Odysseus but the sudden realization that he is really home after years of wandering. The 
sense-perception of a particular object, the old woman,  Menelaus' outward appearance 
and  the  smoke  from  Odysseus'  home  only  triggers  the  insight  or recognition  and  is 
completely  extrinsic  to  that  insight  or recognition.  The  insight  or recognition itself is 
purely noetic  and  is  only externally triggered  by  experience.  In this  limited  sense  Von 
Fritz accepts that sense-perception and voos are related. 
However. he correctly does not conclude from this that senses-perception is included 
within  the  intrinsic  function of VOos·  It is,  therefore,  in  fact  "always distinguished from 
sense-perception". 12)  As a consequence he  would not claim that voos was non-noetic in 117 
any sense. In this point, at least, he is in agreement with Boehme who states that VOo) in 
Homer  always  means  something  "purely  intellectual  or  rather  purely  mental  (rein 
intellektuell).122  From our previous chapter we can easily identify the  strange Homeric 
insight as a naIve and primitive form of  illuminative intuition i.e. as a prototype for a form 
of acquaintive  knowing  that  can  transcend  the  phenomenal.  Von  Fritz  is  struggling 
towards this conclusion in the following passage: 
[Q72]  While,  therefore,  VOEIV  is  always  distinguished  from  purely  sensual 
perception, it is not conceived of  as the result of  a process of  reasoning, much less 
as this process itself, but rather as a kind of  mental perception. if  this expression is 
allowable.  In other words, it  may,  in some way, appear as  a kind of sixth sense 
which penetrates deeper into  the nature of the objects perceived than the other 
senses ... and in Homer,  Vov) never means  "reason" and  VOE1V  never "to reason" 
whether deductively or inductively. 123 
The insight then is acquaintive rather than discursive, a type of  seeing with the "mind's 
eye" .124  Von Fritz calls its elsewhere a "mental vision" or a "sudden intuition" .125  While 
Shirley  Darcus,  who  traces  forward  this  exact  sense  of VOo)  to  Empedocles,  has 
observed that VOO), "serves primarily as an inner organ of  sight that grasps the reality of  a 
situation".126  According  to  Darcus,  when  Empedocles  is  referring  to  actual  sense-
perception he uses the term "phrenes" rather than "nous". Against Verdenius then, voo) 
and VOE1V are still noetic (the etymological link between the terms, in this case, is a good 
guide to their meaning), as illuminative intuition of  which this is a primitive  precursor is, 
in fact, itself a noetic function. Notwithstanding,  there are problems with many points in 
Von Fritz'  analysis of voo) and  VOE1V  in Parmenides.  Certainly,  historically speaking, 
there  is  no  known precedent for  a philosophical use of voo) and  VOE1V  in  Verdenius' 
"wide sense". However it could still be the case that, contra Von Fritz, Parmenides was 
the first to use it in this sense. 
The first thing that we can definitely say about the Parmenidean notion of  VOo) is that 
it  is  under the control of the will. Evidence has already been provided for this tact. The 
deterministic psychology entailed by [Q61, p.  99]. which presents itself as a challenge to 
this view. has been shown to be part of  a deliberately false account. The second thing that 
can  be  said  of Parmenides'  use  of VOo)  is  that  it  can  be  deceived.  The  castigation of 
mortal  intelligence  in  [Q64.  p.  104]  and  elsewhere  demonstrates  how  the  voo)  \vhen 118 
undirected (i.e.  "wandering") or misdirected (i.e.  not "held back") can be deceived into 
thinking  "that  which  is  not",  a  logical  error  according  to  Parmenides.  This  fact  has 
puzzled many  commentators.  Frankel,  for  instance  observes
l27  that,  in  [Q64,  p.  104]. 
Parmenides must be being "ironical and deliberately paradoxical" when associating terms 
like  l61lVEl and VOos  with their apparent contradictories viz.  allfJxaVlV and TT AaYKAos. 
Similarly Guthrie explains that the phrase "nAaYKTov VOOV,,128 must have been a novelty 
and "carried a flavour of  paradox or oxymoron".  129 
Their difficulties arise because, in the tradition up to this point the terms voos and 
VOElV  are used as,  so called,  "success" or "achievement" words.  For instance, we have 
seen that, in Homer, the term is only used when an insight into the true nature of  a certain 
situation is gained. It could in this sense never be linked to failure. It retains this meaning 
throughout the pre-Socratic tradition. It even appears with this meaning in more advance 
philosophical uses,  in  much later texts,  where  it  is  associated with intuitive  certainty. 
Consider the following quote from Aristotle,  "Of the thinking states by which we grasp 
the  trut~ some  are  unfailingly  true,  others admit  of error - opinion  for  instance  and 
calculation - whereas scientific  knowing and voos are always true".  130  So how against 
this tradition can the voos be deceived in Parmenides? 
To  answer this  question  let  us  first  examine  the  potential  errors  possible  for  the 
Parmenidean voos. The first danger mentioned, a path from which he must hold back his 
voos [Q64, p.  104], is that on which the voos makes an error of  logic. The possibility is 
that the voos will choose the wrong path in the mutually exclusive roads of  enquiry. If  it 
does this  it  states,  with  Gorgias of Leonti131, that the subject of any enquiry  is  non-
existent, or in Parmenides' terms,  "that it  is not and that it is  needful that it  not be". 132 
Now, according to Parmenides, there is a sense in which a path of  enquiry that states that 
"that-which-is"  ,  "is  not"  cannot  even  be  thought  with  the  voos,  it  is  an  "altogether 
indiscernible track,,133,  or "no true way".134  The reason for this is  given in fragment 86, 
"What is there to be said and thought (VOElV) must needs be". Any object of enquiry if it 
is to be known, thought about, or delineated must exist. If  our object of  enquiry does not 
in  fact  exist  then  there  simply  cannot  be  any  imaginable  enquiry  at  all.  There  is  no 
"object" to be  enquired into.  To take the path of Gorgias when he  asserts that "What is 119 
thought  of is  not  existent" 135  is,  for  Pannenides,  a  logically  incoherent  posItIon. 
Therefore, the voos is to be restrained from this potential logical error [Q64, p.  104]. 
Despite this, von Fritz
l36 is still mistaken when he says, that error in Pannenides does 
not stem from the senses but from the voos itself This would only be  true if  the only 
possible potential error for the voos is the Gorgias path, but this is plainly not the case. 
There is a second path of  error from which the voos is to be withheld [Q64, p.  104]. This 
potential path of error is  actualised  when the  voos is  distracted  by  the  world  that  is 
habitually revealed to the senses. This world of  seeming discloses to consciousness all the 
illusory attributes mentioned in table 2, colomn B.  For Parmenides this world. unlike the 
Gorgias path, which is identical with a universe of  not-being, includes both being and not-
being.  In line with what the senses reveal, things are certainly posited as existing, contra 
Gorgias, but at the level of pure thought or logical reasoning, these same things involve 
contradiction.  They  involve  contradiction  because  the  posited  existents  all  logically 
involve not-being and, according to Parmenides' strict criterion, what-is-not cannot exist, 
"it is not to be said or nor thought that it is not". 137 
At the level of  logic, or pure reasoning the categories of  what-is and what-is-not are 
clearly distinct and only existents or attributes that have no share in what is not can exist. 
Yet, on the path on which mortals wander, led by "habit born of  much experience", there 
is  no  such  clear  discrimination.  The  voos of mortals,  lazily  distracted  by  the  senses, 
accepts a world in which the two categories coalesce at one moment and are distinct at 
another.  There  is  no  rigid  demarcation  which  pure  reasoning  would  uncover.  The 
"undiscriminating  hordes"  deceived  by  what  they  discover  through  their  aesthetic 
functions posit a world that can only exist if  the logical categories of  being and not-being 
are blurred and confused. This world requires a false indiscriminate logic in which "to be 
and not to be are the same and not the same,,138.  Von Fritz is correct to say that the cause 
of  error is the "wandering voos ,,139, but only in this second mortal path. The first Gorgias 
path involves the voos making the wrong choice, i.e.  not-being rather than being,  with 
regard  to  these  mutually  exclusive  alternatives.  On  the  Gorgias  path  the  voos  is 
discriminatory  but  wrong.  On  the  mortal  path  the  voos  is  wrong  because  it  is  non-
discriminatory. 120 
Von Fritz is  certainly wrong to  say that  the  wandering  voo) is  the  cause of error 
rather than the senses. The voos only wanders because it is distracted from pure logical 
reasoning  by  the  deception of the  world  revealed  by  the  senses.  Now if this  is  the 
mechanism for error, in Parmenides' mortal path, is it likely that Verdenius is correct that 
alo8aol) is part of  the very functioning ofvoo); that part of  the insight gained by voo) 
involves  sensation?  If this  were  so,  would  it  not  be  the  case  that  voo)  would  be 
permanently subject to error? Surely, that which causes the errors for voo) is unlikely to 
be  part of its function.  This would entail that Parmenides' main repository of  intellectual 
insight contained within itself  the seeds of  error. 
If  this were true and Parmenides were still to attain to the "unwavering heart of  well 
rounded truth" 140  then surely he would require some other more reliable faculty than the 
voo) to determine whether the voo) is  using its aesthetic false  insight or its noetic true 
insight.  This brings us back to the problem mentioned by Frankel and Guthrie viz.  how 
the voos, the instrument of  epistemological insight, can possibly err. The fact is that there 
is  a precedent in the use of the terms  VOElV  and voo) for this possibility. A tradition in 
which voos and VOElV  are not "success" or "achievement" words. Consider the following 
quotations  from  Hesiod  which  demonstrate  that  within  traditional  texts  there  is  the 
possibility of  a voo) that is deceived or wrong: 
[Q73]  Trust and mistrust have ruined men.  No arse-rigged women must deceive 
your mind  [VOOS]  with her wily twitterings when she pokes into your granary; he 
who believes a woman believes cheaters.
141 
[Q74]  Prometheus pitted his wits against the mighty son of Kronos.  For he  had 
carved up a big ox and served it in such a way as to deceive the mind  [v~~)] of 
Zeus. 142 
[Q75] Greed (KEpOOS) deceives the minds [VOOS]  ofmen.
143 
The voos in Hesiod can be deceived by lust [Q73], greed [Q75] or false appearances 
[Q74].  The  first  two  conative  modes  are  traditionally  seen  as  clouding  a  person's 
reasoning capacity or judgement. The third demonstrates that the VOo) could be fallible  if 
it does not look beneath the surface appearances. The voos is most vulnerable to error, in 
Parmenides,  when  it  is  not  exclusively  directed  by  the  hOYOS i ~~  or reasoning  process 
using  the  method  of EhEYXOV
l45  and  allows  itself to  be  caught  up  in  distraction.  The 121 
distraction that most often lures voos astray is the world of  the senses. The person who 
trusts the world habitually revealed to the senses has relaxed his discriminatory powers. 
(A similar relaxation occurs in Hesiod when lust or greed has the same effect).  For an 
analysis of  the important Parmenidean, metaphors of  controL in relation to this point, see 
1.  H.  Lesher Parmenides' Critique of  Thinking. 146  That is why the mortals are accused of 
being "undiscriminating hordes" [Q64, p. 104] and why Parmenides is commanded by the 
goddess  to  "judge/discriminate  by  reasoning"  [Q66,  p.104].  Parmenides'  voos.  as  a 
capacity for insight, must use the pure reasoning process to avoid falling into error, must 
test alternatives by the method of EAEYXOV. If it relaxes in any way, then the two false 
paths are waiting to trap it into forming false beliefs. 
On the positive side, however, if  the voos is not distracted and follows the method of 
EAEYXOV it  is  immune from doubt.  So much so that it is not required of Parmenides to 
say why the senses are false. Parmenides does not include an explicit argument against the 
senses, like Melissus147, because for Parmenides sense perception is already discredited by 
the  fact  that it  tells us that things that cannot possibly exist  according to our reason, 
actually do  exist.  This is  the real answer to Barnes' point concerning the absence of an 
explicit argument. Pure reason presents the world as it  must be.  The senses present the 
world differently from pure reason therefore the senses do not present the world as it is 
and are hence deceptive. This is the implicit argument against the senses in Parmenides. 
Significantly  when  Melissus,  whose  philosophy  is  always  closely  associated  with 
Parmenides, does give his explicit argument against the senses it takes the form of, what I 
contend  is,  the  Parmenidean implicit  argument:  (i)  pure  reason  demands  a  universal 
criterion of  unchangeabilty, "if  these things exist as we see and hear correctly, then each 
of them  must  be  as  it  seemed to  us  at  first,  and they cannot  change  or come to be 
different,  but  each must  always  be just as  it  is,,148;  (ii)  The  senses  reveal  change  of 
various types,  "But what is hot seems to us to become cold, and what is  cold hot and 
what  is  hard  soft  ... ,,149;  (iii)  The  senses are false,  "So  it  is  clear that  we do  not  see 
correctly and that those many things do not correctly seem to exist"150.  Hence, there is a 
sense in  which Simplicius is  correct to observe that, "Melissus clearly explains why they 
[i.e.  Parmenides  and  Melissus]  say  that  perceptible  objects  do  not  exist  but  seem to 
•  ,,\'i\  eXIst. -122 
To  conclude  this  section  it  has  been  established  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that 
Parmenides  was  an  apriorist.  In  fact,  the  course  of pre-Socratic  philosophy,  post-
Parmenides,  cannot  really  be  understood  without  this  assumption.  The  Ionian  type 
cosmologies, epistemologically based as they were on what is  revealed to the aesthetic 
functions  152,  had  to  meet  new  stringent  criteria  derived  from  pure  reasoning.  To  re-
institute  cosmogony  as  a  legitimate  field  of enquiry,  in  the  post-Parmenidean period. 
Empedocles  found  it  necessary  to  restore  our  trust  in  the  aesthetic  functions.  The 
following passage (with its Parmenidean echoes) seems a direct reaction to Parmenides' 
challenge to the senses: 
[Q76]  Come now observe with all your powers how each thing is clear, neither 
holding sight in greater trust compared with hearing, nor noisy hearing above the 
passages  of the  tongue,  nor  withhold  trust  from  any  of the  other  limbs  by 
whatever way there is a channel to understanding but grasp each thing in the way 
h· h··  I  153  W  IC  It  IS C  ear. 
Having  established apriorism let  us now move to consider what category of apriorism, 
illuminative or ratiocinative, is represented by the Parmenidean epistemology. 
4.8. The Ratiocinative Pannenidean  NooS 
It was mentioned earlier that certain Homeric uses of voos or VOElV naively anticipated 
illuminative  intuition.  This  is  the specific  form of intuition characteristic of illuminative 
knowing.  Now it  is  Von Fritz'  view that this  form  of intuition is  still  present  in  the 
Parmenidean fragments.  He  states that  in  Parmenides,  prior to any form  of discursive 
reasoning, there is a direct intuitive knowing of TO EOV: 
[Q77]  It is  still  the  primary  function  of the  voos  to  be  in  direct  touch with 
ultimate reality. It reaches this ultimate reality not only at the end and as a result 
of the logical process, but in a way is  in touch with it  from the very beginning, 
since, as Parmenides again and again points out, there is no voos without the EOV, 
in which it unfolds itself. 154 
This is a view which merits a seriously challenge. We have already discovered that the 
Parmenidean voos,  as  an  intuitive  faculty.  can  be  deceived  about  TO  EOV.  This  surely 
could not  happen if the nature of  that-which-is was acquaintively known from  the start. 123 
unless there was some kind of dual consciousness
l55  that can know something and not 
know  something  at  the  same  time.  In  addition,  if the  nature  of reality  could  be 
acquaintively known before the reasoning  process it  is  strange that  Parmenides  would 
present  so  much argumentation subsequently.  We  will  discover  later that.  in  Plotinus. 
illuminative intuition supervenes upon a process of discursive reason.  Discursive reason 
advances the mind to the point where it can attain the acquaintive knowing. This process 
is certainly common in the illuminative tradition. 
However,  to have  an acquaintive  apodeictic  insight  from the  start  and then to  get 
involved in a process of  argumentation that involves many potential pitfalls, and this just 
to  establish what is  already known seems absurd.  The evidence,  from Parmenides, that 
Von Fritz points to in order to justify his theory is,  "For not without what is,  in which it 
unfolds itself will you find thinking". 156 Yet I have already explained Parmenides meaning 
here. There cannot be voos  without TO  EOV  because if  there is just nothingness how can 
thought emerge? What is there for thought to emerge into? There is nothing for thinking 
into  which to  "unfold/express  itself'.  The quotation has,  therefore nothing  to  do  with 
acquaintance  knowing.  Ironically,  for  Von  Fritz,  the  argument  it  contains  is 
paradigmatic  ally  discursive  (the  non-Kantian  meaning  i.e.  propositional).  It  certainly 
cannot justify the positing of  a noetic function like illuminative intuition. 
Notwithstanding  the  above  argument,  Von  Fritz  asserts  that  Parmenides  was 
historically  the  first  to  include  discursive  reasoning  in  the  function  of voos,  "His 
[Parmenides]  work marks  the  most  decisive  turning-point  in  the  history of the  terms 
VOos,  VOElV,  etc.;  for  he  was the  first  consciously to  include  logical reasoning  in  the 
function ofvoOS".lS7 However, this inclusion sits uneasily with Von Fritz' commitment to 
voos as illuminative intuition. He is correct to suggest that there is an intuitional aspect to 
the  Parmenides use  of voos. However, Parmenides' notion of voos corresponds, more 
naturally, to what has been termed deductive intuition in chapter 3. Ifwe look forward to 
Mure's  point  [Q 100,  p.  160],  this  intuition is  the  one  most  intimately  connected  with 
discursive reasoning. Now consider that the Parmenidean voos is a faculty of  insight that 
can  be  incorrigible  but  can  also  be  deceived.  However,  it  is  deceived  only  where  it 
neglects the process of EAEYXOV  or AOYOS,  the pure deductive reasoning process.  It  is 
infallible  when  it  uses  these  processes,  so  it  is  asked  to  direct  itself towards them.  Its 
proper  function  therefore  is  to  judge  between  the  argumentative  possibilities.  If an argument stands up after being subject to this intuitive grasping then and only then do we 
have  truth.  Parmenides would have  accepted Muir's point that ultimately  all  discursive 
reasoning is  ultimately founded upon intuition. However, contra Von Fritz, this intuition 
is  not of the acquaintive but rather of the ratiocinative type.  In conclusion, Parmenides 
was most definitely a ratiocinative rather than an illuminative apriorist. 
4.9. Brahma satyam, pagan mithya, jivo brahmaiva naparal58 
Having established that Parmenides' epistemology is apriorist and that his apriorism is 
of a  ratiocinative  nature  it  is  important  now  to  establish  whether  his  system  is 
transcendent  rather  than  immanent  and,  if so,  whether  it  follows  the  one  or  two 
ontological realm model.  The first  point to  make  is  that,  from  the previous analysis,  it 
seems straightforward that Parmenides' epistemology is transcendent.  Remember, for an 
epistemology to be transcendent it must seek to go beyond experience (in sensu stricto), 
and  associate  the  Truly  Real  exclusively  with  the  noumenal  world,  i.e.  the  world  as 
revealed to the noetic functions.  With respect to Parmenides,  it  seems evident that our 
ordinary experience of the world (represented in table 2,  colomn B)  is to be  rejected in 
favour ofan account of  the world acceptable to voos (represented by table 2, colomn A). 
The qualities that describe the contents of the two  realms  illustrated by table 2,  (p. 
111).  The phenomenal and the noumenal in a later terminology cannot exist together in 
any  single  possible  world - unless  we  deny the principle of non-contradiction.  This  is 
because  they are  so  clearly contradictories.  The qualities must therefore either (i)  exist 
separately in two distinct ontological realms or (ii) one of  the two realms must have no in 
actu  existence.  The  first  alternative,  as  we  shall  discover  is  Plato's  solution  to  this 
contradictory qualities problem. In fact, in the Republic there is an attempt to claim actual 
existence for  an object correlate of the cognitive state of opinion.  It is  a posited realm 
that  lies  between "that which absolutely and unqualifiedly is  and that which is  no  way 
•  ,,159 
IS 
It seems that this  "two worlds hypothesis" cannot be  the Parmenidean solution.  His 
metaphysical  monism,  unlike  Plato's  pluralism,  cannot  tolerate  the  existence  of two 
separate  ontological  realms.  Instead,  Pannenides  embraces  the  second  alternative 
whereby one of  the worlds is rejected as only having the mere appearance of  existing. The 
way  of opinion,  in  Plato,  reveals  an  existing  (or  subsisting)  world,  which  despite  its 125 
imperfections is,  according to the Timaeus, created by the demiurge and modelled on the 
forms.  In contrast, for Parmenides, the way of  opinion is a complete illusion. The names 
by which we refer to it are empty because they refer to nothing that actually exists.  The 
eyes by which we see it are "aimless" [Q69, p. 107] because they have no in actu target to 
hit; the ear and tongue are "sounding" because there is nothing, in fact to hear or to speak 
of Parmenides rejects the qualities ascribed to the phenomenal in favour of  the qualities 
ascribed  to  the noumenal.  As  we saw in  [Q63,  p.  103]  the phenomenal  qualities  are 
described as mere names.  Therefore, the phenomenal world is  condemned to an empty 
nominalism. This is the reason why the voos is to be directed beyond the illusory mortal 
world of phenomena in  which mortals trust.  This transcendence  is  the  reason for  the 
Goddess telling  the kouros of the path of divine truth,  "far indeed does it  lie  from the 
steps ofmen".16o He is also commanded to "look at that which, though far off, is securely 
present  to  the  mind  (vow)"  .  161  The  argument  that  Parmenides  subscribed  to  an 
ontological  monism will  be  developed  further  in  the  discussion  of the  Hamlyn  point 
below.  It is  certainly  the  most  natural  and  convincing  interpretation of Parmenides' 
epistemology. 
Yet, this whole interpretation is again a contested issue. Both J.  H.  H. Loenen and D. 
W.  Hamlyn dispute the point, for two very different reasons.  Loenen incredibly denies 
Parmenidean monism,  claiming that the way of truth is  a description of a transcendent 
Being, whereas the way of  opinion is an account of  an actually existing world as revealed 
by  the  senses.  To  build  an  entire  case  against  Loenen's  eccentric  interpretation  of 
Parmenides is beyond the scope of  this essay. However, the main point against Loenen is 
that  any  such  account  presumes  that  Parmenides  is  not  a  metaphysical  monist.  Yet, 
metaphysical monism is the theory for which he is best known and for which substantial 
evidence has already been provided. Because the textual evidence is  so  strongly against 
his interpretation, to establish it, Loenen finds it necessary to attribute an error of  textual 
transcription
162  to  both Plato  and  Melissus.  This  point  seems  strange  when copies of 
Parmenides poem were available as late as Simpliciusl63. 
Hamyln's  criticism  is  different.  In his  book Metaphysics  (1990),  he  states  that  "It 
would be tempting to say that what he [Parmenides] is arguing for is the thesis that what 
the senses tell us is mere appearance and that reason tells us quite otherwise. At no point 
does he actually say that. If we think such a gloss is  reasonable all the same it  is because 1~6 
we see Pannenides in the context of  later ways of  thinking". 164 Hamyln doesn't think that 
it was possible, before Descartes, for philosophers to condemn a whole reahn of:  mainly 
sensory experience, to  what he  calls  "mere  appearance"  i.e.  to the  status of dreams or 
hallucinations.  The claim being made by Hamlyn is that, until a Cartesian representation 
theory of perception,  philosophers  could not  make  such a  strong  distinction between 
appearance and reality. Only when there is a theory in place, which suggests that what we 
have access to in perception is merely the representations of  things in our minds, can the 
strong  dichotomy  exist.  Hamlyn  suggests  that  Plato  is  nearer  to  making  this  strong 
distinction than Pannenides.
165  However, for  him, only after Descartes is  it possible for 
philosophers to conceive of  a "reahn" of mere appearances (i.e.  with no  existence claim 
whatsoever)  as distinct from a realm of reality.  The  corollary to  this claim is  that true 
rationalism or more specifically transcendent apriorism was only possible with Descartes. 
This position is difficult to accept. It is not surprising that Hamlyn doesn't attribute much 
philosophical status to  his  account,  beginning  as  he  does with the  words  "It is  a least 
arguable that". 166 
The  first  simple  point  to  make  is  that,  historically  speaking,  there  are  undeniably, 
partiCUlarly  in ancient religious texts, examples of the distinction that Hamlyn denies  is 
possible.  In fact,  the  distinction is  made  clearly,  in the  strongest possible  sense  in the 
following quotations (and many others) from the Vedas and the Bhagavadgita. In fact,  it 
is particularly prevalent in all expositions of the classic notion of Indian philosophy viz. 
the Veil of  Maya: 
[Q78]  It is  Maya,  the veil of deception,  which covers the  eyes of mortals,  and 
causes them to see a world of which one cannot say either than it  is or that it  is 
not; for it  is like a dream, like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller from a 
distance  takes to  be  water,  or like  the  piece  of rope  on the  ground  which  he 
nak 
167  regards as a s  e. 
[Q79]  Blind  are  the  eyes  Which  deem  th'Unmanifested  manifest.  Not 
comprehending  Me  in my  true sell Imperishable,  viewless,  undeclared,  Hidden 
behind my magic veil of  shows, I am not seen by all:  I am not known unborn and 
changeless - to the idle world. 168 
[Q80]  The mind  that gives itself to follow  the  shows of sense  seeth its  hehn of 
f  .  h  169  wisdom rent away  ... The world of  sense pours streams 0  WItc  ery. 
This religious notion of  the veil of  Maya should not be possible according to  Hamlyn. 
The  quotation  translated  by  Schopenhauer  [Q78]  even  directly  connects  the  realm  of 127 
appearance with dreams and illusions.  The  second point to be  made is  that Parmenides 
from his  metaphysical postulates must and does, if  he  is  to be  consistent at  all,  posit a 
strong  distinction.  Firstly,  Parmenides,  as  we  have  already  established,  is  saying  more 
than that our senses sometimes, in certain individual cases,  deceive us.  The senses, that 
reveal the world whose attributes are listed in table 2 column B  must be  considered to  , 
constitute a "realm" of  seemings. 
Secondly, how can Parmenides logically posit the existence of seemings that have a 
claim  to  any  existence  other  than  that  of dreams  and  hallucinations.  How  can  any 
seemings,  whether  considered  as  a  realm or not,  exist  separately from  that-which-is? 
That-which-is,  in  Parmenides,  is  a plenum and it  exhausts the  ontological possibilities. 
The  mortals who  go  astray in the  Way  of opinion  are  blamed  for  naming  two  forms 
instead of one.  170  For Parmenides that-which-is has no  parts171; is  of a single kind
l72
;  is 
"all together,,173;  is not "more here or less there,,174; and "all exists alike" 175 and hence no 
divisions or distinctions can actually be made within it.  That is why, also, even being and 
thinking must be identical "For thinking (VOEIV) and being (EOV) are the same,,176 for,  as 
Parmenides explains,  there  can be  no  separation within the  plenitude of that  which is, 
"For you will not cut off for yourself what is from holding to what is,  neither scattering 
everywhere in every way in order nor drawing together". 117 
How then could  there  possibly  be  any  conception  of a  weak  distinction  between 
appearance and reality in Parmenides. From his metaphysical postulates, he  is forced by 
logical necessity to conclude that the world revealed to the senses cannot exist.  A later 
follower of Parmenides, Eukleides of Megara, explicitly encapsulates this doctrine when 
he  states,  "What  is,  is  one  and  the  other  is  not"  .178  Aristotle  accurately  summarises 
Parmenides position in book one of  the Metaphysics when he observed, "he thought that 
the existent is  of necessity one and that nothing else  exists".179  Although he  spoils this 
insight by declaring, as we have already shown, that Parmenides was subsequently, in the 
h  "  180  d  dmi  ..  I  way of  opinion, "forced to follow the p  enomena  an  a  t two pnnClp es. 
This conclusion, established by several arguments presented throughout this section, 
finally refutes the adequatio theory ofLoenen and Von Fritz. For if the world as revealed 
to  the senses does not actually exist, then there is nothing for the senses to be adequate 
to.  There  is  only the  one  ontological realm and  that  is  identical  with the  truth.  If the 
senses are adequate but not to this ultimate realm. what is left for them to be adequate to? 128 
There is nothing else.  We can conclude from this that Parmenides must have embraced 
the sceptical rather than the adequation position with regard to the senses. 
The title quotation that begins this section is taken from Indian philosophy, the system 
of  Shankara (788-822,AD), and is translated "Brahman is real, the world is false, the self 
is not different from Brahman". If  we replace, in this quotation, Shankara's term Brahma 
with  the  notion  of TO  EOV  then we  are  close  to  the  meaning  of the  Parmenidean 
philosophy. In comparison Parmenides fundamental propositions are (i) TO EOV  is all that 
exists,  (ii)  the world presented to perception is  false  and (iii) Thinking is  not different 
from being. 
To conclude this whole section on Parmenides it  has been proved that Parmenides' 
epistemology is (i) apriorist (ii) transcendent (iii) ratiocinative (iv) onto-monistic and (v) 
sceptical.  By establishing epistemological qualities (i)  and (ii)  it  has been demonstrated 
that  Mourelatos  and  Loenen were  correct  to  describe  Parmenides  as  the  "father  of 
western rationalism". The discovery of  the other qualities viz. (iii), (iv) and (v) allow us to 
identify the exact category of  transcendent apriorism which Parmenides ascribes to. 129 
CHAPTER 5 
THE A PRIORI 
5.1. The A Priori (Sensu Stricto) 
Within the  definitional  formulation  Def!  (p.  82),  the  term a  priori  is  qualified  by the 
phrase in sensu stricto. It is important to recognize that, in transcendent apriorism, the 
term a  priori functions  in  a  technical sense  that is  clearly differentiable  from ordinary 
philosophical usage.  In the  loose ordinary usage,  the term can function to designate a 
process of understanding that is independent of  immediate experience only.  In this sense 
the use of a general law, though derived from experience, to predict a course of  events 
prior to their actual happening is often considered an a priori procedure. This usage of  a 
priori tolerates the conjunction of  something that is in a sense both empirical and a priori. 
Kant recognized this sense of  the term in The Critique: 
[Q81] "For it has been customary to say, even of  much knowledge that is derived 
from  empirical  sources,  that  we  have  it  or are  capable  of having  it  a  priori, 
meaning thereby that we do not derive it immediately from experience, but from a 
universal rule - a rule which is  itself, however borrowed by us from experience. 
Thus, we would say of a man who undermined the foundations of  his house, that 
he  might  have  known a  priori that it  would fall,  that is,  that he need not have 
waited for  the experience of its actual falling.  But still he could not know this 
completely a priori.  For he  had first to learn through experience that bodies are 
heavy, and therefore fall when their supports are withdrawn.! 
In  contrast,  in  transcendent  apriorism's  strict  sense  of a  priori,  anything  that  is 
empirical  is  totally  excluded.  Within  the  procedure  of knowing  a  priori,  there  is  a 
complete independence from experience in general, not just from immediate experience. 
Kant  endorses  this  sense  when  he  observes.  "In  what  follows  therefore  we  shall 
understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of  this or that experience, 130 
but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience".2 Although his endorsement, as 
we shall discover later, is not quite as complete as this quotation suggests. 
In some philosophical usages, the term a priori is associated with a type of  knowledge 
that is justified independently of  experience, but not necessarily originated/acquired from 
within that experience.  In this  sense,  a  priori knowledge is  sometimes contrasted with 
"innate"  knowledge.  Here  the  term  innate  functions  to  indicate  the  non-empirical 
origination/acquisition of knowledge. Hence, in this understanding, knowledge can be  a 
priori but not necessarily innate. E. J. Lowe, for example accepts this usage of  the terms a 
priori  and  innate,  "Whether  knowledge  is  a  priori  is  quite  a  different  question from 
whether  it  is  innate.  Mathematics  provides the most often cited examples of a  priori 
knowledge,  but  most  of our mathematical  knowledge  is  no  doubt  acquired  through 
experience even though it is justifiable independently of  experience".3 
In contrast, the strict philosophical sense of  a priori used in transcendent apriorism, in 
addition to indicating justificatory status, incorporates a definite epistemological position 
with regard to  issues of origination/acquisition.  Hence,  in this  case,  the  term a  priori 
includes, as a meaning content, the broad category notion of  a non-empirical derivation of 
knowledge. The term innate can then be used in its proper function to indicate a specific 
theory  about  such  knowledge  types.  The  use  of the  term,  by  Laurence  BonJour, 
illustrates this second philosophical sense of a priori, "an a priori concept or idea is one 
that is not derived from experience in this way and thus presumably does not require any 
particular experience to be realized  ... The main historical account of  such concepts, again 
held by rationalists, construes them as innate".4 
5.2.  The Acquisitive A Priori. 
Since  the  term a  priori  functions  here  in two  distinct  ways  let  us  now  move  to 
consider  both senses  in  more  detail.  Firstly,  in  sense  (i)  the  acquisitive,  the  principle 
concern is  with the ultimate derivation of  the concepts and propositions involved in the 
reasoning process. If  all the aforementioned concepts and propositions are discovered to 
originate  from the  intellect  in  its  purely noetic function then ratiocination is  deemed a 
priori.  The term noetic is  mostly used in its normal philosophical usage.  An idea of this 
usage  is  given  by  Frederick  Crosson when he  defines noetic  in  broad terms as  "(from 131 
Greek  noetikos,  from  noetos,  'perceiving')  of or  relating  to  apprehension  by  the 
intellect".
5 
A better definition is given however in the Dictionary of  Philosophy edited by 
Anthony  Flew  "In contrast to  empirical and sensuous,  pertaining  to  that  which can be 
apprehended by the intellect alone".6 As we discovered in chapter 3, the noetic functions 
are  therefore  comprised by  those  pure  intellective  processes that  exclude  any  element 
found to be derived from experience. 
5.2.1. The Technical Sense of  Experience 
If the noetic is  defined by its exclusion of experience then what exactly is meant by 
the term experience. At first, the answer may appear straightforward. However, Bertrand 
Russell  in  My Philosophical Development made  an important point  in  this  respect.  "I 
found,  when I began to think about theory of  knowledge, that none of  the philosophers 
who  emphasise 'experience' tell us  what they mean by the word.  They seem willing  to 
accept it as an indefinable of  which the significance should be obvious".7 The first thing to 
notice about the use of the word experience, in its proper technical sense,  is that it  can 
only  be  used  meaningfully if  it  is  not  considered  to  be  inclusive  of the  full  range  of 
phenomenological cognitions. The actual inclusion of  such cognitions would certainly be 
part of the ordinary language sense of experience.  In this  loose  sense,  sudden insights, 
mystical  intuitions,  or even  the  most  pure  intellectual  apprehensions  can  certainly  be 
considered "experiences", i.e.  things that are undergone by  a conscious subject.  In fact, 
this is the case irrespective of  whether, epistemologically speaking, they contain elements 
contentually derived from or justified by experience in its philosophical sense. 
If the philosophical sense were so  inclusive, it would have to be admitted that there 
would be a sense in which the intellective processes involved in the noetic functions are 
themselves experiences. This in turn would render the definition of  the noetic functions in 
terms of  the exclusion of  elements derived from experience incoherent. It may seem that 
no  philosopher  could  confuse  the  two  senses  of experience  and  fall  into  a  significant 
mistake  by  doing  so.  However,  it  is  perhaps  Loenen's  failure  to  appreciate  the 
abovementioned  ambiguity  in  the  term  experience  that  causes  problems  in  his 
interpretation of Pannenides.  In  part  (i) of his  definition of epistemological rationalism 
[A3.  p.  252], he  clearly states that  Pannenides is the first  to have recognized that. "true 132 
knowledge does not spring from experience". What then are we to make of  the statement 
in part (ii) that Parmenides' metaphysics is "based on experience". These two statements, 
after  all,  occur in  the same  book.  In the part (i)  statement,  it  is  clear  that  the  strict 
philosophical use of  the term experience is being used. 
However, let us consider the part (ii)  statement.  According to Loenen, Parmenides' 
thought that metaphysics  is  based on experience  because  he  "started  from  a  definite 
reality (thought) present in his  own mind, and by means of  a description of the idea of 
being  established that thought is"  [A3,  p.  225].  There is  no  evidence here of Loenen 
establishing  that  Parmenides'  thought  (VOElV)  of being  and its  description  is  derived 
and/or justified through empirical means. A procedure that is essential if  experience, in its 
philosophical  sense,  was  to  be  used  correctly.  The  fact  is  that  Parmenides'  thought 
(VOElV) of  being is purely a priori in nature. However, at this point, it is sufficient to say 
that it is a revolutionary theory indeed to suggest that Parmenides' metaphysics is based 
on experience  in  its  strict philosophical meaning.  It is  even contrary to  Loenen's own 
earlier statement in (i). Hence, Loenen in statement (ii) is using the term experience in its 
loose sense whereby even Parmenides' VOElV is a phenomenological cognition and hence 
experiential. 
Loenen is not alone in this confusion. The philosopher Henri Bergson similarly falls 
into the trap. It seems the only explanation for the contradiction between (i) the fact that 
the epistemology that underlies his metaphysics is based on noetic intuition and (ii) that 
he  refers  to  his  metaphysics  as  a  form  of empiricism,  "true  empiricism  is  true 
metaphysics".8 Now nobody is  denying that noetic  intuition is  a  form of "experience". 
However, only in the loose non-philosophical sense of  that term as already explained. It is 
important  not to  confuse this  limited  claim with the assertion that  noetic  intuition  is 
experiential in the strict philosophical sense, i.e. necessarily empirical in nature. 
Similarly,  W.  H.  Walsh sometimes  uses  the term experience  in  a  confusing  way. 
Consider  the  following  quotation  from  Reason  and Experience,  "The  only  form  of 
immediate  experience  in  which  rationalists  are  specifically  interested  is  intellectual 
intuition". 10  Here. again, a fundamentally noetic function of  the intellect, viz.  intellectual 
intuition.  is  considered  as  a  form of experience.  Again,  this  must  be  the  loose  non-
philosophical sense of  experience. because it is obvious that the noetic functions can only 
be  defined  by  the  very  fact  that  they  exclude  experience.  In  addition.  if Walsh  used 133 
experience in its strict sense, how could he later make the Kantian distinction between an 
intellectual and a sensory intuition? It is an identical mistake, discussed later in this thesis. 
that  allows  one  commentator to  refer  to  Plotinus  as  an  empiricist.  To  conclude  this 
section,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  that the dual usage  has  and  could result  in  a variety of 
confusions. 
5.2.2. Categories of  Experience 
For this reason the notion of  experience used here always corresponds to the strict sense 
associated  with  normal  philosophical  usage.  This  strict  usage  is  normally  limited  to 
certain categories of cognitions that are  identical with or intrinsically  dependent  upon 
sensory  data.  In  the  latter  case,  the  extent  of dependence  is  immaterial;  if such 
dependence exists at all then it is defined as an experiential cognition. The following list 
enumerates the main historical conceptions of  just what such cognitions are inclusive of: 
(i)  Sensation,  here  defined  as  an  immediate  and  passively  received  sensory  intuition 
considered  prior  to  the  cognitive  activity  of imagination  or the  understanding.  This 
intuition would incorporate the exteroceptive elements, which include all visual, auditory, 
olfactory,  tactile  and  gustatory stimuli.  In addition,  it  would  involve  the  interoceptive 
elements comprising the various kinaesthetic stimuli; (ii) logico-sensitive cognition, here 
defined as that category of  cognition whose content has an intellective component but is 
ultimately derived from sensation.  The  sensation involved  in  sense-perception provides 
the basic unconceptualized raw material, which an active intellectual element relates and 
interprets. The intellective component involved in this process is traditionally termed the 
understanding.  The totality of  judgements that result from the understanding have their 
source not  immediately but ultimately in  sensation;  (iii) imago-sensitive cognition here 
defined  as  that  category of cognition whose  total content  is  derived  by  composition. 
association, or abstraction from sensation. The imagination rather than the intellect relates 
and interprets the raw material of  sensation  I 0; (iv) empirical introspection here defined as 
necessarily involving both the attention the mind gives to itself or to its own operations or 
occurrences  and  this  attention  understood  as  an  internal  sensation  or  internal  sense-
perception  that  precisely  parallels  external  sensation  and  external  sense-perception 
(through this attention I am aware of such things as pain.  boredom. pleasure and anger 
just  as I know by  sensation that this  is  hard or tastes sour).  The technical term.  in  Kant 134 
and  Locke,  for  this  type  of introspective  attention  is  "inner  sense".  It is  defined  by 
Quassim Cassamas as  "a faculty of mind whereby it  is  introspectively aware of its own 
contents in a manner which is analogous to the perception of  external objects". II 
The  abovementioned  components  of experience,  viz.  (i)  to  (iv),  are  together 
categorized as  part of the conscious subject's aesthetic functions.  The  term "aesthetic" 
originates  from the  ancient  Greek word  al081101)  meaning  perception or sensation  in 
general.  This is  the sense in which Aristotle uses it  in the De Anima where it  is  used in 
contrast  with  VOEOl)  or pure  intellection  in  general.  Hence,  in  this  thesis  it  must  be 
remembered  that the  term aesthetic,  unless  otherwise  specified,  does  not  refer to  the 
theory of taste or the philosophy of art - a sense that only became popular in the  18th 
century with the publication of Baumgarten's Reflections on  Poetry (1735).  Therefore, 
the  "aesthetic  functions"  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  general  phrase  for  any  experiential 
function that either directly intuits the sensory data or intrinsically uses sensory data in its 
operation. 
5.3. Immanuel Kant's Inaugural Dissertation 
[Q82]  Intellectual concepts have two functions.  In their first,  elenctic,  use  they 
perform the negative service of keeping sensitive concepts from being applied to 
noumena. Though they do not advance knowledge a single step, they keep it from 
the contagion of  errors. In their second, or dogmatic use, the general principles of 
the pure intellect, such as are dealt with in ontology or rational psychology, issue 
in  some  exemplar  conceivable  only  by  the  pure  intellect  and  is  the  common 
measure of  all other things so far as real. This exemplar - Perfectio Noumenon - is 
perfection in  either a theoretical or in  a practical sense.  In the  former,  it  is  the 
Supreme Being, God; in the latter, moral perfection. I] 
In the Inaugural Dissertation, Kant thought that by dedicatedly excluding experience by 
concentrating on the acquisitional purity of  a priori knowledge he could rescue traditional 
metaphysics.  That  Kant  felt  the  attraction  of traditional  metaphysics  based  upon 
transcendent apriorism is  undeniable. He felt  that the theory was inherently attractive to 
the  human mind.  In the Inaugural Dissertation  he  praises traditional  metaphysics,  but 
hints at its lack of progress, "Everyone knows how much labour metaphysics devotes to 
dispersing the clouds of confusion which darken the common intellect, though its  work 
does not always have as happy an issue as that of  Geometry". \3 There is no doubt that the 135 
Inaugural Dissertation  is  a  work in  which  Kant  seeks  to  remedy the  epistemological 
faults which have hindered such development in transcendent apriorist systems. 
Certainly,  throughout  his  development  as  a  philosopher,  Kant  saw  traditional 
metaphysics  in  transcendent  apriorist  terms.  In  the  Critique  the  ultimate  knowledge-
objects to which metaphysics aspires certainly transcend experience, "These unavoidable 
problems  set  by  pure  reason  itself are  God,  Freedo~ and  Immortality.  The  science 
which, with all its preparations, is in its final intention directed solely at their solution is 
metaphysics".14 There is also no doubt that he saw this type of  metaphysics as absolutely 
apriorist in nature, "no empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics, the concepts 
there met with are not to be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature of  the pure 
intellect" .15 
It  is  also  true  that  Kant,  in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation,  rejected  illuminative 
transcendent apriorism because even at this early stage he  did not think that intellectual 
intuition was possible for  human consciousness,  "No  intuition of things intellectual but 
only a symbolic [discursive] knowledge of  them is given to man. Intellection is possible to 
us only through universal concepts in the abstract, not through a singular concept in the 
concrete".16  In a subsequent letter to Marcus Hertz he  criticises Malebranche whom he 
suggests  makes  spurious  use  of an  illuminative  intuition,  "Plato  assumed  a  previous 
intuition of Divinity as the primary source of  the pure concepts of  the understanding and 
of first  principles.  Mallebranche (sic) believed in a still effective eternal intuition of this 
primary  being". 17  Kant  then  accuses  them  both  of absurdly  introducing  a  divine 
intervention to illegitimately prop up their epistemologies,  "But the deus ex machina in 
the determination of  the origin and validity of  our knowledge is the greatest absurdity one 
could hit upon".18 I was careful to say that Kant thought that such an intellectual intuition 
was impossible only for human consciousness.  He  certainly believed however that God 
could know things through intellectual intuition: 
[Q83]  Thus for our minds,  intuition is always passive, and  is possible only as far 
as something is  able  to affect  our senses.  But the  divine  intuition,  which  is  the 
ground,  not  the  consequence,  of its  objects.  is  owing  to  its  independence, 
archetypal and so is completely intellectual.  19 
So accepting that Kant thinks that objects of  the intellect can only be grasped through 
discursive knowing, how does he plan to rescue traditional metaphysics? Well  the reason 136 
why metaphysicians  "seem to have accomplished scarcely anything  at  all,,20  is  that  they 
have not being using a methodology, which ought to be a necessary propaedeutic to their 
discipline.  This  important  method  is  Kant's  own  discovery  and  philosophers  are 
completely unaware that it is requisite for sound metaphysics, "At present the method of 
this  science  [metaphysics]  is  not well known;  though logic  prescribes  a method  to  all 
sciences in general, that which is suited to the special nature of  metaphysics is completely 
ignored".21  What  then does this  method  consist  in?  In reality,  the  method  consists  in 
detecting when knowledge, derived from the aesthetic functions. has corrupted the purity 
of  noetic understanding. Kant takes very seriously the important notion that transcendent 
apriorists must have a very strict sense of  what counts as a priori knowledge, in tenns of 
both origination and justification. The unwary metaphysician can end up with principles 
or axioms that he thinks are derived from the pure intellect when in fact they are useless 
because contaminated with sensory elements: 
[Q84] I shall briefly expound one point that constitutes an important part of this 
method, namely [preventing] the contamination of intellectual knowledge by the 
sensitive.  This contamination not only misleads the unwary in the application of 
principles, but even introduces spurious principles in the guise of  axioms. 22 
Now in the process of  building a system of  metaphysics without proper investigation into 
these matters it would be easy to fall  into error. Often a metaphysician is convinced that 
his  principles  are  absolutely pure,  but  his  intellect  is  playing  tricks  on him  and  he  has 
fallen into a logical fallacy.  In Kant's tenns this particular mistake is termed the fallacy of 
subreption,  "The tricks of the intellect in decking out sensitive  concepts as  intellectual 
marks may be called a fallacy ofsubreption".23 
Why  is  the  purity  of the  axioms  so  important  to  Kant?  The  reason  is  that  the 
Inaugural Dissertation is  written against the continuity thesis of Leibniz and  Wolff.  In 
order to  counter this thesis,  Kant makes a very strong distinction between the  intellect 
and the senses. The aesthetic functions, including the highest logical form of  the intellect, 
can tell us only of "appearances". Whereas the pure noetic functions act to reveal things 
as they really are, i.e.  the noumenal, "It is clear therefore, that representations of  things as 
they  appear  are  sensitively  thought,  while  intellectual  concepts  are  representation  of 
things  as  they  are'·.2-l  It  is  now  clear  why  the  purity  of intellectual  principles  is  so 
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the sensitive, can only apply to the world as it reveals itself to consciousness. This is not 
the world that the metaphysician wants to reveal. He wants to discover what the world is 
like independently of its relation to consciousness.  This  does not mean that Kant thinks 
that the metaphysician can know the in-itself directly.  Remember  he  does not  say that 
intellectual  concepts  are  identical  with the  in-itself;  he  specifically  says  that  they  are 
"representations" of  things as they are. 
In  conclusion,  then,  if the  axioms  of the  metaphysicians  are  kept  clear  from 
contamination they  can become  a  perfect  mirror  for  the  in-itself.  The  harm  done  to 
metaphysics had largely occurred because of  the subreption axiom: 
[Q85]  An axiom thus hybrid (hybrid in that it proffers what is  sensitive as being 
necessarily bound up with an intellectual concept) I call a subreptive axiom. Those 
principles of intellectual error, which have most harmfully  infested metaphysics, 
have proceeded from these spurious axioms. 25 
The  method  that  has  the  power  to  eliminate  these  false  axioms  therefore  is  "to  the 
immense benefit of  all those who would explore the innennost recesses of  metaphysics".  26 
For  Kant  then,  the  methodology  against  subreption  is  meant  to  correct  and  revivifY 
metaphysical systems that are based on a transcendent apriorist epistemology. 
5.4. The Justificatory A Priori 
There is a second sense in which the a priori functions in the definition. In this sense, 
the justificatory, the principle concern is with the criterion used in the legitimation of  the 
propositions used in, and resulting from the reasoning process. A proposition is a priori if 
its epistemic justification, the reason or warrant for thinking it to be true depends on the 
noetic  functions  of the  intellect  alone.  The pure intellect must  be  the  only  criterion of 
legitimacy.  A positive account of the processes involved  in  such a priori justification is 
given  by  Pollock  in  Knowledge  and Justification  (1974)  and  by  Butcharov  in  The 
Concept  of Knowledge  (1970).  However,  at  this  point.  we  shall  be  content  with  the 
negative  characterization of the  processes  in  terms  of their  exclusion  of any  possible 
reliance on intrinsic experience as defined in the previous section. If  justification were to 
depend,  at  least  in  part,  on  such  experience,  it  will  be  considered  to  be  justified  a 
posteriori or empirically.  This specific distinction has to do only  with the justification of 138 
the propositions and not at alL with how they and their constituent concepts are acquired. 
Thus,  it  is  no  objection  to  a  claim  of a  priori justificatory  status,  for  a  particular 
proposition, that intrinsic experience is required for its acquisition, or for the acquisition 
of  some of  its constituent concepts. 
In modem philosophy, it is fair to say that the notion of  the a priori is dominated by 
the issue of  justification. The question of  acquisition is often pushed into the background 
as irrelevant. The definition of a priori given by Albert Casullo is representative of this 
new consensus: 
[Q86] Our primary concern will be with the epistemic distinction between a priori 
and a posteriori knowledge. The most common way of  marking the distinction is 
by reference to Kant's claim that a priori knowledge is absolutely independent of 
all experience. It is  generally agreed that S's knowledge that p is  independent of 
experience just in case S's belief  that p is justified independently of  experience.  27 
Now the passage in Kant's Critique, which Calluso refers to, does seem to indicate the 
close connection between a  priori and justificational issues.  There is  even a distinction 
made between: (i) a wide sense of  a priori that seems only to require noetic justification, 
"Such universal modes of knowledge, which at the same time possess the character of 
inner necessity,  must in themselves,  independently of experience,  be  clear and  certain. 
They are therefore entitled knowledge a priori".  28  Being clear and certain independently 
of  experience means that their truth-value is determined noetically. Such determination of 
truth-value concerns the justification of knowledge claims independently of experience, 
and  has  nothing  to do  with the noetic  origin of the  elements of such knowledge.  In 
addition,  (ii)  the stricter sense of a priori qualified by the term "pure"  which demands 
noetic derivation as well.  "A priori modes of  knowledge are entitled pure when there is 
no  admixture of anything empirical.  Thus for instance, the proposition, 'every alteration 
has its cause', while an a priori proposition, is not a pure proposition, because alteration is 
a concept which can be derived only from experience".29 
However, Kant quickly abandons this distinction between a priori and pure a priori. 
Within  a  page  of making  it  he  contradicts  himself by  giving  the  proposition,  "every 
alteration  must  have  a  cause",  as  an  example  of a  pure  a  priori  proposition.
30 
Subsequently, he becomes as stringent, on the issue of  noetic derivation as a requisite for 
any  a  priori  knowledge,  as  he  was  in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation.  Knowledge  that  is 139 
derived from experience, by definition, is not a priori, "But the elements of  all modes of  a 
priori  knowledge,  even if capricious  and  incongruous  fictions,  though  they  cannot. 
indeed,  be  derived from experience,  since  in that case they would not be knowledge a 
priori,,3}.  There  is,  at  times,  more  emphasis placed on issues of origination than upon 
those of  justification. The categories of  the understanding and the forms of  intuition are a 
priori, insofar as they cannot be derived or acquired from experience. They are,  in fact. 
the very condition of  the possibility of  such experience and hence cannot be derived from 
it. 
Furthermore, Kant's postulation of a priori concepts (notions) would not make sense 
if the  term a  priori  were  used  solely  to  refer  to  the  justification of the  elements  of 
knowledge.  Concepts,  unlike  propositions,  are just not  the  sort  of things  of which  it 
would make sense to say that they can be "justified independently of  experience". It is an 
obvious category mistake to utter such a statement and Kant was just too sophisticated a 
philosopher to make it.  Kant even invented a specific word viz.  "noologist,,32  for  those 
philosophers who thought that knowledge was acquired/originated/derived independently 
of experience  i.e.  from  the  (noe)tic  functions  of the  intellect.  Kant  then  would  not 
consider a postulated example that conformed to Calluso's  "generally agreed" definition 
to  be  a  priori  unless,  in  its  mode  of origination/derivation/acquisition,  there  was  no 
intrinsic "admixture of  experience". Such an issue was certainly of  substantial importance. 
Although Calluso is wrong in his interpretation of  Kant, it is important to understand 
that his definition of the a priori, in terms of  justificatory considerations alone, is typical 
of the modem analysis of the subject.  Prior to the modem period, issues of origination 
were just as important and were included as definitionally requisite for the categorization 
of  propositions as a priori. 
5.5 The Detenninate Definition and the A Priori 
Having explained the two principle ways in which the term a priori can function it  is 
important  now to  determine  how it actually functions  in  the  definition of transcendent 
apriorism. In fact a priori is used, in sensu stricto, in order to completely exclude intrinsic 
experience  from  the  reasoning  process.  Ratiocination  is  a  priori.  if and  only  if (i)  the 
propositions involved in its process are derived from and justified by the intellect's noetic 1-+0 
functions  and  (ii)  the  concepts  involved  in  the  process  are  derived  from  the  noetic 
functions. In other words, the strict sense of  a priori used in the definition of  transcendent 
apriorism must  involve  a  conjunction of the way a priori functions  in  its  acquisitional 
sense  with  the  way  it  functions  in  its  justificatory  sense.  If,  for  example,  only  the 
justificatory sense were included in the definition of a priori, intrinsic experience would 
not  be  entirely excluded from the reasoning process.  It has  already been noted that  a 
proposition can be a priori in this sense and yet be acquired through experience. 
There is an important reason for this strict definition of  a priori. Historically speaking 
the  transcendent apriorist  systems  actually establish strict criterion as  to what  is  to  be 
included as pure a priori knowledge. Although the actual term a priori is, of  course, rarely 
used.  In fact,  the  criterion involves  both stipulations  (i)  and  (ii)  above.  It  may  seem 
strange for the modem philosopher that, for the transcendent apriorist, even the concepts 
out of which propositions are  constructed must be  noetically derived.  Yet,  historically 
speaking, this was the general view even in the most advanced systems. 
John Locke had insisted in his criticism of  innate knowledge (innate knowledge is a 
type  of a  priori  knowledge  so  the  criticism  is  relevant  here)  that  the  principles  of 
knowledge cannot be noetically derived. This was because their constituent concepts are 
derived from experience, "Since, if  the ideas which made up those truths were not, it was 
impossible that the propositions made up of them should be  innate".33  Leibniz's answer 
was  to  assert  that  the  only  thing  wrong  with  Locke's  argument  was  that  the  most 
important  concepts  or ideas,  used  in  the  highest  metaphysics,  were  indeed  noetically 
derived.  In  fact,  the  element  concepts  of all  necessary  propositions  are  derived 
independently of  intrinsic experience: 
[Q87] Phil.  But truths are subsequent to the ideas from which they arise, are they 
not? And ideas all come from the senses. 
Theo.  Intellectual ideas, from which necessary truths arise, do not come from the 
senses  ... But the ideas that come from the senses are confused; and so too, at least 
in part, are the truths which depend on them; whereas intellectual ideas, and the 
truths  depending  on  them,  are  distinct,  and  neither  the  ideas  nor  the  truths 
originate in  the senses; though it  is true that without the senses we would never 
think ofthem.
34 
Suffice it to say, at this point. that a looser sense of  a priori either fails to distinguish 
transcendent apriorism from  other related epistemologies or leads to incoherence within 141 
the statement of the doctrine.  Presumably, it was for the latter reason that  historically  ,  '" 
speaking, pure knowledge for the transcendent apriorist involved the stricter definition. 
It is relevant, at this point, to consider the vagueness and inaccuracy of  many of the 
modem definitions with respect to the strict  sense of a priori.  A.  P.  D.  Mourelatos is 
content merely to talk about "a priori projections" [AI, p. 252] without giving any further 
clues in the text as to the sense of  a priori he might be referring to. It is not clear whether 
(i) he is referring to the  acquisitive a priori, the justificatory a priori or some combination 
of  them both, or (ii) whether there is the additional qualification of  the acquisitive a priori 
that stipulates that even the concepts involved in the reasoning process must be noetic. 1. 
H.  M.  M.  Loenen and F.  Copleston seem to connect (against the modem trend) pure 
knowledge  solely with a  priori acquisition.  The  former's  reference  to  knowledge  that 
"does not spring from experience" [A3, p. 252] and latter's notion of "pure" rationalism 
whereby a  system of reality is  deduced  "simply  from the resources of the  mind  itself 
without recourse to experience" [A4, p. 252] seem to confinn this viewpoint. However, 
both statements are ambiguous (an ambiguity that is not resolved through further reading 
of the texts involved) and could conceivably refer to the justificatory sense of a priori. 
Although there is  in both quotations an indication of the exclusion of experience from 
acquisition, this is often no guarantee that the author extends the exclusion to concepts as 
in  (ii)  above.  Just  consider Kant's  confusing  account  of a  priori  concepts  mentioned 
previously. The confusion of  the acquisitive with the justificatory a priori is more marked 
in  Cottingham [A5,  p.  251]  where  both senses  are  mentioned,  without  being  clearly 
differentiated.  At some points in his text Cottingham sees the essence of "apriorism" in 
terms of  Bacon's famous quote in Cogitata et Visa (1607) viz.: 
[Q88]  Empiricists  are  like  ants;  they  collect  and  put  to  use  but  rationalists 
(rationales) are like spiders; they spin threads out of  themselves.  35 
A  quote,  which  he  mostly  interprets  in  terms  of the  acquisition of knowledge.  The 
empiricist  acquiring  ("collecting")  his  knowledge  from  "careful observation"  i.e.  from 
experience. The rationalist derives it from the resources ofhis own mind ("pure thought") 
i.e.  from the noetic functions of  the intellect. Yet, in the same paragraph, in which this is 
explained. there is also reference made, by Cottingham, to the justificatory sense of  the a 
priori. The apriorist is caricatured as a man who wants to justifY his knowledge "from the 142 
armchair" instead of  allowing his knowledge to be "detennined by scientific experiment". 
This  latter notion of the a priori  seems to  have  little  to  do  with the  sense  of Bacon's 
quote, which exclusively deals with issues of  acquisition.  Cottingham just does not seem 
to realize that he is making a different point. Furthermore, there is again no  specification 
within Cottingham's text with respect to the status of  a priori concepts, i.e. whether they 
are requisite for a priori ratiocination. 
This vagueness with regard to the issue of  the a priori can lead to many confusions. 
These  become particularly important when comparing the epistemology of science with 
the epistemology of transcendent apriorism.  As we  shall discover later, there are  many 
modern scientists and philosophers of science who  would accept a priori projections as 
possible  sources  for  hypotheses.  These  hypotheses  would  subsequently be justified  or 
falsified  by empirical methods. Yet, to associate their methods with the apriorist's would 
be  a mistake.  The apriorist requires the justification as well as origination to  be  noetic. 
Many philosophers who do not understand that, in transcendent apriorism, a proposition 
is  a priori only when it  is  specified that the terms or concepts involved in its statement 
must  originate  noetically,  are  prone  to  confusion.  The  truth  is  that  if there  are  any 
empirical elements at all in a proposition, the necessity, which the transcendent apriorist 
wishes to attribute to his  propositions, disappears.  He  is  left  only with probabilities and 
his  system  collapses.  Not  to  recognize  this  could  lead  us  to  think  the  argument 
constructed by Locke
36 and reiterated by Leibniz's interlocutor Philalethes [Q87, p.  140] 
is  fatal  to  transcendent  apriorism  for  it  denies  to  such  a  philosopher  the  purity  of 
knowledge required by his system. 
5.6. The Real Use of  the Intellect 
The existence of both, (i) the processes that constitute the intellect's noetic function and 
(ii)  the pure concepts and propositions that are derived from the exercise of this noetic 
function,  are a precondition for the acquisitive a priori.  In this respect. to consider that 
the  processes  mentioned,  in  the  list  of noetic  functions,  actually  exist  as  part of the 
capacities of the human intellect,  is  to ascribe to the theory that the intellect has,  in the 
terminology of  Kant. a "'real use". That is to say,  it has the capacity to be an independent 
non-discursive source of the concepts and principles of  reasoning. The term discursive is 1-l3 
used here in its specifically Kantian sense to indicate the intellect's reliance on the passiye 
or receptive aspect of human experience for  its content,  "thoughts without content are 
empty".37 
The intellect is described as "non-discursive" if  and only if  its functioning is not in any 
manner (whether immediately or ultimately) intrinsically38  dependent upon the intuitions 
of experience,  that  is  internal  or  external  sensations.  Hence,  the  designation  non-
discursive would even exclude those apparently abstract intellective processes postulated 
by  Kant,  whose  function  is  to  bring  intuitions  under  concepts  or,  in  other words,  to 
intellectualize the data of sense.  The constituent parts of this process would,  for Kant, 
include  the  formation of universals;  their  application to  the  given39  in judgement; the 
subordinating of logically  inferior to  logically  superior  universals  and judgements and 
finally  the  drawing  of  formal  inferences.  These  cognitive  functions  would  be 
characterized, by Kant, as part of  the logical rather than the real use of  the intellect. The 
reason being that the original cognitions upon which the intellect works are in the final 
analysis derived from sensation. As Kant observes in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, 
"But here it  is of  the greatest moment to note that these cognitions, no  matter to what 
extent  the  logical  use  of the  intellect  has  been exercised  upon  them,  are  still  to  be 
considered sensitive. For they are called sensitive on account of their origin, not on any 
comparison as to identity or difference. Hence the most general empirical laws are none 
the less sensual".40 The logical function of  the intellect would correspond to the notion of 
logico-sensitive cognition. Therefore, it is part of  the aesthetic functions of  the intellect. 
In contrast, the real use of  the intellect is, by its exclusion of  such functions (being non-
discursive),  noetic  in  nature.  As  Kant  himself affirms,  "In  pure  philosophy,  such  as 
metaphysics,  the use of the intellect in dealing with principles is  real,  i.e ..  the primary 
concepts of things and relations, and the axioms themselves, are first  given by the pure 
intellect itself,41. 
To consider that pure concepts and propositions actually exist involves, either  (i) an 
adherence to some version, either dispositional or otherwise, of  the rationalist doctrine of 
innate  ideas,  or  (ii)  an  "enlightenment"  theory  of axiomatic  intuition  and  deductive 
intuition.  This  is  the  conclusion of an  argument  that  is  demonstrated  in  a  much  later 
section of  this thesis.  However, some preliminary remarks may be useful at this stage. If 
certain concepts or principles are generated in the non-discursive intellect that is  to say 
experience  played  absolutely  no  intrinsic  role  in  their generation (not even as  the  raw materials of intellective cognition) then it  follows that either:  (i)  such cognitive objects 
must be in some way innate to that faculty.  They are in other words either consciously 
present to the intellect prior to experience (the non-dispositional sense) or rather there 
exists an inborn disposition to form them on the occasion of  experience or otherwise - the 
dispositional form.  The only alternative to innate ideas that could function noetically in 
this way would be Kant's notion of "Abstracted ideas".42 Later however, this notion will 
be demonstrated to be incoherent and hence logically no real alternative to innate ideas, 
or (ii)  they are  derived  in some way from a  source of enlightenment intuition.  A  full 
discussion of  this special intuition will occur much later. 
Let  us  consider  here  an  important  point  which  relates  to  alternative  (i):  the 
dispositional doctrine of innate  concepts and principles  can incorporate an element of 
experience without infringing upon the necessary qualifying condition for the a priori viz. 
generation from the intellect's noetic function. The theory determines that experience has 
only  an extrinsic  role  in  the  generation of concepts and  principles.  Leibniz  forms  an 
implicit distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic function of  experience in the New 
Essays on Human  Understanding,  "intellectual ideas, and the truths depending on the~ 
are distinct, and neither the ideas nor the truths originate in the senses; though it is true 
that without the senses we would never think of  them".  43  Despite the fact that experience 
may be necessary for certain concepts and principles to be possible at all (acting merely as 
a extrinsic agent of  activation in the process of  their formation) it has absolutely no input 
into the contentual aspect that results from this formation. 
In contrast, if  these  concepts and propositions originate  ultimately  from  forms  of 
experience  that  exclude  noetic  experience  then  ratiocination  is  not  a  priori  in  the 
acquisitive  sense,  but  is  rather a  posteriori.  This  notion of the  a  posteriori would be 
inclusive  of those  concepts  and  propositions  that  derive  ultimately  from  internal  or 
external sensation or empirical introspection considered as forms of  experience. CHAPTER 6 
INNATE IDEAS 
6.1. The Innate and the A Priori 
[Q89]  There  is  the  question whether the  soul itself is  completely blank  like  a 
writing tablet on which nothing has yet been written - a tabula rasa - as Aristotle 
and the author of the Essay maintain, and whether everything which is inscribed 
there comes solely from the senses and experience; or whether the soul inherently 
contains  the  sources of various  notions  and  doctrines,  which  external  objects 
merely rouse up on suitable occasions, as I believe and as do Plato and even the 
schoolmen.  The  Stoics  call  these  sources  Prolepses,  that  is  fundamental 
assumptions  or things  taken for  granted  in  advance.  Mathematicians  call  them 
common notions. Julius Scalinger used to call them the 'seeds of  eternity' and also 
'zopyra' - meaning living fires or flashes of  light hidden inside us but made visible 
by the stimulation of  the senses, as sparks can be struck from steel. And we have 
reason to believe that these flashes reveal something divine and eternal. 
[Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz
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It has  already  been  suggested  that  the  ratiocinative  model  of transcendent  apriorism 
requires that the concepts and principles of  reasoning are not only justified independently 
of  experience, but are also generated in the mind without the intrinsic involvement of  the 
aesthetic  functions.  If the  concepts  and  principles  are  so  generated then we  have  an 
instance of  what Kant called the real use of  the intellect. An important question therefore, 
for  the transcendent apriorist, was how such a real use was possible.  In most cases of 
ratiocinative transcendent apriorism the answer to this question was to posit some variant 
of the  theory of innate  ideas.  There  was good reason for  this  particular  answer  and 
Leibniz's version of  the answer was certainly the most sophisticated. It is the contention 
of this  thesis  that, if  the  real use of the intellect  is  to  be  an epistemologically credible 
function then an adherence to some theory of  innate ideas is necessitated. 146 
This  is  not to affirm the stronger thesis that the theory of innate  ideas is  a logically 
essential precondition for  any  possibility of a real use for  the intellect.  That  the  theory 
was indeed logically  essential was a position adopted by  Copleston when he  observed. 
"Rejection of  the theory of  innate ideas, must, of  course, entail rejection of  the rationalist 
ideal if  this  is  taken to  be  the  ideal  of deducing  a  system of reality  simply  from  the 
resources of  the mind itself without recourse to experience".2 This stronger theory can be 
rejected  because  logically  it  is  possible  to  conceive  of the  intellect  having  a real  use 
without  possessing  any  innate  ideas.  It is  logically possible to  conceive of forms  of a 
priori  knowledge  that  are  not  either  dispositionally  or  occurently  innate.  Augustine's 
posited the notion of a version of axiomatic intuition that is,  at any time,  dependent on 
the "eternal light of  the divine reason". Such an intuition is not of  necessity ever innate in 
the  mind  and requires to be  re-immediated  by  a  divine  enlightenment  every time  it  is 
thought. Certainly, Augustine maintained, in direct contrast to Copleston, that there were 
such non-innate  intuitions that  could form the  basis of a priori deductive  systems  like 
geometry. 
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Another theory,  that presents itself as  a form  of a priori knowledge,  which  is  not 
innate  is  Kant's  theory  that  the  forms  of intuition  and  the  pure  categories  of the 
understanding  are  acquired in  an act  of "original acquisition". 
4  It must  be understood 
however that this theory was developed in response to Eberhard's attack on the Critique 
of  Pure Reason. At this time, Kant had abandoned the contention that the real use of  the 
intellect  could  provide  us  with transcendent  truth.  A  theory  he  had  maintained  in  a 
modified  form  in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation  (the real use  could provide  us  with  only 
"symbolic"  knowledge  of the  noumenal  world).  However,  there  is  no  reason  why  a 
doctrine  could  not  be  posited  that  combined  the  theory  of original  acquisition  and 
transcendent truth. This would then act as an exception to Copleston's strong thesis. It is 
interesting to note that Copleston, presumably to maintain his strong thesis, interprets the 
Kantian theory of the a priori as a development of  the Leibnizian dispositional theory of 
innate ideas,  "the Kantian theory of the a priori can be represented as,  in some sense. a 
development of  Leibniz' theory of  virtually innate ideas, with the difference that the ideas 
became innate categorical functions"s. 
However,  this  seems  a  historically  inaccurate  interpretation  of Kant's  thesis.  It 
ignores the  fact  that  Kant  wrote a whole  work.  entitled  On  a Discovery According 10 
which any New Critique of  Pure Reason has been made Superjluous by an  Earlier One. separating his theory from the Leibnizian theory of innate ideas. This is a \vork in which 
Kant  unambiguously  claims  that  the  categories  are  not  innate  in  the  s~nse  requir~d. 
However.  it  is  the contention of this thesis  that  Kant's theory of original acquisition is 
incoherent, and there is an attempt to demonstrate this below. Hence. Copleston's theory. 
although not historically accurate, is at least a logically more convincing explanation for 
the categories. In the above discussion, it is  clear that there is  some distinction  betw~~n 
ideas that are innate, and those that are a priori.  Kant for  instance would affinn that his 
categories are a priori but not innate. Before moving to consider the v.ider debate in more 
detail, it is important at this point to make the tenninology clear. 
Stephen  P.  Stich  highlights  terminological  confusion  as  a  source  of error  m  the 
examination of  innate ideas: 
[Q90] Advocates of  the doctrines of  innate ideas and innate knowledge commonly 
take the notion of innateness itself as  unproblematic.  They explain it  with a  f~\\ 
near synonyms, "inborn" or "unlearned". or a metaphor or an allegory. and leave it 
at  that.  The  doctrine's  opponents  often  begin  by  puzzling  over just  what  the 
doctrine  could  possibly  mean.  They go  on to  construct  a  variety of accounts. 
arguing against each in turn. The advocate's rejoiner, as often as not. is that he has 
been misunderstood.
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This  is  certainly the  case.  However,  when Stich attempts to  unravel  his  definitions  he 
makes some fundamental errors. According to him. the distinction between innate and a 
priori knowledge is  "passably clear"7 and takes the following form:  "To say that a bit of 
knowledge is a priori. then. is to say something about its justification. while to  say that a 
belief is  innate is to say something about its cause or genesis". 
8  He then accuses Leibniz 
of being  unaware of this difference  between the a priori and  the  innate.  However.  the 
notions  involved  here  are  far  more  complex  than  Stich  suggests.  In  fact.  historically 
speaking, the meaning of  the tenn a priori has changed significantly and. because of  this 
meaning shift, the tenn innate has also needed to be modified. 
The  meaning  Stich  attaches  to  a  priori  is  certainly  the  prevalent  one  in  mod~m 
analytic  philosophy.  As the  last  chapter made  clear a proposition is  often considered a 
priori.  if it  is  justified  independently of experience.  This  usage  will  be  designated  the 
justificatory definition. The alternative historical interpretation of  the a priori is that of  the 
transcendent apriorist. who believes that matters of origination are just as  important as 
those offllst{jication. This usage will  be designated the double criteria definition.  Gi\ en I-t8 
these historical interpretations it will be natural for someone who accepts the justificatory 
definition to contrast the a priori justificatory process with the innatist derivation process. 
However,  the acceptance of the  double  criteria definition must  give  rise  to  a different 
concept of innateness. The distinction between the a priori and the innate cannot. in this 
case, coherently encapsulate the difference between the justification of  knowledge and the 
origination of concepts and knowledge. It cannot do  this because its definition includes 
the originative process in the very notion of  the a priori. 
Rather, in the tradition of  the double criteria definition, the distinction between the a 
priori and the innate marks off two special types of pure derivation process. On the one 
had  there  are  those  concepts  and  principles  that  are  derived  either  occurently  or as 
dispositions  from that which is  implanted  in  or given by  the mind  prior to  experience. 
These  concepts  and  principles  are  called  innate.  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  those 
concepts and principles that are derived from some function of  the pure intellect but are 
not  within that intellect prior to experience.  Innate concepts and  principles are  always 
present  in  the mind  in  some  form  (latently or actually)  prior to  experience  whereas a 
priori concepts and principles, although also not in any way derived from experience, are 
not implanted by, or given in, the mind in advance of  experience. That such a concept of 
the  a  priori  exists  is  illustrated  by  the  following  quotation  from  the  Inaugural 
Dissertation and by the reply to Eberhard mentioned above: 
[Q91]  Since no empirical principles are to be found in metaphysics, the concepts 
there met with are not to be looked for in the senses, but in the very nature of  the 
pure  intellect,  not  as  concepts  connate  to  it  but  as  concepts  abstracted  (by 
attention to  its  actions on the occasion of experience)  from  laws  inborn  in  the 
mind and to this extent as acquired concepts. Concepts of  this sort are: possibility, 
existence,  necessity,  substance,  cause,  etc.  with  their  opposites  or  correlates. 
These never enter into  any sensual representations as parts of it,  and could not, 
therefore, in any way be abstracted from it.
9 
In consequence,  the transcendent apriorist,  who  accepts the  dual criteria definition, 
considers the origination process a fundamental part of  what it means for something to be 
a priori.  In fact,  a proposition cannot be described as a priori, in their opinion, if it  were 
derived from experience in any way. They cannot also therefore accept the corresponding 
definitions of  innateness and a priori that derive from the justificatory definition. They do, 
in  tact accept  the  definitions  that  arise  from  their  dual  criteria.  Firstly.  that  a  priori 149 
propositions, knowledge or concepts are derived independently of  all experience but are 
not  in  the mind  prior to  experience.  Secondly, that  innate propositions.  knowledge  or 
concepts are derived independently of all experience and are  in the  mind  occurently or 
dispositionally  prior  to  experience.  To  answer  Stich's  tennino10 gical  problem  of the 
vagueness of the attribution of the terms "unlearned" and  "inborn"  to innate  ideas it  is 
now clear that innate ideas, in the transcendent apriorists' definition are all "inborn". What 
this  means  is  defined  above.  However,  innate  ideas are  certainly not all  unlearned.  As 
Leibniz observed in his response to Locke: 
[Q92] I cannot admit this proposition; all that one learns is not innate. The truths 
of  numbers are in us yet nonetheless one learns them either by drawing them from 
their source when we learn them through demonstrative proof (which shows they 
are innate), or by testing them in examples, as do ordinary arithmeticians. 10 
In fact,  all  dispositional theories of innate ideas incorporate some  learning  process,  by 
which that which is  at first only latent becomes manifest on the occasion of  experience. 
Certainly,  occurent versions of connatism specify that  there  is  no  need  to  "learn"  the 
innate ideas. As we have already discovered, Plato's theory of  anamnesis only requires the 
ideas to be  remembered rather than learned.  The  different attitudes toward the learning 
process  in  the  various  forms  of the  theory indicate  that the  notion of learning  is  not 
something  that  can define  the  meaning  essence  of innateness,  as  applied  to  ideas.  In 
conclusion,  innate  ideas  in  the  transcendent  apriorist's  definition  (a  definition  that 
corresponds with Kant's) are essentially inborn but only contingently unlearned. 
6.2. The Downfall of  the Alternatives to Innateness 
Having clarified the meaning content of  the doctrine of innate ideas it is time now to 
return to the issue of  whether the theory is required to give credibility to a real use for the 
intellect.  Consider Kant's theory of a priori intuitions and categories that are  "originally 
acquired",  in  order  to  determine  whether  they  can  function  to  provide  a  credible 
alternative to the innate ideas doctrine. As we have seen the intuitions and categories, for 
Kant.  are  a  priori  rather  than  innate  (in  the  sense  of being  known  independently  of 
experience without being in the mind dispositionally or occurently before experience).  In 
his  reply  to  Eberhard,  Kant  insists  that  the  forms  of intuition  and  the  categories  are 150 
"  .  d  d  .  ,,11  d  acqUIre  an  not  mnate  an  presuppose  "nothing  innate  except  the  subjective 
conditions  of  the  spontaneity  of  thought  (in  accordance  with  the  unity  of 
apperception)  ,,136.  The  act  of "original  acquisition"  itself gives  rise  to  the  fonTIS  of 
intuition  and  the  categories  of the  understanding.  They  are  not  in  the  mind  either 
occurently or as latent ideas prior to the spontaneous act of  generation.  The act itself is 
an  "original  acquisition of that  which previously did  not  exist,  and  therefore  did  not 
pertain to anything before the act".13 
The  possibility of such an act presupposes the freedom of the will,  something for 
which Kant, because of  the nature of  his critical philosophy, could not provide a scientific 
[Wissenschaft]  proof. Phenomenally we are determined by natural laws, noumenally we 
may  be  free  but we do not possess the intellectual intuition required to go beyond the 
phenomenal.  That the will  was free  however was the first  postulate of Kant's practical 
philosophy. A lesser "transcendental" proof  could, however, be given. The freedom of  the 
will  was  requisite  for  the moral  life  and the  a  priori origination of the  intuitions  and 
categories  (accepted  by  Kant  as  givens)  to  be  possible  at  all.  Consider the  following 
quotations  that  demonstrate  the  necessary  connection  between  the  a  priori  and  the 
freedom of  the will, the latter is required for the former to be possible: 
[Q93]  All our and other beings' actions are necessitated, only the understanding 
(and the will in  so far as it can be determined by the understanding is  free  and a 
pure self-activity that is  determined through nothing else but itself.  Without this 
originary and unchangeable spontaneity, we would know nothing a priori.  14 
[Q94]  intuitions are original acquisitions, whose ground is receptivity; while the 
concepts  of the  understanding  are  original  acquisitions,  whose  ground  is  the 
spontaneity of  thought (in accordance with the unity of  apperception.  IS 
When  these  quotations are taken in  conjunction with [Q91,  p.  148]  the  following 
theory emerges. There are in fact permanent innate laws in the mind that coordinate that 
which is sensed. The concepts and principles of  the understanding are derived by the mind 
using its own spontaneous self-activity from these permanent innate laws on the occasion 
of experience (experience plays only an extrinsic role in the process). As Kant observes, 
in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation,  "each  of the  concepts  has.  without  any  doubt.  been 
acquired, not, indeed by abstraction from the sensing of objects (for sensation gives the 
matter and not the form of  human cognition) but from the very action of  the mind. which 
coordinates what is sensed by it, doing so in accordance with permanent laws". 16 151 
The  innate  laws  are  not  therefore  identical  with  the  pure  principles  of the 
understanding,  as  Copleston's  theory  seems  to  entail.  Rather  the  pure  principles  are 
derived from them by a spontaneous act of  origination. Before the act of  origination. the 
result-content of  the act did not exist and hence this result-content is a priori rather than 
innate.  It  is  noetically  derived  but  does  not  exist  in  the  mind  prior  to  experience. 
Copleston is therefore wrong when he observes that,  "the Kantian theory of  the a priori 
can be represented as in some sense a deVelopment of  Leibniz' theory of  virtually innate 
ideas,  with  the  difference  that  the  ideas  became  innate  categorical  functions". 17  The 
categories and forms of intuition are derived from innate functions  but are not identical 
with them. They are a priori not innate. 
This is, in many ways, a problematic doctrine. Supposedly, the innate structure of  the 
mind organizes experience in a certain way.  For example, it may divide the given matter 
of  experience and structure the manifold into things like subjects and qualities. Over this, 
the "spontaneity of  thought" has no control. It is one of  the permanent laws of  the mind. 
Yet recognizing this organizing principle within its experience the mind (on the occasion 
of experience) originates from it  a notion of substance.  This  is  to concede a lot  to the 
innatist.  The  entire  structuring  function  of the  mind  with  regard  to  experience  is 
confirmed as innate.  Hence, the innate contentual elements determine the concepts and 
principles that are actually formed. In real terms, the only process that is not innate, but a 
priori is the linguistic one of  actually giving names to the contentual elements. It is not, as 
Kant  seems to suggest, that there is  a process of derivation or origination in terms of 
content.  The  contentual  elements  are  already  there  prior  to  experience  awaiting 
discovery.  Once discovered the innate  contents are  designated by  the terms that  Kant 
mentions viz. possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause etc. 
However.  it  is  difficult  to  attribute to this process terms like  "origination"  or "the 
spontaneity of thought".  The  point  is  that  the  concepts  and principles  formed  in  the 
process  are  determined  by  the  innate  permanent laws.  They are  not  freely  created or 
originated at all.  Only the process of naming is original in this sense. There is  in fact  no 
real sense of  the "derivation" of  concepts and principles at all  in the process. The notion 
of substance is not really "derived" from the way the innate structures of  the mind divide 
up experience. Rather it instantiates. in concept form. the existing division. In conclusion. 
although Copleston's attribution of  a theory of virtually innate ideas to Kant is mistaken. 
in  the sense that clearly this was not what Kant thought his  theory entailed (or was not 152 
what he intended it to entail), there is a sense in which the theory does collapse into just 
such  a  doctrine.  It is  certain  that  Kant's  theory  would  become  more  philosophically 
coherent ifit were to accept and incorporate this collapse. 
Notwithstanding the above,  there are certain alternatives to the Kantian theory of a 
priori origination. However, the scope of such alternatives is limited by the necessity of 
finding  a  sense  of derivation or origination that meets  the  following  requirements:  (i) 
experience  must  have  no  intrinsic  role  in  the  process;  (ii)  the  process  must  occur 
subsequent to experience, and (iii) the process must be truly originative, i.e.  it  must not 
be just an instantiation or fixing  in language of ideas that exist prior to experience. It is 
impossible  to  find  such  a  theory  that  is  philosophically  coherent.  The  only  viable 
alternatives  therefore  that  can be  suggested  are  those that  reject  the  whole  notion of 
origination/derivation and  rely  instead on the  content  ideas  being  supplied  by  sources 
outside the autonomous intellect. For instance, the possibility still exists that concepts and 
principles  exist  neither  actually  nor  potentially  in  the  mind  prior  to  experience. 
They may be either put in our minds subsequently, perhaps by God, nature, or some other 
mechanism of  this sort, or occur in our minds subsequently by chance. If, for example, St 
Bonaventure can hold to the theory that the notion that God exists or the Supreme Good 
exists  is  naturally implanted  in  the  soul before  birth
18  there  seems to  be  no  reason to 
suppose that it is any more illogical to implant such knowledge subsequent to experience. 
Such knowledge would have to be considered a priori rather than innate. 
That  it  is  a  chance  occurrence  that  such  ideas  suddenly  occur  subsequent  to 
experience (and not before)  seems  similarly difficult  to believe,  however the possibility 
cannot be entirely eliminated. The notion that sheer chance can give rise to such a priori 
knowledge materials is different in nature. An active use of  the pure intellect occurs and 
by pure chance, the principles and concepts of  reasoning just appear on the scene. This is 
a theory, incredible though it  is,  that just cannot be refuted. Even a strong argument for 
the  universality  of such  concepts  and  principles  would  only  affect  the  theory  in  a 
probabilistic way. That is to say, that it would make it  less likely that the theory was true 
when so many different individuals have apparently, by sheer accident, acquired the same 
concepts  and  principles.  This  would  not  however  refute  the  theory.  To  speak 
pragmatically the theory does have considerable disadvantages. It does not really provide 
any  sort  of explanation.  It  is  similar  to  the  meteorologist  who  might  explain  the 
occurrence of the  rotation of a whirlwind  on pure chance events - it  just happens that 153 
way.  The explanation has no value. It forces us to admit however that the real use of  the 
intellect requires the theory of innate ideas for credibility and explanatory reasons rather 
than strictly necessary ones. 
6.1. Requisite Innateness: the Leibnizian Defence. 
It is the contention of  this thesis then that those transcendent apriorists who rejected the 
illuminative  or  enlightenment  variants  of the  doctrine  must  find  another  credible 
explanation for the real use of  the intellect. The only credible explanation can be in terms 
of innate ideas. It is no  surprise then that historically speaking, from Plato onwards, the 
theory  of innate  ideas  has  a  seminal  place  in  ratiocinative  transcendent  apriorist 
epistemology.  One  of  the  most  significant  contributions  Leibniz  made  to  this 
epistemology  was  his  development  of a  more  sophisticated  and  convincing  theory  of 
innate ideas. This in turn would give a more credible psychological mechanism that would 
underlie the notion of  a real use for the intellect. Most previous attempts to provide such 
a  mechanism,  with  the  notable  exception  of Descartes'  proto-dispositional  theory  of 
innate  ideas,  had  been  poorly  developed,  crude  or  implausible.  In  Leibniz's  lifetime 
previously  established  versions  of the  theory  had  come  under  severe  attack  from  the 
English empiricist John Locke and the theory required reassessment if  it  was to survive. 
In terms of  epistemological credibility, it was essential that it did survive. 
Descartes  had  made  only  limited  progress  since  Plato's  postulated  his  occurent 
version of the theory, i.e.  the doctrine of anamnesis.  In Descartes' third Meditation,  the 
meditator lists those categories of  ideas that he discovers within himself He observes that 
some seem to  be  innate,  some adventitious (coming from an outside source) and  some 
fictitious  (or  imaginatively  constructed).  The  first  class  includes  the  idea  we  have  of 
ourselves as thinking things, the idea of  God, and basic mathematical concepts like that of 
triangularity.  Also  included,  are  certain fundamental  truths of logic  such as,  "that  it  is 
impossible  for  the  same  thing  to  be  and  not  to  be  at  the  same  time".19  John  Locke 
objected to innate ideas on the ground that many people (idiots and children for example) 
seem quite unaware of  the abovementioned truths. Yet, "to imprint anything on the Mind 
without the Mind's perceiving it" he wrote, "seems to me hardly intelligible".:w 15.+ 
Yet, in the case of  Locke's "idiot", Herbert ofCherbury had already given a more than 
adequate  reason  why  this  was  a  spurious  case  against  innate  ideas.  Herbert.  when 
defending the universal consent argument for innate ideas,  states that he  is  only talking 
about  universal  consent  among  "normal  men".21  The  term  universal  then  is  sensibly 
qualified to exclude cases where the mind is  defective,  fuddled,  drugged,  immature &. 
etc.  (Although Herbert does assert that occasionally,  even in  these  extreme cases,  the 
innate ideas are not entirely absent). For, he observes, we must put aside "persons who 
are out of their minds or mentally incapable,,22  and those who are  "headstrong, foolish, 
weak-minded and imprudent".23 And although the faculty for being or becoming aware of 
innate ideas (for Herbert "Natural Instinct  ,,24)  "may not ever be entirely absent" and "even 
in madmen, drunkards, and infants extraordinary internal powers may be detected which 
minister to their safety".25  We  can expect to find  universal consent to common notions 
only  among  the  normal,  rational  and  clearheaded.  This  is  a  sensible  qualification and 
makes Locke's mention of "idiots",  whatever he  means  by this term,  irrelevant.  If the 
brain is  defective or drugged in some way, for example, then it  is logical to suggest that 
this process of  recognition or knowing may be suppressed, or may not occur at all. 
In the case of  Locke's child example, the answer Descartes' would have given would 
be that the ideas under consideration, although not presently perceived by the mind are 
still there in the mind at a "preconscious" level. The term preconscious is a Freudian term 
but, it best explains the conscious phenomena to which Descartes is referring. The innate 
ideas are not, as in Plato, "forgotten" by the mind because of  its attachment to the world 
of  the senses. They are not buried in the depths of  the soul (or unconscious). Rather the 
ideas,  although available immediately to the mind,  are just not being attended to at the 
moment in question: "The child has within itself the idea of  God, itself and all such truths 
as  are  called  self-evident,  in  the  same  way as  adult  humans  have  when  they are  not 
attending to them;  it  does not acquire them later on as  it grows 0Ider".26  But if  these 
truths are ever-present just waiting to be discovered,  what is  it  that prevents everyone 
discovering them? Descartes' reply is  that we are distracted by two things (i)  by  urgent 
bodily  stimuli  which  dominate  the  mind  in  childhood,  and  (ii)  by  a  body  of inherited 
"preconceived opinions"  i.e.  obscure and confused judgements heteronymously derived 
that  obstruct our perception of the  truth.  However, if the  intellect  could  be  distanced 
from the immediate sensory input or prevented from taking on false opinion then it would 155 
easily recognize its inheritance of innate truths. Certainly, the souL if  removed from the 
body, would perceive at all times the ideas present within it.27 
Leibniz's answer to Locke's criticism is  a lot more sophisticated. He does not think 
that the ideas exist at the pre-conscious leveL like Descartes. He concedes more to  Locke 
when he observes that it is wrong "to think that we can easily read these eternal laws of 
reason in the soul as the Praetor's edict can be read on his notice board, without effort or 
inquiry;  but it  is  enough that they can be discovered within us by  dint of attention".  28 
However why is  it  "enough" to make this point against  Locke? In what sense are  the 
ideas in the mind if  we do not always perceive them? The answer is that innate ideas are 
not  "in  us"  occurently but rather as  dispositions.  Just  as  families  have  dispositions  to 
develop certain illnesses, so the human mind has a disposition to form certain ideas rather 
than others.  It only  actually  does  so,  however,  if the  conditions  are  right  and  these 
conditions  cannot  just  become  right  through  our  natural  development.  As  Leibniz' 
suggests  specific  labour  is  required  to  bring  the  ideas  to  the  level  of explicit 
conscIousness: 
[Q95] For if the soul were like such a blank tablet then truths would be in  us as 
the shape of  Hercules is in a piece of  marble when the marble is entirely neutral as 
to whether it assumes this shape or some other. However, if  there were veins in 
the block which marked out the shape of Hercules rather than other shapes then 
that block would be more determined to that shape and Hercules would be innate 
in it, in a way, even though labour would be required to expose the veins and to 
polish them into clarity, removing everything that prevents their being seen. This 
is  how ideas and truths are innate in us as inclinations, dispositions, tendencies or 
natural potentialities.
29 
This is a good answer to Locke for it implies that ideas can be "in us", in potentia, at any 
stage of human deVelopment  without ever being perceived by us.  Just as saying that a 
family  is  prone to  certain illnesses  does not  imply  that these  illnesses  will necessarily 
develop  in  any particular individual.  At this point,  Locke's argument  is  in  trouble.  We 
would not normally argue, for instance, that there could not be any innate dispositions to 
form diseases because the diseases cannot be within us in any way with out our actually 
being aware of  them. 
The arguments for and against this dispositional theory of  innate ideas are continuing 
in  modern philosophy. For, example Noam Chomsky sees his own linguistic theory. that 
children  possess an  innate  grammar that  is  the  foundation of language  acquisition.  as 156 
"fully in accord with the doctrine of  innate ideas, so understood, [by Leibniz] and can be 
regarded as providing a kind of  substantiation and further development of  this doctrine".  30 
Although the arguments have changed and those ideas considered to be innate are usually 
different. However, these debates are beyond the scope of  this thesis  which acts onlv as a  ,  . 
propaedeutic to  such questions in  so  far  as the transcendent apriorist has  to consider 
them. 
Let us move then to consider Leibniz' theory in terms of  its support for the real use of 
the intellect.  Copleston seems to think that Leibniz is  using the term innate in  a unique 
way for he talks of a  "technical,,3l  or "special,,32  sense of innateness. This, according to 
Copleston, allows Leibniz to exclude certain truths from the category of  innate ideas. The 
example given is  the proposition "the sweet is not the bitter" which is  certainly not an 
innate idea for Leibniz. It cannot be innate simply because it contains particular notions 
that are derived intrinsically from experience. Of  course all notions for Leibniz, including 
"intellectual ideas,,33  are extrinsically experiential because, "without the senses we would 
never  think  of them".  34  However  intrinsically  experiential  notions  would  render  the 
proposition uncertain, "truths involving ideas which come from the senses are themselves 
at  least  partly dependent on the senses.  But the ideas  that  come from  the  senses are 
confused;  and  so  too,  at  least  in  part,  are  the  truths  which  depend  upon  them".  35 
Consequently, if  a proposition contains these sense notions then it cannot be indubitable 
and therefore cannot be innate. 
In connection with the relationship between innateness and indubitability, 1. L. Mackie 
has pointed out that only if  Descartes and Leibniz could demonstrate the existence of a 
"benevolently  veracious  God,,36  could  innate  ideas  be  connected  with  authoritative 
knowledge.  According to him,  such items of knowledge are not authoritative  "merely 
because  they are innate".  37  Yet,  Leibniz is  not using  an argument  which categorically 
states that all innate propositions are necessarily indubitable. Rather he is suggesting that 
if a proposition is  already proved indubitable then it  must be innate.  Samuel Parker had 
observed that there was certainly no guarantee that our innate ideas were not false: 
[Q96] But suppose that we were born with these congenite Anticipations, and that 
they take Root in  our very Faculties, yet how can I be certain of their Truth and 
Veracity?  For 'tis  not  impossible  but  the  seeds of Error  might  have  been  the 
natural Results of my Faculties, as Weeds are the first  and  natural Issues of the best Soyles, how then shall we be sure that these spontaneous Notions are not 
false and spurious.  38 
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Now Leibniz would accept this possibility and recognized that the epistemological status 
of  innate ideas was something open to debate: 
[Q97]  "He  [Locke]  will  have  wanted to fight  the  laziness  and  shallowness  of 
thought of  those who use the specious pretext of  innate ideas and truths, naturally 
engraved on the mind and readily assented to, to avoid serious inquiry into where 
our items of  knowledge come from,  how they are connected, and what certainty 
they have. I am entirely on his side about that.
39 
Returning now to the relation between sensory notions and innate principles, it can be 
said that Leibniz does not accept as truly innate those propositions that contain sensory 
notions.  This  is,  in  fact,  a  classic  transcendent  position regarding  a priori knowledge. 
Leibniz  is  not  using  the  notion  of innateness  in  a  "technical"  or  "special"  sense  as 
Copleston suggests  but  in  the  traditional  sense  which  is  commensurate  with  the  dual 
criterion a  priori  ..  In this  tradition,  the  exclusion of intrinsic  sensation  is  part  of the 
meaning  of the  a  priori  in  general  and  innateness  in  particular.  Leibniz  correctly 
recognizes that there are "Intellectual ideas from which necessary truths arise,,40 that "do 
not come from the senses,,41.  These intellectual ideas will form the basis of truly innate 
principles, "the soul comprises being, substance, unity, identity, cause, perception, reason 
and many other notions which the senses cannot give,,42  so that "neither the ideas nor the 
truths  originate  in  the  senses  ,,43 •  It  is  these  innate  notions  that  ultimately  form  the 
foundation for the real use of  the intellect. 158 
CHAPTER 7 
THE ILLUMINATIVE TRADITION 
7.1. Ratiocination and Immediate Intellectual Intuition 
Historically  speaking,  the  actual  processes  that  must  conform  to  the  strict  a  pnOrI 
criterion within transcendent apriorism are ratiocination and direct intellectual intuition. 
Both are  definitionally  important,  and  hence  included  in  Def]  (p.  82),  because  they 
represent  two  distinct  epistemological  methods  by  which  transcendent  apriorists  have 
attempted to attain to the Truly Real. We have already seen, in our analysis of  the noetic 
functions, that there is a distinction between knowledge by description and knowledge by 
acquaintance.  The  distinction  between ratiocination  and  direct  intellectual  intuition  is 
actually of  a similar nature. It must be specified however that, in transcendent apriorism, 
both descriptive and acquaintive knowing are noetic processes functioning to attain to the 
noumenal.  There  are,  after  all,  other  epistemological  doctrines  employing  empirical 
versions of  these processes. We are of  course not interested in those here. 
It must be said, however, that there is much confusion in this area of  epistemological 
analysis.  The distinctions are sometimes confused and there are many issues that are still 
controversial. The main problems occur: (i) with the careless introduction of  the further 
distinction  between  discursive  and  intuitional  knowing  into  the  discussion.  The  term 
discursive  has previously been used,  but only in  a  sense that  is  specific  to the  Kantian 
epistemology.  The alternative meaning corresponds with its more familiar  philosophical 
use.  A  discursive  element,  therefore, would involve  a composite durational  intellectual 
process, one that involves the movement from one truth to another, as in deduction. This 
is  usually  contrasted  with  the  unitary,  static  and  immediate  character  of intuitive 
cognition.  This  distinction,  despite  superficial  similarities  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
contrast  between ratiocination and  direct  intellectual intuition: (ii)  when there  is  only  a 159 
vague differentiation made between the modes of intuition inherent in these distinctions 
and (iii) when intellectual intuition is confused with its non-rational counterpart. 
7.2. Discursive and Non-Discursive Intuition 
In an attempt to unravel the meaning of the above distinctions let  us  start with an 
analysis of  what Kant meant by his denial of  intellectual intuition to human consciousness. 
Consider in this respect the following quotation from the Inaugural Dissertation: 
[Q98] No intuition of  things intellectual but only symbolic [discursive] knowledge 
of them is  given to  man.  Intellection  is  only possible  to  us  through universal 
concepts in the abstract, not through singular concepts in the concrete. For all our 
intuition is bound to a certain formal principle under which alone anything can be 
perceived  by  the  mind  immediately,  that  is,  as  singular  and  not  as  conceived 
merely discursively through general concepts. But this formal principle of  intuition 
(space and time)  is  the condition under which anything can be an object of the 
senses, and being thus the condition of sensitive knowledge it  is  not a means to 
intellectual intuition. I 
Kant, in this passage, is interested in distinguishing two possible ways in which the human 
mind can attain to knowledge of the noumenal world.  The first  involves an  immediate 
apprehension of the noumenal through an intellectual  intuition.  In  this  sense,  it  is  an 
intuitional  or  non-discursive  method.  In  contrast,  the  second  involves  a  durational 
reasoning process making  use of abstract universal concepts.  This is  putatively a non-
intuitional  or  discursive  process.  It is  noticeable  that,  for  human  consciousness,  the 
intuitional method, according to Kant, is not regarded as a viable option. This is  because 
human intuitions are exclusively, for him,  either sensory in nature or merely function as 
pre-conditions  for  the  sensory world's  appearing  to  consciousness  as  it  in  fact  does. 
Hence, an intellectual intuition, that takes one beyond the sensory to grasp the noumenal 
world,  just  doesn't  exist  for  human  consciousness.  A  point  that  is  re-iterated  in  the 
Critique: 
[Q99]  If by  'noumenon', we  mean a  thing  as  far  as  it  is  not  an  object of our 
sensible intuition. and so abstract from our mode of  intuiting it. this is a noumenon 
in  the negative sense of the term.  But if we understand by it  an object of a non-
sensible intuition. we thereby presuppose a special mode of intuition. namely the intellectual,  which  is  not  that  which  we  possess  and  of which  we  cannot 
comprehend even the possibility.2 
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In contrast, the so-called discursive method, in the Inaugural Dissertation. is a difficult. 
but not impossible, option for attaining to the noumenal. However later, in the Critique. 
Kant was to deny even this possibility to human consciousness, putting an unbridgeable 
gap between the human intellect and the noumenal world. 
Yet there are, as we have already mentioned in point (i)  above,  problems with this 
division between the discursive and the intuitional. The main difficulty is that there seems 
to  be  a non-sensuous intuitive element (an intellectual intuition) that forms  an essential 
part of the discursive process itself.  What is  being referred to,  in particular,  is  what we 
have  already  referred  to  as  deductive  intuition.  We  have  noted  the  close  relationship 
between deductive intuition and the discursive deductive method.  In fact,  it  is so much a 
part  of deduction  that  deduction  could  not  take  place  without  the  constant  re-
immediation of  the whole process in intuition.  (Dr.  A.  C.  Ewing in his  British Academy 
Lecture
3  even suggests that  intellectual  intuition forms  an  important  part  of inductive 
reasoning).  The  necessity  of this  type  of intellectual  intuition  within  deduction  IS 
problematic for Kant, as G. R. G. Mure has recognized in his Introduction to Hegel: 
[QI00]  Had Kant paid more attention to the nature of inference he  might  have 
found it less easy to deny to thought its native moment of  intuition. The discursive 
factor  in  thought  is  not revealed only  in  the  dispersion of an  identical  concept 
through a multiplicity of sensuous intuitions which instantiate it,  but  also  in the 
movement  of inference  from  premises  to  conclusion;  and  in  the  grasping  of a 
conclusion a complementary factor of intellectual intuition is plainly manifest, not 
as  an  act  separate from  discursion but as  the  re-immediation of the  discursive, 
d·  4  me  tatory moment. 
If Ewing and Mure are correct, then the Kantian denial to  human consciousness of 
any  form  of intellectual  intuition  not  only  puts  an  end  to  the  possibility  of dogmatic 
metaphysics (Kant's actual intention) but also would render the whole reasoning process 
itself inconceivable.  For they  would  ask,  what  reasoning  process does  not  contain  an 
intellectually intuitive element?  It is true that Walsh), in Reason and Experience, tries to 
discredit  this  argument  by  claiming  that  Kant  only  denies  the  existence  of a  human 
intellectual  intuition  that  has  reference to  any  possible  real  use  for  the  intellect.  In  the 161 
logical  use  of the  intellect  then,  presumably,  intellectual  intuition has  a  role  tor  Kant 
according to Walsh. 
This would certainly make Kant's theory more coherent. However. there is e\'idence 
to  suggest that Kant,  against the  Walsh interpretation, denied to  human consciousness 
any form of non-sensuous intuition, "Thus for our minds, intuition is always passive and 
is possible only so far as something is able to affect our senses".6 Without getting into the 
complexities  of this  debate  it  is  at  least  obvious  that  the  question of what  counts  as 
discursive and what counts as  intuitive is  problematic.  That the distinction between the 
two  categories  is  far  from  rigid  is  demonstrated  further  by  the  existence  of a 
transformation procedure that can exist between them.  In  fact~ previously we discovered 
that certain rationalist philosophers saw the possibility of  transforming discursive methods 
into intuitive one's. I refer of course to the so called process of "enumeration" in which. 
as Descartes suggested, it is possible to intuit a chain of  connections "in a continuous and 
wholly uninterrupted sweep of  thought. .. so  swiftly that memory is left with practically no 
role to play,  and I seem to intuit the whole thing practically at once". 7 If this is possible 
then the clear differentiation, at one level, breaks down. 
So  far,  we  have  only  discussed  deductive  intuition,  but  what  about  axiomatic 
intuition?  It  is  certainly  required  to  grasp  the  axioms  of the  deductive  method  in 
foundationalist  systems,  for  example  in  geometry and  certain systems  of metaphysics. 
This is surely a species of  intellectual intuition, yet to deny it to human consciousness is a 
drastic step. To conclude, the introduction of  the distinction between the discursive and 
intuitional, in this instance, creates more problems than it solves. It is certainly clear that 
it  has little to do  with our distinction.  For ratiocination,  as  used in a technical sense  in 
Def\., is  inclusive of both discursive and some intuitional elements.  Although it  must be 
admitted that intellectual acquaintance intuition is certainly non-discursive in nature. 
The real question is just what sort of  intuitional elements belong to which side of the 
distinction.  This  was  problem (ii)  mentioned  above.  The  solution to  this  problem will 
reveal the  two main historical strands of transcendent apriorism.  Let  us  start then  with 
ratiocination.  In  its  technical  sense  in  Def\.  this  would  include,  all  those  intuitional 
processes  required  by  and  involved  in  a durational  reasoning  process.  Many  of which 
have  already  been  mentioned  and  explained  in  our  discussion  of noetic  concepts.  in 
particular:  (i) the intuitional re-immediation of  a discursive process mentioned hy  Ewing 
and  Mure, and designated  by  me  deductive  intuition~ (ii)  the  intellectual  intuition of the l6~ 
axIOms  upon  which  the  reasorung  process  is  based,  previously  designated  axiomatic 
intuition.  Although not durational in itself this form of intuition never functions  outside 
the  durational reasoning process; (iii) noetic introspection and (iv)  the apprehension of 
noetic concepts. In addition, it would, of  course, include a discursive element viz.  (v) the 
actual process of  noetic-deductive reasoning. The term ratiocination therefore is inclusive 
of the  first  five  noetic  processes  and  is  a  term  synonymous  with  knowledge  by 
description. It is knowledge by description but not purely discursive knowledge. In fact, 
four out of  the five processes involved are intuitional in nature. 
7.3. Illuminative intuition 
The  only  noetic  process  not  included  in  the  category  of ratiocination  is  unmediated 
rational intuition.  This is  an intuitional process that is  sui generis.  It has  therefore been 
designated  illuminative  intuition.  It  is  the  only  noetic  process,  which  represents 
knowledge  by  acquaintance  rather  than  by  description.  It is  this  putative  intellective 
process that creates the possibility of  a second form of  transcendent apriorism. This form 
involves  the  ability  of the  intellect  to  grasp  the  noumenal  directly  without  mediation 
through a durational reasoning process.  We  have  already seen in our discussion of The 
Seventh Epistle,  how Plato attempts to  distance  ultimate  knowing (direct acquaintance 
with the forms)  and knowing by description (even his own works are of  this nature).  In 
this  interpretation of Plato, knowledge by description is  only  a preparatory exercise;  a 
means  of concentrating the mind  on the  true objects of knowledge  so  that the  soul  is 
ignited and acquaintance knowing occurs. R.  S.  Bluck sees the latter type of  knowing as 
already present with Plato's use of  the term ElTlOTT)J..lll in the Republic, "In the Republic, 
at  least,  ElTlOTT]J..lll  is  certainly  a matter of 'knowledge  by  acquaintance'  with  forms". 
8 
Hamlyn9 agrees and adds that later in the Theaetetus ElTlOTT]J..lll represents knowledge by 
description while YVWOlS is knowledge by acquaintance - a distinction Bluck denies. 
We  have  already  noted  that  in  Grote  and  Russell  the  model  for  knowledge  by 
acquaintance  was  visual  perception.  In  a  transcendent  apriorist  epistemology.  of the 
acquaintance type,  the  model for  acquaintance  knowing  is  similarly  often perceptual in 
nature.  However. it  is  usually a mental perception rather than a visual perception that  is 
indicated.  Certainly,  mental  perception  is  sometimes  explained  through  metaphors  of 163 
visual  perception,  but  is  not  identical  with  it.  In  fact,  according  to  Plato.  mental 
perception is "a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes, for by it only is 
reality beheld". 10 It is certain that images of  mental seeing, often with the so-called "eye 
of the  soul"  are present throughout the Republic
ll
•  In particular,  Plato's metaphors for 
knowing the intelligible realm i.e. the line and the cave are obviously based on this model. 
For a much later Platonist like  Plotinus there also  exists a form of mental seeing.  a 
knowledge by acquaintance with the Forms. However, this form of  intellective seeing was 
to be carefully distinguished from the non-intellective or mystical seeing of "the One" to 
which,  in  Plotinus,  it  was  only  a  prelude.  (The  distinction  between  direct  intellectual 
intuition and mystical or other non-intellective intuitions will be discussed presently). For 
Plotinus,  direct  intellectual  intuition  was  certainly  of major  importance  in  gaining 
knowledge of  the intelligible world. Yet, it was not the ultimate form of  knowing as it had 
been for  Plato.  Ultimate knowledge of the  Truly Real could  only  be  attained through 
what Eyjolfur Emilsson calls  "hyper-intellectual vision"  or "hyper-noesis".'2 This  was a 
non-intellective intuition that took the soul beyond the vision of  the forms to the vision of 
"the One" or "the Good". The following passage from the Enneads makes this important 
distinction: 
[QI01] She [the soul]  declares that the object of her vision  [hyper-noesis]  does 
not  think,  even  though  she  attains  the  vision  by  becoming  intellect  herself, 
essentially intellective, and established in the intelligible realm~ for although on her 
arrival and in her lingering she is a thinking intellect, yet when she sees that God 
she discards all else. It is as if  someone were to enter a richly appointed house of 
intricate beauty,  and gaze  in wonder at  every ornate feature,  before  seeing  the 
master of the house;  but at the  splendid  sight of him,  no  mere  adornment  but 
reality and worthy object of  attention, he would ignore those images and now fix 
hi  him  I 
13 
S eyes on  a one. 
However,  it  was the  intellective rather than  the  hyper-noetic  version of mental  seeing 
developed  in  Plato,  Philo  of Alexandria and  Plotinus  that  gave  birth to  the  important 
epistemological doctrine of illumination.  The reference is,  of course,  to  the  intellective 
illumination  of Augustine  et.  al.  as  opposed  to  the  mystical  or religious  illumination 
found, for example, in the Islamic "Ishraqiyah" tradition of  Ibn Sina or Suhrawadi. This is 
an  important point because the two traditions of illumination,  viz.  the philosophical and 
the  mystical  must  be  kept  separate.  They  are  based  on  the  fundamentally  ditlerent 
categories of intuition discussed by  Plotinus.  For example the  14th century mystic  John 164 
Ruysbroeck,  although  influenced  by  Augustine,  has  a  very  different  notion  of what 
illumination means. In fact, in Revelations of  Divine Love he associates it with the h)"per-
noesis type intuition, "Illuminated men are caught up, above the reason into naked vision. 
There the Divine Unity dwells and calls them Hence their bare vision. cleansed and free. 
penetrates the activity of  all created things  ... "  14 
The epistemology of  the early medieval period was, however. dominated by the other 
category of intuition viz.  intellective  illuminative  knowing.  With regard to  this  fact.  it 
could be argued that, in the main tradition of  Western epistemology, the noetic triumphed 
over the gnostic.  The origins of this intellective notion of illumination are not easy to 
trace but Plato had described how, in the mental seeing of  the noumenal, the mind was 
suddenly illuminated "at last in a flash understanding of  each blazes up, and the mind, as it 
exerts all its powers to the limit of  human capacity, is flooded with light".)5 For Plato, the 
mental seeing occurred as a relation between the human intellect and the intelligible world 
of  the Forms. Later Middle Platonist philosophers, such as Albinus, located these forms in 
the divine mind which, in effect, identified the intelligible world with the mind of God. 
The illuminative process was now a relation between the human soul and the divine Mind. 
An idea that secured for the doctrine a long future in the body of Christian thought. In 
fact, it was the Christian philosopher Augustine who made the most substantial use of  the 
theory. The details of  the story of  the acquaintance type of transcendent apriorism from 
Augustine onwards will be given in detail later. At this point, it  is sufficient to point out 
two  things.  Firstly,  Scott  MacDonald's  interpretation of Augustine,  given  below,  IS 
correct for it draws attention to the acquaintance knowing involved in illumination: 
[Q 102]  We discern intelligible  objects directly by turning within the immaterial 
soul  and  away from  sense  perception and the material  world.  He  [Augustine] 
develops his notion of direct acquaintance in terms of  the metaphors of light and 
vision.  Just as our seeing material objects depends on their being illuminated by 
the light of the sun,  our intellectual vision of intelligible  objects on their being 
illuminated by an intelligible light, truth itself  16 
Secondly, there was a long tradition of  acquaintive transcendent apriorism that used the 
doctrine  of intellective  illumination,  largely  because  of the  influence  of Augustine. 
Philosophers  such as Avincenna,  William of Auvergne,  Bonaventure.  Henry of Ghent. 
Malebranche and Bergson. Kant. in the Inaugural Dissertation. admits the existence of  a 
direct intellectual intuition of  noumenal objects for, at least. the divine mind: [QI03] Thus for our minds intuition is always passive and is possible only so  far 
as  something is  able  to  affect  our senses.  But the  divine  intuition,  which  is  the 
ground,  not  the  consequence,  of its  objects,  is,  owing  to  its  independence, 
archetypal and so is completely intellectual. 17 
7.4. Rational and Non-Rational Intuitions 
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It is  of further  importance  to  stress  that  both ratiocination  and  direct  intellectual 
intuition are processes that exclude any form of  non-intellectual intuition. The discursive 
part of ratiocination is by definition not an intuition, so  can easily be distinguished from 
non-intellectual intuition.  But some may have a problem differentiating the  intellectual-
intuitionist  elements,  of (i)  ratiocination and  (ii)  acquaintance  knowing  (in  particular), 
from  their  non-intellectual counterparts.  Can a clear distinction  be  made,  for  instance, 
between  the  intellectual  intuition  in  Plotinus,  which  grasps  the  forms,  and  the  non-
intellectual  intuition  that  apprehends  the  One?  Is  intellectual  intuition  in  some  way 
distinguishable from mystical insight? Commentators like Walsh have certainly noted their 
similarity,  "There is no question of the mystic's first  having certain experiences and then 
reflecting on their significance: what he  has is rather immediately significant experience. 
In this respect mystical experience is  akin to the knowing of an intuitive understanding 
rather  than to  anything  with  which  we  are  familiar  in  every  day  life".18  When  Walsh 
speaks of an intuitive  understanding he  is,  of course referring  to  illuminative  intuition, 
which he classes as an intuition in the "full-blooded sense".19  However his  categories of 
intuition are somewhat confused and deductive intuition is also classed as "full-blooded". 
We  are  concerned,  of course,  purely with the  distinction, if  there  is  one,  between 
illuminative intuition and mystical intuition. Unfortunately, this could be the subject for a 
thesis in  itself.  Despite this, there are some remarks to be made on the issue, which are 
significant.  The  fact  is,  that  mystics  themselves  are  often at  great  pains  to  stress  the 
difference.  They are aware, at least at the phenomenological level, of transcending their 
intellectual intuitions.  The two types of intuition are  in this sense different experiences. 
The intellective intuition involves a focussing and concentration of  the mind and it mainly 
occurs  subsequent  to  a  period  of intense  discursive  reasoning.  It  is  noteworthy,  in 
contrast, that mystical intuition is usually, but not always20,  seen as supervening upon an 
emptying of  the mind of  intellectual and other content. This process is perhaps familiar to 
us from the practices of  Buddhist meditation but it also plays a significant role in Western 166 
mysticism.  Master Eckhart, for instance, observes "where all the powers are withdra\\TI 
from their work and images, there is this word spoken  ... the more thou canst draw in all 
thy powers and forget the creature the nearer art thou to this, and the more receptive".21 
Consider also the views ofDionysius the pseudo-Areopagite as typical in this respect. "  ... 
united  to  the  Unknown  by  the  most  noble  part  of herself  and  because  of her 
renouncement of knowledge; finally  drawing from this  absolute ignorance a knowledge 
which the understanding knows not how to attain,,22 
The intellective intuition, in contrast, is a controlled process that is never linked with 
the suppression, abandonment or transcending of reason and learning. It rather functions 
as an extension that is continuous with the reasoning process. Whereas mystical intuition 
is  often  associated  with  a  loss  of control  of the  intellective  faculties.  In  fact.  this 
abandonment  of intellect  is  seen  as  positive.  Even  if the  intellect  plays  a  role  in  the 
preparations for  mystical  insight,  as  it  does in  Plotinus,  the  intellect  must  still  be  left 
behind and abandoned in order that the  illumination may  replace  it.  Consider Plotinus' 
own attempts to make the distinction between the two intuitions clear: 
[QI04] The first way of seeing belongs to intellect when sane, but the second is 
intellect in love, transported and "drunk with nectar" when sated with the object 
of  desire it dissolves in contentment - and better for it to be drunk than too solemn 
for such drunkenness.  23 
[QI05] It is here that he abandons every kind of learning.  He has been guided so 
far  and established in Beauty,  and  until  this  moment  is  a thinking  intellect;  but 
now, swept away on the wave of  Intellect itself and lifted on high by its swell, he 
suddenly sees - yet sees not how, for the vision fills his eyes with light, a light not 
the medium of  sight but itself the vision.
24 
The mystic intuition is  also not so  much seen as the result of a process of dialectics 
but rather as a consequence of  the process of  loving. The intuition itself, as in [QI04], is 
often regarded as a process of  loving rather than knowing. Hence. in this case the mystic 
intuition itself is  conative rather than cognitive.  Certainly,  in all cases, conative loving is 
essential to the mystical path to knowledge. As Berger has observed love and desire are 
"the  fundamental  necessities;  and  where  they  are  absent  man.  even  though  he  be  a 
visionary, cannot be  called a mystic".25  We  can also  say that.  in  mysticism, the love  for 
the  transcendent  being  is  seen as  possessing an epistemological role.  In  fact  a superior 
epistemological role to the so-called. dry  science of dialectics.  In  qualification.  it  is  not 
that the mystic seeks knowledge of the noumenal through loving God.  I,oving God is  an 167 
end in  itself.  It just so happens that love brings with it  an unsought knowledge of the 
noumenal. A knowledge that understanding itself cannot reach. The mystic himself would 
regard  those  who  search for  noumenal wisdom through the  medium of love  as  mere 
magicians
26
•  Some quotations culled from the mystical tradition will now be given that 
demonstrate the role of  love in the epistemology of  mysticism: 
[QI06] Anonymous - By Love He may be gotten and holden, but by thought of 
understanding never.  27 
[QI07]  Gertrude More - Out of this true love between a  soul and thee.  there 
ariseth such a knowledge in the soul that it loatheth all that is an impediment to 
her further proceeding in the Love of  thee. 0  Love, Love  ...  28 
[QI08] Ruysbroeck - For I would dwell with you today. And this hasty descent to 
which he is  summoned by God is  simply a descent by love and desire in to that 
abyss  of  the  Godhead  which  the  intellect  cannot  understand.  But  where 
intelligence must rest without, love and desire can enter in.
29 
[QI09] Anonymous - He may not be known by reason, He may not be gotten by 
thought, nor concluded by understanding; but he may be  loved and chosen with 
the true lovely will of  thine heart. Such a blind shot with the sharp dart of  longing 
love may never fail to prick, the which is God.3o 
There is actually an active engagement between the knower and the thing known that 
brings  with  it  intense  emotions  like  love,  adoration  and  ecstasy.  In  contrast,  the 
illumination in the intellective intuition is a passive reception of knowledge. In addition, 
although the intellectual intuition is  often described in metaphors of light, the mystic  is 
more likely to see actual lights or the light. As [QI05, p.  166] makes clear the light is not 
just the medium through which the eye of  the soul can see the truth, rather the light, for 
the mystic, is the truth - it is the content of  the revelation. Some of  the above points are 
made by Evelyn Underhill in her famous study of  the mystical consciousness: 
[Q 11 0]  But there is  no  sense in  which it  can be  said that the desire of love  is 
merely  a  part of the  desire  of perfect  knowledge:  for  that  strictly  intellectual 
ambition  includes  no  adoration,  no  self-spending,  no  reciprocity  of feeling 
between  Knower  and  known.  Mere  knowledge,  taken  alone,  is  a  matter  of 
receiving, not of  acting: of  eyes, not wings: a dead alive business ofknowing.
31 
Mystical intuition was given as an important example of  a non-rational intuition but it was 
not the intention to suggest that it was the only one. 7.5.  Illuminative Transcendent Apriorism from Plotinus to Bergson 
[Qlll] Along with it  [discursive intelligence], however, we find  the existence of 
another way of gaining knowledge. And so, we have on the one side science and 
mechanical  art,  which  derives  from  pure  intelligence,  and,  on  the  other.  the 
metaphysics that appeals to intuition. 
[Henry Bergson
32
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168 
To separate out the illuminative and the ratiocinative versions, is extremely important for 
the  accuracy  of  any  assessment  of  transcendent  apriorism.  Much  confusion  in 
categorization and  errors in  criticism occur as  the result of a misunderstanding of this 
most  fundamental  epistemological dichotomy.  To  clear  up  these  errors and  confusions 
and  to  thereby prepare the  ground for  a more  accurate  assessment  is  the  aim of this 
chapter. To do this there will be a concentration on the essence and history of  illuminative 
apnonsm. 
In the  various histories of philosophy,  the  term "illumination"  has  been used  in  an 
extremely loose way to describe an incredibly wide variety of  philosophical and mystical 
doctrines.  This  indiscriminatory  use  of the  term  has  resulted  in  certain  important 
distinctions, between such "illuminative" phenomena, being overlooked. For this reason I 
want  to  significantly narrow the  meaning  of the term and  restrict  its  function to  those 
epistemological doctrines that make use of a specific rational/intellectual intuition - viz. 
illuminative  intuition.  This  would  exclude  the  following  meanings  that  are  confusingly 
embraced by the current terminology: (i) any non-noetic intuitions, like mystical insights 
which instead of  being called illuminations will now be termed "hyper-noetic visions", (ii) 
any  noetic  intuitions  other than  illuminative  intuition that  are  attained  through divine 
intervention.  Such  intuitions  will  be  termed  enlightenment  rather  than  illuminative 
intuitions. Examples of  both types of  excluded intuition will be given subsequently in this 
section. 
Historically  this  strictly  defined  form  of illuminative  intellectual  intuition,  which 
functions to transcend experience (in sensu stricto) first  emerged in the "secret doctrine" 
of Plato.  To  speak  at  a  very  general  level,  it  then  only  fully  re-appeared.  with  any 
significant  role,  in  Philo  of Alexandria  and  subsequently  with  the  Neo-Platonism  of 
Plotinus  and  Porphyry.  Although,  as  will  be  explained,  in  Neo-Platonism.  at  least.  this 169 
role did not constitute the absolutely highest level of  cognition as it had done in Plato. As 
we already discovered, the Neo-Platonists' posited a non-intellective intuition, or hyper-
noetic  vision,  as  the  culminating  epistemological  stage.  In  the  subsequent  historical 
period,  illuminative  apriorism  had  a  long  and  distinguished  existence  in  Muslim  and 
Christian Platonism, where again it  was important, but often subordinate to  theological 
revelation.  In this regard, versions of  the theory were defended, in the medieval period, 
by  important  philosophers  and  theologians  like  Augustine,  Avincenna,  William  of 
Auvergne,  Bonaventure  and  Henry of Ghent.  This  represented  the  golden age  of the 
theory. 
However,  the  growing  influence  of Aristotle  in  the  Medieval  Universities  came  to 
supplant the Platonic legacy (which for Christians had been mediated through Augustine). 
The illuminative theory of transcendent apriorism then fell  into  neglect  until  it  was re-
discovered by Malebranche. Joseph Owens,  in his article Faith,  Ideas,  Illumination and 
Experience,  observes that "the doctrine of divine  illumination becoming attenuated and 
finally  disappearing for centuries till the seeing of "all things in God" was revitalised by 
Malebranche"  .33  With the  demise  of Malebranche  the  illuminative  tradition seemed  to 
have  reached  its  terminus;  with  all  other  important  philosophers  in  the  transcendent 
apriorist  tradition  adopting  a  ratiocinative  rather  than  an  illuminative  version  of the 
theory.  However,  the  modem  philosopher  Henri  Bergson  seems  to  defend  a  hybrid 
version of  it - but this is controversial. 
Before moving to consider the specifics of  this doctrine, it is necessary to confirm, at 
a very general level that, according to this interpretation the philosophers mentioned in 
this  tradition  are  not  only  apriorists  but  also  "transcendent"  apriorists.  In  Philo  of 
Alexandria it  is the highest knowledge of  God that is attained by illuminative intuition.  34 
In Plotinus the objects of  dianoia and noesis are the transcendent forms and ultimately the 
fonn  of the  Good,  otherwise  known  as  the  One.  Plotinus  definitely  defended  the 
ontological  separation of the  Forms.  Even directly countering arguments  made  by  the 
Platonic  Pannenides against  the philosophical viability of ontological separation.
35 
This 
implies the transcendence of  the knowledge-object in the onto-dualistic mode. The human 
soul  can certainly grasp this  transcendent object,  "He  will  see  an  intellect  that  sees  no 
object of  sense nor any of  these mortal things, but by its own eternity has apprehension of 
eternity.  the  entire  content of the  Intelligible".  36  Sinrilarly some  of the  most  important 
interpretations  of Judaism.  Christianity  and  Islam.  have  stressed  the  transcendence  of 170 
God. As the anthropologist Joseph Campbell observes, in The Masks of  God.  "There can 
therefore be no question, in either Jewish, Christian or Islamic orthodoxy, of  seeking God 
and finding  God either in the world or in oneself,.37 Not only does orthodoxy demand a 
transcendent  destiny  for  the  soul,  but  also  the  denigration  of the  corporeal  world  in 
comparison with the incorporeal realm of  the divine, which transcends it. 
Now for the philosophers and theologians who embraced these "revealed doctrines" it 
was natural to direct their philosophies towards the most important transcendent realm 0 f 
Being. For here lay the objects of  their veneration. Augustine set the tone for the whole 
medieval  period  when  he  associated  the  only  true  philosophy  with  the  study  of the 
intelligible world. In the post-Medieval period, the epistemology of  Malebranche is deeply 
influenced by the Augustinian model. Some modem commentators are wary of  attributing 
to Augustine the theory that the human soul can transcend experience to such an extent 
that it  can see the divine mind.  For example, Copleston calls this doctrine "ontologism" 
and denies that Augustine ever ascribed to it,  "to the present writer at any rate it  seems 
clear that Augustine is not talking either about a special mystical enlightenment or about 
an illumination which enables us to see God himself or the contents, so  to speak, of the 
divine mind".38  However it is certain to me that Malebranche interprets Augustine in this 
ontologistic  way  and,  as  we  will  discover  shortly,  adopts  this  extreme  transcendence 
theory himself. 
Finally,  according  to  Bergson,  in  The  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,  the  discursive 
intellect is confined to the realm of  appearance and only intuition can attain to the truths 
of  metaphysics, which are concerned with the "domain of  spirit". This is an onto-monistic 
version of transcendence.  The version of reality given by  appearance  is  constructed by 
those categories of mind that function to maintain the bodily organism.  The true reality, 
what  Bergson  means  by  the  "spiritual  realm"  can  only  be  grasped  by  a  form  of 
illuminative intuition. 
Now considering the specifics of  the illuminative intuition, illuminative intuition, there 
are  two  main  types.  In  the  invented  terminology  of this  thesis,  there  is  autonomous 
illuminative  intuition  and  heteronymous  illuminative  intuition.  A  passage  from 
Grosseteste is  illustrative of this division.  "pure intellects receive direct  irradiation from 
the divine  light~ generally human intellects are not directly irradiated  by  the  light  of the 
divine ideas. but by the created light of  their minds". 39  The distinction invo lves the extent 
to  which  the  intellect  can attain  to  transcendent  knowledge  by  it  own de\lces.  I  f the 171 
process  of attainment  is  open  to  the  intellect  directly  or  on  the  completion  of an 
intellectual methodology then it  is  described as  autonomous.  This  is  certainly the  case 
with the Platonic "secret doctrine". It is also the Plotinian view that, "in the souls \\lthin 
ourselves there is  true knowing;  and these attributes are  no  images or copies from  the 
Supreme, as in the sense world, but are actually those very originals in a mode peculiar to 
this sphere".  40 
If on the other hand the final intuition can only be attained by God's grace then it  is 
described  as  heteronymous.  Classic  statements  of the  heteronymous  version  occur  in 
these quotations from Augustine and Henry of  Ghent respectively: 
[Ql12] For no  creature, howsoever rational and  intellectual,  is  lighted of itself, 
but is lighted by participation of  eternal Truth".  41 
[Q113]  Man can  know pure  truth about  no  thing  by  acquiring  its  knowledge 
through purely natural means, but only by an illumination of  the divine  light~ even 
when he attains this light in his purely natural condition man does not attain it by 
purely natural means, because it freely offers itself to whom it wills.
42 
The  heteronymous  theory,  as  can  be  seen  from  [Q113],  naturally  emphasizes  the 
weakness of  the human mind, as Augustine laments, "if truth were equal to our minds,  it 
would be mutable".43  Whereas the autonomous version emphasizes the great potential of 
the self-enlightened human mind. For example, as Plotinus observes: 
[Ql14]  But  there  is  a  third  order - those  godlike  men  who,  in  their  mightier 
power, in the keenness of their sight, have a clear vision of  the splendour above 
and rise to it from among the cloud and fog of  earth and hold finnly to that other 
world, looking beyond all here, delighted in the place of  reality, their native land, 
like  a  man  returning  after  long  wanderings  to  the  pleasant  ways  of his  own 
country.  44 
[Q115] If  this is the soul, when it returns to itself, it is surely of  the nature that we 
ascribe  to  all  divine  and  eternal  Being.  Wisdom  and  true  virtue  are  godly 
possessions  which  could  not  be  found  in  something  mean  and  mortal;  their 
possessor must be  of divine nature, endowed with divine attributes by  it  kinship 
and identity of substance.  Anyone of us, therefore who  attains to  this state will 
differ little as to his soul from the gods above, and fall short of  them only in being 
embodied.
45 
Now, whether it  is of  the autonomous or heteronymous variety.  illuminative intuition 
IS  sui  generis.  It  must  conform  to  certain  strict  criteria  before  it  can  be  correctly 
identified.  Although  certain  criteria  only  logically  apply  to  either  the  autonomous  or 172 
heteronymous  variety  specifically.  Firstly,  if the  intuition  is  to  qualify  as  illuminative 
intuition  it  must  be  a  strictly  a  priori  intuition.  I  t  must  be  what  Kant  called  a pure 
intuition.
46 
There must be no  admixture of experience. It is  understood that  it  must  be 
immediate,  like  all  intuitions,  to  distinguish  it  from  the  process  of noetic-deductive 
reasoning. It must be totally unconnected with the inferential process, i.e.  it cannot be the 
re-immediation of  a deductive sequence. Non-inferentiality distinguishes it from deductive 
intuition. Most importantly of all,  however, it must be acquaintive rather than discursive 
i.e.,  it  must  be  the  grasping  of a  truth,  which  is  not  in  propositional  form.  This 
distinguishes it clearly from axiomatic intuition. It is the great mistake of  Augustine and 
some of  his successors not to make an evident distinction between axiomatic intuition and 
illuminative  intuition.  They  confuse  the  intuition  of the  primary  axioms  (which  are 
propositions) with a purely acquaintive intuition of  the noumenal. 
Certain epistemological  considerations  lead  some  philosophers  to  a  theory.  which 
requires an intuition that transcends experience, in order to grasp a primary axiom or a 
simple mathematical truth. In this way, an illuminative intuition was seen by Augustine as 
a solution to a problem raised by the slave  boy example in Plato's Meno.  How can we 
explain the slave boy's eventual understanding of  some of  the primary axioms of  geometry 
if he  had  never  previously  been  taught  them?  Now  Plato  posited  his  theory  of 
reminiscence or anamnesis to explain this phenomenon. However, this solution conflicted 
with the orthodox Christian rejection of  any theory that posited the pre-existence of the 
soul.  Hence, Augustine instead posited his  own theory of illumination.  A heteronymous 
illuminative intuition was, supposedly, required to explain knowledge of  the "multitude of 
principles  and  laws of arithmetic  and  geometry,  none of them derived  from  any  sense 
impressions".47 It is more credible, as he puts it  in one place, to account for  the kind of 
knowledge displayed by Plato's slave-boy,  in  the  Meno by  saying  that "the light  of the 
eternal reason is  present to them,  in  whatever measure they are  able  to  perceive  it.  in 
which they can see the unchanging truths; not because they once knew them and  have 
forgotten them, as Plato and others have held".48 
However,  we  are  still  dealing  here  with  an  intuition  that  functions  to  grasp 
propositional knowledge, hence it  cannot  be  illuminative  in  the  special sense and  is  still 
correctly considered as axiomatic  intuition rather than illuminative  intuition.  It is  just a 
special  case  of axiomatic  intuition  that  requires  the  intervention  of god.  In  our 
terminology, this intuition would be  a heteronymous "enlightenment" intuition.  It should 173 
therefore be kept separate from Augustine's true theory of illuminative  intuitioIL  which 
involves  the  acquaintive  intuition of the  ultimate  standards  or Forms.  This  would  be 
correctly termed a heteronymous illuminative intuition.  Althoug~ in this case. both forms 
of intuition  are  heteronymous.  However,  grasping  a  primary  axiom  or  mathematical 
equation is  fundamentally different from apprehending the absolute standard of beauty_ 
goodness etc. 
7.5.1. Philo, Plotinus and Autonomous Illuminative Intuition 
Let  us  now move  to  a  more detailed historical analysis.  It is  certain that  Philo  of 
Alexandria defended the autonomous version of the theory.  His  argument was that the 
human mind,  despite its limited nature, was created in the  image of the divine  logos or 
Reason.  The  human mind  is,  therefore,  akin to  God.  It must  consequently  share  the 
characteristics of  the divine mind to some extent. Now the divine mind knows the realities 
beyond time and space, so  the human mind must also have some capacity to know such 
truths. According to Philo, if  we are to attain to God-like knowledge we  must  learn to 
ignore the pull of  the sensible world. For when the senses awake the mind sleeps and vice 
versa.
49  The highest knowledge however cannot  be  attained  by  inferential knowledge
50 
and is only grasped by an intellectual intuition. 
5 
I 
There  is  little  dispute that Plotinus  was  a  transcendent  apriorist  in  the  illuminative 
mould.  However,  this  lack of contention can only  be  considered  the  case if the  term 
illumination is used in its loose sense. It is not the case if  we are to consider illuminative 
transcendent  apriorism  to  be  restricted  to  those  versions  of the  theory,  which  use 
illuminative intuition. In this instance, there is a great deal of  dispute. It seems that there 
is  frequently  looseness in the way the term illumination is  used in  Plotinus' scholarship. 
There  is  a  lack  of an  awareness  of the  distinction  between  intellective  and  mystical 
intuition/illumination.  We have already seen that illuminative intuition is not the ultimate 
form of knowing in  Plotinus.  There is  a hyper-noetic or mystical vision that supervenes 
upon  the  intellectual.  This  is  certainly  true,  but  it  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  a 
straightforward  dichotomy  between  discursive  intellection  and  intuitive  mystical 
experIence. 17~ 
In fact,  in order to support this dichotomy certain commentators find  it  necessary to 
reduce  Plotinus'  notion  of intellective  vision,  or  illuminative  intuitioIL  to  discursive 
internal thinking. For example, Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson states: 
[Q 116]  What Plotinus describes as Intellect's actualized vision and identifies with 
Intellect's self-thinking is  not a direct apprehension of the One,  but the thoughts 
Intellect ends up with internal to itself when trying to apprehend the One.
52 
Yet, as was the case with Plato, Plotinus posits an intellective intuitional faculty between 
discursive reasoning and the "madness" of  divine inspiration.  We  will discover later that 
Henry of Ghent similarly posits an intermediate intuition between "intelligentia" and the 
"supematurallight" which he calls, appropriately, the "middle light".53 For Plotinus, there 
is an intellectual intuition when the soul is drunk and when it is sober. 
Before discussing this in detail, it is important to clear up a related error in discussing 
Plotinus. The fact that the ultimate form of  knowing is a form of  mystical vision has led 
John Bussanich to conclude bizarrely that Plotinus was a type of  empiricist. This seems to 
militate against the categorization of Plotinus as a transcendent apriorist.  Yet,  when we 
check the  actual passage  from  Bussanich,  in  which  this  assertion  is  made,  we  find  a 
familiar confusion: 
[Ql17] We should think ofPlotinus as a 'mystical empiricist' that is, a thinker who 
is  committed to the view that ultimate reality can be grasped in itself, in mystical 
experience  that  transcends  the  duality  of subject  and  object  and  all  familiar 
cognitive  and  affective  states.  The  transformative  type  of philosophy  works 
towards an experiential goal.  54 
Again,  there  is  the  confusion of the  strict  sense  of the  term experience  used  by  the 
empiricist  and  the  loose  sense  of experience  used  in  ordinary  language.  The  mystical 
vision of Plotinus  is  certainly an experience, just as  even a priori cognition is  also  an 
experience in this loose sense. It is  something that is undergone by consciousness. it  is a 
conscious  experience.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  Plotinus'  philosophy  has 
anything to do with empiricism whatsoever.  In  tact, empiricists are naturally sceptical of 
mystic  vision precisely because it  transcends what can be  known in experience (in sensu 
stricto). Although an a priori cognition like  grasping a  deducti\'t~ sequence is  undeniahle 
an  experience  (loose  sense)  it  is  actually  defined  hy  its  rejection  0 f experience  (strict 175 
sense). It is  a non sequitur to derive a commitment to a version of empiricism from the 
fact that a particular philosophy has an "experiential goal". 
In fact,  far  from  being  an empiricist  of any type,  Plotinus  is  a  strict  transcendent 
apriorist. He rigidly excludes the intrinsic use of  the aesthetic functions from his quest for 
authentic knowledge. Consider the following quotations: 
[Ql18] It must be our care to bring over nothing whatever from sense, to allow 
nothing from that source to enter into  Intellectual-Principle:  with Intellect  pure. 
and with the summit of  Intellect, we are to see the All-Pure.55 
[Q 119] On the other hand, there is the knowledge handling the intellectual objects 
and  this  is  the  authentic  knowledge;  it  enters  the  reasoning  soul  from  the 
Intellectual-Principle and has no dealing with anything in sense.
56 
The exclusion even extends to the highest forms of sensory knowledge,  what  has  been 
called logico-sensory cognition or in Kant's terms the logical use of  the intellect: 
[Q120] If  the quester has the impression of  extension or shape or mass attaching 
to That Nature he has not been led  by  Intellectual-Principle which  is  not of the 
order to  see  such things;  the activity has been of sense  and  of the judgement 
following upon sense: only Intellectual-Principle can infonn us of  the things of its 
scope;  it  competence is  upon its  priors,  its  content, and  its  issue:  but  even its 
content is outside of  sense; and still purer, still less touched by multiplicity, are its 
priors, or rather its prior.  57 
Plotinus follows Plato rather than Parmenides in his view of  the senses as inadequate 
rather than false.  The aesthetic functions are adequate to their particular epistemological 
object-correlate,  viz.  the  sensory  world.  However,  the  objects  in  this  world  are  for 
Plotinus images, copies of  the authentic existences, viz. the intelligibles, "these attributes 
are  no  images  or copies  from  the  Supreme,  as  in  the  sense-world".
58  These  objects, 
because of  the Platonic flux argument
59
•  cannot be known in any true sense only opined, 
"Knowledge in  the reasoning  soul is  on the one side  concerned with objects of sense. 
though indeed this can scarcely be called knowledge and is better indicated as opinion or 
surface-knowing".6o Plotinus is  certainly not an idealist,  like  Pannenides. with regard to 
the sensory world. However, when Emilsson observes that. "Plotinus nonnally speaks as 
a  non-representational realist  about  the objects of sense  perception,,61  he  goes too  t~l.r. 
There may be a world out there. which corresponds to the aesthetic functions.  hut  it  is a 
subsisting world, as we saw with Plato.  to  which  Plotinus is  referring.  This world docs 176 
not,  in Plotinus' terms, have  "authentic existence"  like  the intelligibles.  For only  things 
which  are  forever  themselves,  never  changing  or  degenerating  are  entitled  to  be 
considered authentic existents, "in space they remain forever in themselves. accepting no 
change, no decay, and by that are they authentically existent".62 The sensibles themselves 
are mere images cast upon matter, "for in things of  sense the Idea (Form) is but an image 
of  the authentic, an image thrown upon Matter".  63 
However, the purpose of  this chapter is not to examine Plotinus' theory of  the senses 
but rather to investigate his use of illuminative intuition.  The first  thing to note,  in  this 
respect,  is  that direct intellectual acquaintance with the intelligible  is  introduced by  the 
traditional metaphors of the "eye of the soul" or "mental perception" that we found  in 
Plato.  Talking of the "higher" and "lower" world Plotinus states that  "perceptions here 
are Intellections of  the dimmer order, and the Intellections There are vivid perceptions".<H 
Similarly the godlike men, the philosophers, "in the keenness of their sight, have a clear 
vision of the splendour above and rise to it from among the cloud and fog of earth and 
hold firmly to that other world".  65 Of  course the parallels between sensory and intellectual 
vision are not exact because the intellectual vision is not directed toward some subsisting 
entity external to it,  "in the intellectual, the vision sees not through some medium but by 
and through itself  alone, for its object is not external: by one light it sees another. .. ".66 
Notice the obvious contrast between Plotinus' descriptions of this  "sober"  intuition 
and the mystical intuition when the soul is described as "drunk". The sober intuition is still 
described  as  a  "contact purely intellective  ,,67,  whereas  the  hyper-noetic  vision  is  non-
intellective and "sees by a kind of confusing and annulling of the intellect which abides 
within  it,,68;  for  "the  Supreme  is  not  known intellectively".  69  There  is  even  a  distinct 
tenninology that distinguishes between the noetic and hyper-noetic functions in Plotinus. 
Everything up to and including deductive intuition, including noetic deductive reasoning, 
is  episteme,  dianoia  or,  as  H.  Blumenthal  suggests,  .... nous  qualified  by  the  terms 
logizomenon or merzizon".  70  While  illuminative  intuition  is  nous or noesis  unqualified. 
The hyper-noetic vision of  the One is termed parousia: 
[Q121] The perplexity (aporia) arises especially because. our awaren~s.s (sunesis) 
of that  One is  not  by  way of reasoned  knowledge  (eplsteme)  or ot mtellectual 
perception (noesis),  as with other intelligihle  beings,  hut  hy  way  of a  presence 
(parousia) superior to knowledge.  71 177 
According to Plotinus,  this  first  form of knowing  up  to  deductive  intuition cannot 
grasp the intelligible world.  Such discursive reasoning is  completely inadequate because 
the process itself lacks any affinity with intelligible reality. The doctrine is reminiscent of 
Plato's dictum that "like is known by like". Now the intelligible is,  by its nature, \Vithout 
movement, progression and variation yet the discursive reason moves and progresses and 
vanes: 
[Q122] All our effort may well skim over every truth, and through all the verities 
in which we have part, and yet the reality escape us when we hope to a~  to 
understand: for the understanding, in  order to its affirmation, must possess itself 
of  item after item; only so does it traverse all the field:  but how can there be any 
such peregrination of  that in which there is no variety?72 
There is,  therefore, an "absence of discursiveness in the intellectual realm". 73  From this 
stems  the  requirement  that  the  intellectual  realm be  grasped  by  an  intuitional  faculty, 
which  attains  knowledge  all  at  once  and  as  a  whole.  Hence,  the  requirement  for  the 
second  form  of knowing,  illuminative  intuition,  which,  as  in  Plato,  supervenes  upon 
dialectic. 
However,  unlike  Plato,  for  Plotinus,  there is  the third stage of mystical  union that 
supervenes upon illuminative intuition.  This  is  because Plotinus thinks that the  in-itself 
rather then the noumenal can be grasped directly.  This seems to contradict an argument 
used later in this thesis (p.  192) concerning the impossibility of  a subject directly knowing 
the in-isel£  In fact,  this is  not the case.  Plotinus recognises that any grasping of the in-
itself would  require  the  unification of the  subject-consciousness  with the  object.  The 
concept of  knowledge itself assumes a distinction between knower and known and yet, as 
Plotinus observes, "the simplex cannot be thus divided into knower and known".  74  There 
could, however, be a union where the distinction between subject and object breaks down 
and  it  is  certainly  true  that  both  Plotinus75  and  Porphyry76  have  claimed  to  have 
experienced this phenomenon. Yet, this is a mystical experience rather than anything that 
comes within the bounds of  transcendent apriorism. 
It is to Plotinus' credit that he recognised that the in-itself could not be  "knOV,/fl" in the 
sense that transcendent apriorists use the term. That a wholly different type of "mystical" 
knowing  was  required  for  this  to  be  possible.  This  mystical  intuition  transcends  the 
noumenal and attains to  the in-itself by supervening upon illuminative intuition.  The soul 
"is carried out of it  rthe noumenal]  by the surge of the waye of intellect itself,.77  It  is  to 178 
be  noted  that,  for  Plotinus  illuminative  intuition  is  autonomous  whereas  mystical 
experience is heteronymous. Plotinus, unlike Augustine, thinks that the human mind can 
possess knowledge derived from its own intellective processes and intellectual intuitions 
without the intervention of God.  The human mind has illuminative  intuition when "the 
soul suddenly takes light,,78  whereas the soul experiences parousia when God brings the 
light himself to the mind "we may believe in the Presence when, like that other God on 
the call of a certain man, He comes bringing light".  79  Plotinus can have an autonomous 
theory largely because he accepts Plato's theory of  reminiscence. 
Having described all this it  is  difficult to understand how some commentators, like 
Eyjolfur Kjalar Emilsson in [Ql16, p.  174],  can deny illuminative intuition in Plotinus. 
Emilsson  states  that  the  "intellect's  actualized  vision"  is  not  to  be  identified  with 
illuminative intuition but rather with certain discursive thoughts that occur when trying to 
apprehend the One. However, as Plotinus himself makes clear, the soul has its vision in 
immediacy and only afterwards can reason upon it: 
[Q123] Yet, All the need is met by a contact purely intellective. At the moment of 
touch  there  is  no  power  whatever  to  make  affirmation;  there  is  no  leisure; 
reasoning upon the vision is for afterwards. We may know we have had the vision 
when the Soul has suddenly taken light. This light is from the Supreme.  80 
The discursive reasoning process can only take place after the vision and hence cannot, as 
Emilsson suggests, be identical with it. 
7.5.2. St. Augustine and Heteronymous Illuminative Intuition 
[Q124] The interest medieval philosophers showed in the doctrine of illumination 
is testimony  ... to Augustine's authority.8} 
Whereas Plotinus had substantial confidence in the natural power of  the human mind 
to  attain  at  least  the  ultimate  "intellectual"  knowing  unaided,  Augustine  was  more 
conscious of  the mind's weakness. The human mind, corrupted by the fall of  Adam, was 
now somewhat limited in  scope, and consequently Truth is  assessed as  being  "superior 
and  more  excellent"  than our minds82.  The  human mind  still  had  its  natural  potentiaL 
"God  hath  created  man's  mind  rational  and  intellectual,  whereby  he  may  take  in  His 
light".83  However, the eternal wisdom was beyond it  without the intervention of God to 179 
make this potential actual.  Having said this,  with the help of God (the epistemological 
counterpart of  divine grace), the human mind could grasp the Truth, "He so enlighteneth 
it of Himself: that not only those things which are displayed by the truth, but even truth 
itselfmay be perceived by the mind's eye".84 Here again we have the notion of  the "eye of 
the soul" that we found in Plotinus and Plato. However, with Augustine the interior and 
intelligible eye (oculo suo interiore atque intelligibili85) is not activated autonomously as a 
permanent interaction with the Form of  the Good or the One. Rather a divine intervention 
is required by the father of  the intelligible light (pater intelligibilis lucis). An act of  grace 
that rescues the soul from the ignorance belonging to corporeal knowledge. 
What then is the mechanism by which the intelligible eye functions? The first thing to 
remember is  that he  uses the term indifferently of axiomatic  intuition and  illuminative 
intuition respectively. The grasping of  primary axioms is described in terms of the same 
mechanism as the direct acquaintance with the archetypal forms.  Firstly, Augustine asks, 
in the Contra Academicos,  "How does the finite,  changing  human mind  attain certain 
knowledge of eternal truths,  truths which rule  and govern the mind  and so  transcend 
it?".86  His first  investigation with regard to finding  an answer to this question involves 
him in an attempt to justifY propositional knowledge of  the primary axioms of reasoning 
and  mathematics.  Much  of his  work  on  this  question  anticipates  Descartes  in  this 
respect87. 
To counter the sceptics he notes that there are several forms of  propositional knowing 
that we can be certain of These are: (i) the principle of  contradiction, "there is one world 
or it  is  not the case that there is  one world,,88;  (ii)  what Husserl89  was later to call the 
cogitationes,  "I  know that this  seems white  to me,  I  know that this  sound gives  me 
pleasure  ... ,,90;  (iii) that he can be certain of  his own existence because to doubt is to exist 
in some way, "if  you did not exist you could not be deceived in anything,,91; (iv) he can be 
certain  further  that  he  lives92;  (v)  that  he  understands93  and  finally  (vi)  of simple 
mathematical propositions94. Although many of  these arguments or equations recur in the 
Cartesian project, the explanation that Augustine gives for our knowledge of  these truths 
is  very different.  He does not say with Descartes that these truths are  grasped by  the 
autonomous light of  reason. Nor does he state with Plato that the truths are remembered 
from a  previous life  (despite a  confusing terminology that may suggest this).  No, these 
truths are grasped only because God lights the mind with knowledge. 180 
However, as D.  Furley correctly states of Augustine's epistemology,  "knowledge  is 
not just of  propositions; it is also direct acquaintance with entities that correspond to the 
Forms of  Plato ".95 The Forms of  Augustine exist not separate from the divine mind, as in 
Plato's Timaeus, but in the divine mind, "The ideas are certain archetypal Forms or stable 
and immutable essences of things, which have not themselves been formed  but  existing 
eternally and without change, are contained in the divine intelligence".96 This is where we 
move  beyond  discursive  knowing  to  the  Augustinian  version of illuminative  intuition, 
which he considers unique and which results from the interaction between the intelligible 
eye of the soul and a direct illumination from God.  The intelligible eye alone could not 
attain to the vision and is reliant on the "disposition" of  the creator to provide the light by 
which it  can see the eternal,  "According to the disposition of the Creator,  it  sees them 
[intelligible things] in a certain incorporeal light which is sui generis, just as the corporeal 
eye sees adjacent objects in the corporeal light". 97 
It is important to realize that despite similarities between the role of  God in Augustine 
and  the  Form of the  Good in  Plato,  there is  an important distinction to  be  made.  The 
Form of  the Good, in certain metaphors in the Republic, illuminates the intelligible world 
so  that  the  eye  of the  soul can see  the Forms.  Yet,  even if we  take these  metaphors 
seriously the point is that the whole process of  knowing the eternal, in Plato, is open to 
the  autonomous  intellect.  The  Good  cannot  just  withdraw  its  light.  However,  m 
Augustine  the  knowing  of the  eternal  depends  on a  free  act  of God's  grace.  It  IS 
interesting to note that this epistemological heteronomy is mirrored in Augustine's notion 
of ethics.  Here a human being, because of original sin,  cannot attain true virtue without 
the  intervention  of divine  grace.  Consider  only  Augustine's  vehement  opposition  to 
Pelagius
98 who saw an important role for autonomous volition in human salvation. 
However. returning to epistemology, there is certainly something the mind can do  to 
put itself in a position to receive illumination. The first  stage is to direct our minds away 
from the temporal things revealed by the senses. The senses are useful in their own way 
and  true  in  so  far  as  sensation does not  form the basis of  judgements.  The  objects of 
sensation, the mutable and corporeal things are also not to be despised and are requisite 
for practical life, without them "life does not go on".  99  However the mind must reject the 
senses and tum away from the world they reveal if we are to grasp the important things. 
Even  rational  cognition  of the  temporal  world  revealed  to  the  senses  (immanent 181 
apriorism)  must  be  rejected as  mere knowledge rather than true wisdom.  All  attention 
must be directed on the eternal things, which are of  primary importance: 
[Q125]  If this  is  the  correct  distinction between wisdom  and  knowledge,  that 
intellectual  cognition of eternal  things  should  pertain to  wisdom,  but  rational 
cognition of  temporal things to knowledge, then it is not hard to judge which is to 
be ranked above and which below. 100 
The epistemological ascent to illuminative intuition in Augustine requires a contemplative 
inwardness. A direction of  the mind away from the external temporal world to an inward 
contemplation  of that  which  is  eternal.  In  this  state,  which  closely  resembles  the 
predicament of  the Cartesian meditator, the eternal truths are attainable. but only through 
divine  intervention,  "Concerning  universals  of which  we  have  knowledge,  we  do  not 
listen to  anyone  speaking and making  sounds outside ourselves.  We  listen to  the truth 
within  us  which  presides  over  our  minds ... Our  real  teacher  is  Christ". 101  It  was 
Augustine's  influence  that  kept  the  illuminative  theory of transcendent  apriorism alive 
throughout the medieval period. 
7.5.3 Influxum Hyperphysicum
102 in Malebranche 
There is no  better way to see the confusions, that result from a careless approach to the 
differentiation of types of noetic function,  than to read much of the commentary on the 
works of Nicolas Malebranche.  The most  quoted line  in  such commentary,  "que  nous 
voyons  toutes choses  en Dieu"  103  is  often depicted  as  an  example  of the  doctrine  of 
illumination.  This was certainly a suggestion made by Joseph Owens, as  quoted earlier. 
However. this is a mistake. It is important to make a distinction between "illuminations" 
that  facilitate  axiomatic  and  deductive  intuitions  and  those  that  facilitate  illuminative 
intuition.  Malebranche's  famous  quote  is  concerned  with  the  former  and  is  therefore 
reliant  upon  divine  enlightenment  rather than  divine  illumination.  Malebranche's  quote 
relates  entirely  to  propositional  knowledge  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  direct 
acquaintance knowing of  the noumenal. 
That  God  helped  enlighten  the  mind  of  the  prunary  axIOms  and  concepts 
(Malebranche used the vague term "ideas" to cover both) is an important development in 
the history of ratiocinative transcendent apriorism.  It  has its origin in Augustine and \\ a~ 182 
further  developed by  Malebranche as  an alternative to Descartes theory that  ideas are 
implanted  in  our  souls  by  nature.  Although  Malebranche  was  a  great  admirer  of 
Descartes,  "in  thirty  years  Descartes  discovered  more  truths  than  all  other 
philosophers,,104 he nevertheless thought that there was a fault in the foundations of the 
Cartesian epistemology: "this great philosopher has not at all probed to the bottom of  the 
nature of ideas".105  It was this  epistemological weakness  that  led  Malebranche  to  re-
invent  Augustine's  theory of divine  enlightenment.  Instead of the  Cartesian notion of 
autonomous axiomatic intuition, Malebranche substitutes a heteronymous alternative that 
relies  on  the  divine  will  to  intervene.  This  is  a  very  extreme  theory,  a  type  of 
occasionalism applied to epistemology, 
[Q126] Thus, the mind can see God's works in Him, provided that God wills to 
reveal to it what in him represent them. 106 
[Q127] This view places created minds in a position of complete dependence on 
God - the most complete there can be . For on this view, not only could we see 
nothing but what He will that we see, but we could see nothing but what he makes 
us see. 107 
However,  all  this  has  nothing  to  do  with the  illuminative  tradition of illuminative 
intuition that we are discussing in this section. In this aspect of  Malebranche's philosophy, 
there is no direct acquaintive knowing of  the noumenal, i.e.  illumination. Instead, there is 
just an intuitive knowing, of propositions and equations,  which is  dependent on divine 
intervention, i.e. enlightenment. It is a part of  the tradition of  divine enlightenment rather 
than of divine illumination. In fact,  according to Malebranche, far  from seeing all things 
by  divine  illumination we can only see one thing  in  this  way.  The  one epistemological 
object-correlate of illuminative  intuition in  Malebranche  is  God and  God alone.  "Only 
God do we perceive by a direct and immediate perception".108 By perception, of course, 
Malebranche means intellectual perception; he is not of  course suggesting that we can see 
God  with  the  senses.  C.  1.  McCracken is  therefore  correct to  refer to  Malebranche's 
theory as a "doctrine of  a direct acquaintance with or perception of  God". 109 
The  reason  that  we  must  have  illuminative  intuition  of God  is  defended  by 
Malebranche with the following argument: Finite minds know the nature of God.  Yet. to 
know God,  through discursive  reasoning,  a  finite  mind  would  have  to  have  an  idea or 
representation of the infinite.  This idea of the infinite being different  from God (it  is the 
idea through which the mind grasps God) must  be  an individual created being.  Yet  ho\\ 183 
could such a limited created being give us knowledge of  universal uncreated being. It is 
not  therefore  reasonable  to  think that  God is  known indirectly through ideas.  Hence. 
there must be a direct way of  knowing God: 
[Q128]  We  cannot conceive how a created thing can represent the infinite.  how 
being that is without restriction, immense and universaL can be perceived through 
an idea, we are forced to conclude that we know God through himself 1  \0 
The great advantage of  this theory, according to Malebranche, was that it avoided the 
famous  Cartesian circle  argument.  Some  commentators have  suggested that  Descartes 
found  a solution to this particular counter-argument within his  own frame  of reference. 
The arguments surrounding this theory are considered later.  However. even today there 
are  commentators who  think that the  circle  argument  is  a  refutation of the  Cartesian 
epistemology. The argument starts from the fact that Descartes provides a demonstrative 
proof of God's  existence.  He  then  uses  God  to  guarantee  the  ultimate  validity  of 
demonstration.  This argument is  clearly circular.  Malebranche by making knowledge of 
God's nature purely acquaintive avoids the problem of  circularity. We can know that God 
is not a deceiver intuitively and demonstration is therefore justified in a non-circular way, 
"It  is  necessary to  know by  simple  perception and  not  by  inference  that  God is  not  a 
deceiver,  because  reasoning  can  always  be  mistaken  if we  assume  God  to  be  a 
d  .  ,,111  ecelver  . 
7.5.4. Henry Bergson and Spiritual Auscultation 
Rather than the illuminative type of  transcendent apriorism it was the ratiocinative version 
of transcendent apriorism that Bergson rejected.  In fact,  Bergson's whole philosophical 
project seems to have begun with a critical analysis of  the Eleatic version of ratiocinative 
transcendent apriorism. As Leszek Kolakowski observes,  "Bergson's early philosophical 
development was occasioned by his attempt to understand properly what was wrong with 
Zeno's paradoxes". 112  The paradoxes, according to  Bergson in  his  Essay.  arise  because 
we  impose an abstract notion of time that involves infinite di'v'isibility (properly a spatial 
concept) and quantifiability onto our real experience of  time (duree). Our real experience 
of time.  gained  in  an  attitude  of disinterested  contemplation.  is  of something  that  is 
revealed  to  consciousness as  non-divisible  and  qualitative.  It is  this  sense  in  which  the 184 
Eleatic project is  wrong.  Our abstractive discursive intelligence,  according to  Bergson. 
has its proper function. It is our evolutionary inheritance and it allows us to deaL  interact 
with and manipulate the material world. 
[Q129] What is intelligence? The human way of  thinking. It has been given to us 
as instinct to a bee, to direct our conduct. Since nature designed us to use and to 
master matter,  intelligence  develops easily only in  space and  feels  itself at ease 
only  in  the  unorganized  world.  It  directs  itself  from  the  outset  towards 
manufacturing, it reveals itself in  an activity that anticipated the mechanical arts 
and in a language that announced science.
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However, when this sort of  thinking is introduced into metaphysics, errors inevitably 
arise.  It misrepresents our actual experience.  For one thing our experience is  particular 
whereas abstract discursive intelligence can only tell us of that which is general, of what 
things  have  in  common  with  other  things  rather  than  what  makes  them  unique. 
"Analysis .. .is an operation which reduces the object to elements that are known and that 
the  object has  in  common with others".  114  This  is  also  a fault  of our language,  which 
underlies such abstract thinking, and can only express things by unnaturally arresting the 
flux of  experience, "language cannot grasp it without immobilizing its mobility". 115 
If we  are  not  to  be  locked  into  pessimistic  scepticism here,  then  we  can  see  the 
pressure to develop a non-propositional understanding of reality.  This  is  certainly what 
Bergson does and he  founds  his  metaphysics  upon a  particular form of intuition.  This 
intuition is  described as "a sympathy whereby one carries oneself into the interior of an 
object to coincide with what is unique and therefore inexpressible in it.
116 Intuition is non-
utilitarian and can therefore give us insight into how the world really is.  However, what 
does  Bergson  mean  when  he  says  that  our  real  experience  can  only  be  described 
intuitively? It is certain to me that when Bergson talks of  experience he is not referring to 
empirical  experience  but  rather  that  loose  sense  of experience  which  would  include 
mystical,  aesthetic or indeed a priori experience.  This point  has  already  been discussed 
and  it  was  suggested  there  that  Bergson himself seems  confused.  He  makes  a  similar 
mistake  to  Emilsson who  termed  Plotinus a  "mystical empiricist".  Bergson also  makes 
strange use of  the term empiricism. This is because he appears to make the old blunder of 
confusing,  what  has  been  termed  elsewhere.  experience  (strict  sense).  and  experience 
(loose sense). Consider the following passage: [~l~O] ~ut what true  e~pir!cism aims at is  to  follow as closely as  possible the 
ongmal Itself, to deepen Its life and, by a kind of  'spiritual auscultation' to feel its 
soul pulsate, and this true empiricism is true metaphysics. J 17 
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It  is  difficult  to  imagine,  personally,  too  many  empiricists  being  happy  with  a 
metaphysics based on an intuition that is compared to a "spiritual auscultation" one that 
seeks to feel a pUlsating soul.  In fact, the language would immediately suggest mystical 
rather than empirical intuition. Certainly, in Bergson's later work. he refers to mysticism 
as the universal religion.  Incidentally,  such experience has  often been approached in  an 
extremely  sceptical  manner  by  most  empiricists.  However  there  are  problems  here. 
Firstly,  there  is  the  paradoxical  phrase  in  [QI30,  p.  184]  "true  empiricism  is  true 
metaphysics". Now certainly it has been a perennial critique of  empiricism by rationalists 
that empiricism itself is  nothing but a metaphysical position.  However, many empiricists 
would take issue with the whole project of metaphysics.  Consider also  [Q Ill. p.  168]. 
which contrasts "science and mechanical art"  which are associated with intelligence,  i.e. 
discursive reason and "the metaphysics that appeals to intuition". 
Secondly, if we are  talking  about a  mystical  insight  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  such 
insights together forming  what  could be  described  as  metaphysics.  In fact.  Bergson is 
trying  to  establish  not  an  empirical  intuition,  nor  a  mystical  intuition.  but  a  noetic 
intuition,  i.e.  illuminative  intuition.  Although Bergson sometimes  criticises our "inborn 
Platonism" he would not have objected to what has been called Plato's "secret doctrine". 
He  is  trying to establish metaphysical truth both about the world and, more importantly 
for  transcendent apriorism,  about the immortal soul and  God.  In fact,  his  project only 
makes sense if  we see him in the tradition of  Plato, Plotinus, Augustine and Malebranche. 
His  intuition is  not qualified  by the term intellectual because,  for  Bergson,  the  term is 
always associated with discursive abstract reason. 
7.6. Further Confusions in Kant and Ayer 
To conclude this section let us consider some more examples of how the blurring of the 
distinctions. made in this section, has caused confusion and hov,:  a more exact treatment 
helps us assess the doctrine correctly. It is obvious now that Kant  is wrong to categorize 
Plato's theory of reminiscence with Malebranche's notion of the intuition of Divinity.  In 186 
the  Letter  to  Marcus  Hertz  Kant  groups together types  of intuition  under  the  general 
heading influxum hyperphysicum,  "Plato assumed a previous intuition of Divinity as the 
primary  source  of the  pure  concepts  of the  understanding  and  of fIrst  principles. 
Mallebranche (sic) believed in a still effective eternal intuition of  this Primary Being".118 
Yet, as we have seen, there is a great difference between the direct grasp of  the noumenal 
by the illuminative intuition (Malebranche's intellectual intuition) and what I have termed 
enlightenment intuition of concepts, axioms and principles.  The latter may reveal certain 
notions with respect to the nature of  the noumenal. However, they are obviously distinct 
from  an immediate acquaintive  cognition with it.  Kant mistakenly thinks  that  both are 
examples of the  posited intellectual intuition of the  noumenal,  which  he  denies  in  the 
Inaugural  Dissertation,  "No  intuition  of things  intellectual  but  only  a  symbolic 
[  discursive] knowledge of  them is given to man". 119 
Yet, in our section on Plato we saw that the theory of reminiscence was part of the 
ratiocinative (i.e. discursive) stage in Plato's epistemology, as opposed to the illuminative 
secret  doctrine.  We  saw  also  in  chapter  2  that  the  intuition  of "pure  concepts  and 
principles"  is  intimately bound up with discursive knowledge.  Remember it  was Mure's 
criticism of  Kant [QI00, p.  160] that he had not considered the important role of  intuition 
in the discursive process. This certainly may be true, because Kant does not always seem 
to  correctly  distinguish  between  enlightenment  intuition,  which  is  propositional,  and 
illuminative  intuition  that  is  acquaintive.  At  least  Kant's  criticism  of illuminative 
transcendent  apriorism makes  sense  when he  takes  the  type  of intuition discussed  by 
Malebranche as his model. However, the criticism relies heavily on an acceptance of  the 
Kantian epistemology as a whole. 
Ayer is  similarly confused.  We  saw in  [A7,  p.  252]  that metaphysical rationalism is 
described as positing a "purely intellectual intuition" whose object is  the "supra-sensible 
world". This sounds like a clear reference to illuminative intuition. However, Ayer almost 
immediately moves to  talking  about how such a rationalist intuition has the  function of 
validating  propositions.  This  role  however  has  nothing  to  do  with  an  intuition of the 
noumenal (acquaintance type), which is separate from discursive knowing. Instead, it  has 
everything  to  do  with the  grasping of propositions and  concepts that  mayor may  not 
apply to the noumenal.  In fact,  Ayer,  in his criticism of transcendent apriorisrn, does not 
even consider the  illuminative variety.  For him there seems to  be  no  middle  ground (or 
"middle  light"  in  Henry of Ghent's terminology)  between the  ratiocinative  philosopher. 187 
who  uses discursive reasoning,  and the  mystic  who  uses hyper-noetic  vision.  He  only 
considers  the  actual  distinction  between the two  to  be  irrelevant.  "As  far  as  we  are 
concerned,  the  distinction  between  the  kind  of metaphysics  that  is  produced  by  a 
philosopher  who  has  been  duped  by  grammar,  and  the  kind  that  is  produced  by  a 
mystic .. .is of  no great importance"  .120 
However,  Ayer  does  cover  himself,  perhaps  unintentionally,  by  saymg  that  his 
arguments  work against  any form of intuitional knowing that  claims  to  be  synthetic. 
Being  a  solid  "justification"  empiricist  he  does not even deny that  knowledge  can be 
attained by any such variety of intuition, "We do not in any way deny that a synthetic 
truth may be discovered by purely intuitive methods as well as by the rational method of 
induction".121  Ayer is interested not in the origination but in the justification of  knowledge 
claims.  His response to the transcendent apriorist who uses illuminative intuition would 
probably be the same as his response to the mystic,  "We do not deny a priori that the 
mystic is able to discover truth by his own special methods. We wait to hear what are the 
propositions which embody his discoveries, in order to see whether they are verified or 
confuted by our empirical observations".  122  Yet, as Desmonde Clarke correctly observes, 
"An  intuitus  is  not  a  judgement".123  Remember,  in  Plato's  secret  doctrine,  the 
propositional form is often just considered inadequate to convey the intuition. Unlike the 
mystics' vision, which Ayer mentions and fails to distinguish, illuminative intuition is not 
ineffable.  It  can  be  expressed  only just not  in  propositional  form;  for  this  particular 
medium would distort its meaning. This important point will be developed further in the 
conclusion to this thesis. 
Finally, we have seen that many of  the transcendent apriorist philosophers, subsequent 
to  Parmenides,  attempted to extend the frontiers  of their knowledge of the noumenal 
through  illuminative  intuitions.  The  illuminative  tradition  of transcendent  apriorism 
extended up to and, if  our interpretation of  Bergson is correct, beyond the great revival of 
a purely discursive rationalism.  Descartes, Leibniz,  Spinoza and Kant (in the Inaugural 
Dissertation)  rejected all  aspects of illuminative transcendent apriorism in  favour of its 
ratiocinative counter-part. That this is the case is admittedly not uncontroversial. Howard 
Caygil,  for  instance. observes.  "Descartes and Spinoza lean towards a Platonic view of 
intuitive  knowledge which prefers the immediate knowledge of the intelligible  realm to 
the mediated knowledge of  the senses". 124 However. I hope to prove. in opposition to this 
view.  that the philosophers considered had an absolute commitment to  the ratiocinative 188 
version and  were  not  tempted to  import any instances of illuminative  intuition.  In  this 
respect their work marks a return to purity ofParmenides' deductive method. 189 
CHAPTER 8 
THE NOUMENAL WORLD 
8.1. Terminological Subversion 
In transcendent apriorism the Truly Real is identical with the noumenal world. So far 
two definitions of  what is meant by "noumenal world" have been given. In Def 1 (p. 82) it 
was legitimately defined as the "undistorted being-for-consciousness of  the in-itself'. This 
is the correct (strict) definition explicated in this section. However, in the majority of  this 
paper,  so  far,  there has been an acceptance of a much looser definition,  that was only 
adequate for epistemological differentiation. This loose definition was based upon Kant's 
"negative" sense of  the term noumenal as presented in the Critique. To remind the reader 
I will quote it again here, "ifby 'noumenon' we mean a thing so far as it is not an object of 
our sensible intuition, and so abstract from our mode of  intuiting it, this is a noumenon in 
the negative sense of  the term".  1 It is important to deepen the definitional analysis beyond 
this  Kantian template.  In order to  do  this  it  is  necessary to  subvert  and  redefine  the 
currently existing terminology that is relevant to the question of  the noumenal world. The 
existing epistemologies were again found to be loose and riddled with confusions. 
The  true meaning,  within transcendent  apriorism,  of the  following  terms:  in-itself, 
noumenal (world), appearance, illusion, phenomenal (world) and representation will now 
be  considered.  In the new definition,  the distinction made between the in-itself and  its 
contraries,  viz.  representation  and  appearance,  is  of a  separate  nature  to  that  made 
between either the noumenal and phenomenal, or the transcendent and immanent.  The 
terminological subversion is  intended to capture this distinction in  meaning and  fix it  at 
the level of language. This is  important because the non-recognition of  the distinction is 
the source of  much modern epistemological confusion in this area of  research. 190 
8.1.1. Appearance, Representation and the In-Itself 
Firstly,  let  us  consider the trilogy of related terms viz.  "in-itself',  "representation"  and 
"appearance". These terms are strictly used, in this thesis, only to indicate whether or not 
there is  a relation between a specific object and a subject consciousness.  If x has some 
relation to a subject-consciousness p of  any type (including a subject-consciousness that 
does not recognise itself as a subject) then x is  an appearance or representation to  that 
subject  p.  In contrast, if x  is  out with  the  parameters of any  possible  experiencing, 
including  noetic  experience  of subject  p,  then  x  is  in-itself.  Note  carefully  that  the 
definitions  given of representation or appearances  are,  in  epistemological  terms,  non-
pejorative. From the proposition that x has a relation with, or is filtered through a subject 
consciousness p there is no necessary inference that p in some way distorts x and makes it 
unreal or illusory.  Yet this is  an inference made by many Kantian philosophers in  their 
criticism of  transcendent apriorism. 
Consider,  in  this  respect,  the following  passages about representation from  Arthur 
Schopenbauer's The World as Will and Representation: 
[Q 131]  What  is  knowledge? It  is  above  all  else  and  essentially  representation. 
What  is  representation?  A  very  complicated  physiological  occurrence  in  an 
animal's brain, whose result is the consciousness of  a picture or image at that very 
spot. Obviously the relation of  such a picture to something entirely different from 
the animal in whose brain it exists can only be a very indirect one. This is perhaps 
the simplest and most intelligible way of  disclosing the deep gulf  between the ideal 
and the real. 
2 
[Q132]  The  world  is  my representation:  this  is  a  truth valid  with reference  to 
every living  and knowing being, although man alone can bring it  into reflective, 
abstract consciousness. Ifhe really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned 
upon him,  It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun 
and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth  ... 
3 
[Q133] Because our knowledge consists only in the framing of  representations by 
means  of subjective  forms,  such knowledge always  furnishes  mere  phenomena, 
not the being-in-itself  ofthings:~ 
The dangerous word in [Q13l] is "obviously". The way in which something "appears to" 
or is  "represented"  to  consciousness  is  not  necessarily a  distortion i.e.  something  that 
creates  a  gap  between the  ideal  and  the  real.  For instance  it  would  be  meaningful  to 
suggest  that  the  manner  in  which  things  appear  to  us  (their  mode  of appearance)  is 
actually  the  only true reality.  This  was the  position,  as  we  have  discovered,  of certain 191 
imrnanentist  epistemological  theories  like  descriptive  and  existential  phenomenology. 
These epistemologies, as we have already demonstrated totally rejected the notion of  an 
in-itself  Yet  there  in not,  with them,  any  sense  of a reduction of the  world  to  some 
subjective phantasm.  A consequence that for  Schopenhauer would inevitably follow  on 
such a rejection: 
[Q134]  Yet  the  perceived  object  must  be  something  in-itself,  and  not  merely 
something for others; for otherwise it would be positively only representation and 
we  should have  an absolute  idealism that in the  end would  become theoretical 
egoism,  in  which  all  reality  disappears,  and  the  world  becomes  a  subjective 
phantasm. 
5 
In  contrast  to  Schopenhauer  appearances  or  representations,  for  the  immanentist 
epistemologists, are identical with the True Reality.  The phrase "only representation"  in 
[QI34] would make no sense to them. For them, as in transcendent apriorism, the terms 
representation and appearance are epistemologically value neutral. 
A  further  argument  is  that  to  creatures  with  a  different  perceptual  or  cognitive 
apparatus  and  to  some  aspects  of our  own  perceptual  or  cognitive  apparatus,  the 
appearances  might  be  different  and  hence  illusory.  Yet  one  very  specific  use  of our 
consciousness  gives  us  transparent  access  to  the  world  as  it  is  independently  of our 
consciousness.  This  would  be  the  transcendent  apriorist's  contention.  Hence, 
Schopenhauer is wrong to infer that because a representation of  x, i.e. Rx, is of  a different 
nature from x itself (Rx being in relation to consciousness rather than something in-itself) 
then  Rx must  always  misrepresent  x.  As  [Q133,  p.  190]  makes  clear,  Rx  instead  of 
grasping "the being-in-itself of  things" furnishes the mind with "mere phenomena".  Why 
should this be  so? Surely a further argument is required to establish that the very fact of 
relation necessarily entails misrepresentation. 
Indeed, if  there is  such a distortion of x then we  are dealing with a special type of 
appearance  or representation,  viz.  what  will  be  designated  a  "seeming".  This  type  of 
appearance would only occur if  both the following  conditions were fulfilled:  (i)  x were 
filtered  through  a  subject-consciousness  p  (the  only  required  qualification  for  its 
designation as an appearance) and (ii) that the constitution of  the subject-consciousness p 
in some way distorted x.  From this point on, this second condition will be designated the 
distortion qualification.  The  notion of appearance or representation.  in  contrast  with  a 192 
seemmg,  does  not  necessarily  possess  a  distortion  qualification  and  is  therefore  non-
identical and not even necessarily connected with the concept of  illusion. 
To be  consistent with the above, the designation (being-, thing-)  "in-itself"  needs to 
be  re-defined.  Normally  (although  not  always)  the  tenn is  used  by  philosophers  as 
interchangeable with the phrase "the noumenal world". However, in this thesis, it is to be 
given  a  unique  designation  and  indicates  only that which exists  independently  0 f any 
possible  relation  with  any  subject-consciousness.  This  definition  has  an  important 
consequence, viz. that the in-itself, thing-in-itself or being-in-itself is, unlike the noumenal 
as we shall soon discover, absolutely unknowable - by definition. The demonstration is as 
follows:  (i)  x  if it  is  a  thing-in-itself must  remain  unrelated  to  any  type  of subject 
consciousness p.  (ii) if  x is knowable it is related to a subject consciousness p in respect 
of being  known  by  p.  Hence  (iii)  if x  is  a  thing-in-itself  then  x  is  unknowable. 
Schopenhauer grasped the force of  this argument when he observed that "being-known of 
itself contradicts  being-in-itself',.6  However,  he  makes  the  mistake  of thinking  that 
because the in-itself cannot be known directly transcendent apriorism is impossible. 
It may seem that this contradicts what was said about Schopenhauer on p.  68. There 
it was said that he legitimized a special method, viz. an introspective intuition, by which 
consciousness could grasp the in-itself However, this would require a special non-noetic 
intuition that could unite that which knows with that which is known. In Schopenhauer's 
case the knower, in this special case, just is the known. Plotinus similarly posits a special 
"hyper-noetic" intuition that involves a union of  knower and known. This again is because 
noetic intuitions cannot perfonn this feat, so direct intuition of  the in-itself is denied them. 
In  an  essay  entitled  "On  the  Antithesis  of Thing  in  Itself  and  Appearance" 
Schopenhauer makes a seemingly pertinent criticism viz.,  "Every dogmatic transcendent 
philosophy  is  an  attempt  to  construe  the  thing-in-itself  according  to  the  laws  of 
appearance". 
7  Schopenhauer's  proposition  could  be  interpreted  in  different  ways 
depending on the meaning of  the phrase "laws of  appearance". The apparent strength of 
the  statement  relies  on this  ambiguity.  If by  appearance  Schopenhauer  really  means 
seeming, then it  can simply be said that it is  the transcendent apriorist's belief that there 
are aspects of consciousness which are undistorting with regard to the representation of 
the thing-in-itself. It may be that he is wrong and, in fact. human consciousness is trapped 
in  the  world of seeming.  However, to prove this would require a further  argument and 
does  not  follow  from  Schopenhauer's  belief  that  the  world  is  representation.  For 193 
representations, as we have seen, are neutral as to truth value and,  unlike  seemings, are 
not necessarily distorting in the special sense required here. 
Alternatively, if  Schopenhauer is using the term appearance in the sense attributed to 
it above, then he is misinterpreting the transcendent apriorist's position. The transcendent 
apriorist confronted with Schopenhauer's proposition, in  this sense, would totally agree 
with it.  He would probably ask the further question, viz. is this meant to be a criticism of 
my  position when you seem just to be re-stating it? The transcendent apriorist actually 
maintains that the world as it is in relation to a specific aspect of  consciousness, namely 
the  noetic,  is  just  identical  with  the  in-itself;  that  noetic  consciousness  directly 
corresponds to  the  actuality of the thing-in-itself  In the  Inaugural Dissertation.  Kant 
affirms this important connection, "intellectual concepts are representations of things as 
they are". 
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Now the noetic consciousness is a relation between consciousness and the object of 
consciousness. It is therefore an appearance. However, for the transcendent apriorist, it is 
not  a  seeming.  The transcendent  apriorist  does  not  embark  on the  impossible  task of 
directly  knowing  the  in-itself  He  merely  identifies  the  in-itself  with  his  noetic 
representations or appearances.  In fact,  as  will  become clear, the transcendent apriorist 
does not aspire to knowledge of the in-itself but rather of the noumenal world.  He just 
assumes,  perhaps  mistakenly  that  this  noumenal  world  is  identical  with  the  in-itself. 
Solomon identifies this underlying assumption when he observes: 
[Q135]  "How  can  we  know  whether  our  ideas  of what  the  world  is  like 
correspond to what the world is really like"? Underlying this question was a host 
of assumptions concerning the nature of  human understanding, most importantly, 
that our ideas if  correct, conform to the real objects to which they correspond. 
9 
According  to  Hegel,  it  was  a  fundamental  unlegitimized  Kantian  assumption  that, 
even though our ideas may be logically correct, because they are representations, there is 
an  unbridgeable gap between them and the in-itself Schopenhauer had argued that this 
putative assumption was Kant's great contribution to  epistemology,  "The real side must 
be  something toto genere different  from the world as representation, namely that  which 
things are in  themselves; and  it  is  this complete diversity between the ideal and  the real 
that Kant has demonstrated most thoroughly". 10 19.f 
In contrast, Hegel saw it as a backward step. The Kantian epistemology just accepts 
this un-argued for view because, according to Hegel, it takes too seriously the metaphor 
of  knowledge as a tool or medium. If  there is a medium or tool that attempts to grasp the 
in-itself,  must not this tool/medium distort what it  sets out to  know? It  is  this  fear  of 
distortion that inhibits the whole metaphysical project, "It  [the fear of error in  Kantian 
philosophy]  starts  with ideas  of knowledge  as  an  instrument,  and  as  a  medium;  and 
presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge". II  This  presuppositio~ for 
Hegel,  is  just  that  which  cannot  be  established  by  philosophy;  because  in  order  to 
establish whether the intellect is  a distorting tool or not, the only method of validation 
available to us is the intellect itself; the very intellect that we are questioning. This would 
seem to be a self-defeating project. 
As a consequence of  the impossibility of  this Kantian project, Hegel admires instead 
the fearlessness of  the transcendent apriorist metaphysical project. Its assumption that our 
noetic representation is  identical with the in-itself,  is  superior to  the  Kantian inhibiting 
fear of  error: 
[Q136] The older metaphysic [pre-Kant  ian] had in this respect a loftier conception 
of thought than that which has become current  in  more modern times.  For the 
older metaphysic  laid down as fundamental that which by thinking  is  known of 
and in things, that alone is really true ofthem  .. Thus this older metaphysic stands 
for  the view that thinking and the determination of thinking are not something 
foreign  to  the  objects of thought,  but  are  rather  of the  very  essence of those 
b·  12  o  ~ects. 
8.1.2. Phenomenal (world) versus Noumenal (world) 
[Q137]  Intelligence  is  the  faculty  of the  subject  through  which  it  is  able  to 
represent things, which cannot by their own nature come before the senses of  that 
subject. The object of sensibility is the sensible; that which contains nothing save 
what must be known through intelligence is the intelligible. The former was called, 
in the ancient school, phenomenon; the latter no umenon.13 
Let us move now to the second of  our sets of  contrary terms, viz.  noumenal (world) 
and  phenomenal  (world).  This  first  thing  to  note  is  that  the  terms  involved  do  not 
distinguish between that which is  related to a subject-consciousness p and that which  is 
not  so  related.  They  do  not  repeat  therefore  the  in-itself  versus  representation  or 195 
appearance dichotomy.  As we shall  soon discover both the  noumenal  (world)  and  the 
phenomenal  (world)  are  always  related  to  a  subject  consciousness.  They  are  both 
therefore, in the terminology established above, representations or appearances. 
Secondly,  unlike  the  in-itse1f7representation  dichotomy  the  phenomenallnoumenal 
distinction will  not be epistemologically value  neutral.  In Def l  we  established  that  the 
noumenal world is  the goal of the transcendental apriorist's quest for  knowledge.  It  is 
considered the true representation/appearance of  the in-itself This is what is meant by the 
phrase  "being-for-consciousness  of the  in-itself'  in  Defi.  The  phenomenal  world.  in 
contrast,  is  the  realm of illusion  and  falsehood.  It  is  therefore  associated  with  false 
representations of  the in-itself In the terminology established above it is a particular type 
of  representation/appearance, viz. a "seeming". 
Hamyln has suggested that the etymology of  the word phenomenon gives us a clue to 
its  meaning  in  epistemology.  In his book Metaphysics he  observes,  "the Greek phrase 
which might be thought to be appropriately translated as 'appearances' - ta phainomena -
literally means 'the things that seem'"  .14 For reasons given above I think that it  is better to 
translate ta phainomena simply as "the phenomena" rather than introducing the confusing 
term  "appearances".  However,  the  phrase  "the  things  that  seem"  correctly  connects 
phenomena with the concept of  "seeming". Unfortunately, this could still be confusing. In 
transcendent apriorism, phenomena are not actually identical with "seemings".  They are 
rather  a  particular  category  of seeming.  Indeed,  they  are  a  category  of seeming 
exclusively connected with experience (in sensu stricto) or the aesthetic functions of  the 
intellect. 
The distortion qualification above, specified a condition for when an appearance was 
classified as a seeming, viz. when the constitution of  the subject  -consciousness p in some 
way  affected  or distorted  the  object  of knowing.  For the  transcendent  apriorist  it  is 
experience (in sensu stricto) or the aesthetic function of  the intellect, which is the element 
in the constitution of  the subject consciousness that does the distorting. To put it crudel) 
the  transcendent  apriorist  would  agree  with  the  following  quotation  from  the 
Bhagavadgita: "The mind that gives itself to follow the shows of sense seeth its helm of 
f  .  h  ,,15  wisdom rent away  ... The world of  sense pours streams 0  WItc  ery  . 
From the standpoint of transcendent apriorism,  knowledge that  is  founded  upon the 
distorting aesthetic elements within consciousness (the  "shows of sense")  is  designated 
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world,  which is common in philosophical discussion, may be  confusing as  a designator. 
Although,  in certain philosophers, the phenomenal may be  an actually existing world  (I 
have  tried  to  prove  that  such  "ontological separation"  is  present  in  Plato)  this  is  not 
always  the  case.  The  phenomenal  world  for  many  transcendent  apriorists  is  just  a 
phantasm.  In this case,  the aesthetic functions do  not just lead us  into  knowledge of a 
created world inferior, for example, to the perfect world of  the Forms. In contrast, they 
lead into a world of  illusion where what seems to be, is not. Again, to be crude, we could 
compare  their  notion  of the  phenomenal  world,  with  the  veil  of Maya  in  Indian 
philosophy: 
[Q138] It is  Maya, the veil of deception, which covers the  eyes of mortals, and 
causes them to see a world of which one cannot say either that it  is or that it  is 
not; for it is like a dream, like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller from a 
distance  takes  to  be  water,  or like  the  piece  of rope  on the  ground  which  he 
regards as a snake. 16 
Note that it  is  still appropriate to talk about a phenomenal world here.  Admittedly,  the 
world is a sUbjective/intersubjective idealist's world-for-consciousness. In addition, such a 
phenomenal world is, according to the transcendental apriorist, entirely deceptive. 
The  phenomenal (world) is  in direct opposition to  the  so-called noumenal (world). 
The doctrine of transcendent apriorism postulates the identity of the Truly Real and the 
noumenal world. The phrase noumenal world within the context of  this doctrine has two 
substantial meaning components.  The first  distinguishing feature of the noumenal world 
concerns the  manner in  which it  is  known.  As  the  etymology suggests
17
,  it  is  a realm 
knowable by nous, or the pure intellect which is the subject-correlate of noesis the pure 
intellectual  processes.  Now this  is  important  because  it  means  that,  in  transcendent 
apriorism, the noumenal world, by definition, is not grasped by the aesthetic functions of 
the intellect, or by nous in combination with these aesthetic functions. 
This last clause may seem strange because, in transcendent apriorism, nous is the pure 
intellect out of  combination with the aesthetic functions.  Remember. however. that this is 
not its meaning for all philosophical uses of the term.  Of course in other doctrines,  like 
transcendent  aposteriorism,  the  noumenal  world  does  not,  by  definition.  exclude  the 
possibility of being  known by  non-noetic functions.  In  fact,  with respect  to  the  natural 
theology of philosophers like Aquinas and Duns Scotus, it  is  the aesthetic functions that 197 
are an indispensable condition of  attaining to the nownenal. The divine invisibles. among 
which Aquinas included the "eternal types" of  Augustine and Plato could be approached 
only  through  the  empirical  - the  observation  of the  visible  and  particular.  Limited 
knowledge  of the  noumenal  can be  obtained  by  "natural  reason"  which  "depends  on 
images drawn from the world of the senses and on the natural light  of our intelligence 
abstracting concepts from these images".  18 
In the case of  transcendent aposteriorism then the etymology of the word noumenal 
does not help us understand its meaning. For nous alone does not exclusively grasp the 
noumenal. In fact, some claim it can be grasped by nous plus aisthesis. This non-exclusive 
use  of noumenal  is  common  and  requires  the  transcendent  apriorist  to  observe,  in 
qualification, that his is an "apriorist" attempt to grasp the noumenal. 
The second distinguishing feature of  the noumenal concerns the nature of that which 
is known.  The noumenal world is an intelligible realm that contains the object-correlates 
of the entire noetic process, viz.  noumena.  To  emphasize the etymological connection. 
the noumenal world is that which is known by nous through the agency of noesis or the 
noetic process. This realm is  posited as existing but is  regarded as  transcendent, that  is 
located beyond the realms of  experience. 
The  fact  of knowability (being  known by  nous)  establishes  the  noumenal  world  as 
non-identical  with  the  thing-in-itself  In  the  doctrine  of transcendent  apriorism  the 
nownenal world unlike the thing-in-itself is related to a subject-consciousness p. although 
this relation is of  a very specific type.  That is to say,  the noumenal realm is a particular 
type  of appearance,  namely  one  that  is  related  to  a  subject-consciousness  p  in  a 
categorically non-distorting form.  The distorting qualification discussed earlier forms  no 
part  of that  relation.  The  implication is  that the  subject-consciousness  p can,  through 
some  specific  method  or intuition,  grasp  the  nature of the  no umena I world  in  a  form 
undistorted  by the  particular nature or constitution of p.  In transcendent  apriorism the 
noetic function of  the intellect is considered to be that which has the capacity to know the 
noumenal world in this specific manner.  How the world appears through the  use of the 
noetic  function of the  intellect, if  this noetic  function  is  used  in  the  correct  way  and  is 
functioning correctly, can be an undistorted or transparent picture of  the noumenal. 
In  contrast  the  aesthetic  functions  of the  mind  which  include  sensation.  logico-
sensitive cognition, imago-sensitive cognition and empirical introspection can grasp only 
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of the  subject-consciousness p.  The  assumption that  the  involvement  of the  aesthetic 
function of the mind at any level necessarily affects or distorts our apprehension of the 
noumenal world is  unique to transcendent apriorism.  Other doctrines that associate the 
Truly Real  with the noumenal world,  like  transcendent  aposteriorism,  assume  that  the 
logical  use  (in the previously discussed Kantian  sense)  of the  intellect  can attain to  a 
transparent link with the noumenal world. 
The second meaning component, which concerns itself with the object of  knowledge 
rather than the manner of knowing is  also  important.  The nature of this object viz.  the 
noumenal "world" is not as simple to understand, as it seems. The term "world" is given 
scare  quotes because,  as  we  shall  soon discover,  it  may  be  misleading  to  think of the 
noumenal world as exclusively a realm of transcendent entities existing separately from 
another realm of  phenomenal entities. Although this is what the term seems to suggest. In 
fact,  in  transcendent apriorism the  noumenal can be  transcendent  in  two  ways.  It can 
transcend both the phenomenal world as a distinct realm of entities, and the phenomenal 
world as a false or inadequate representation of  the noumenal. 
For the transcendent apriorist, the noumenal world is not necessarily a world that lies 
behind or beyond the more familiar world of experience. Of course, in  Plato's case, the 
noumenal  world  is  most  definitely  a  separate  realm,  ontologically  distinct  from  the 
phenomenal realm.  In the Timaeus the Demiurge creates the phenomenal world, i.e.  the 
imperfect  realm  of entities  that  we  experience  through  our  sensory  equipment,  by 
reference  to  the perfect world of the  forms  that exist  wholly  beyond  the  phenomenal. 
Therefore, this world is  only an imperfect copy of the world of the Forms.  Now this is 
certainly  a  notion of the  noumenal  world  that  is  found  within  transcendent  apriorist 
epistemology.  When Plotinus observes,  "As one wishing to contemplate the Intellectual 
Nature will lay aside all the representations of  sense and so may see what transcends the 
sense-realm,,19  he  uses  the  term  "realm"  deliberately  to  indicate  a  world  of existing 
entities.  This  doctrine  fitted  in  well  with the Christian notion of condemnation of "the 
things of  this world" and is expressed in this form by Augustine: 
[Q139] ... after many generations and many conflicts there is .strained  ~ur at  la,st..1 
should say, one system of  really true philosophy. For that philosophy IS  not ot thIS 
world  - such a  philosophy our sacred  mysteries  most justly detest  - but  of the 
other. intelligible world.
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However, it would be  false  to say that this is the only notion of  the noumenal world 
or that it is the solely legitimate notion. In fact, particularly in post-Medieval philosophy, 
the  noumenal world  is  more often just the  one  existing world  as  grasped  by  the  pure 
intellect as opposed to the world of  phenomena or appearance. The so-called phenomenal 
world  in  this  case  is  just an illusory  version of the  Truly  Real  that  results  from  the 
filtration  of  the  noumenal  through  distorting  aesthetic  elements  within  human 
consciousness.  The  noumenal  world  certainly  transcends  experience,  but  it  is  not 
consequently necessary to posit any two worlds hypothesis that erects a sharp ontological 
boundary between it and the phenomenal. 
There  is  a  sense in which,  for  some transcendent apriorists,  the  phenomenal world 
does not have any separate existence at all, at least in the sense that dream objects are not 
usually considered to possess true existence. However, a more philosophical comparison 
might  be  made  between the  existence-sense  of phenomenal  objects  and  the  existence 
sense of  Locke's secondary qualities. In the Scholastic terminology the phenomenal world 
would  possess esse  ut verum (existence in  the  sense of the  true)  but  not actus essendi 
(actual  existence).  With  this  notion  of the  noumenal  it  would  be  wrong  to  ask  the 
question  "what  is  the  relation  between the  noumenal  and  phenomenal  worlds?"  when 
taking issue with the transcendent apriorist in general.  The question would, in fact,  only 
be  relevant to the Platonist type theory of  the noumenal world.  In fact,  it  is  a question 
often directed by modem philosophers at Platonism.  Plato of  course would say that the 
phenomenal world "partakes" or "shares" in the noumenal and this may be an inadequate 
answer. 
However, the same question could not legitimately be asked for instance of Spinoza 
for  whom the  phenomenal  order  is  imaginary:  "We  have  now perceived,  that  all  the 
explanations commonly given of  nature are mere modes of  imagining, and do not indicate 
the  true nature of anything,  but only the constitution of the imagination; and.  although 
they have names,  as though they were entities, existing externally to  the  imagination,  I 
call  them entities  imaginary  rather than real".  21  There  can  be  no  relation  between  the 
"world" of  noumena and the "world" of  phenomena because in actuality there is only one 
world,  viz.  the  noumenal,  the  world  of phenomena  being  just  an  illusion.  In  both 
conceptions of  the noumenal the notion of  transcendence refers only to the transcendence 
of experience.  It does not  refer to  the notion of a realm of entities over and  above the 200 
existing realm of  entities. For as we have seen, in at least one case, this would constitute 
an illegitimate postulation. 
In conclusion, we can say that the noumenal (world) is for the transcendent apriorist 
an undistorted appearance/representation of a world beyond experience that is  identified 
with the  in-itself  It  is  a  world  in  relation to  noetic  consciousness.  which  is  seen  as 
identical with the world independent of any relation to consciousness.  There is  no  gulf 
between the Ideal and the Real. Hence it is appropriately defined, in Def l • as the being for 
noetic consciousness of  the in-itself, because, for the transcendent apriorist, the noumenal 
world is the in-itself as disclosed by the noetic consciousness. 
Before moving to consider potential errors that can result from the misunderstanding 
of the transcendent apriorist position on these matters, let us summarize the conclusions 
reached in this section in diagrammatic form: Relations that are 
epistemologically 
neutral with regard to 
distortion. 
Relations that are 
positively distorting. 
Relations that are 
completely 
undistorting. 
The noetic object as 
related, or fIltered, 
through human 
consciousness. 
Appearance. 
Representation. 
Seemings. 
Phenomenal (world). 
Noumenal (world) 
That-which-is unrelated 
to and hence unfiltered 
by human consciousness. 
Assumed identity of. 
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Let  us now return to our modem definitions.  It is  immediately obvious that  they are 
surface definitions, which miss most of  the important points. Mourelatos [AI, p. 252] is 
correct  to  say  that  the  transcendent  apriorist  makes  "projections  into  a  transcendent 
noumenal  world".  R.  C.  Solomon  [A8,  p.  253]  is  equally  correct  to  affirm  that 
transcendent apriorism is  concerned with "noumena". However, what they mean by the 
terms noumena or noumenal world is not explained. It could be that they associate these 
terms with the in-itself. Although this is unclear because of  their lack of  explanation it  is 
certainly  a  connection  often  made.  Consider  the  following  quote  from  H.  Caygill, 
"Intellectual intuition consists in a direct, intellectual knowledge of  things in themselves 
rather than as appearances in space and time".  22 
If  in their statements, what they mean by noumenal is in-itself, as strictly defined, then 
they are committing a  serious error.  For the transcendent apriorist himself recognizes 
such a projection would be an impossibility. It is accepted that the in-itself simply cannot 
be directly known - noetically at least. To indicate that a transcendent apriorist could, (i) 
make a  priori projections into the in-itself;  (ii)  have the in-itself as his  epistemological 
object, or (iii) reach it with intellectual intuition, is - as we have seen - to accuse him of  an 
unbelievably  simple  logical error which he  does not make.  Unfortunately, much actual 
analysis uses the fact that the transcendent apriorist has made such an error as a starting 
point for a putative refutation. 
Another serious potential error that can arise from the definitions is  to consider the 
noumenal, solely, as a  de facto  world existing independently of another de facto  world 
viz.  the phenomenal world. In this respect, Walsh [A2, p.  252] talks of the "intelligible 
sphere"  as  existing  "beyond"  or  "behind"  the  "commonsense  world  known  in  sense-
perception"; Macquarrie [A9, p.  253] envisages a supersensible reality as underlying the 
"empirical phenomena of  the world", and Ayer [A7, p. 252] asserts that the transcendent 
apriorist  attains  to,  "knowledge  of a  reality  transcending  the  world of science  and 
common sense". These authors certainly regard the phenomenal world as existing in actu. 
It  is considered a world that somehow the transcendent apriorist must get behind in order 
to discover the only reality he regards as Real. 
We have already mentioned that there is a strain of  transcendent apriorism that holds 
to  this  "two  worlds"  viewpoint.  However,  most  post-Medieval transcendent apriorism 
takes  a  different  form.  The  phenomenal  (world)  is  no  longer  considered  a  de  facto 
existing  "world"  that  something  else  can  exist  behind.  Rather,  the  phenomenal  is 203 
considered a total illusion. From this viewpoint therefore there is only one de facto  world 
viz.  the noumenal.  It is  wrong to associate transcendent  apriorism  with  one  particular 
tradition of  that doctrine. It is certain that attempted refutations have often been founded 
on this association. The consequence is that, even if  true, the criticism could only apply to 
a small part of  the tradition. 
8.2. Squaring the Cartesian Circle 
[Q140]  If the  Being  of the  world,  its  presence  and  the  meaning  of its  Being, 
revealed itself only in illegibility,  in a radical illegibility which would  not  be  the 
accomplice of a lost or sought after legibility,  of a page not  yet  cut from  some 
divine  encyclopaedia?  If the  world  were  not  even,  according  to  Jaspers's 
expression, "the manuscript of  another," but primarily the other of every possible 
manuscript. 
[Derrida
23
] 
In  the  last  section  we  observed  that  the  transcendent  apriorist  just  assumes  the 
identity of  the noumenal and the in-itself As  we  have demonstrated, the in-itself cannot 
be  known directly unless we posit a non-noetic intuition that unites knower and known. 
Hence,  the transcendent apriorist,  committed as she  is  to work within the  limits of the 
noetic,  must  presuppose an identity between what  his  noetic  functions  reveal,  viz.  the 
noumenal,  and that-which-is, viz. the in-itself This pre-supposition involves two further 
assumptions  viz.  (i)  that  the  in-itself is  a  logos,  and  (ii)  that  the  in-itself is  a  logos 
accessible  to our noetic functions.  Here,  by  logos,  is  meant a rational structure,  which 
corresponds to the mind's rationality. That the identity of  the noumenal and the in-itself is 
an unargued for assumption is not often understood or made explicit by those in the living 
tradition  of transcendent  apriorism  and  this,  as  I  previously  mentioned,  is  a  definite 
epistemological weakness. 
Now Descartes,  unlike  his  predecessors, is  certainly aware of the  problem.  (In  fact 
many commentators have tried to suggest that the problem of the Cartesian circle arises 
through  a  failed  attempt  to  solve  it).  In  an  article  entitled  "Descartes'  Validation  of 
Reason', Harry G.  Frankfurt observes that,  "Descartes' metaphysical doubt is  precisely a 
doubt  whether being  false  is  compatible  with  being  indubitable.  His  position  is  that  as 
long as the demon remains a possibility, we must acknowledge that what we intuit may be 204 
false".24  Similarly, Boyce Gibson thinks that the "evil genius", introduced as  a cause for 
doubt
25 
in  Meditation  I,  represents  "the  enemy  of the  principle  of reason  in  the 
universe".26 In other words the evil genius is introduced to pose the important question, 
how can we  be  certain that what  we  know indubitably with our reason  is  true of the 
universe? 
If a malicious demon was deceiving us constantly there would be  no  guarantee that 
even our clear and distinct perceptions corresponded to how the universe actually is,  in-
itself  It could  even be the  case,  as  a modem philosopher  like  Derrida suggests  as  a 
possibility,  that the universe just does not conform to our rationality in any respect.  It 
may be that Being is not, in Derrida's terms, a cryptogram to be deciphered by the logo-
centric mind.27 Whether Being is, or is not compatible with human reason is, for Derrida a 
"non-question".28 For it is a question that is never seriously posed by philosophers. whose 
point of departure is  always the assumption that Being is a logos, i.e.  that the noumenal 
transparently mirrors the in-itself 
Alan Gerwith29  and Henri Gouhier
30 have suggested that, according to Descartes, this 
gulf between the noumenal and the in-itself can only be bridged if  it  can be proved that 
there is an omnipotent God who is no deceiver. God would then act as a guarantor that 
our  clear  and  distinct  perceptions  are  true  of reality  in-itself  As  Nagel  observes, 
"Descartes' God is a personification of  the fit  between ourselves and the world for which 
we  have  no  explanation but which is  necessary for  thought to yield  knowledge".3\  The 
argument is that a beneficent God would surely not design us so that he gave us a faculty 
of reason such that when we thought we  had grasped something with absolute certainly 
we  were,  in  fact,  wholly in  error.  If we  could prove that such a God existed it  would 
certainly solve one of  the seminal problems of  a transcendent apriorist epistemology. That 
the noumenal was identical with the in-itself would no longer just be a pre-supposition of 
the system. 
However, it is immediately clear that there is a problem with this argument. How can 
we prove the existence of such a God? Surely we can only prove the existence of such a 
God  by  using our rationality.  Hence, that very mind  function whose ultimate legitimacy 
for  the exegesis of  Being is currently open to question. We cannot logically demonstrate 
that  our  clear  and  distinct  perceptions  correspond  to  reality  by  using  these  very 
perceptions (whose legitimacy  is  not proven) to  establish that  there is  a God who  is  no 
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VICIOUS.  Consider  Gassendi's  explanation  of the  problem  m  his  objections  to  the 
Meditations: 
[Q141] I note that a circular argument appears to have its beginning at this point, 
according to which you are certain that there must be a God and that he  is  not a 
deceiver on the ground that you have a clear and distinct idea of  him, and you are 
certain that a clear and distinct idea must be true on the ground that you know 
that there is a God who cannot be a deceiver.  32 
Here we have a classic statement of  what was originally designated Arnauld's circle but is 
now generally referred to as the Cartesian circle. 
Notwithstanding,  this  whole  difficulty  has  ansen  because  of  a  fundamental 
misunderstanding of some elements within the Cartesian epistemology. It is  certain that 
Descartes recognized the problem of  just assuming an identity between the noumenal and 
the  in-itself  He  did  not  naIvely  believe  he  could  solve  the  problem  by  rationally 
demonstrating the existence of  a non-deceiving God. His actual response to the problem, 
is  to suggest that the possibility of  the noumenal not corresponding to the in-itself, is so 
remote and unlikely that we can safely ignore it. According to Descartes, when we are, in 
a strict sense,  strongly convinced of something,  it  is  then futile  to  ask whether it  might 
still be false.  We cannot, at that moment, believe it to be false nor do we have any reason 
at all to suspect that it might be false. Consider the following passage in this respect: 
[Q 142] What is it to us if  someone should feign that the very thing of  whose truth 
we are so firmly persuaded appears false to the eyes of  God or of  the Angels and 
that hence, speaking absolutely, it is false? Why should we concern ourselves with 
this  absolute  falsity,  since  we by no  means  believe  in  it  or even have  the  least 
suspicion  of it?  For we  are  supposing  a  belief or a  conviction  so  strong  that 
nothing can remove it,  and this conviction is in every respect the same a perfect 
.  d  33  certItu  e. 
This  may  seem an unsatisfactory response.  Just  because  we  find  it  hard  to  believe 
something does not guarantee that it does not exist. For example, just because the atheist 
finds  it  extremely difficult  to believe that there can exist  anything corresponding to  the 
notion of  God does not necessarily imply that God does not exist.  Similarly. not to have 
any  suspicion  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  absolute  falsity  does  not  prove  that  the 
possibility of  absolute falsity does not exist.  However. at least Descartes sees the problem 
and comments upon it. which is more than can always. be said for his predecessors. 206 
In Descartes defence it  can be argued that the doubt, which remains  is  only a \en  ,  .  . 
high level epistemological doubt. Ifwe could attain to an indubitable system of  truths and 
only this problem remained it would be a major achievement. Certainly, no other system 
of knowledge  puts  before  itself such  a  rigid  epistemological  criteria  of certainty. 
Notwithstanding,  it  must  be  remembered that  the  absolute  legitimacy  of transcendent 
apriorism must always depend on providing an argument for this assumption. If the very 
act  of proving  such  an  argument  is  self-refuting  then  it  will always  remain  a  mere 
presupposition.  In  fact,  we  could  say  that  it  is  the  foundational  assumption  of any 
transcendent apriorist epistemology. 
It has been said that certain commentators are wrong in suggesting that the proof  of  a 
non-deceiving God, in Descartes, represents a solution to the problem of  absolute falsity. 
I  t  has  also  been  said  that  they  have  misunderstood  elements  within  Cartesian 
epistemology. We must now move to establish what the Cartesian epistemology is really 
about. Willis Doney has stated that, for Descartes, "Present clear and distinct perceptions 
were never subject to doubt. Anything so perceived did not depend on God as guarantor 
of its truth".  34  This is  a correct statement, with the single reservation about the  phrase 
"never subject to doubt" which would ignore the high level epistemological doubt already 
discussed.  Yet,  Doney is  correct to  suggest that,  for  Descartes, there  is  an element  in 
man's  epistemological make-up,  which is  fully  autonomous.  That  is,  an element  which 
does not require the existence of a non-deceiving God to guarantee the certainty of its 
truth-claims.  There is  an element that survives the doubt introduced by the evil demon. 
That such a rational function survives the doubt would confute Boyce Gibson's claim that 
the evil demon represented the "enemy of  the spirit of  reason in the universe". 
However, what exactly could such an element be? Doney suggests that all "clear and 
distinct  perceptions"  are  autonomous.  There  is  certainly  evidence  for  this  view  in 
Descartes'; when, for example, he clearly states that, "the light of  nature, or the faculty of 
knowledge ... can  never  disclose  to  us  any  object  which  is  not  true,  inasmuch  as  it 
comprehends it,  that is,  inasmuch as it  apprehends it  clearly and distinctly".  35  This fact. 
that whenever I clearly and distinctly perceive x, x is true, is designated, by Louis E.  Loeb 
"the  truth rule".36  However, although I agree that  Descartes held  to  the truth rule,  the 
proposition, as formulated, is a bit vague. For instance what is it exactly that constitutes a 
clear and distinct perception. 207 
In an impressive article, entitled 'Descartes and the Autonomy of  Reason', Peter. A. 
Schouls makes a more incisive analysis of  what Descartes meant by such a perception. He 
suggests that  Descartes' notion of reason contains  various  distinct  functions.  He  even 
correctly suggests that Descartes' distinguished between what has been termed axiomatic 
intuition and deductive intuition, both of  these standing in contrast to deduction. Consider 
how Schouls makes the distinction: 
[Q143] I  ntuitionl  and intuition2  have in common that the act of intuition occurs 
instantaneously  and  hence  excludes  successive  movement  and  memory.  They 
differ in that whereas the object of intuitionl  is  simple and hence not subject to 
division and analysis, the object of  intuition2 is compound and can be divided and 
analysed.  Intuition2 is more closely related to deduction than is intuition!. In fact, 
whereas intuition1  is in no  way dependent on deduction, intuition2 can occur only 
after deduction has taken place.37 
There  is  certainly evidence  that Descartes  understood  the  distinctions  involved  and  at 
quite a deep level. This is quite surprising because as we have seen, later, Kant and Ayer 
still  seem a bit  confused.  Of intuition in general,  which is  immediate,  in  its contrast to 
deduction, which is a process, Descartes writes: 
[Q144]  Whereas the act of intuition occurs instantaneously,  i.e.  what is  intuited 
"must be  grasped  ... at the same time and not successively', deduction is a process 
which "appears not to occur all at the same time, but involves a sort of  movement 
on the part of  our mind when it infers one thing from another.38 
Unlike  intuition which "occurs instantaneously"  it  is  important to  stress the  role of 
memory  in  deduction  "deduction does  not  require  an immediately presented evidence 
such  as  intuition  possesses;  its  certitude  is  rather  conferred  upon it  in  some  way  by 
memory".39  Descartes also  understands that  first  principles  or axioms  are  "known per 
se,,40  and  he  distinguishes  this  type  of intuition  i.e.  axiomatic  intuition  from  the  re-
immediation  of a  deductive  sequence,  i.e.  deductive  intuition.  This  latter intuition  can 
only occur, for Descartes, in a deductive sequence linking propositions. Clarcke correctly 
observes that,  in  Descartes,  "intuitus" can be  "the act of understanding ... the evidentiary 
.  ..  " 4!  connectIons between propOSItIons  . 
I  f the conclusions are very distant  from the first  principles then they can be  known 
only by deduction "the remote conclusions are furnished only by deduction".42  However, 
if  the  linkage does not  involve  a  long chain then intuition has a role  in  re-immediation. 208 
Hence, the propositions which are derived (in a discursive process) from those primary 
axioms grasped by axiomatic intuition are, in some circumstances, known by  deductive 
intuition.  In others by noetic deductive reasoning,  "propositions  ... which are immediately 
deduced from first principles are known now by intuition, now by deduction.. i.e.  in a way 
that differs according to our point of view. But the first principles are given by intuition 
alone" .  43  Hence,  according  to  Descartes,  intuition  can  function  to  draw  necessary 
conclusions from a process of  discursive reasoning, as long as these conclusions are not 
too  distant.  A  clear  statement  of Descartes  commitment  to  this  notion of deductive 
intuition is given in the Regulae: 
[Q145]  This  evidence  and  certitude,  however,  which  belongs  to  intuition,  is 
required  not  only  in  the  enunciation  of propositions,  but  also  in  discursive 
reasoning  of whatever  sort.  For example  consider  this  consequence:  2  and  2 
amount to the same as 3 and 1. Now we need to see intuitively not only that 2 and 
2  make  4,  and  that  likewise  3  and  1,  but  further  that  the  third  of the  above 
statements is a necessary conclusion from these two.  44 
That  deductive  intuition is  understood by Descartes is  also  evident from  his  notion of 
enumeration which will be discussed presently. Remember, the fact that Kant did not see 
the role of  intuition in deduction "from first principles" was Mure's criticism of  him. 
Now it  is  by axiomatic  intuition,  in  Descartes,  that one  grasps the cogito,  "I  think 
therefore I am,,45  for this is  the primary axiom or first principle of his metaphysics. It is 
the "Archimedean point,,46 which is grasped with absolute clearness and distinctness, and 
that  survives all the doubts raised even by the postulation of the  evil  demon:  "I  am,  I 
exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind". 46  It 
survives  the  demonic  doubt  even  before  the  proof of a  beneficent  God  is  given  in 
Meditation III. Therefore, according to Descartes, we can surely discover, at least, some 
truth  by  axiomatic  intuition,  before  God is  proved to  exist  and to  be  beneficent.  This 
cannot be seriously challenged, for it is clearly stated by Descartes in Meditation II, "But 
there is  some deceiver or other, very powerful and very cunning, who ever employs his 
ingenuity in deceiving me.  Then without doubt I exist also if he deceives me, and let  him 
deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so  long as I think I 
am  something".47  Yet. if it  is  accepted,  it  certainly refutes,  once and  for  alL  the  Boyce 
Gibson position. I  f the demon was the enemy of  reason, as he suggests, then it  is certain 209 
that  no  rational intuition could ever establish anything  with certainty.  However.  as  we 
have  see~ the cogito definitely does survive the postulation of  the malicious demon. 
Notwithstanding,  Schouls goes wrong in his  assessment of how Descartes used  his 
distinctions. Schouls argues correctly that, "when, in the Meditations, metaphysical doubt 
is  introduced, there  is  no  indication that it  does,  and there are  many indications that  it 
does  not  affect  intuitionl.  Because  we  know  the  simple  objects  of intuition  either 
completely or not at all,  the evil genius cannot trick us with respect to them". 48  He then 
observes  that  Descartes uses  axiomatic  intuition to  establish the  other primary  axiom 
needed for the proof of  God's existence, "It is manifest by the natural light that there must 
be at least as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in the effect of  that cause,,49. 
This is the so-called causal axiom. 
Yet,  the autonomy of the intellect  is  considered limited to  axiomatic  intuition with 
deduction and deductive intuition, in contrast, remaining doubtful.  In  fact,  according to 
Schouls, deductive intuition and  deduction must wait on the proof of a beneficent  God 
for their legitimacy to be confirmed, "Specifically, he  [Descartes] must have held at least 
intuition1  to be trustworthy, and must have considered at most deduction and deductive 
intuition to stand in need of  a justification".  50 
Yet  what  Schouls fails  to explain is  how the existence of God can be  proved using 
axiomatic  intuition alone.  Earlier it  was suggested that, in  order to avoid the Cartesian 
circle,  Malebranche  had  formulated  the  theory that  illuminative  intuition  acquaintively 
grasped  the  existence  of God.  In this  case,  it  can  be  seen  how  axiomatic  intuition, 
deductive  intuition and noetic-deductive reasoning  can then be  logically justified.  They 
would, in that case, not be required to prove the existence of  a beneficent God and hence 
legitimize themselves, for God would be known to exist by illuminative intuition.  Yet. if 
Schouls' interpretation of Descartes is correct, how can the existence of God be proved 
from an intuition, i.e.  axiomatic intuition that exclusively grasps first  principles or simple 
propositions. 
The proof of God's existence in  Meditation III  requires the joining of these primary 
axioms.  i.e.  what  Descartes would term "succession".  and  hence  the  proof requires  at 
least  deductive  intuition,  if not  noetic-deductive  reasoning.  In  tact.  noetic-deductive 
reasoning  is  defined as having this very function.  "Knowing by deduction.  by  which we 
understand  all  necessary  inference  from  other  facts  that  are  known  with  certainty".  51 
Hence.  we would be back in the same Cartesian circle that Schouls is  trying to  deny  an 210 
application in  Descartes. We  would need to justifY deductive intuition and deduction by 
proving that God exists and is no deceiver.  Yet~ to prove this we must actually use these 
questionable processes. 
The  problem  of the  Cartesian  circle  can  only  be  properly  understood  by  close 
attention to Descartes discussion of it  in his replies to  this specific objection.  When  we 
consider these replies we find that he is surprised that his critics think that God is required 
to guarantee clear and distinct ideas as presently conceived.  Whereas~ his point was that 
the  existence  of a  beneficent  God~ is  only  required  to  guarantee  the  legitimacy  of 
reasoning from clear and distinct ideas not presently conceived~ but retained in memory as 
having  been  previously  conceived.  Bernard  Williams  and  others  also  consider  that 
Descartes' God acts as guarantor for chains of  reasoning, which rely on memory because 
the  conclusion is  very  distant.  However,  in  the  actual  passages referred  to,  this  latter 
point  is  never  mentioned.  Why  this  is  so  will  be  considered  later.  In  the  meantime 
consider the passages in question: 
[Q146] There I distinguished those matters that in actual truth we clearly perceive 
from those we remember to have formerly perceived.  For first,  we  are sure that 
God exists because we have attended to the proofs that established this  fact~ but 
afterwards it  was enough for us to remember that we  have  perceived something 
clearly~ in order to be  sure that it  is true; but this  would not  suffice,  unless  we 
knew that God existed and that he did not deceive us. 52 
[Q147]  I  announced in  express terms that I referred  only  to  the  knowledge of 
those  conclusions,  the  memory  of which  can  recur  when  we  are  no  longer 
attending to the reasons from which we deduced them.  53 
[Q148]  But  I  was  dealing  only  with  those  things  which  we  remember  having 
clearly perceived earlier,  not the things which we  clearly perceive at the present 
moment.  54 
Descartes  is  sure  that  God  exists  because  he  has,  "attended  to  the  proofs  that 
established  this  fact".  These  proofs,  as  we  have  said~ involve  a "successive"  reasoning 
process.  This  reasoning  process  certainly  involves  axiomatic  intuition  to  grasp  simple 
clear  and  distinct  ideas  like  the  cogito  and  the  causal  axiom.  However.  from  these 
separate axioms, or first  principles~ Descartes recognizes, unlike  Schouls, that  he  cannot 
prove  God's existence.  The  linking  of these axioms  must,  as  we  noted  earlier,  in\olye 
propositions,  "which are immediately deduced from first  principles" and are "kno\\TI no\\ 
by  intuition  now  by  deduction",  i.e.  either  by  deductive  intuition  or  noetic-deductiye 211 
reasoning.  The former, if  the chain of reasonings is  short enough to  grasp  in  a  single 
intuition. The latter if  the conclusion is too distant. 
Now it  is  necessary to argue against Schouls that deductive intuition, like axiomatic 
intuition, is fully autonomous in Descartes. It does not stand in need of  justification by a 
beneficent God. For Descartes God, is only required, as the above passages make clear. 
to  guarantee the legitimacy of our memory of previously conceived clear and distinct 
ideas.  This  theory  is  a  version  then  of what  Bernard  Williams  calls,  "the  memory 
,,55  b  t  .  ha  fir  I  .  answer  ,  u  a  verSIon  t  t  st y  mcorporates  many  of Descartes'  sophisticated 
distinctions. Secondly, it denies Descartes thought that God could guarantee the memory 
required in noetic-deductive reasoning. 
Before considering specifics, it must be pointed out that the memory answer has had 
its  critics.  Bernard  Williams,  in  agreement  with Frankfurt,  observes  that  the  memory 
answer, "does not adequately represent what Descartes wants to say is suggested by his 
insistence,  on  several  occasions  ... that  it  is  not  just  memories  of clear  and  distinct 
perceptions  but  clear  and  distinct  perceptions  themselves  that  require  validation  by 
God".56  It certainly cannot  be  denied that  there  are  some  Cartesian passages that  do 
suggest  that clear and distinct ideas require God's guarantee.  The following  quotation 
seems  unambiguous,  in this respect,  and there are  others with a  similar  content,  "that 
which I have just taken as a rule  ...  that all things which we very clearly and very distinctly 
conceive  of are  true,  is  certain only  because  God is  or exists".57  I  am certainly  not 
suggesting that the critics who raised the Cartesian circle argument had no evidence to 
point  to.  However,  it  counts  as  more  conclusive  evidence  that,  when  Descartes  is 
confronted  explicitly  with  this  notion,  he  denies  it  consistently.  There  is  a  constant 
objection throughout his Replies that he is not talking about clear and distinct ideas but 
about our memory of them. Consider again [QI46, p. 210] and [QI47, p.  210] and the 
clear  distinction  made  between  those  matters  we  "clearly  perceive"  and  those  we 
"remember that we formerly perceived" in  [QI48,. P.  210]. This and other evidence has 
led Nakhnikian to designate those quotations which imply that the clear and distinct ideas 
themselves  require the existence of God,  "Descartes' Aberrant  view". 58  The alternative 
suggested in the Replies may indeed be a later development of Descartes' view.  worked 
out in  reaction to a legitimate objection. However, it  is  certainly his  mature response to 
the problem. and as we shall soon discover prevents circular reasoning. 212 
Another much cruder objection is made by Anthony Kenny who denies that Descartes 
ever doubted the memory,  "Descartes never seriously raises sceptical doubts about  the 
reliability of  memory".  59 As a consequence, it would have been pointless for him to posit 
God as a  guarantor for  its reliability.  It is  difficult  to accept this  argument  against  the 
memory answer because the process which Descartes' terms enumeration60, is specifically 
designed to eliminate the need for any reliance on our doubtful memories. 
Let us now consider this enumerative process in greater detail. The first thing to say 
about  this  process  is  that  it  is  an attempt  to  convert  noetic-deductive  reasoning  into 
deductive intuition. Why is it that this should be an advantage? Descartes observes that it 
is  necessary if  our judgements are to be true and certain, "For resolving most problems 
other precepts are profitable, but enumeration alone will secure our always passing a true 
and  certain  judgement  on  whatsoever  engages  our  attention".61  Yet,  why  should 
transforming a deductive process into one that is purely intuitive make any difference to 
the  certainty of our judgements? The  answer to  this  question is  clear.  The  deductive 
process  being  "successive"  rather  than  "immediate"  involves,  as  we  have  seen,  the 
processes of  memory. Memory, as a function of  mind, is according to Descartes liable to 
error. It is  described in  the Regulae as "weak and liable  to deceive  US".62  We  certainly 
cannot  guarantee  our memories  are  immune  from  the  process of doubt.  Hence,  any 
conclusions arrived at by a process that involves memory necessarily become doubtful. 
The process of  enumeration seeks to remedy this situation by eliminating the involvement 
of  memory in the quest for knowledge: 
[149]  To  remedy  this  I  would  run them over from  time  to  time,  keeping  the 
imagination  moving  continuously  in  such  a  way  that  while  it  is  intuitively 
perceiving each fact  it simultaneously passes on to the next; and this I  would do 
until I had learned to pass from the first to the last so quickly, that no stage in the 
process  was left  to the care of the memory,  but  I  seem to have  the  whole  in 
intuition before me at the same time.63 
It  is  the  process of enumeration that transforms, for Descartes, doubtful deductions 
reliant  on memory into  certain truths grasped by  intuition.  Against Schouls, God is  not 
required as guarantor at any stage in this process for deductive intuition is autonomous. 
Yet. what if the conclusions are so remote or so many facts are involved that the process 
of enumeration is  impossible  for our limited  intellects.  Here we  have  a situation where 
deduction cannot be transformed into enumeration. Is God required here to guarantee our 113 
memories?  Certainly,  many  commentators'  verSIons  of the  memory  answer  have 
suggested that this is the case. Margaret Wilson, for example observes, "As is now fairly 
widely acknowledged, Descartes seeks to limit the scope of  the Deceiver Hypothesis, in 
the  Replies  and  even in  later parts of the  Meditations,  to,  in  effect.  non-self-evident 
,  I'  '"  64  H  G  d  ld  be  .  d  .  cone USIOns.  ence,  0  wou  requITe  to  guarantee these dIstant  conclusions, 
which inevitably involve memory. 
For Descartes, it is true that in order to grasp these distant conclusions it is requisite 
to  use the unreliable memory, "In fact the memory, on which we have said depends the 
certainty of the conclusions which embrace more than we can grasp in  a single  act  of 
intuition".65 Yet strangely the "certainty of  the conclusions", in this case. is not considered 
to  be  of the  same  magnitude  as  that  in  examples  of the  grasping  of first  principles 
(axiomatic  intuition)  or  intuiting  deductive  sequences  (deductive  intuition).  Noetic-
deductive  reasoning,  which cannot  be  "enumerated"  and  hence  must  be  dependent  on 
memory,  is  considered to involve an inferior grade of certainty, a type of certainty that 
the mind because of its limitations, must just resign itself to, "But if  we  infer any single 
thing from various and disconnected facts,  often our intellectual capacity is not so great 
as to be able to embrace them all in a single intuition; in which case our mind should be 
content with the certitude attaching to this operation".66 Simple intuition and enumeration 
provide the only truly certain knowledge, "We must note that by adequate enumeration or 
induction is  only meant that method by which we  may attain surer conclusions than by 
any other type of  proof, with the exception of  simple intuition".  67 
Yet if  Wilson and  others are  correct then God's  main  function  is  to  guarantee the 
memory  in  this  very case.  Surely then our memory would be  secure  from  doubt.  We 
would not have to settle for an inferior grade of  certainty. Is it not also strange that when 
Descartes  discusses  memory  extensively  in  the  replies  he  never  mentions  the  type  of 
memory that extends beyond the process of  enumeration? He,  in fact,  only discusses the 
memory of clear and distinct propositions. Descartes does this because memory cannot 
guarantee  a  process  that  has  not  been  clearly  and  distinctly  conceived  already.  God 
functions  only  to  guarantee  that  the  memory  of previously  intuited  clear  and  distinct 
axioms or non-remote conclusions can be enumerated. Those that have never and cannot 
be  hrought  under  a  clear  and  distinct  perception.  viz.  remote  conclusions,  cannot  be 
guaranteed  by  God.  Only  if a  long  deductive  sequence  can  be  enumerated,  and  most ~14 
68  •  full  .  ha  can  ,can we attam to a  certamty t  t evades the doubt introduced by the malicious 
demon: 
[Q150]  ~ere we .maintain that an en.umeration [of  the steps in a proof] is required 
as well, if  we wIsh to make our SCIence  complete.  For resolving most problems 
other  precepts  are  profitable,  but  enumeration  alone  will  secure  our  always 
passing  a  true and  certain judgement on whatsoever engages  our attention:  by 
means  of it  nothing  at  all  will  escape  us,  but  we  shall  evidently  have  some 
knowledge of  every step.69 
Let us return now to the Cartesian circle argument. We have already established that. 
for Descartes, all intuitions are distinguished from deductions because of  their immediacy 
or instantaneousness and hence their non-reliance on memory.  The only thing then that 
still  requires  argument  is  whether  Descartes'  proof of God's  existence  involves  a 
deductive process that must rely on the memory of  remote conclusions. If it does require 
such reliance  then the  existence of God would  not  be  able  to  be  grasped clearly  and 
distinctly.  God's  existence  would not  be  beyond  all  doubt  but  only  beyond  the  highly 
metaphysical  one  already  recognized.  The  consequence  would  be  that  we  could  not 
guarantee our clear and distinct ideas beyond the moment on which we actually grasped 
them. We could only say that they were true at tl not at any future time t2, for between t\ 
and  t2  is  a  period  of time  tx  which  the  memory  must  guarantee.  Yet,  in  the  third 
Meditation, Descartes indicates that the existence of  God is a clear and distinct idea, "this 
idea [of God] is very clear and distinct and contains within it more objective reality than 
any  other".  70  The proof therefore cannot contain any  remote  conclusions and  must  be 
receptive to the process of enumeration.  The whole argument avoids any  suggestion of 
circularity because the existence of  God is proved through forms of  intuition that, by their 
nature as immediate, do not require memory. Remember, even in enumeration "no  stage 
in  the  process  [is]  left  to the care of memory".  71  God is  used,  not to  guarantee the  so 
intuited  clear  and  distinct  ideas  that  are  used  to  prove  his  own  existence.  God  only 
guarantees that our potentially unreliable  memories of these clear and  distinct ideas are 
not subject to error. God's beneficence precludes the unreliability of  memory over period 
t".  In addition, memory period t" has no impute to the proof of  God's existence. 
In conclusion, Descartes' mature position in contrast to the so-called "aberrant view" 
avoids the  Cartesian circle objection.  Axiomatic  intuition and  deductive  intuition  \\hich 
supply clear and distinct ideas are autonomous and outside the influence of  the malicious demon.  The memory of  this type of  proposition is not autonomous and theoretically can 
be subject to the tricks of  the malicious demon. However, the proof of  the existence of  a 
beneficent God that is clear and distinct, guarantees that the malicious demon cannot be 
allowed to tamper with such memories. For, in the forth Meditation. Descartes observes. 
"He [God]  could not desire to deceive me, it is clear that He has not given me a faculty 
that will lead me to err if  I use it aright".  72 
Notwithstanding, certain remote conclusions cannot entirely survive the introduction 
of the  evil  demon  and  are  consequently  not  completely  certain.  Yet  as  Descartes 
observes, this doubt is only a high level metaphysical doubt, "the reason for doubt which 
depends on this opinion alone is very slight, and so to speak metaphysical". 73  It relies on 
the  remote  possibility that  there  is  an evil  power in  the  universe  tampering  with  our 
memory.  If we cannot achieve absolute certainty here against the sceptic it  must just be 
accepted that our propositions are only highly probable. It might  be objected here that if 
there is a beneficent God why has he  given us any faculty of  memory that can err in any 
way;  for  surely he does not want to deceive us.  Descartes answer to  this is  simple.  The 
error is not in the faculty supplied by God but in the human will which wants to extend its 
use  beyond  its  proper  function.  Remember  a  beneficent  God  only  guarantees  that  a 
faculty  is  immune from error if  it  is  "used aright".  If we use  our memories to  attain to 
remote conclusions, which move beyond the scope of  our certain intuitions, i.e.  what  is 
guaranteed  by  our reason then of course  we  will  err.  We  must  just  curb our  will  to 
prevent it outstripping the intellect's powers, "in the matters to be examined we come to a 
step  in  the  series  of which  our understanding  is  not  sufficiently  well  able  to  have  an 
intuitive cognition, we must stop short there. We must make no attempt to examine what 
follows".74 
Notwithstanding,  this  Cartesian  mature  position  still  does  not  bridge  the 
epistemological gap between the noumenal and the in-itself. Descartes assurances on the 
absence of "absolute falsity"  are certainly not convincing. This possibility ensures that the 
stubborn sceptic  is  not entirely defeated.  Descartes convincingly counters the  sceptic's 
malicious  demon  argument  but  the  absolute  falsity  argument  still  looms  large.  The 
Cartesian circle is squared, but the sceptic's doubt is not entirely eliminated. 216 
CHAPTER 9 
SPINOZA AND SCIENTIFIC MODELS 
9.1. Immanent Aposteriorism 
We  have  already  touched  on  the  distinction  between  transcendent  apnonsm  and 
immanent  aposteriorism in  our earlier discussion on the epistemology of existentialism. 
However,  the  most  important  aspect of the  distinction  has  yet  to  be  addressed.  This 
concerns  the  determination of the  exact  nature  of the  contrast  between  transcendent 
apriorism  and  the  methodological  epistemology  of  science.  The  most  common 
understanding of  the epistemology of science puts transcendent apriorism and science at 
opposite scales of  the epistemological spectrum. The epistemology of science, according 
to this view, is immanent and a posteriori rather than transcendent and a priori. 
However,  there  are  problems  with  this  simple  view.  Firstly,  it  is  certain,  that 
deductive  and  other  a  priori  processes  have  had  a  role  in  the  history  of scientific 
discovery. In fact, in extreme cases, like Cartesian science, such forms of  reasoning which 
imply varieties of  apriorism, are epistemologically dominant. In addition, it is not the case, 
as we shall discover, that synthetic a priori forms of  reasoning are necessarily extruded by 
philosophers of science from contributing to scientific  methodology.  Secondly,  there  is 
the further confusion concerning whether the postulation of unobservable entities within 
scientific  theories  constitutes  a  commitment  to  a  transcendent  rather  an  immanent 
epistemology.  These are important questions, which raise further issues that are relevant 
to the exact nature of  transcendent apriorism. 
9.1.1. Is Science Immanent or Transcendent? 
The doctrine that scientific theories should concern themselves purely with that which  is 
immanent.  with that which is  not beyond actual or possible experience,  is  a view  shared 
by  scientific  epistemologies  such  as  reductionism.  operationalism.  verificationalisrn. 217 
instrumentalism and  internal  realism.  It is  also  the  view  of science  that  we  are  being 
pushed  towards if we  accept  the  under-determination  thesis.  All  the  abovementioned 
scientific epistemologies attempt to eliminate any theories that make reference to  posited 
unobservable features of the world in their explanatory apparatus.  Some assert that the 
full cognitive content of  a theory is exhausted by its observational consequences reported 
by  its  observational  sentences.  While  the  under-determination  thesis  is  the  scientific 
equivalent of Kant's theory that any attempt to comprehend the noumenal will result  in 
antinomies.  The thesis, as defined by Daniel E.  Little (1995), states that any theory that 
makes  reference  to  unobservable  features  will  "always  encounter  rival  theories 
incompatible  with  the  original  theory  but  equally  compatible  with  all  possible 
observational data that might be taken as confinnatory of  the original theory".' 
However, let us now consider the sense in which the scientist in this epistemological 
reading  of his  project,  is  attaining  to  the  noumenal  world.  Now  it  is  certain that  the 
transcendent apriorist and the scientist largely reject the "ordinary" man's common-sense 
notions of the world.  The world picture of the  scientist, for  instance, does not reveal  a 
world of  solid objects in three dimensions existing through linear time, rather it involves a 
world of invisible particles in curved space-time.  Yet this  is  not enough to  instantiate a 
strong distinction between the world as it appears to aesthetic consciousness, identified as 
false or illusory and the world as it revealed to the noetic functions identified as the True 
Reality.  Certainly, for the scientist, the ordinary person is wrong in his understanding of 
the  world  for  he  trusts to, (i) the naive  interpretations of his  senses (i.e.  aesthesis not 
consciously  structured  and  interpreted  by  the  mind  using  a  strict  methodological 
procedure  with  proper  testing  of conclusions);  (ii)  arguments  from  authority;  (iii) 
superstition;  (iv)  the  constructs  of his  imagination,  or  (v)  experience  that  is  not 
mechanically heightened. 
However,  the  scientist  and  the  ordinary  person  use  and  start  from  the  same 
experiential materials that are not considered illusory.  The aim of both is  to  understand 
the  world of  phenomena not to attain to the noumenal. Of course there are more or less 
adequate ways of interpreting the phenomenal and the scientist considers that  his way  is 
the  correct one and the ordinary person's way  is  incorrect.  Yet, there is  no  rejection  hy 
the  scientist  of the  phenomenal  in  favour of the  noumenal.  In  both cases,  that  of the 
scientist  and of the  ordinary person.  this project of understanding the  phenomenal  may 
involve  the  positing  of  putative  noumenal  entities.  For  the  ordinary  person  the 218 
supernatural world  is  sometimes  invoked,  whereas  for  the  scientist  it  is  quarks,  black 
holes and neutron stars that are considered to be beyond experience. 
However,  even if we  can consider the  latter scientific  knowledge  to  attain  to  the 
noumenal (a question considered subsequently), knowledge of  the noumenal world is.  for 
the scientist, still subsidiary to the interpretation of  the phenomenal. Any such insight into 
the  noumenal  being  defeasible  if it  does  not  correspond  with  experiential  data.  The 
intention  of the  scientist  is  to  create  a  hypothesis  that  best  explains  the  phenomenal 
world.  In contrast,  for  the  transcendent  apriorist,  the  phenomenal  world  is  a  form  of 
seeming only.  She therefore seeks a higher form of understanding, i.e.  insights into  the 
noumenal world and this knowledge, when attained,  is  not defeasible  with reference to 
experiential data. The scientist, in one epistemological understanding, seems to transcend 
the  phenomenal  and  attain  to  the  noumenal.  However,  the  distinction  between  this 
process and the metaphysics of  transcendent apriorism is still clear and substantial. 
Now the attempt to connect all scientific statements with down-to-earth observation 
statements, would obviously connect science with the phenomenal world as its epistemic 
object.  However,  the  other  view  of the  epistemology of science,  usually  identified  as 
scientific  realism,  tolerates  unobservables  in  its  explanatory  systems.  The  view  of 
unobservables in  this type of scientific epistemology is  radically different,  "the terms of 
theories that putatively refer to unobservables ought to be taken at their referential face 
value and not reinterpreted in some instrumentalist manner". 
2 As we have seen, this could 
be interpreted as a severance of  the strict ties of science to the world of  phenomena. It is 
certain  that  the  modem  scientist  presents  a  picture  of the  world  that  appears  very 
different  from  the  one  encountered  in  experience.  The  world  of neutrons,  protons, 
electrons,  quarks  and  other  sub-atomic  particles  plus  empty  space,  according  to  the 
scientist, are the true fabric of reality that underlies the solid material objects like chairs 
and  tables  that  we  encounter  in  our  everyday  experience.  Bertrand  Russell.  from  an 
empiricist standpoint, observed that the truth about material objects must be strange. 
Is  it  not, after all,  possible to contend that the epistemological object of the  modem 
scientist is the noumenal world rather than the phenomenal? The answer is no. because it 
is  not just the willingness to  state that the world  is different  from  what it  appears in our 
"ordinary"  experience  that  marks  out a commitment  to  the  noumenal.  Rather  it  is  the 
Willingness  to  state  that  (i)  the  world  is  different  from  ordinary  and "heightened"  or 
"mechanically  enhanced"  experience:  (ii)  such  intrinsic  experience  in  general  IS ~19 
unnecessary for the origination and justification of  one's theory. and (iii) such experience 
cannot falsify one's theory. The modem scientist cannot make all of  these commitments. 
His theories are consequently rooted in the phenomenal world. 
With  regard to  point  (i)  above,  the  object of the  modem scientist's  enquiry  is  to 
explain the world as it appears with regard to a certain fonn of  experience. This particular 
fonn referred to is  "heightened" or "mechanically enhanced" experience.  It is  often not 
our "everyday" experience of  the world that is relevant. We have seen that our apparently 
solid chairs and tables are not as we perceive them. However, it is experience heightened 
by and filtered through sophisticated pieces of  equipment, viz.  the instruments of science 
that extend the range of our senses.  There is  reference to the electron microscope, the 
radio telescope, the mass spectrometer, the infrared or gamma ray detector, the  atomic 
clock, the seismometer, the voltmeter, the gigacounter etc.  We must be careful then not 
to  see  some  modem  science  as  transcending  experience  when  it  is  in  fact  merely 
transcending  "everyday  experience"  or  "unaided  observational  experience".  For  such 
transcendence has nothing to do  with the  attainment of the  noumenal  world.  This  is  a 
common error. To give one example, John Worrall suggests that the scientist is successful 
because he has grasped the truth about the noumenal world. 
[Q 151] How else can we account for the success [of science] except by assuming 
that what our theories say is  going on 'beneath' the phenomena is  'essentially' or 
very  largely  correct?  If so  the  argument  goes,  what  the  theories  say  about 
'transempirical' reality is true or 'close to the truth'. 
3 
Yet,  what  he  means  by  the  noumenal  world  here  is  revealed  by  his  examples,  VIZ. 
electromagnetic  waves  and  the  subatomic  particles  underlying  nuclear  physics.  The 
theories that posit these entities are described as transempirical. They grasp what is going 
on "beneath the phenomena" . Yet such entities are not beyond experience per se.  They 
only transcend unaided, non-heightened experience. In this respect they are not noumenal 
entities at all. 
It would  be  premature  to  conclude  from  this,  however,  that  scientists  never  posit 
entities that are beyond everyday and even heightened experience.  Robert Oppenheimer 
posited the existence of Black holes for  instance despite the fact  that there could be  no 
observational consequences of  their existence that could be detected by the telescopes of 
his day. Now. if any such entities were posited because of  a priori mathematical rl?asoning 220 
then they could certainly be described as noumenal objects. This has certainly happened. 
although only in a very small number of instances.  That it  is the case \vith the theory of 
black holes is  confinned by  Stephen Hawking when he  observes that,  "Black  holes are 
one of  only a fairly small number of  cases in the history of  science in which a theory was 
developed in great detail as a mathematical model before there was any  evidence  from 
observations that it was correct".4 
Despite this, the main epistemological object of  such a scientific procedure is still the 
phenomenal world. Whereas in transcendent apriorism the noumenal is  the end point of 
philosophical  enquiry,  for  the  scientist  it  is  the  means  to  further  explanation  of the 
phenomenal.  The scientist posits a noumenal entity often only to  explain an anomaly in 
the phenomenal data.  The noumenal is  posited therefore only  in  order to  better explain 
the data provided by the aesthetic functions. 
The fact  is that the scientist, even if he  regarded the noumenal entity as  the end-in-
itself of his enquiry, would not be doing transcendent apriorism but  rather transcendent 
aposteriorism. This may not seem obvious but it becomes evident when we consider that 
observational experience is still fundamentally relevant in the justification. verification, or 
falsification of scientific theories. John Mitchel, in the Philosophical Transactions of  the 
Royal Society of  London of 1783, had first posited the existence of black holes.  Yet  it  is 
only  in  the  latter  part  of this  century  that  their  existence  has  been  established  and 
accepted by scientists. 
This  acceptance  was  largely  due  to  the  invention  of the  radio  telescope  and  the 
extension in  power of the conventional telescope and their subsequent combined use  by 
Maarten Schmidt and Jocelyn Bell. Schmidt needed to observe red-shift (the reddening of 
light from a star that is moving away from us) of  a faint star like object in the direction of 
the source of  radio waves called 3C273. Whereas Bell's discovery depended on observing 
an  object  in  the  sky that emitted regular pulses of radio  waves.  Although a black  hole 
itself does not emit  light  it  can exert a gravitational force  on nearby objects and  this  is 
observable.  The scientific acceptance of black holes was due  therefore to  the  extended 
possibilities for  observational data provided by  heightened experience as  defined  ahove. 
Until  this  evidence came there was only a priori justifIcation of their existence.  Now a 
priori justification would  be  the  most  adequate justification of all  tt)f the  transcendent 
apriorist.  However the fact that the evidence for Black holes was a priori counted against 
it  for  the  scientist.  As  Hawking  suggested.  "this  used  to  be  the  main  argument  of 221 
opponents of  black holes: how could one believe in objects for which the only e\'idence 
was  calculations  based  on the  dubious  theory of relativity?".  5  The  question  of the  a 
posteriori nature of  the scientific method will now be dealt with in more detail. 
9.1.2. Is Science Aposteriorist or Apriorist? 
The doctrine that scientific theories should be established by a posteriori means is almost 
universal in  "modem" science.  However, it should always be remembered that  much of 
what  constitutes "traditional"  science has  a more apriorist  approach.  There  is  even an 
important  traditional  science  that  proceeds  entirely  a  priori.  The  latter.  still  being  a 
science,  has the phenomenal (world) as its epistemological-object.  However.  there  is  a 
noetic justification and origination of its fundamental concepts and propositions. In table 
1.,  this  pure  enquiry  was  designated,  "Cartesian"  science  and  with  respect  to  its 
underlying epistemology categorized it as immanent apriorist. This designatory qualifYing 
term "Cartesian" is  chosen purely because of its familiarity.  There is  no  suggestion that 
such a scientific project originated with Rene Descartes. In fact.  it could more accurately 
be  attributed  to  the  Pre-Socratics and  Plato,  Copernicus,  Kepler,  and  Galileo  used  it 
before  Descartes.  However,  it  is  certain  that  Descartes  is  the  philosopher  usually 
associated with this type of  science. 
Science, in the apriorist tradition, had a mathematical-type epistemology and one that 
was  considered  synthetic  a  priori  in  nature.  It had  a  distrust  of empirical  content  or 
justification. And had reliance upon clear and distinct ideas attained through intellectual 
intuition and deduction (rather than induction). The ideal model for all knowledge in this 
tradition  was  mathematics  and,  in  consequence,  natural  science  was  to  adopt  the 
mathematical-type methodology. As Parkinson argues, "such a methodology. as  is clear, 
is  strongly a  priori  in  nature.  The  mathematician  does not  proceed  by  experiment  and 
induction,  but  works  out  the  consequences  of his  definitions  and  axioms  without 
f
'  .  ,,6  re erence to sense-expenence . 
There  is  an  important  distinction  to  be  made  within  this  mathematical  method. 
Modem  science  also  views  the  role  of mathematics  as  the  indispensable  tool  for  its 
methodology.  However.  at  the  level  of epistemology  this  mathematics  is  reduced  tn  a 
series of content  less  tautologies.  They can.  in  themselves.  establish  no  contentual truth 
concerning the Truly Real. A representati\'t~ view in this regard is that of A.  1.  Ayer when he  observes,  "a priori propositions of logic  and  pure mathematics ... these  I allow  to  be 
necessary and certain only because they are analytic". 
7 The view that Mathematics and  a 
priori thought give us synthetic a priori scientific  knowledge cannot  be  said  now (as  it 
previously  was)  to  be  the  dominant  view,  although  its  still  has  its  defenders.  The 
mathematician H.  Poincare, for example, in La Science et !'Hypothese states the case for 
mathematics being synthetic a priori. 
Modem science therefore requires the a posteriori to provide the contentual aspects 
of the  enquiry.  The  a  priori  only  provides  purely  formal  elements.  In  contrast,  in 
traditional science, a priori ratiocination proved synthetic, contentual and hence gave rise 
to  necessary  propositions  about  the  world  that  left  no  room  for  observation  and 
experimentation. Cohen has connected the rise of  a priori science with the success of the 
mathematical method in the new mechanics of  Kepler, Galileo and Newton: 
[Q152] It was probably at least in part because of the  important part played  by 
mathematics  in the  new  mechanics  of Kepler,  Galileo  and  Newton,  that  some 
philosophers thought it plausible to suppose that rationality was just as much the 
touchstone  of  scientific  truth  as  of mathematical  truth.  At  any  rate  that 
supposition seems to underlie the epistemologies of Descartes and  Spin07a,  for 
example,  in  which  observation  and  experiment  are  assigned  relatively  little 
.  8  unportance. 
It  is  clear  that  the justification of beliefs  by  experiment  and  observation  are  of little 
importance  (although,  not of no importance)  to  Cartesian science.  Let  us  consider the 
issue of  justification with regard to the modem scientist. 
Now for the modem scientist, unlike the transcendent apriorist or Cartesian scientist, 
the justification or falsification of  his beliefs depends ultimately on the aesthetic functions. 
It  is  therefore  a  posteriori.  There  is  even  much  concentration  on  finding  the  "crucial 
experiment"  that  either justifies  or falsifies  a  particular  hypothesis.  The  hypothetico-
deductive method is  often seen as  the  essence of scientific  method.  I  t  is  the  viev.  that 
theories are first  arrived at as creative hypotheses of the scientist's imagination and then 
confronted,  for justificatory or falsificatory  purposes, with the  observational predictions 
deduced  from them.  Of course there are other criteria of  justification, sometimes used. 
like the simplicity of  a theorem (enshrined in Occam's razor); the authority of tradition as 
in  methodological  conservatism~ part  or e\'en  coherence  \\ithin  the  total  theory,  as  in 
conformational  holism.  Those  philosophers  cyl1ical  of the  scientific  method.  like  Kuhn he  observes,  "a priori propositions of logic  and  pure mathematics ... these  I allow to  be 
necessary and certain only because they are analytic". 
7 The view that Mathematics and a 
priori thought give us  synthetic a priori scientific knowledge cannot  be said  now (as  it 
previously  was)  to  be  the  dominant  view,  although  its  still  has  its  defenders.  The 
mathematician H. Poincare, for example, in La Science et ['Hypothese states the case for 
mathematics being synthetic a priori. 
Modem science therefore requires the a posteriori to provide the contentual aspects 
of the  enquiry.  The  a  priori  only  provides  purely  formal  elements.  In  contrast,  in 
traditional science, a priori ratiocination proved synthetic, contentual and hence gave rise 
to  necessary  propositions  about  the  world  that  left  no  room  for  observation  and 
experimentation. Cohen has connected the rise of  a priori science with the success of  the 
mathematical method in the new mechanics of  Kepler, Galileo and Newton: 
[Q152] It was probably at least  in part because of the important part played by 
mathematics  in  the  new mechanics  of Kepler,  Galileo  and  Newton,  that  some 
philosophers thought it plausible to suppose that rationality was just as much the 
touchstone  of  scientific  truth  as  of mathematical  truth.  At  any  rate  that 
supposition seems to underlie the epistemologies of Descartes and  Spinoza,  for 
example,  in  which  observation  and  experiment  are  assigned  relatively  little 
.  8  Importance. 
It is  clear  that  the justification of beliefs  by  experiment  and  observation  are  of little 
importance  (although,  not of no importance) to  Cartesian science.  Let  us  consider the 
issue of  justification with regard to the modem scientist. 
Now for the modem scientist, unlike the transcendent apriorist or Cartesian scientist, 
the justification or falsification of  his beliefs depends ultimately on the aesthetic functions. 
It  is  therefore  a  posteriori.  There  is  even  much  concentration  on finding  the  "crucial 
experiment"  that  either  justifies  or falsifies  a  particular  hypothesis.  The  hypothetico-
deductive  method is  often seen as  the  essence of scientific  method.  It  is  the  view that 
theories are first  arrived at as creative hypotheses of the scientist's imagination and then 
confronted,  for justificatory or falsificatory purposes, with the observational predictions 
deduced  from  them.  Of course there are  other criteria of justification. sometimes used. 
like the simplicity of  a theorem (enshrined in Occam's  razor)~ the authority of  tradition as 
in  methodological  conservatism:  part  or even  coherence  within  the  total  theory.  as  in 
contonnational  holism.  Those  philosophers cynical  of the  scientific  method.  like  Kuhn 223 
and Feyerebend, fmd  numerous others that provide a dubious foundation for knowledge. 
Despite all  this,  the ultimate justificatory criterion is  still the data of experience.  Even 
mathematical cosmologists like  Stephen Hawking admit the need for such confirmation. 
Of  course there is a mathematical, and therefore a priori, element that is the bedrock of  a 
sound theory, a theory cannot be mathematically inconsistent. However, there is still the 
need for observational confirmation or justification of  the theory's content. As Hawking's 
observes: 
[Q153] What would it mean if  we actually did discover the ultimate theory of  the 
universe? As was explained in Chapter 1,  we could never be quite sure that we 
had indeed found the correct theory, since theories can't be proved. However, if 
the theory was mathematically consistent and always gave predictions that agreed 
with observations, we could be reasonably confident that it was the right one.
9 
The first thing to note is that the aesthetic functions of  the intellect are relevant to the 
justification of  the hypothesis.  For instance, if  there is the actual possibility of detecting 
previously  undetectable  neutron  stars  with  the  senses  (enhanced  by  sophisticated 
equipment  of course)  then this  observation  acts  as  the  ultimate  judgement  upon  its 
validity.  This  type of justification would not be  legitimate  within the  epistemology of 
transcendent apriorism where all true justification is noetic. Of  course, it is impossible to 
deny that philosophers, who work within the epistemology of  transcendent apriorism, are 
often  interested  in  science.  They  even  sometimes  talk  of experiential justification of 
certain propositions.  However,  as we shall see later in discussing  Spinoza, this type of 
justification is only found at all relevant when the limitations of  the human pure reason is 
most  strongly felt.  It is  a  form of argument, but a  last  resort argument that does not 
establish anything as necessarily true.  In conclusion, no  theory which fails  to "save the 
appearances"  (which  for  the  transcendent  apriorist  would  be  like  saving  the  mere 
"seemings") can establish itself  permanently and securely within the scientific community. 
Now as  for  the  origination of the  scientist's beliefs  the case  is  just as  clear.  If the 
scientific object is the immanent phenomenal world accessible to the senses, then it seems 
that  theories relevant to this world are going to emerge from patterns or regularities in 
the  data available about this world, i.e.  sensory data.  Accordingly the  inductivist states 
that  theories are somehow generated out of accumulated observational data.  However, 
those who hold to the hypothetico-deductive or falsifiability thesis often observe that the 224 
hypotheses are generated in the mind of  the scientist and then only justified or falsified by 
experience.  The truth is that even if  this could be proved a noetic process of hypothesis 
generation it  would not  blur the distinction between the  scientist and the transcendent 
apriorist.  For  in  aprioris~ the  propositions  involved  must  be  both derived  from  and 
justified by the intellect's noetic function. It is  true that some methodologists, like  Karl 
Popper,  deny that theories can be justified by observational experience.  However.  this 
does not represent a rejection of observational experience. It is just the epistemological 
claim of fallibilism that epistemological certainty cannot be  achieved through induction. 
Hence  a  non-inductive  procedure should replace  it.  This  non-inductive  procedure  still 
involves  observational experience  but  this  time  used  to  falsifY  experience  rather than 
corrfinn it.  To use Popper's own example, the observation of  a black swan would falsifY 
the universal proposition that, "all swans are white". 10 
Hence, the fact that the scientist justifies his belief a posteriori is enough to distinguish 
him  from the transcendent apriorist.  However, philosophers of science often ascribe to 
the  theory  that  the  imagination  generates  the  hypothesis,  which  are  then testable  by 
experience. The imagination functions in the scientific understanding to generate a theory 
with captures all the various sense data in a particular way or under a particular model. 
Hence the scientific imagination has its source and foundation in the aesthetic functions 
only. 
Modem science exclusively sees an important role for experience in its epistemology. 
It  can  be  considered,  in  Kenneth  Winkler's  terms,  to  be  "content"  empiricism  or 
"justification" empiricism and it can be both. We have already considered the implications 
of these  terms in  our definition of experience.  However, to  give  an example  that  will 
trigger our memories; the following quotations from W.  V.  Quine could be considered as 
examples of both (i)  extreme justification empiricism that,  "no  statement is  immune  to 
revision  in  response  to recalcitrant  experience"l1  and  (ii)  content empiricism  when  he 
quotes with approval in Pursuit of  Truth (1992) the slogan "nihil in mente quod non prius 
sensu".12  It  is  important to note that I am not suggesting here that this is Quine'S actual 
view of  the role of  experience in science. Such a topic is extremely complex and beyond 
the scope of  this thesis. 
Within other epistemologies of  science experience plays a more limited less pervasive 
role.  Karl  Popper.  for  instance  could  be  considered  a justification empiricist  but  not 
necessarily a content empiricist. However. it  is the emphasis on the epistemological value of experience that defines our "modern" science. Now it  is  sometimes argued that some 
modern scientific work is closer to the Cartesian model because it is only tenuously linked 
to  experience.  However,  firstly  it  is  important to  remember  not  to  confuse  the  trans-
experiential, i.e.  the noumenal, with heightened experience.  If this confusion is  avoided 
then  the  abovementioned  link may  seem  anything  but  tenuous.  Secondly.  any  link  in 
justificatory  terms  with  intrinsic  experience  marks  science  off  from  transcendent 
apriorism.  Some modern scientists may not endorse the extreme "contrite fallibilism"  of 
C.  S.  Peirce, who expressed his willingness to, "dump the whole cart  10 ad of his  beliefs, 
the moment experience is against them". 13 However, there is no determination on his part. 
as  there  is  with the Cartesian scientist whose  ideal is,  to  dispense  with it  altogether.  I 
qualifY by saying that this is their "ideal" because some practitioners of  Cartesian science 
have a secondary inferior use for experience as providing various unprovable conjectures 
when,  because of the limits of the human mind,  they cannot proceed a priori.  Scientists 
who  are  willing  to  sever their link with experience  completely  (or in  the  above  sense 
exclusively) would be either transcendent apriorists or immanent apriorists. 
9.2. Baruch Spinoza: Scientia Intuitiva 
[Q154]  Summum Mentis bonum est Dei cognitio, et summa Mentis virtus Deum 
cognoscere. 
This  section represents a defence of a traditional interpretation of Spinoza,  which goes 
against  the  grain of much contemporary opinion.  It is  the contention of this  thesis that 
Spinoza was a transcendent apriorist in the classic sense, and instantiated in his work one 
of the  highest  achievement  of that  epistemology.  However,  the  modem  interpretation 
denies  that  Spinoza  was  a  transcendent  apriorist  at  all.  Largely  the  traditional 
interpretation of Spinoza is  at the point of falling  out of favour  and  a new  "tradition" 
established.  The  new  interpretation  is  concerned  with  the  re-assessment  of rationalist 
philosophers  in  general  and  accuses  the  old  tradition  of misrepresenting  them  or 
"caricaturing" them for various non-philosophical reasons. 
The traditional interpretations. in contrast, have a long history beginning perhaps - as 
Curley.  the  great  enemy  of this  exegetic  tradition.  surprisingly  admits  - with  the 226 
rationalists themselves,  "to  some extent it  [the traditional interpretation]  may  represent 
the way Kant's predecessors thought of  themselves". 15 The clearest self-assessment of  the 
rationalist  project  in  this  mould  comes  in  Leibniz'  Preface  to  the  New  Essays.  The 
interpretation was further re-enforced by Kant in particular
16
•  Curley also  admits that  it 
probably represents Kant's view of his relation to his predecessors.  It  has  subsequently 
been, as he himself suggests, a huge influence on "the construction of  university curricula 
anthologies  and general histories of philosophy"  .17 All this  is  not to  suggest,  however. 
that the traditional interpretation is without modem defenders. 
It  will  be  interesting  to  note  at  this  point  how  the  defenders  of the  modem 
interpretation view the position from which they are  rebelling.  In appendix 2 (p.  254) 
quotations from some of  the staunchest defenders of  the modem position are listed. If  all 
this  is  correct then the philosophers who defend the traditional interpretation,  including 
Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza themselves (on Curley'S admission) are motivated not by 
consideration of the evidence or by what they intend  in  their own epistemologies,  but 
rather by  various  non-philosophical criteria.  These  include  aesthetic  pleasure,  neatness 
and organizational simplicity, the urge to think that philosophy is progressive, the urge to 
tell a story, the need for edification and finally the need to provide interest or drama to a 
dull subject through caricature. 
It is  certainly difficult to accept this view.  However, such motivational issues are  a 
side  issue  which  represent  ad  hominem  arguments  against  the  philosophers  invo Ived 
without proving or disproving the issue at stake. At best the arguments draw attention to 
a prejudice that could underlie a particular interpretation and of course it  is  wise to bare 
this in mind. It can be noted at this point that we have already identified a prejudice that 
could just as easily be said to underlie the motivation for the modem interpretation. That 
is the desire to distance major philosophers of  the past from the supposedly unacceptable 
epistemological position of  transcendent apriorism.  However, the real question can only 
be  answered,  in  this  section with respect to the case of Spinoza, with reference  to  the 
arguments involved and the textual evidence available. 
Although Curley cites Copleston as one of the defenders of the  traditional view 18. 
there is a sense in which he is wrong to do so. Copleston, with regard to Spin071l at  least. 
incorporates  both interpretations into  one exegesis  by  bifurcating  Spinoza's  philosophy 
into  contrasting aspects.  Certainly, Copleston does not countenance an  extreme modern 
position, which promotes (i) the role of  experience in Spinoza and (ii) his abandonment of 227 
final  causality to such an extent as to see him as a precursor to  the modern scientist.  In 
fact Copleston admits that a large part of  Spinoza's philosophy conforms to the traditional 
interpretation.  However,  there  is  also,  according  to  ~  an  aspect  of Spinoza's 
hil  h  "th  t  li t'  ,,19  ha  p  OSOp  y,  e na ura  s IC  aspect  ,t  t conforms to the modern interpretation and  is 
described as being  a "sketch of a programme for  scientific  research".20  We  are  warned 
that  this  aspect  is  not to  be  viewed  as  Spinoza's  exclusive  interest  but  it  is  certainly 
accepted as an important part of  his philosophical project. To prove that Copleston do~s 
not have the one-dimensional view,  with regard to Spinoza,  which Curley attributes to 
him, the following passage in which the above points are made is quoted: 
[155]  The  system of Spinoza is  thus  I  suggest,  two  faced.  The  metaphysic  of 
infinite  being  manifesting  itself in  finite  beings  looks  back  to  the  metaphysical 
systems of  the past. The theory that all finite beings and their modifications can be 
explained  in  terms  of causal  connections  which  are  in  principle  ascertainable, 
looks forward to those empirical sciences which do  in fact  omit consideration of 
final  causality and try to explain their data in terms of efficient causality.  If one 
stresses  the  metaphysical  aspect,  one  will  tend  to  see  Spinoza  primarily  as  a 
"pantheist",  as  one  who  endeavoured  to  develop  consistently,  even  if not 
successfully,  the  implications  of the  concept of God  as  infinite  and  completely 
non-dependent  being  if one  stresses  what  I  may  perhaps  call  the  "naturalistic 
aspect, one will tend to concentrate on Natura naturata, to question the propriety 
of calling  Nature  "God"  and of describing  it  as  "substance",  and  to  see  in  the 
philosophical system the sketch of a programme for scientific  research.  But one 
must not forget that Spinoza himself was a metaphysician with the ambitious aim 
of explaining reality or making the universe intelligible.  He may have anticipated 
hypotheses,  which  have  commended  themselves  to  many  scientists;  but  he 
concerned himself with metaphysical problems with which the scientist as scientist 
is not concerned.
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Copleston's  division  of Spinoza's  philosophy  into  two  parts  VIZ.  (i)  traditional 
metaphysics ("the metaphysical systems of  the past") and (ii) the "naturalistic aspect" or 
"the sketch of  a programme for scientific research" attempts to  strike a balance between 
the two types of interpretation. Yet, there is  little evidence to  substantiate a division of 
this nature. In fact, this thesis denies any such dualist position that provides room for an 
empirical  aspect.  It is  one of the contentions that there  is  an  overemphasis.  in  modern 
scholarship,  on the process of "rescuing" rationalist philosophers from  their supposedly 
dubious epistemology. This is a case in point. There seems to be desperation. on the part 
of modern  exegetes,  to  find  something approaching  modern  science  in  the  \\Titings  of Spinoza. Even Copleston, who is otherwise sympathetic to the traditional approach. feels 
compelled to do so, and yet it is pure anachronism. 
For one thing Spinoza's view of  the epistemology of  science contrasts quite strongly 
with our modem conception. The fundamental feature of  modem science \vas found to ~ 
its  aposteriorism,  not  exclusively  in  the  acquisition,  but  always  in  the justification of 
knowledge claims. There is a need for a distinction here because, as Cohen has suggested. 
science itself, in the Cartesian tradition that influenced Spinoza, was considered to haye a 
mathematical-type epistemology viz. one that was a priori in nature: 
[Q156] It was probably at least in part because of the important part played by 
mathematics  in  the  new mechanics of Kepler,  Galileo  and  Newton.  that  some 
philosophers thought it plausible to suppose that rationality was just as much the 
touchstone  of  scientific  truth  as  of mathematical  truth.  At  any  rate  that 
supposition seems to underlie the epistemologies of Descartes and  Spinoza.  for 
example,  in  which  observation  and  experiment  are  assigned  relatively  little 
•  22  unportance. 
Our  "modem"  science  therefore  is  defined  as  one  that  sees  an  important  role  for 
experience  in  its  epistemology.  In its  epistemological aspect  it  can  be  considered,  in 
Kenneth Winkler's terms, to be "content" empiricism or "justification" empiricism and  it 
can be  both. This is in direct contrast to Cartesian Science with its distrust of empirical 
content  or justification  and  its  reliance  on clear  and  distinct  ideas  attained  through 
intellectual  intuition  and  deduction  (rather  than  induction).  The  ideal  model  for  all 
knowledge, in this tradition, was mathematics and as a consequence natural science was 
to adopt the mathematical methodology. As Parkinson argues, "such a methodology, as is 
clear,  is  strongly a priori in nature. The mathematician does not proceed by experiment 
and  induction,  but works out the consequences of his  definitions  and  axioms  without 
reference to sense-experience; and it  is the mathematician's method of procedure which 
Spinoza, like Descartes, wishes to extend to all branches ofknowledge".23 In this respect. 
it  is the ideal of  Cartesian science to dispense with experience altogether. I say that this is 
their ideal because some practitioners of Cartesian science have a secondary inferior use 
for experience as providing various unprovable conjectures when, because of  the limits of 
the  human  nund,  they  cannot  proceed  a  priori.  Scientists  who  seyer  their  link  with 
experIence  completely  would  be  transcendent  apriorists  or  immanent  apriorists. 
Consequently they would be indistinguishable from either the rationalist metaphysician or the  Cartesian type scientists respectively.  To say therefore that  Spinoza had  "scientific" 
interests will not prove the modernist exegetes' point. He must prove, more specifically. a 
commitment to a particular scientific epistemology. 
It  is  certainly  true  that  Spinoza  was  extremely  interested  in  such  scientific 
understanding  in  the  experimental tradition.  His  English correspondent Oldenburg  was 
secretary of the Royal Society and kept  Spinoza informed about the  new  experimental 
methods. Through Oldenburg Spinoza was able to conduct an argument with the chemist 
Boyle concerning the latter's' chemical experiments. Oldenburg even sent Spinoza Boyle's 
recently published volume of  Physiological Essays and Spinoza made many observations 
and  criticisms  concerning  the  nature of the  "43  experiments  used  to  establish  Boyles 
conclusions". Oldenburg also frequently discusses with Spinoza the theories of  the Dutch 
physicist  and  astronomer  Huygens  with  particular  reference  to  his  theory  of comets. 
Furthermore,  Spinoza's own occupation as  a lens grinder gave him an  interest  in  optics 
and  it  was this interest that encouraged Leibniz to  send  Spinoza his  own paper on this 
subject, to which Spinoza replied with criticism. The letters of Spinoza even reveal that 
he  actually  conducted  some  experiments  particularly  on pressure.
24  He  wrote  a  small 
pamphlet on the rainbow and, at one point, had intended to write a treatise on physics.
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Although  to  what  extent  the  latter  would  have  followed  the  experimental  method  is 
another question. 
So  far  we  have  just  been  discussing  Spinoza's  interests  and  if this  were  all  the 
evidence available it might just be possible to admit that Spinoza had a passing interest in 
the  experimental methodology but never embraced  it  enthusiastically  as  the  great  new 
method in science. In fact his attitude to the methodology is usually very critical. Hall and 
Hall  in  "Philosophy and Natural Philosophy:  Boyle  and  Spinoza"  (l964)"~6 present  the 
Boyle correspondence as a classic confrontation between a rationalist and an empiricist. 
They highlight the fact  that Spinoza's main criticism of Boyle  was that  his  experiments 
were  largely  unnecessary.  This  point  is  also  made  by  McKeon
27  and  most  clearly  by 
Parkinson  when he  observes that,  "Spinoza,  in  his  correspondence  with  Boyle.  seems 
unable to understand the stress which Boyle laid on experiment. His view was that since 
physical Nature follows mechanical laws which can be  known in advance, and  since the 
implications  of these  can  be  deduced  mathematically,  any  experiment  is  practically  as 
good as any other".28 In fact, Leibniz in the New Essays made a similar criticism of Boyle 
where the rationalist point is made clearly: [Q157]  Spinoza  offered  a  similar  reflection  in  one  of his  letters.  He  \\as 
commenting ~n  a work of  Mr Boyles, who, it must be said, does spend rather too 
long on drawmg from countless fine experiments no conclusion except one which 
he  coul~ have  adop~ed. as a p~ciple, namely that everything in nature takes place 
mechanically - a prmclple which can be made certain by reason alone.  and  never 
by experiments, however many of  them one conducts.
29 
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Spinoza's attitude to experimentation was negative because for  him, as  for  Leibniz~ 
the necessity of experimentation was bound up with the limitations of the  human mind. 
All  attempts  must  be  made  to  prove  something  a  priori  before  we  must  accept  the 
uncertainty of any experimental method.  The experimental method  is  uncertain because 
the  conclusions that can be  drawn from it,  as Leibniz informs  us  above,  by  their  very 
nature  as  inductive inferences,  do  not possess necessity.  Necessity and  hence  certainty 
can only be provided by pure reason. As Spinoza observes "Reason perceives things truly 
as  they are  in themselves,  i.e.  not as  contingent  but  as  necessary,,30,  and  "The  object 
aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas,  such as are  produced by the pure 
intellect, and not by chance physical motions".31  Of course when human reason fails  due 
to  its  own  limitations,  unfortunately,  experimentation  is  all  that  remains.  However. 
experimentation can only deliver unprovable conjectures, never metaphysical truth.  The 
model  to  be  aspired to was divine  reason because all  things are  understood  by  God  a 
priori,  as  eternal truths.  However,  that  this  is  the  correct  interpretation  of Spinoza's 
attitude to experimentation will have to await proof until we discuss Spinoza's concept of 
imagination. 
In  the  seventeenth  century,  there  was  not  the  huge  prejudice  against  traditional 
metaphysics that exists today. Although Kant, almost a century later, bemoans that "the 
changed  fashion  of the  times  brings  metaphysics  nothing  but  scom,,)2  it  must  be 
remembered  that  Kant's  Inaugural  Dissertation  was,  in  fact,  a  work  of traditional 
metaphysics.  The  disparagement  of metaphysics  even  in  the  late  18th  century  was 
considered a "fashion". i.e.  a passing fad  arising recently from contemporary taste.  \\,ith 
regard to Spinoza and Leibniz's assessment of metaphysics in  the  17th century. the:  not 
only found  such metaphysics respectable, but  also  rather considered it  more  respectable 
and  important than the scientific endeavour (of the Cartesian or the  experimental  type). 
This  fact  still  requires  proving,  but  it  can  be  noted  at  this  point  that  this  attitude  to 
metaphysics  is  consistent  with  the  Cartesian  legacy  expressed  in  the  Llmous  passage 231 
where Descartes had compared philosophy to a tree; "the roots are metaphysics. the trunk 
is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences".  33 
The corollary to this attitude to metaphysics is the rejection of the idea that Spinoza 
was an immanent apriorist. It could, after all,  be accepted that Spinoza was an apriorist 
without the further commitment that his metaphysics was transcendent. Admittedly. there 
is  one sense  in which the metaphysics of Spinoza is  not transcendent  but  immanentist. 
There  is  no  Platonic  insistence  on the  existence  of a  supersensible  realm  that  exists 
independently of an actually realm of phenomena. The metaphysical monism of Spinoza 
precludes the existence of  two separate realms of  being. As a consequence of  this God or 
nature is described by Spinoza as, "the indwelling and not the transient cause of  things  ,,_'4 
because,  "besides  God there  can be  no  substance,  that is  nothing  in  itself external  to 
God,,35.  However, as we have noted before, this is not the sense of  "transcendent" that is 
necessarily required by transcendent apriorism.  The only requirement instead being  that 
there  is  an epistemological rather than an ontological transcending of experience.  The 
noumenal,  in  the  former  case,  would  be  "that  which  is"  as  it  is  known  by  the  pure 
intellect, in contrast to "that which is"  as revealed through phenomenal representations. 
The noumenal would "transcend" the phenomenal not to the extent that it  is necessarily a 
separate  ontological realm  "beyond"  phenomenal representations.  Rather just  from  the 
fact that it is, in epistemological terms, "beyond" phenomenal representations in the sense 
that  it  disregards  them and  posits  a  new criteria  for  judgement.  The  epistemological 
object  of transcendent  apriorism  can  be  the  noumenal  (Spinoza's  onto-monism)  or  a 
noumenal  world  (Plato'S  onto-dualism).  In contrast the  immanent  apriorist  has,  as  his 
epistemological object, the phenomenal world that he interprets through pure reason. The 
methodology of  the Cartesian science can be classed as immanent apriorism in this sense. 
It seems certain that if  Spinoza did plan to write a book on physics it would be in this 
Cartesian  tradition  not  in  the  immanent  aposteriorist  experimental  methodology.  For 
Spinoza clearly identifies empiricist philosophy with his epistemologically vague "second 
mode of perception".36  In a footnote relating to his  section on this  vague  cognition  he 
observes  "I  shall here treat a little more in detail of experience. and  shall  examine  the  , 
method  adopted by  the  Empirics,  and  by  recent  philosophers".37 The  second  mode  of 
cognition,  on which  these  "empirics"  rely  is  designated  "Perception arising  from  mere 
experience,,38  and  is  further  described,  in  the  section to  which  the  footnok  refers.  a"i 
follows: [Q15~] The seco~d mode of perception cannot be  said to give us the proportion 
of which we are ill search. Moreover its results are very uncertain and indefinite. 
for .we shall never. disco",er anything in natural phenomena by its  means.  except 
aCCIdental  propertIes, which are never clearly understood,  unless the essence  0 f 
things in question be known first. Wherefore this mode also must be rejected.39 
Spinoza  then  clearly  states  that  nothing  except  "accidental"  (rather  than  essential) 
properties can be  discovered of natural phenomena through the empirics'  method.  Is  it 
then likely that he would use this method in his scientific work? 
It is clear anyway that metaphysics is  more important to Spinoza than physics.  The 
most important epistemological object, for ~  is the noumenal not the phenomenal. To 
think  differently,  like  the empiricists,  is  to fall  into  error,  "The  nature of God.  which 
should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of  knowledge and the 
order of  nature, they have taken to be  last in the order of  knowledge, and have put into 
the first place what they call the objects of  sensation  ... So it  is  hardly to be  wondered at. 
that these persons contradict themselves freely".40 It seems strange to say but there is.  as 
a consequence, a remarkable resemblance between Parmenides and Spinoza both in terms 
of  epistemology and the metaphysical conclusions derivative of  this epistemology. Both in 
fact  stand  out  as  extreme  examples  of philosophers  who  transcend  the  phenomenal 
without compromise. The noumenal, in Parmenides, as we have seen, contradicted in an 
extravagant way all our phenomenal experience. The most common phenomena revealed 
by experience viz. motion, change, imperfection, duration, plurality, diversity. divisibility, 
separateness,  generation  and  destruction  were  all  denied  by  Parmenides  as  mere 
representations. 
The noumenal world of Spinoza is equally distant from phenomenal representations. 
In  the  examples  given  below  the  fact  that  God  is  presented  as  possessing  certain 
attributes may appear confusing. However, for Spinoza, the principle of  all-inclusiveness, 
"Whatsoever is  is  in God,,41  follows from his monistic view of substance. This meant a  , 
commitment to the pantheist doctrine that God was in  fact  identical with the  universe. 
This  identity is  manifest is  Spinoza's term for the supreme deity.  viz.  Deus seu  \:atura 
(God or nature). Hence Spinoza's God has the same meaning content as Parmenides' "that 
which is". 
With regard to this referent then there is,  in Spinoza, a denial of: (i)jll1i/el1(,ss:  "Lvcry 
substance is  necessarily infinite. ,,42;  (ii) dura/ion:  "God and  all  the attributes of God arc ~33 
eternal,,43  and  "in  eternity  there  is  no  such  thing  as  when.  before  or  after"-l4  (cf 
Parmenides); (iii)  contingency:  "Nothing in the universe  is  contingent.  but  all  things are 
conditioned to exist  and  operate in  a particular manner  by  the  necessity  of the  diyine 
nature,,45;  (iv)  divisibility:  "No  attribute of substance  can be  conceived  from  which  it 
would  follow  that  substance  can  be  divided,,46;  "Substance  absolutely  infinite  is 
indivisible,,47;  (v)  change:  "it  follows  that  God,  and  all  the  attributes  of God.  are 
unchangeable
48
;  (vi) imperfection: It clearly follows from what we have said. that things 
have been brought into being by God in the highest perfection.,,49. "Reality and Perfection 
I use as synonymous terms50; (vii) plurality, "There cannot be granted several substances. 
but  one  substance  only,,51,  "Only one substance can be  granted  in  the  universe,,5~ and 
finally (viii) generation: "Substance cannot be produced or created".53 
The  distinction  between the  noumenal and  phenomenal  in  Spinoza  is,  as  we  have 
stated,  not  that they exist  ontologically as  two  separate  worlds.  Rather  it  is  that  the 
noumenal world is  the world as it  is  conceived, in epistemological terms,  by  the  noetic 
functions,  whereas  the  phenomenal  world  is  the  world  as  conceived  by  the  aesthetic 
functions.  In the following quotation Spinoza's use of the term imagination is equivalent 
to  sense  perception or experience.  The  exact  meaning  of the  term  in  Spinoza  will  be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. It is  sufficient here to note that  it  is only distinct 
from sense perception or experience and hence non-interchangeable with them because it 
is  more  inclusive.  The  following  quotation  demonstrates  Spinoza's  attitude  to  the 
epistemological objects and his commitment to the noumenal world (in the above sense): 
[Q159] If  anyone asks me the further question, why are we naturally so  prone to 
divide  quantity? I  answer, that quantity is  conceived by  us  in  two  ways;  in  the 
abstract  and  superficially,  as  we imagine  it;  or as  substance,  as  we  conceive  it 
solely  by  the  intellect.  If,  then,  we  regard  quantity  as  it  is  represented  in  our 
imagination,  which we often and more easily  do,  we  shall  find  that  it  is  finite. 
divisible, and compounded of parts; but if  we regard it  as  it  is  represented in our 
intellect,  and  conceive it  as  substance,  which  it  is  very difficult  to  do.  we  shall 
then, as I have sufficiently proved, find that it is infinite, one, and indivisible.  This 
will  be  plain enough to all,  who make a distinction between the intellect and  the 
imagination. 54 
For  Spinoza,  in  contrast  to  the  modern  scientist.  justificatory  experiments  In  the 
phenomenal  were  considered  unreliable  and  deceptive.  Knowledge  derived  trom  them 
was termed, "knowledge from vague experience"s:, (cognitio ab experientia \'aga)  and  it 234 
could not justifY or falsifY a truth concerning the noumenal world. In fact. to rely on this 
data instead of  the data supplied by the pure intellect was the source of serious error. It 
could give  you a totally distorted picture of reality.  i.e.  the  phenomenal one.  Such an 
error usually  resulted  from  a  hazy distinction between understanding  and  imagination. 
This  meant  non-recognition that  reliance  should  not  be  placed  in  the  objects  of the 
imagination. 
[Q160] We now know that the operations, whereby the effects of  imagination are 
produced,  take  place  under  other  laws  quite  different  from  the  laws  of the 
understanding, and that mind is entirely passive with regard to them.  Whence we 
may also see how easily men may fall into grave errors through not distinguishing 
accurately  between  the  imagination  and  the  understanding;  such  as  believing 
extension must be localized, that it must be finite, that its parts are different from 
one  another,  that  it  is  the  primary  and  single  foundation  of all  things,  that  it 
occupies  more  space  at  one  time  than  at  another,  and  other  similar  doctrines 
entirely opposed to truth.  56 
It will be noted that the grave errors mentioned are also made by Cartesian science whose 
object,  though not its  epistemological instrument,  is  the phenomenal world revealed to 
the imagination. True and certain knowledge, in contrast, results from a priori deduction 
from  the nature of God as defined and characterized above,  "The highest endeavour of 
the  mind,  and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. 
The third kind of  knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of  certain attributes of  God 
to an adequate knowledge of  the essence of  things" .57 
The above point will become clear when we now discuss Spinoza's attitude towards 
experience.  This attitude to experience must be  seen in the context of Spinoza's overall 
aim.  For Spinoza, the highest aim in life  is to attain to the perfect understanding of the 
noumenal  world,  knowledge  available,  in  its  entirety,  only  to  the  divine  intellect.  The 
mind  must  be directed away from perishable phenomenon that  cause  mental  confusion 
and  disturbance:  "All  these  [disturbances  of mind]  arise  from  the  love  of what  is 
perishable,  such as the objects already mentioned.  But  love  towards a thing eternal and 
infinite  feeds  the mind wholly with joy".58 The mind  must be  re-directed towards things 
eternal  and  infinite,  towards  that,  as  yet,  unknown  something  "the  discovery  and 
attainment  of which  would  enable  me  to  enjoy  continuous,  supreme.  and  unending 
happiness".59  This however is not the renunciation of the world. considered as  a vale  of 
tears, for the transcendent realm of angels, spirits. and God that is  familiar  in  mysticism. As we have seen, Spinoza will not allow two separate ontological realms. rather there is 
only  one  realm  differently  conceived  depending  on  the  epistemological  instruments 
engaged. 
For  Spinoza  then  that  which  guarantees  happiness  and  blessedness  is  not  the 
translocation of  the soul in death or life to the realm of  spirit but rather the attainment of 
an epistemological state in which one sees the world in its true light, i.e.  not as perishable 
and finite but as eternal and infinite. The world in its true light is the noumenal world and 
the noumenal world is attained by the development of  the pure understanding: 
[Q 161]  Thus in life  it  is  before all things useful to perfect the understanding.  or 
reason, as far as we can, and in this alone man's highest happiness or blessedness 
consists,  indeed blessedness is  nothing else but the contentment of spirit.  which 
arises from the intuitive knowledge of God: now, to perfect the understanding is 
nothing else but to understand God, God's attributes, and the actions which follow 
from the necessity of his nature.  Wherefore of a man.  who  is  led  by  reason. the 
ultimate aim or highest desire, whereby he seeks to govern all his fellows.  is that 
whereby he  is  brought to the adequate conception of himself and  of all  things 
within the scope of  his intelligence.60 
It is just this knowledge that science, with its epistemological reliance on the phenomenal 
world revealed to the senses, could not deliver, for "the first principle of  nature ... has no 
likeness  to  mutable  things,,61.  Things  are  mutable  only  under  the  aspect  of the 
imagination.  Only transcendent apriorism with its rejection of the aesthetic  functions  in 
favour  of pure  reason  can  attain  to  knowledge  of the  noumenal.  Pure  reason  is 
fundamental;  "1  shall  first  set  forth  the  object  aimed  at,  and  next  the  means  for  its 
attainment. The object aimed at is the acquisition of clear and distinct ideas. such as are 
produced by the pure intellect, and not by chance physical motions,,62,  because  it  is  that 
which sees the world correctly, i.e.  as noumenal in nature.  There  is  for  Spinoza, a path 
whereby the intellect, according to its capacity, may attain knowledge of  eternal thingS.
63 
Certainly  Science,  if it  relies  on  sensory  experience  for  its  primary  data  or  its 
epistemological justification, can never attain to more than the contingent. 
So far this is quite general and it  is important now to give a more detailed picture of 
Spinoza's  epistemology.  Let  us  first  examine  Spinoza's  epistemological  assessment  of 
sensory  experience  because  this  is  an  area  in  which  the  modem  scientist  and  the 
transcendent' apriorist  can be  seen to  disagree  most  strongly.  For the  modern  scientist 
sensory  experience  is  used  as  the  source.  the  justification  for.  or the  falsification  l) r ~36 
knowledge claims. For the transcendent apriorist sensory experience normally only plays 
an extrinsic role in knowledge origination and none at  all  in  knO\\ ledge justification or 
falsification.  Spinoza uses the tenn "imagination" to encompass all that is meant today b: 
sensory perception, although it  is  more inclusive.  For it  designates what  Spinoza calls 
"knowledge from symbols", i.e. knowledge that does not come directly from the senses 
but rather from heteronymous sources: 
[Q162]  From all  that has  been said  above  it  is  clear,  that  we,  in  many  cases. 
perceive the fonn our general notions: - (1) From particular things represented to 
our intellect fragmentarily,  confusedly,  and without order through our  senses~ I 
have  settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from  the  mere 
suggestions of  experience. (2) From symbols, e.g., from the fact of  having read or 
heard certain words we remember things and fonn ideas concerning them. similar 
to  those  through  which  we  imagine  things.  I  shall  call  both  these  ways  of 
regarding things knowledge of  the first kind, opinion or imagination.  64 
Of course  the  tenn  imagination  used  by  a  modem  philosopher  would  have  a 
completely different sense, a sense not included in Spinoza's definition. In the light of  this 
discrepancy Spinoza's sense will be designated by writing imaginationt. The modem use 
of the tenn is designated imagination2. The connection between imagination and sensory 
perception in Spinoza is discussed by Parkinson: 
[Q163]  It is  clear  that  what  has  been described  in  the  foregoing  account  of 
"imagination" is sense perception, and the physical processes which correspond to 
it.  That Spinoza uses "imagination" in this sense was also noted at §6.5 when the 
example of  the distance of  the sun was cited. This differs from the most modem 
sense of the word, in which it  roughly means thinking of things,  which are  not 
present.  65 
Of course  Spinoza  uses  the  more  traditional  terms  like  the  senses,  sensation.  and 
experience with an almost identical reference. However, his use of  the term perception is 
the exception and requires to be understood as equivalent to cognition. 
Spinoza's attitude towards imagination1  or sense perception is,  with the exception of 
one  peculiar  case,  totally  negative.  Ideas  that  have  their  genesis  in  imaginationt  are 
considered to be a primary source of  error, "Thus, then, we have distinguished between a 
true  idea  and  other  perceptions,  and  shown  that  ideas  fictitious.  false,  and  the  rest. 
originate  in  the imagination"M and "Everyone judges of things according to  the  state of ~37 
his  bra~ or rather mistakes for things the forms of  his imagination".  67  Consider also the 
relevance of  the following quotation: 
[Q164]  We  have  now perceived,  that  all the  explanations  commonly  given  of 
nature  are  mere  modes  of imagining,  and  do  not  indicate  the  true  nature  of 
anything,  but only the constitution of the  imagination;  and  although  they  have 
names, as though they were entities, existing externally to the imaginatioIL  I call 
them entities imaginary rather than real; and,  therefore, all  arguments against  us 
drawn from such abstractions are easily rebutted.  68 
Notice how Parmenidean this  last  quotation is.  We  have  seen that  in  the  "Way  of 
Truth"  the  "dazed  undiscriminating  hordes"  mistakenly  assign  names  to  those  things 
revealed by their sense experience and hence posit the existence of  things which are not.
6Q 
For  Spinoza  imaginationl  gives  rise  to  an  army  of entities  that  have  names  but  no 
existence in reality. Spinoza observes that men were, "bound to form abstract notions for 
the  explanation of the nature of things".70 These  included,  "goodness,  badness,  order. 
confusion,  warmth,  cold,  beauty,  deformity,  and  so  on".71  Such  abstract  notions  are. 
"nothing but modes of  imagining, in which the imagination is differently affected". 72  Yet 
they are, "considered by the ignorant as the chief attributes 0 f things" .  73 
For Spinoza then that which is represented to us by the senses gives rise to one of  the 
two  lowest  forms  of cognition  possible.  Any  knowledge  claim  derived  from  these 
cognitions  is  perhaps  superior,  in terms of its  truthfulness,  only  to  those  insubstantial 
claims  derived  from  second  hand  opinion.  Included  in  this  category  would  be  the 
scholastic  "argument  from  authority"  as  defended  by  Aquinas  and  other  more  simple 
cases  that  Spinoza mentions,  viz.  knowledge passed down from  one's  parents e.g.  the 
belief that  I  was  born  on  such  and  such  a  day.  Also  included  are  the  so  called. 
"perceptions  arising  from  signs"  viz.  those  acquired,  "from  the  fact  that  having  read 
certain words we form certain ideas of  them through which we imagine the things". 74  It is 
said that, for Spinoza, cognitions that have their genesis in sense perception are "perhaps" 
superior to the abovementioned types, because this is  uncertain.  In the  Ethics there are 
only three categories of cognition with knowledge from  second hand  opinion and  from 
sense-experience  classed together.  However,  in  the  earlier  On  the  Improl't!menl  (?( Ihe 
Understanding,  there  are  four  categories,  sense  experience  being  in  the  third  while 
second hand opinion is in the forth. 238 
What  is  certain is  that,  whatever the exact  order,  knowledge  claims  derived  from 
sense experience are fallacious. In the Ethics it is referred to in the following terms: 
[Q165]  From  single  things,  which  are  represented  to  us  bv  the  senses  in  a 
mutilated and confused form,  and without order to the  intelle~t (see  ii.  29 Cor). 
and so I have been accustomed to call such perceptions "knowledge from vague 
experience" (cognitio ab experientia vaga).75 
Firstly,  this  talk of sensory  representation as  "confused"  calls  to  mind  Descartes' 
revival of the well-known "argument from illusion" which makes much of cases such as 
that of  the stick that appears bent in water, where the information provided by the senses 
can  be  misleading.  Secondly,  the  labelling  of sensory  experience  as  vaga  (fleeting. 
inconstant) might recall Plato's argument that claims based on the  senses that count as 
true at a certain time, or from a certain point of view, may turn out to be  false  later, or 
from a different point of  view. All these lines of  argument may have indirectly influenced 
Spinoza's attitude to inconstant experience,,76, but the argument that is most characteristic 
of his  thinking  about  sensory experience depends on his  distinction between adequate 
perception,  "All ideas are in God and in so far as they are referred to God are true and 
adequate;  therefore there are no  ideas confused or inadequate,  except  in  respect  to  a 
particular  mind"  77,  and  "inadequate"  perception,  "Falsity  consists  in  the  privation  of 
knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary or confused ideas involve".78 
An adequate perception involves not merely a perception that something is  actually 
the case, but an understanding of  the necessity for its being true. Now an isolated sensory 
perception will merely convey the information that something is the case.  However. no 
series  of perceptions,  however  extended,  can of itself be  sufficient  to  establish  that 
something must be the case. It follows that one who is in search of  necessary truth must 
go  beyond the data of the senses. For Spinoza there are three kinds of knowledge. The 
first  kind  is  inclusive  of the  imagination  and  is  the  source  of falsity  and  cannot  be 
established with certainty the other two kinds correspond to  the understanding and  are 
necessarily true. 
For Spinoza, as for all transcendent apriorists, the aesthetic functions of the intellect 
have  the  epistemologically  degenerate  role  of bringing  a  confused  apprehension  of 
phenomena.  As  Spinoza  clearly  states,  "Imagination  is  the  idea  wherewith  the  mind 
contemplates a  thing as  present~ yet this idea indicates rather the present disposition of ~39 
the  human body rather than the nature of the  external thing"  79  For  S  .  't'  h  .  pmoza.  1  IS  t  e 
noetic functions that bring knowledge of  the noumenal world which is  seen as mirrorino 
e 
the thing-in-itself 
It is interesting to note how this is tied in with the doctrine of the immortality of the 
soul.  In Plato  the  understanding  is  best  able  to  contemplate  the  truth concerning  the 
noumenal world when divorced from the body,  i.e.  in death.  Now Spinoza is sometimes 
considered to reject the immortality of the soul.  Yet this  is just not  the  case.  although 
there is  no  indication that the soul after death improves its epistemological position.  In 
Spinoza's  theory  the  understanding  survives  death  whereas  the  imagination  and  the 
memory are destroyed: 
[166]  The mind can only imagine anything,  or remember what  is  past.  while the 
body endures.  80 
[167]  The mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body,  but  there remains 
of  it something which is eternal.  81 
[168]  Hence  it  follows  that the part of the  mind  which endures,  be  it  great  or 
small,  is  more  perfect  than  the  rest.  For  the  eternal  part  of the  mind  is  the 
understanding, through which alone we are said to act the part we have shown to 
perish is the imagination through which only we are said to be passive. 82 
The truth is that one can grasp the truth equally well when one is still living as long as one 
ignores  the  promptings  of the  imagination,  which  is  described  as  "passive".  The 
imagination is passive because forces interacting with the human body determine it  from 
without.  The understanding is  active because with its use, the truth is determined by  the 
autonomous intellect working with its own innate (rather then acquired  by  experience) 
instruments of  truth: 
[169]  Hence it  follows that the human mind,  when  it  perceives things  after the 
common  order  of nature,  has  not  an  adequate  but  only  a  confused  and 
fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies.  For the 
mind  does  not  know  itself,  except  in  so  far  as  it  perceives  the  ideas  of the 
modifications of body.  It only perceives its own body through the  ideas  of the 
modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means; thus. in 
so  far  as  it  has such ideas of modification,  it  has not  an  adequate knowledge of 
itself, but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof I say expressly. that 
the  mind  has not  an adequate but only  a confused knowledge of itself,  its  own. 
body. and external bodies, whenever it perceives things after the  commo~  ord~r 0/ 
nature~ that is,  whenever it  is detennined from without. namely.  hy  the tortuttous 
play of circumstance, to regard this or that: not at  such times as  it  is  detemlineJ from wit~  that is by the fact of  regarding several things at once, to understand 
their points of  agreement, difference and contrast. Whenever it is determined from 
wit~  it regards things clearly and distinctly  ... 83 
Curley has  suggested that there is  no  theory of innate  ideas  in  Spinoza.  Again  this  i-; 
clearly  a  mistake
84
.  If truth  is  to  be  brought  forth  deductively  (Spinoza's  ~10re 
Geometrico method in addition to what we have said before is evidence of this) from the 
active part of  the mind, viz.  the understanding, without recourse to the passive elements 
of experience; if  it is to be "determined from within"  then the mind  must  have  its  OW11 
intellectual tools underived from experience.  In our chapter on Leibniz  we  discovered 
that most usually the theory of  innate ideas is given as an explanation of  how this process 
is to be possible. For the transcendent apriorist this is most coherent theory and Spinoza 
clearly adheres to it: 
[Q170] Just as men in the beginning were able to make the easiest things with the 
tools they were born with [innatis intrumentis]. .. so the intellect, by its own inborn 
power  [vi nativa]  makes  intellectual tools  for  itself by  which  it  acquires  other 
powers for other intellectual works  ... and so proceeds by stages to the pinnacle of 
wisdom.  85 
[Q 171]  Let us,  then,  enumerate here the properties of the understanding,  let  us 
examine them, and begin by discussing the instruments for research, which we find 
•  •  86  mnate m us. 
All  the  elements  are  now in  place  for  categorizing  Spinoza as  a  classic  transcendent 
apriorist. The modem theory must find other arguments. Anyway, is it likely that Spinoza 
was not working within the Cartesian tradition of  transcendent apriorism? CONCLUSION 
There is undoubtedly more to transcendent apriorism than one is normally led to  expect. 
It has  been demonstrated that,  even the  epistemological  definition  of the  doctrine,  is 
extremely  complex  and  great  care  is  required  in  its  statement.  The  errors  and 
misconceptions,  exposed in the course of this  thesis,  are  testimony to  an  unwarranted 
simplistic  approach.  In fact,  transcendent  apriorism  has  a  rich  diversity  of forms.  an 
almost Byzantine epistemology and an extensive historical tradition. It has been defended 
be  some of the greatest minds in the philosophical tradition.  Even  Kant,  the  man  who 
supposedly  refuted the doctrine,  defended  an  important  variant  of it  in  the  Inaugural 
Dissertation.  Subsequent  to  the  publication  of the  Critique  of Pure  Reason.  it  is 
regrettable  that  philosophers  did  not  follow  Hegel's  objective  methodology  in  their 
assessments. Instead, a new dark age for the understanding of  the doctrine emerged. 
Unfortunately, modem analytic  philosophy, with its  inception as  a rebellion against 
Hegelianism,  encouraged philosophers to ignore Hegel's important  legacy.  If there  had 
been  an  awareness  of the  powerful  arguments  that  Hegel  had  mustered  against  the 
Kantian  refutation of transcendent  apriorism,  then the  damaging  attitude  of contempt 
would  never have  emerged.  Due to this  attitude, that has  been engendered  in  current 
debate, this thesis has had to completely redefine the doctrine and reformulate its history 
and  epistemology from  scratch.  However,  progress has  been made  and  the  thesis  has 
fulfilled  a propaedeutic function in clearing the way for  an overdue reappraisal.  Before. 
there was merely a blank canvas, but now at least the basic outlines have been drawn in. 
Hence,  it  is  now possible to determine whether the arguments that  have  been  used 
against transcendent apriorism actually apply to it,  only to part of it.  or just entirely miss 
the mark.  For example, the criticism of  the two world's aspect of  transcendent apriorism. 
by  the  phenomenologist,  does  not  impact  upon  the  doctrine  in  toto.  Parmenides  and 
Spinoza were transcendent apriorists. who because of their rigid onto-monism. could not 
logically  posit another world.  For them.  there was only  one  world.  Yiz.  the  noumcnal. 
Similarly.  the  new distinction between ratiocinative and  illuminative  variants means  that an  attack,  for  instance,  on Descartes'  circular  ratiocination  would  not  impact  on  an 
illuminative  theorist  like  Malebranche.  These  seminal  divisions  between  transcendent 
apriorist philosophers are illustrated, in summary fo~  in Appendix 3 (p. 255). 
It is certainly testimony to the strength of  the analysis that many historical problems 
connected with transcendent apriorist epistemology have been resolved.  Even perennial 
difficulties like the status of  the Parmenidean way of  opinion and the Cartesian circle have 
been taken forward by the new more intricate epistemological analysis.  This conclusion 
will  be  used  to  build  further  upon this  newly  established  epistemological  foundation. 
Substantial  arguments  have  already  been  given  against  epistemological  attacks  on 
transcendent  apriorism.  Hence,  much  of the  material  given  here  is  supplemental. 
However,  many of the  most  recent  articles  relating  to  the  questions  involved  will  be 
examined,  including  a profound puzzle set by Derrida.  One of the  strongest arguments 
against the putative refutation of transcendent apriorism was developed in  chapter 8.  A 
wide range of  philosophers, including Kant, have thought that a special intuition capable 
of  grasping the in-itself, was required for transcendent apriorism to be possible.  Yet. this 
argument was found to be misdirected because the transcendent apriorist himself admits 
that such an intuition would require a mystical union with the knowledge  0 bject.  It  is  a 
fundamental revelation that the transcendent apriorist claims only an indirect knowledge 
of  the in-itself, through its parity with the noumenal.  However, it is undoubtedly true that 
the issue of  rational intuition is essential to any reappraisal of  the doctrine. 
Let us begin then with the illuminative version of  transcendent apriorism, which never 
seems to be directly considered in modem critical assessments. The type of  intuition upon 
which this version of rationalism is founded,  viz.  illuminative intuition,  is  rarely,  if ever. 
properly distinguished or understood and is only dealt with obliquely. It is not wise just to 
ignore an epistemological theory that has played an important part in the development of 
transcendent apriorism. Let us therefore consider its legitimacy. The only correct \vay  to 
test this form of  intuition seems to be in experiential terms. In fact.  illuminative intuition is 
a form of  cognitive experience that must be undergone in order to  be assessed at all.  I  t is 
important to recognize that it is not a judgement of  any sort and consequently it does not 
take a propositional form.  It can putatively supervene upon (Plato. Plotinus) or function 
to  legitimize (Malebranche) propositional understanding. The  insight  gained  can even  he 
written  down as  a  sequence of words that  have  the  appearance of propositional  tl)flll 
(Wittgensteinl).  Yet.  in  this  latter case,  Rudolf Carnap  would  call  such  a  SCqUCTKL'  of words a "pseudo-proposition,,2 because, although "such a sequence of words looks like a 
statement at first glance,,3, it does not articulate some truth in the fonn ofa statement.4 
However,  Camap's  argument  does  not  refute  the  illuminative  transcendent  apriorist's 
position,  for  the  simple  reason that an epistemologist of this  type  does  not  think  that 
truths can only be conveyed in propositional form.  Although often closely connected in a 
variety of  ways with propositional knowing illuminative intuition is always extrinsic to  it·  .  . 
as has already been maintained illuminative intuition is completely sui generis. 
Let us develop this point further. It has been stated that, although A.  1.  Ayer fuils  to 
properly distinguish illuminative intuition from hyper-noetic vision, his arguments against 
mystical intuitions could, nevertheless, be used against illuminative intuition. Ayer would 
certainly  not deny the possibility of the intuitions mentioned;  rather  he  stipulates  that 
those who  claim to have them must transform them into propositional fonn so  that the 
verifiability criteria can properly function,  "We  wait  to  hear what  are  the  propositions 
which embody his  [the mystics] discoveries, in order to see whether they are verified or 
confuted by our empirical observations". 
5 It is here that, in my opinion, Ayer goes wrong 
and it  is this mistake, which marks the point of separation between the logical-positivist 
doctrines  of the Vienna circle  and the  views of Ludwig  Wittgenstein  in  the  Traclatus 
Logico-Philosophicus.  For Wittgenstein rightly recognized that,  although certain things 
could  not  be  said  to  be  true,  they  could,  at  least,  be  shown  to  be  true.  Hence,  to 
categorize something as unsayable, for Wittgenstein, is not to affirm that it  is completely 
inexpressible in any form. Rather it is only to say that it  is inexpressible as a proposition. 
Hence  informative cognitions are postulated that can be  disclosed to  us,  but just not  in 
propositional form, "What can be shown cannot be said".6 
In fact,  for Wittgenstein, that which could be  intrinsically expressed in propositional 
fonn  was  limited  and  philosophically unimportant.  Facts  about  how  the  world  is,  the 
propositions of  natural science, could certainly be expressed as propositions, "The totality 
of true propositions is the total natural science (or the totality of the natural sciences)".  7 
However these propositions are irrelevant for providing answers to "higher" philosophical 
questions  which  constitute  what  is  fundamentally  important.  "How  the  world  is,  is 
completely indifferent for what is higher"g and "The solution of the riddle of lik in space 
and time lies outside space and time (it is not problems of natural science which ha\c to 
be solved)".9 For Wittgenstein then all  philosophically important matters. the meaning of 
existence, whether the soul is immortal. whether God exists. and all  religious. ethical and aesthetic questions are inexpressible in propositional form because "Propositions cannot 
hin  hi  h  ,,10  As  express anyt  g  g er.  a consequence, "We feel that even if  all possible scientific 
questions be answered, the problems of  life have still not been touched at all".ll 
To answer then the really important questions is  to transcend the  limits  of what  is 
expressible as a proposition. Now Ayer12  and Carnap both have the prejudice that what 
cannot be  intrinsically expressed as a  proposition must  be just gibberish.  \\'ittgenstein 
would  certainly  not  agree.  That  which  cannot  be  expressed  as  a  proposition.  for 
Wittgenstein, can still disclose itself to consciousness - it can show itself, "There is indeed 
the inexpressible. This shows itself'.  13  This notion of "showing" is closely related to what 
has been termed illuminative intuition. It is certainly not an irrational hyper-noetic vision. 
Wittgenstein  does  sometimes  use  the  term  Das  Mystische  in  relation  to  "showing". 
However,  as  H.  O.  Mounce correctly explains,  "This  word  [mystical]  has  unfortunate 
connotations,  which perhaps the  German equivalent  lacks;  it  suggests  a  revelation  of 
extraordinary events by extra ordinary means. But this is not at all what Wittgenstein had 
in mind". 14  For Wittgenstein it is philosophical puzzles that are mystical.  not revelations 
from  the  beyond,  "It  is  not how things  are  in  the  world that  is  mysticaL  but  that  it 
exists"  .15  Having  said this,  there may be  still  a  suspicion here of Bergson's  error
16  of 
confusing the non-discursive with some form of  mysticism. 
We have seen, in our discussion of  the secret doctrine, that Plato also considers that 
the  ultimate  philosophical  insight  cannot  be  expressed  in  propositional  form.  In  fact, 
because of the complete inadequacy of language for  this function  anyone  who  tries to 
express  it  in  this  way has  "utterly blasted his  wits". 17  Similarly,  we  saw that  Bergson 
thinks that because language can only express those universals, which function to aid our 
biological survival, it is useless for attaining to metaphysical insight.  In both these cases 
as with Wittgenstein's, it would be a mistake for Ayer to "wait" for these philosophers to 
"embody their insights" in propositional form.  Ayer's position would only make sensc if 
what ultimately counted as a rational intuition were limited to non-acquaintive examples. 
Yet.  this thesis  has attempted to identifY  and distinguish all types of rational  intuition. 
Failure  to  do  this  has  resulted  in  many  confusions  that  are  exemplified  evcn  in 
contemporary debate. 
Those who wish to defend some contemporary fonn of "rational intuition". usually as 
an  explanation  for  a  priori  knowledge.  restrict  themselves  to  the  non-acquaintivc 
deductive  and  axiomatic  intuitions.  In  a  recent  \\ork.  Laurence  Bonjour.  has  defincd rational intuition as  "intuitive  insight  into  necessity".18  The  term necessity.  as  Bonjour 
uses it, is a qualifier that applies to propositions. Now, as we haye seeIL  an insight that a 
proposition,  or  sequence  of propositions,  is  necessary  is  very  different  from  an 
acquaintive insight into reality, which is not mediated through propositions. It  is  not. tor 
example,  the proposition that  "God exists"  that Malebranche grasped  \\ith illuminativL' 
intuition.  In fact,  illuminative  intuition cannot grasp  propositions at  all  for  the  simple 
reason that it is acquaintive in nature and consequently connects with reality directly. It: 
for  Malebranche, the knowledge that God exists were propositional, how could  he  say 
that it guarantees knowledge in a way that avoids the problem with the Cartesian circle? 
If Malebranche  had  a  rational intuition in  Bonjour's sense,  viz.  one  that  grasped  the 
necessity of  the proposition "God exists", then he would be using propositional intuitions 
to  legitimize  other  propositional  intuitions.  This  would  inevitably  lead  us  back  into 
circular forms of  argument. 
In  conclusion,  the  Ayer  argument  projected  from  mysticism  to  illuminative 
transcendent apriorism misses its target.  The verifiability argument  is  set  up  on an  un-
argued  for  prejudice  viz.  that  all  knowledge  is  propositional.  Ayer's  only  response  to 
those that posit a form of  illuminative intuition is to commit a category mistake by asking 
them to transform what is essentially non-propositional into propositional form so that it 
can  be  assessed.  Illuminative  transcendent  apriorism  therefore  survives  criticism  that 
arises from Ayer's supposed comprehensive refutation of  metaphysics. 
Like  Ayer,  most modem commentators just ignore,  or are  unaware of illuminative 
transcendent apriorism and its sui generis insight, illuminative intuition. It is  almost as if 
there is a consensus only to examine those rational intuitions connected with the necessit y 
of propositions.  In a recent article entitled "Rationalism,  Empiricism,  and the  A Priori" 
Quassim Cassas, in stating the "standard" account of  Bonjour makes an instructive error. 
in this respect, when he observes: 
[Q172]  According  to  the  standard  account  ... rationalism  is  then  said  to  he 
committed  to  the  principle  that  the  source  of some  or  all  of our  a .pr.iori 
knowledge is  what is variously described as 'rational intuition'. 'clear and  dlst.m~t 
perception',  or 'rational insight'.  For one's knowledge of p to  count  as  a. pno:l. 
one's justification for believing this proposition must be a priori. and, the  ~atlOn~hs~ 
claims that rational intuition or one of its variants is  the source of  one s a pnOrI 
justification.  19 ~46 
Here then, there is a seamless epistemological leap from talking about rational intuition as 
the  source  of a  priori  knowledge,  to  the  assumption  that  this  knowledge  must  be 
propositional. This is because, although Cassam disagrees with BonJour's defence of  pure 
reason,  he  unquestioning  accepts  BonJour's  definition  of rational  intuition  as  only 
concerned with necessary propositions.  This  unargued for  assumption  is  all  the  more 
strange because, as we have seen, Kant certainly recognised the need to counter the non-
propositional version of a priori knowledge presented by Malebranche.  Why do modem 
philosophers not feel this need? 
One possible reason stems from their attitude to what 1. L. Mackie, with reference to 
any defence of  moral propositions which involve an appeal to rational intuition, has called 
"the  argument  from  queerness".20  Quassim  Cassam  has  extended  the  scope  of this 
argument to include any epistemological appeals to rational intuition.
21  The argument is 
that  rational  intuition  - which,  as  Christopher  Peacocke  observes  with  obvious 
reservations, has been associated with some of the "headier forms of rationalism,,22  - is 
just  too  strange  an  explanation  for  our  a  priori  epistemological  knowledge.  The 
explanation, in effect, would require us to posit a special faculty23,  described by some as 
"occult"  "mysterious"  or  "exotic",  which  is  at  variance  with  our ordinary  modes  of 
knowledge  acquisition.  This  is  a  common  argument  directed  not  against  non-
propositional  illuminative  intuition but rather against  any  form of rational  intuition of 
propositions. It could be used to counter defences of  aprioristic knowledge claims - in the 
ratiocinative model of  transcendent apriorism (Parmenides, Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza) 
or within another tradition (K.  Godef4, R. Penrose25) - that appeal to a form of rational 
intuition into  the necessity of a proposition. It is  obvious that the queerness argument 
could be used  a fortiori  against illuminative intuition and the illuminative tradition.  ,  , 
The argument has been taken so seriously that it has forced Christopher Peacocke to 
develop a more "sober" explanation of  epistemological phenomena. He has consequently 
developed a "programme for moderate rationalism".26 However, if  such an alternative. to 
positing  rational  intuition,  is  not  found  then  the  normal  response  to  the  queerness 
argument  is  to say that a  form of intuitionism is  even accepted as  legitimate  by  sober 
minded empiricists, in respect to analytic a priori knowledge. I accept Cassam's definition 
of intuitionism,  which  involves  the  view,  "that  our  a  priori  knowledge  of some 
proposition p  rests upon our ability to 'see' that p  is  necessarily true".  27  A.  J.  Ayer has 
certainly stated, of such analytic  truths.  that  "independent of experience"  we  "see  that 2-l7 
th  ari1 " 28  E  .  ey are necess  y true.  ven qUIte recently Michael Ayers has defended a "qualified 
form of  intuitionism".29 If  this is the case, it is argued, why is it that when the rationalist 
posits such an intuition it is considered bizarre? The response to this argument is usually 
that the intuitions involved in the empiricist doctrine are "merely linguistic intuitions" not 
"intuitions of  reason". As A.  J. Ayer would say they only "enlighten us by illustrating the 
way in which we use certain symbols".30 The debate is unresolved as to whether this claim 
is actually coherent. 
It  is  important to take a totally different  approach here.  The  argument developed 
from a point made by Spinoza, has the advantage of defending both propositional and 
non-propositional rational intuitions.  It starts  from  a  defence  of the  simple  rationalist 
contention  that  "queerness"  is  a  predicate  with  no  epistemological  value.  We  have 
discovered  already  that  Parmenides,  in  particular,  is  a  philosopher  who  follows  his 
rational intuitions without concern for whether his results are "queer" or not.  He  makes 
no  attempt whatsoever to "save the appearances" (not even,  as  we have  shown.  in  the 
"Way of  Opinion"). This is surely the correct attitude for any philosopher. In saying this. 
there  is  an  admission  of advocating  an  extreme  anti-common  sense  approach  to 
philosophy.  Philosophers  should  be  completely  unconcerned  with  the  question of the 
strangeness or otherwise of  a particular doctrine. In contrast, their only concern should be 
the  doctrine's  viability.  Modem  quantum  physics  is  certainly  weird,  with  theories 
governing the behaviour of sub-atomic particles playing fast  and  loose with our normal 
logical  categories but  surely no-one,  not even an empiricist,  would advocate that  this 
somehow lessens the epistemological validity of  the theories involved. 
However, perhaps it might be said that if  a less strange explanation of  the behaviour 
of sub-atomic  particles  were  available  then  a  theory  that  avoided  queerness  was 
preferable.  Yet,  this would be to attribute epistemological value  to  a purely subjective 
psychological quality.  As Spinoza observes of similar psychological qualities "As for the 
terms good and bad, they indicate no  positive quality in things regarded in  themselves. 
but  are  merely modes of thinking,  or notions  which we  form  from  the  comparison of 
things one with another".31  The fact that we consider some things to  be  less queer than 
others can often be explained merely by the fact  that familiarity  has  destroyed our sense 
of strangeness.  That we have a faculty of physical seeing or that we  are  selt:conscious 
beings should be no less "queer" to a philosopher than the rationalist's claim that we  ha\~ 
a  taculty of "mental"  seeing.  The  argument  from  queerness.  therefore.  is  no  threat  to 248 
any  form of theory based on rational intuition.  The  defender  of rational  intuition  can 
safely admit, to his critic, that the theory is queer but then add that whether it  is or not. is 
irrelevant. The only important epistemological question to be asked is "is it true?" 
However, there has  been a  genuine misunderstanding about  how the  whole  debate 
concerning a priori knowledge has been conceived by modern commentators.  We  have 
already  remarked  that  modern philosophers  post-Frege  (and  in  contrast  to  traditional 
accounts)  have  conceived  knowledge  to  be  a  priori  only  in  relation  to  issues  of 
justification and without regard to the previously significant issue of genesis.  The  Frege 
passage  which  announced  this  new conception begins,  "These  distinctions  between  a 
priori and a posteriori, synthetic and analytic, concern, as I see it, not the content 0 f the 
judgement but the justification for the judgement-pronouncement".32 That this conception 
of the  a  priori  is  definitive  seems  to  be  the  pre-supposition  underlying  most  modem 
debates on the issue of a priori knowledge.  However, it  is  never explained why the old 
conception, of the importance of concept genesis, was abandoned.  Why  did  it  suddenly 
become irrelevant? This is  definitely a significant issue.  Philip  Kitchner,  in his  essay" A 
Priori Knowledge Revisited', states that "most apriorists have allowed for the possibility 
that  we  could have  a  priori knowledge of propositions containing concepts that  could 
only be garnered from experience".33 This would certainly be true ifwe were to ignore all 
apriorists before Kant. 
This represents a rejection of  Tyler Burge's claim, in his essay 'Frege on the Apriori', 
that  Leibniz  gave  the  first  modern  account  of the  a  priori,  "Since  Leibniz  explicitly 
indicates that one might depend psychologically on sense experience in order to come to 
know any truth, he means that a truth is a priori if  the justificational force invo lved in the 
knowledge'S justification is  independent of experience".  34  However, the  issue of genesis 
was absolutely central to Leibniz. For instance, Theophilus35  takes Philalethes' criticism, 
that  if the  ideas  in  propositions  are  empirical  then  the  truths  that  contain  these 
propositions must  be empirical,  very seriously.  For, contra Tyler  Burge, the  genesis of 
ideas  within  a  priori  propositions  is  fundamental  to  Leibniz.  F  or  if these  ideas  are 
intrinsically  derived  from  the  senses  then  the  propositions  that  result  are  confused. 
irrespective of  how they are justified: 
[Q173]  Truths involving  ideas,  which come  from  the  senses.  are  themsclvl's  at 
least partly dependent on the senses.  But the ideas that come from the senses are confused;. and  so  to?,  at  least  in  part  are  the  truths  which  depend  on  them: 
w~ereas m~ellectual Ideas,  and  the  truths  depending  on them  are  distinct.  and 
neIther the Ideas nor the truths originate in the senses. 36 
It is for the same reason the Burge type error occurs that the whole subject of  a priori 
concept genesis is ignored in modem accounts. Again, this reason involyes the premature 
rejection  of the  transcendent  apriorist  programme.  Modem  "rationalist"  accounts just 
assume that the most that could be claimed for synthetic a priori knowledge is that it can 
(rarely and under very specific circumstances) attain to truths concerning the  empirical 
world.  This  is  the explicit claim of Bill Brewer in his  article  'Externalism and  A Priori 
Knowledge of  Empirical Facts,37, but there is a general assumption within the debate that. 
at  most,  only some limited form of immanent  apriorism is  possible.  As a result  of this 
assumption, there is no concern with concept genesis.  Whether the concepts contained in 
propositions are sensible, or not, is unimportant because there is no  longer any ambition 
to  transcend the phenomenal.  Kant's  original concern to  prevent  "the contamination of 
intellectual knowledge by the sensitive,,38 has no function in the modem debate. 
A  transcendent  apriorist,  like  Leibniz,  would  recognize  that  if we  use  empirically 
derived concepts to attain transcendent knowledge, i.e. of  the noumenal, then we would 
be  immediately confronted with the great problem of  Aristotelian Medieval metaphysics, 
viz.  the  problem of natural  theology.  This  problem  consists  in  questioning  how  our 
empirically derived concepts can legitimately apply to trans-empirical reality.  Surely,  we 
cannot just assume that our putatively experience-based concepts are univocal between 
empirical  and  trans-empirical reality.  It is  easy to  see  that there  is  no  danger of such 
equivocality in the modem debate on the a priori, for it has no trans-empirical ambitions. 
The problem rather is how knowledge attained independently of  experience can pertain to 
experience.  For example,  Brewer talks of:  "a problematic non-empirical  source of new 
empirical knowledge".39  In contrast, Kant  sums up  the  transcendent apriorist's position 
when  he  states,  "It  is  clear therefore, that representations of things as  they  appear are 
sensitively thought, while intellectual concepts are representations of  things as they are".-I(I 
However,  because the  modem debate  has  no  concern with  such putatively  fanciful 
flights  into  the  noumenal,  it  need  not  concern  itself with  the  purity  of the  concepts 
involved in its propositions. The definition of  the a priori therefore is analysed in terms of 
issues of  justification alone.  It is important to recognize that the modem detmition of the 
a priori is  not detennined upon for legitimate philosophical grounds but  is detemlincd D: 250 
a prejudice with regard to "moderation" (another term of no  epistemological value)  in 
setting the limits of  reason. It would be no argument against the transcendent apriorist to 
suggest  that  his  notion  of the  a  priori  was  illegitimate  in  the  light  of modern 
developments. 
We  saw earlier,  that  even if the transcendent  apriorist,  using  only  pure  concepts 
constituting truly a priori propositions, established noumenal conclusions there was no 
guarantee  that these  applied  to  the  in-itself  We  said  there  that  Jacques  Derrida  had 
suggested  that  philosophers  had  no  guarantee  that  Being-in-itself is  in  fact  logos-
structured, that they had no choice but just assume that Being is isomorphic with logos. 
As  Derrida  makes  clear,  in  [Q140,  p.  202],  this  assumption  may  be  an  initial  and 
fundamental error. We saw that, at a much earlier period, Descartes had understood the 
problem but had not found an adequate solution. Yet, it is possible to go  a little further 
than Descartes.  However, the answer to Derrida's problem is  not entirely  satisfactory. 
Derrida's statement that there is the possibility that Being is not a logos is a strange claim 
in many ways. The first thing to note is that the term "Being" is  used, by Derrida, in  its 
most universal metaphysical sense. Hence, "Being" does not mean "being alive" or being 
a  particular  substance  but  rather  indicates  only the  bare  fact  of existence.  Secondly, 
Derrida admits that our thinking is "logos-structured" and it is this feature of  thought that 
is illegitimately imposed by metaphysicians on a universe that might not be, in any sense, 
a "cryptogram" to be deciphered by reason. 
Now it is obvious that from this we can conclude that at least one aspect of  Being is, 
in  fact,  logos-structured  - viz.  thinking  itself  For,  as  Descartes  cogito  makes  clear, 
thinking  implies,  at least,  existence of some sort.  Even against the  extreme  Derridean 
sceptic or Descartes' malicious demon we can be  sure that some aspect of Being,  viz. 
thinking, is logos-structured. We can be certain that the universe in Derrida's terms is not 
"the  other of every possible manuscript"  [Q140, p.  202]  but  instead that there is  some 
portion of it  that is  isomorphic with logos. From this it  can be  inferred that there is  at 
least nothing about Being which is essentially anti logo-centric. The transcendent apriorist 
as  we  have  discovered  just  assumes  the  identity  of Logos  and  Being,  of noumenal 
knowledge and in-itself.  This assumption still certainly requires some proof.  However at 
least we can prove that there is some isomorphic connection between the two sides of  this 
epistemological abyss and that there is nothing intrinsically non-rational about Being. 251 
Finally,  it  will  be  remembered  that  we  concluded  earlier.  that  modem  debates 
concerning innate ideas,  so  essential to ratiocinative theories of transcendent  apriorism. 
are  still  open-ended.  Hence, we can conclude overall that even these.  state of the  art. 
arguments in contemporary epistemology do not refute transcendent apriorism. In reality. 
the most  common response has been to completely ignore the doctrine.  The  arguments 
that are formulated  only usually apply to the doctrine by chance rather than  by  design. 
However,  all  the  evidence  so  far  considered  plus  the  fact  that  these  contemporary 
objections  are,  at  the  very  least,  not  conclusive  indicates  that  there  is  scope  for  a 
fundamental re-appraisal of transcendent apriorism. However. there is a recognition that 
this thesis represents a lone voice, crying in the wilderness, in asking for one. APPENDIX 1 
1.  A.  P.  D. Mourelatos, dogmatic rationalism is  defined as,  "the kind of view that 
makes a priori projections into a 'transcendent' noumenal world".  1 
2.  W.  H.  Walsh,  "It [transcendent metaphysics]  was accordingly a  doctrine which 
professes to take its adherents beyond the common-sense world known in sense-
perception altogether, giving them insight into the general nature at least of the 
supersensible or intelligible sphere which lay behind it". 2 
3.  1.  H. M. M. Loenen, (i)  "On the other hand he [Parmenides] may be called the 
founder of epistemological rationalism, since he is the first to have assumed that 
true knowledge does not spring from experience".3 (ii)  deductive metaphysics -
"the latter [Parmenides] started from a definite reality (thought) present in his own 
mind, and by means of  a description of  the idea of  being, established that thought 
is.  This is a form of  metaphysics based on experience. Melissus on the contrary, 
starting  from the existence of something that  is,  from  the  predicate  infers  the 
further attributes of  the subject in a deductive way. This is deductive metaphysics 
in its purest form". 
4 
4.  F.  Copleston, ideal rationalism or pure rationalism defined as "deducing a system 
of reality  simply  from  the  resources  of the  mind  itself without  recourse  to 
experience"  .  5 
5.  1.  Cottingham, apriorism - (i) "the belief in the possibility of  arriving at knowledge 
independently of  sense,,6 and (ii) "The ants and spiders model suggests contrasting 
schools of  philosophy, one based on careful observation, the other based on 'pure 
thought'. In the past, this contrast has worked to the detriment of  the rationalists. 
implying  that  they were  nothing  but  a  priori  web-spinners,  building  elaborate 
metaphysical  systems  'from  the  armchair',  and  trying  to  settle  by  abstract 
theorizing  questions  about  the  nature  of reality  which  ought  properly  to  be 
determined by scientific experiment".  7 
6.  D.  W.  Hamlyn, metaphysics - "Among philosophers, from Descartes onwards. it 
[the term metaphysical] has come to have the distinct sense of having to do v.ith 
what lies beyond what is available to the senses - with what is not merel; abstract 
b ·  d  als"g  ut ill some sense transcen ent  o. 
7.  A.  1.  Ayer,  transcendent metaphysics - (i)  "The metaphysical doctrine  \\hich is 
upheld  by rationalists,  and rejected by empiricists,  is  that  .the~e. exists  ~ supra-
sensible world which is  the object of a  purely intellectual  mtUltlon  and  IS  alone 
wholly  real".9  (ii)  "We  may  begin  by  criticizing  the  metaphysical  thesis  that philosophy affords us  knowledge of a reality transcending  the  world  of science 
and common sense".l0 
8.  R.  C.  Solomo~ speculative  metaphysics  - "This  is  most  often interpreted  as  a 
return  to  speculative  metaphysics  - the  fare  of Spinoza  and  Leibniz  - the 
investigation of  transcendent objects or noumena". 11 
9.  J.  Macquarrie,  speculative  metaphysics  - "Speculative  metaphysics  of  the 
traditional  sort  may  be  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  extend  reason  beyond  the 
empirical phenomena of the world  so  as  to  grasp  the  supposedly supersensible 
reality underlying these phenomena".  12 APPENDIX 2 
1.  The  most  significant  use  of the concept of epistemological rationalism  is  to 
organize the textual data from Descartes to Kant so that they tell a coherent storY 
with  an  edifYing  moral.  Modern  philosophy,  it  is  often- said.  begins  with  ~ 
rationalist  reaction against  scholastic  Aristotelianism,  a  reaction  that  privileges 
mathematics  as  a  model  of human  knowledge.  Ideally.  our  knowledge  of 
ourselves, of  God and of  the world ought to be organized into a deductive system. 
in  which  all  truths  are  derived  from  a  relatively  small  number  of axioms  and 
definitions, whose truth is  guaranteed by their self-evidence.  Only if  our starting 
points  are  absolutely  certain,  and  we  proceed  by  careful,  certainty-preserving, 
deductive  steps from them,  can we  achieve  knowledge,  for  genuine  knowledge 
requires  certainty.  On  this  picture  of knowledge,  experience  is  essentially 
irrelevant; it is not needed and cannot provide the certainty we require. This is the 
textbook rationalist programme in epistemology, to which Descartes. Spinoza and 
Leibniz are all supposed to subscribe.
13 
2.  So understood, rationalism is an exercise in extravagant optimism, as might be 
argued by considering the mutually inconsistent (and often bizarre) metaphysical 
systems the rationalists advocated, or by noting the crucial role arguments from 
experience play in the development of  the sciences. It was only natural, the story 
goes that there should develop in opposition to rationalism a school of  philosophy 
which would (over-) emphasize the importance of  experience ... This way of  telling 
the story of  philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is aesthetically 
pleasing,  and  gratifies  our  desire  to  think  of philosophy  as  a  progressive 
discipline. 14 
3.  The 'ants and spiders' model,  suggests contrasting schools of philosophy.  one 
based on careful observation, the other based on "pure thought". In the past, this 
contrast has worked to the detriment of the rationalists,  implying that they were 
nothing but a priori web-spinners, building elaborate metaphysical systems 'from 
the armchair', and trying to settle by abstract theorizing questions about the nature 
of reality  which ought properly to  be  determined by  scientific  experiment.  This 
caricature  of "philosophical  rationalism  involves  more  distortions  than  can 
conveniently be exposed in this brief introduction  ... "  15 APPENDIX 3 
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